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The thesis presents research exploring emotional processing and psychosocial factors 
in individuals diagnosed with dissociative seizures (DS).  Initially, clinical, biological, 
and psychosocial correlates of DS are discussed, in addition to theoretical 
perspectives on the disorder.  This is followed by a review of previous research 
investigating dissociation and emotional processing in DS.  A novel model of the 
triggering mechanism underlying DS is proposed, and the rationale, aims, general 
hypotheses and overall methodology are outlined.  Four empirical quantitative studies 
are then described, in which the DS group were compared to healthy control 
participants. 
 
A study of psychosocial factors, based on self-report questionnaires, generally 
confirmed/extended findings from previous studies.  Patients with DS reported 
elevated depression, anxiety, post-traumatic symptoms, borderline personality 
features, and psychological and somatoform dissociation.  Higher rates and greater 
impact of adverse life events were also reported by the DS group. Contrary to 
expectations, no group differences in childhood family functioning were observed. 
 
Another study utilising an emotional Stroop paradigm revealed the presence of a 
preconscious attentional bias towards emotional facial expressions in DS patients.  A 
related experimental investigation of explicit facial affect processing elicited evidence 
of a deficit in facial expression recognition in the DS sample, alongside reduced 
autonomic responding to the stimuli in a subgroup of patients.  A further experimental 
study explored patients’ affective responses to visual images.  Whilst there were no 
group differences in subjective emotional responses on this task, autonomic 
responding was elevated in a subgroup of patients.   
 
Qualitative techniques were used in the final study, which explored emotional 
experiences in a subsample of patients.  The findings provided phenomenological 
insights into patients’ understanding of these processes.  The findings are drawn 
together and discussed, and the proposed triggering model is presented in a modified 
form in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 1. Dissociative seizures: the clinical context 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Dissociative seizures (DS) are discrete episodes of disrupted awareness, sensation, 
cognition, emotion, and behaviour that resemble epileptic seizures (ES), but are not 
associated with the organic aetiology of that condition, or any other specific or 
consistent organic pathology.  Instead, DS are proposed to have a psychological 
causation, generally understood to reflect psychological/emotional distress and to 
operate at an unconscious/involuntary level (Alsaadi & Marquez, 2005; Bowman, 
1998; Fritzsche et al., 2013; Iriarte et al., 2003; Lesser, 2002; Oto & Reuber, 2014; 
Reuber, 2009).  Many patients with DS experience considerable distress and loss of 
functioning as a result of their attacks (Binder & Salinsky, 2007; Krahn et al., 1997; 
Lempert & Schmidt, 1990), in addition to undergoing numerous medical 
investigations/procedures and prescription of anti-epileptic drugs (AEDs).   
 
A variety of terms have been used to describe DS; including 'hysterical seizures', 'non-
epileptic seizures', 'pseudoseizures', 'non-epileptic attack disorder', 'psychogenic 
(non-epileptic) seizures’, ‘conversion seizures’, ‘stress-related seizures’, and 
‘dissociative convulsions'.  There has been considerable debate regarding the most 
appropriate label for these phenomena (Benbadis, 2010; Cowan, 2010; Desai, Porter, 
& Penry, 1982; Gates, 2002; Karam, 2010; LaFrance, 2010; O’Hanlon, Liston, & 
Delanty, 2012; Sethi, 2010).  Some of the terms can be interpreted as pejorative (e.g. 
‘pseudoseizure’), suggestive of symptom feigning, or can be confusing for patients and 
carers (Bodde et al., 2009; Scull, 1997; Stone et al., 2003).  Currently, the most 
commonly used label in the literature is ‘psychogenic non-epileptic seizures’ 
(Schmutz, 2013).  From the patients’ perspective, Stone and colleagues (2003) report 
that general neurology outpatients preferred the terms ‘functional seizures’ and 
‘stress-related seizures’.  
 
Within the International Classification of Diseases – 10th Edition (ICD-10; World 
Health Organisation, 2010), DS (termed ‘dissociative convulsions’) are categorised as 
a dissociative disorder (along with other conversion disorders), characterised by “a 
partial or complete loss of the normal integration between memories of the past, 
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awareness of identity and immediate sensations, and control of bodily movements”.  
Dissociative disorders are purported to be of psychological origin, and closely related 
to trauma, insoluble problems and relationship disturbances.  DS are included in the 
category alongside dissociative amnesia, fugue, stupor, trance and possession, 
dissociative motor disorders, dissociative anaesthesia and sensory loss, multiple 
personality disorder, Ganser's Syndrome, and unspecified dissociative disorder.  
These diagnoses require the exclusion of other medical, neurological or psychiatric 
causes.   
 
However, DS are categorised within the ‘somatic symptom disorders’ group in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - fifth edition (DSM-5; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013), along with other conversion disorders.  The 
somatoform disorders group engulfs a wide range of different symptoms that are 
indicative of physical/organic illness, but without any clear sign of organic causation 
(e.g. gastrointestinal problems, fatigue, pain, and genitourinary problems).  
Somatoform disorders are sometimes referred to as ‘functional’ or ‘medically 
unexplained’.  The commonality between the various somatoform disorders is the 
presence of medically unexplained physical symptoms that are presumed to be 
produced by unconscious mechanisms.   
 
More specifically, conversion disorders are those involving symptoms that affect 
voluntary, motor, or sensory function and mimic neurological conditions, with no 
organic basis. These include weakness/paralysis, impairment of hearing/sight, aphonia, 
fixed dystonia, gait problems, and tremor, among others.  There has been 
considerable debate regarding the classification of DS and conversion disorders more 
generally, and whether or not they should be classified as somatoform or dissociative 
disorders (R.J. Brown et al., 2007; Guz et al., 2003; Harden, 1997; Kihlstrom, 2005; 
LaFrance & Zimmerman, 2010; Nijenhuis, 2001; Ozcetin et al., 2009).  It has been 
proposed that a shared psychological mechanism might underlie the conversion 
(including DS) and dissociative disorders (e.g. R.J. Brown et al., 2007; Kihlstrom, 2005).  
In the present thesis, this proposed mechanism is referred to as ‘dissociation’, and is 
characterised by an involuntary reduction/loss of normal control or awareness of bodily or 
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psychological processes (see Chapter 3 for further discussion).  As such, the term 
‘dissociative seizures’ (DS) is used throughout.   
 
The use of the term ‘dissociative seizures’ also conforms most closely to ICD-10 
terminology, and therefore, that which is internationally recognised.  The term DS is 
used instead of ‘dissociative convulsions’, to reflect the fact that many patients with 
the disorder do not have convulsive episodes (see section 1.3).  The abbreviation ‘DS’ 
is used synonymously with the following: psychogenic/non-epileptic seizures, 
pseudoseizures, hysterical seizures, dissociative convulsions, functional seizures, 
conversion seizures, and non-epileptic attacks.  The authors of publications cited in 
the thesis may have used any of the above terms or others; however, the term ‘DS’ 
is used for consistency.   
 
The current chapter provides a general overview of clinical issues relating to DS, 
including symptoms, diagnostic criteria/procedures, epidemiology, treatment 
approaches and outcomes.  The review is based on electronic searches of the 
following databases: Web of Knowledge/Web of Science, Science Direct, 
PubMed/Medline and Embase (last updated in January 2015).  Three search terms 
were entered into each database as follows: ‘psychogenic seizures’, ‘dissociative 
seizures’ and ‘non-epileptic seizures’.  These terms were selected as three of the 
most commonly used labels for the disorder.  Abstracts for original research articles, 
reviews, and case studies/series were screened for relevance to the current chapter.  
Articles pertaining to aetiological factors, theories/models and emotional processes 
in DS are discussed in subsequent chapters.    The focus of the review is on patients 
with adult-onset DS.   
 
 
1.2. Epidemiology and demographic characteristics 
 
1.2.1. Incidence and prevalence  
The incidence of DS has been reported to lie between 0.91-4.9/100,000 per year 
(Duncan, Razvi, & Mulhern, 2011; O’Sullivan et al., 2007; Sigurdardottir & Olafsson, 
1998; Szaflarski et al., 2000).  However, most of these studies required evidence of 
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DS based on video-electroencephalography (video-EEG) monitoring, and so it is 
possible that these figures may underestimate the actual incidence of DS.   
 
To date, there are no studies detailing the exact prevalence of DS in the general 
population; however, an estimate based on the available data indicates that it falls 
between 2 and 33 per 100,000 (Benbadis & Hauser, 2000).  However, it is known 
that DS occurs commonly among individuals assessed in specialist neurological 
settings.  Francis and Baker (1999), for example, summarised a number of 
epidemiological studies of DS in specialist epilepsy centres and quoted prevalence 




Females are known to be over-represented among adult patients with DS 
(Rosenbaum, 2000; Schmitz, 2010), with many studies reporting 65-75% of samples 
being women (Abubakr, Kablinger, & Caldito, 2003; Ahmedani et al., 2013; Alper et 
al., 1993; Arthuis et al., 2014; Asadi-Pooya, Emami, & Emami, 2013; Buchanan & Snars, 
1993; Dixit et al., 2013; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Ettinger, Devinsky, et al., 1999; 
Hendrickson et al., 2014; Hovorka et al., 2007; Hubsch, Baumann, & Maillard, 2011; 
Koby et al., 2010; Krahn et al., 1997; Kuyk, Swinkels, & Spinhoven, 2003; Mitchell, Ali, 
& Cavanna, 2012; Moore & Baker, 1997; O’Brien et al., 2015; Portuguez et al., 2007; 
Reilly et al., 1999; Reuber, Howlett, et al., 2007; Scheepers et al., 1994; Selkirk et al., 
2008; Silva et al., 2001; Snyder et al., 1994; Thomas et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2009).   
 
In fact, a considerable proportion of investigators have reported proportions of 
females that are over 75% (Aboukasm et al., 1998; Alessi & Valente, 2013; Alessi et 
al., 2013; Bodde et al., 2007; 2013; Bowman, 1993; Bowman & Markand, 1996; 
Chabolla & Shih, 2006; D’Alessio et al., 2006; Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011; Duncan 
et al., 2011; Ettinger, Dhoon, et al., 1999; Ettinger, Weisbrot et al., 1999; Gambini et 
al., 2014; Gates et al., 1985; Gazzola et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 2013; Karakis et al., 
2014; Kristensen & Alving, 1992; Kuyk et al., 2008; Lancman et al., 1993; J.P. Lazarus 
et al., 2003; Marchetti et al., 2009; Myers et al., 2012; Patidar et al., 2013; Reeves et 
al., 1998; Reuber, House, et al., 2003; Reuber, Pukrop, Bauer, et al., 2003; Reuber, 
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Pukrop, Mitchell, et al., 2003; Reuber, Pukrop, et al., 2004; Scévola et al., 2013; 
Schramke et al., 2010; Uliaszek, Prensky, & Baslet, 2012; van Merode et al., 1997; 
Wadwekar et al., 2014). Interestingly, a study carried out in China did not find the 
same predominance of females in their sample, with a ratio of approximately 1:1 male 
to female (An et al., 2010).  This suggests that cultural factors might interact with 
gender in the aetiology or reporting of the disorder (Schmitz, 2010).   
 
1.2.3. Age 
In patients with onset in adulthood, DS typically first occur in the third or fourth 
decade (Alessi & Valente, 2013; Alessi et al., 2013; Arain et al., 2007; Arthuis et al., 
2014; Bowman, 1993; Carton, Thompson, & Duncan, 2003; Dhiman, Sinha, Rawat, 
Harish, et al., 2013; Dixit et al., 2013; Duncan et al., 2011; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; 
Ettinger, Devinsky, et al., 1999; Ettinger, Dhoon, et al., 1999; Gambini et al., 2014; 
Hendrickson et al., 2014; Hubsch et al., 2011; Koby et al., 2010; Krahn et al., 1997; 
Kuyk et al., 2003; 2008; LaFrance & Syc, 2009; Moore & Baker, 1997; Patidar et al., 
2013; Reuber, Pukrop, Mitchell, et al., 2003; Reuber, House, et al., 2003; Reuber et 
al., 2004; Reuber, Howlett, et al., 2007; Schramke et al., 2010; Silva et al., 2001; Tojek 
et al., 2000; Wolf et al., 2015).   
 
Age of onset is typically later in patients with DS than those with ES (Berkhoff et al., 
1998; M.C. Brown et al., 1991; Derry & McLachlan, 1996; Dixit et al., 2013; Dodrill, 
2008; Drane et al., 2006; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Fargo et al., 2004; Frances, Baker, 
& Appleton, 1999; Gale & Hill, 2012; Hendrickson et al., 2014; Hixson et al., 2006; 
Hoepner et al., 2014; Holman et al., 2008; M.D. Holmes, Dodrill, et al., 2001; Karakis 
et al., 2014; Koby et al., 2010; Litwin & Cardeña, 2000; Locke et al., 2006; Proença et 
al., 2011; Schramke et al., 2010; Storzbach et al., 2000; Strutt et al., 2011a,b; Szaflarski 
et al., 2003; Testa et al., 2011; Tojek et al., 2000; Wolf et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2009).   
 
Whilst diagnoses of DS are less common in childhood and older age, DS do occur 
throughout the lifespan.  A considerable number of studies of DS in paediatric patients 
have been published (Baker, Moore, & Appleton, 1995; Bhatia & Sapra, 2005; Carmant 
et al., 1995; Desai & Talwar, 1992; Dhiman, Sinha, Rawat, Vijaysagar, et al., 2013; 
Gudmundsson et al., 2001; G.L. Holmes et al., 1980; Kim et al., 2012; Kotagal et al., 
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2002; Kramer et al., 1995; Kutluay et al., 2010; Lancman et al., 1994; McLean & Dyer, 
2003; Metrick et al., 1991; Pakalnis & Paolicchi, 2000; 2003; Pakalnis, Paolicci, & Gilles, 
2000; Patel et al., 2007; Plioplys et al., 2014; Rawat et al., 2014; Salpekar et al., 2010; 
Say et al., 2014; Selbst & Clancy, 1996; Szabo et al., 2012; Vincentiis et al., 2006; Yi et 
al., 2014; Yilmaz et al., 2013).  The occurrence of DS in older patients has also become 
increasingly recognised (Abubakr and Wambacq, 2005; Behrouz, Heriaud, & Benbadis, 
2004; Duncan et al., 2006; Kellinghaus et al., 2004).   
 
1.2.4. Culture  
Much of the previous literature on DS originated in the western industrialised 
societies of the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and western/northern 
Europe.  However, DS is not specific to this cultural context.  There have been 
references to events that resemble DS in a variety of cultural groups, such as Haitians 
and Native Americans (Francis & Baker, 1999).  Studies of patients with DS have now 
been published from numerous geographical locations incorporating diverse cultural 
environments, including India (Goyal, Kalita, & Misra, 2014; J.P. Lazarus et al., 2003; 
Patidar et al., 2013; Wadwekar et al., 2014), Pakistan (Gul & Ahmad, 2014), South 
America (Alessi et al., 2013; d’Alessio et al., 2006; LaFrance et al., 2012; Marchetti et 
al., 2008; 2009; Portuguez et al., 2007; Proença et al., 2011; Scévola et al., 2013; Silva 
et al., 2001), China (An et al., 2010; Ding et al., 2013; 2014; Li et al., 2014; Xu et al., 
2014), Iran (e.g. Asadi-Pooya, Emami & Emami, 2014), eastern/central Europe (Awad 
& Softic, 2011; Bora et al., 2011; Hovorka et al., 2007) and southern Europe (Baillés 
et al., 2004; Mari et al., 2006; Mazza et al., 2009; Rodriguez-Urrutia et al., 2014).   
 
These findings suggest that DS may be a universal psychological disorder (LaFrance, 
Baker, et al., 2013).  However, as discussed by Martinez-Taboas et al. (2010), there 
may be cultural influences on aetiological factors or manifestations of the disorder.  
For example, two studies have noted subtle differences in clinical manifestations of 
DS between Caucasian and African American patients (Abubakr & Wambacq, 2013; 
Abubakr, Wambacq, & Goerres, 2013).  Furthermore, there may also be cultural 





1.3. Clinical presentation 
 
1.3.1. Symptoms 
Many patients diagnosed with DS present with frequent seizures that occur on a daily 
or weekly basis (Bodde et al., 2007; 2012; Carton et al., 2003; Davis, 2004; Dworetzky 
et al., 2005; Duncan et al., 2011; Goyal et al., 2014; Karakis et al., 2014; J.P. Lazarus 
et al., 2003; O’Brien et al., 2015; Scheepers et al., 1994; Szaflarski & Szaflarski, 2004; 
Wolf et al., 2015), and significantly disrupt patients’ functioning (Bodde et al., 2013; 
R. Thompson et al. 2009).  Patients with DS seem to experience more frequent 
seizures (Al Marzooqi et al., 2004; Dworetzky et al., 2005; Jędrzejczak, Owczarek, & 
Majkowski, 1999; Lally et al., 2010; Szaflarski & Szaflarski, 2004; Wolf et al., 2015) and 
reduced global functioning in comparison to patients with ES (Scévola et al., 2013).   
 
Symptoms of DS vary considerably between cases (Reuber et al., 2011; Sirven & 
Glosser, 1998), and can resemble any type of epileptic seizure (ES), including: frontal, 
temporal, myoclonic, generalised and absence seizures (Bauer & Elger, 2001; Boon & 
Williamson, 1993; Bowman, 1998; Fejerman, 2005; Saygi et al., 1992; Twamley & 
Bortz, 1999).  There have been inconsistencies in reports of the most common 
symptoms of DS, although expert opinion (Reuber, 2009) suggests that tonic-clonic 
like seizure presentations are the most frequent (i.e. excessive limb, trunk and head 
movements).  The current review indicated that the most common symptoms of DS 
are major or minor positive motor symptoms, such as shaking, trembling, thrashing 
and jerking (Abubakr et al., 2003; An et al., 2010; Bodde, Lazeron, et al., 2012; Cianci 
et al., 2011; d’Alessio et al., 2006; Goyal et al., 2014; Gröppel, Kapitany, & 
Baumgartner, 2000; Hovorka et al., 2007; Hubsch et al., 2011; Lancman et al., 1993; 
1994; Mitchell et al., 2012; Moore & Baker, 1997; Reuber, Pukrop, Bauer, et al., 2003; 
Selwa et al., 2000; Silva et al., 2001), and unresponsiveness and/or reported loss of 
awareness (An et al., 2010; Bodde et al., 2007; Cianci et al., 2011; Lancman et al., 
1993; 1994; J.P. Lazarus et al., 2003; Moore & Baker, 1997; Patidar et al., 2013; Reuber, 
Pukrop, Bauer, et al., 2003; Reuber et al., 2011; Selwa et al., 2000).   
 
Ictal eye closure (An et al., 2010; Asadi-Pooya, Emami, & Emami, 2014; Cianci et al., 
2011; Hovorka et al., 2007; Hubsch et al., 2011; Patidar et al., 2013), hyperventilation 
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(Cianci et al., 2011; J.P. Lazarus et al., 2003) and peri-ictal auras (Asadi-Pooya, Emami 
& Emami, 2014; Hovorka et al., 2007) were also reported relatively regularly.  
Symptoms can also include: non-verbal vocalisations, weeping, pelvic thrusting, 
stiffening, back-arching, drying of the mouth, elevated heart rate, and ‘pins and 
needles’ (Gates et al., 1985; Hovorka et al., 2007; Lesser, 1996; Mellers, 2009).  
Several authors have reported signs of peri-ictal autonomic arousal and/or anxiety in 
this patient group (Galimberti et al., 2003; Goldstein & Mellers, 2006; Moore and 
Baker, 1997).  
 
Patients with DS frequently perceive their seizures to come ‘out-of-the-blue’, without 
any warning signs or triggers (Reuber et al., 2011), although some patients report 
prodromal symptoms (Stone & Carson, 2013).  Nonetheless, when triggers can be 
identified, they are often those not consistently seen in ES, such as sounds, pain, 
physical activity, lights and being ‘upset’ or stressed (Benbadis, 2009; Benbadis & 
LaFrance, 2010; R.J. Brown et al., 2011; LaFrance, Baker, et al., 2013).  Triggers 
involving stressful circumstances are said to be indicative of DS (Benbadis & LaFrance, 
2010; LaFrance, Baker, et al., 2013), although they do not reliably distinguish patients 
with ES and DS because stress can also precipitate ES (Allendorfer & Szaflarski, 2014; 
Benbadis & LaFrance, 2010).   
 
On average, both onset and termination of seizures are more gradual than in ES 
(Francis & Baker, 1999; Fritzsche et al., 2013; Mostacci et al., 2011; Reuber, 2008). 
The severity of symptoms can vary considerably during an attack (Hubsch et al., 2011), 
and some patients with DS present with a variety of seizure symptoms and types 
(Bowman, 1998; Galimberti et al., 2003; Silva et al., 2001).     
 
1.3.2. Seizure types 
A number of investigators have attempted to categorise DS into discrete types of 
seizure.  Early approaches to classifying DS were largely dichotomous, with seizures 
being seen as either ‘hypermotor’ or ‘atonic’ (Griffith & Szaflarski, 2010).   LaFrance, 
Baker, and colleagues (2013) maintain that the most common seizure types are 
‘convulsive/thrashing’ with unresponsiveness, and ‘falling’ with unresponsiveness.  A 
wide range of classification schemes has now been reported, ranging considerably in 
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specificity.  In accordance with the above authors, only two main subtypes have been 
distinguished by some investigators (e.g. Abubakr et al., 2003), although others have 
distinguished between three or more (e.g. Bora et al., 2011; Dhiman, Sinha, Rawat, 
Harish, et al., 2013; N.M. Griffith et al., 2007; Gröppel et al., 2000; Hubsch et al., 
2011; Selwa et al., 2000; Seneviratne, Reutens, & D’Souza, 2010).  Whilst there were 
methodological weaknesses in many studies (e.g. mixed ES and DS included, 
inconsistent/unspecified seizure rating procedures), the general pattern in the 
literature is that of four main DS ‘subtypes’, including major motor, minor motor, 
unresponsiveness, and subjective/sensory symptoms.  However, it is important to 
recognise that many patients do not fit into these discreet categories. 
 
1.3.3. Prolonged DS 
Some patients present with ‘pseudostatus’, referring to seizures that are prolonged 
and often mistaken for status epilepticus (Dworetzky, Bubrick, & Szaflarski, 2010; S.J. 
Howell, Owen, & Chadwick, 1989; Rechlin, Loew, & Joraschky, 1997).  The 
proportion of DS patients who have experienced pseudostatus generally ranges from 
around 10-25% (Asadi-Pooya, Emami, Emami, & Sperling, 2014; Dworetzky et al., 
2006; Hubsch et al., 2011), although Reuber, Pukrop, Mitchell, et al. (2003) reported 
a rate as high as 77.6% in one sample.  The Non-epileptic Seizure Task Force 
(American Epilepsy Society) carried out a survey of US neurologists (Dworetzky et 
al., 2010) and found that 45% of them did not typically differentiate prolonged seizures 
from other types of DS.  There also seems to be little in the way of standardised 
interventions for ‘pseudostatus’. Recognition, treatment and management of 
‘pseudostatus’ in patients with DS is an important area for further research, not least 
because inappropriate emergency medical treatment can be harmful, if not fatal 
(Reuber, Baker, et al., 2004).       
 
1.3.4. Comorbidity of DS and ES 
Between 5 and 56% of patients with DS have been reported to have comorbid 
epilepsy (Asadi-Pooya & Emami, 2013; Benbadis, Agrawal, & Tatum, 2001; Bodde et 
al., 2012; 2013; Bora et al., 2011; Devinsky et al., 1996; Gambini et al., 2014; Hoepner 
et al., 2014; Hubsch et al., 2011; Lempert & Schmidt, 1990; Marchetti et al., 2009; 
Martin et al., 2003; Muller et al., 2002; O’Sullivan et al., 2007; Patidar et al., 2013; Pillai 
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& Haut, 2012; Scheepers et al., 1994; Silva et al., 2001).  In patients with comorbid ES 
and DS, the onset of the epileptic disorder often occurs before the onset of DS 
(Devinsky et al., 1996; Magaudda et al., 2011).  Moreover, the occurrence of individual 
ES and DS can occur in close temporal proximity (Andrade, Singh, & Bhakta, 2006; 
Devinsky & Gordon, 1998).  Interestingly, some patients have been found to develop 
DS after epilepsy surgery (Markoula et al., 2013; Ney et al., 1998).  On the other 
hand, one study showed that, in patients with pre-existing mixed ES/DS, the DS 
actually improved or resolved following neurosurgical interventions for epilepsy 
(Reuber, Kurthen, et al., 2002).   
 
1.3.5. Clinical differences between ES and DS 
Whilst there is some overlap in symptoms, the presentation of DS differs from ES in 
several ways.  DS tend not to conform to the usual stereotyped configurations of 
symptoms that are indicative of epilepsy (Benbadis, 2009; Boon & Williamson, 1993; 
Devinsky, Gazzola, & LaFrance, 2011; Goldstein & Mellers, 2012; Mellers, 2009).  DS 
symptoms also vary throughout (‘waxing and waning’) and between seizures 
(Devinsky et al., 2011; Francis & Baker, 1999; Mellers, 2009).   
 
A number of reviews have discussed the semiological characteristics that best 
discriminate ES and DS.  Reviewers have generally found support for the following 
distinguishing characteristics of DS: asynchronous (‘out-of-phase’) movements, side-
to-side head and/or body movements, fluctuating course/symptoms, pelvic thrusting, 
ictal eye closure, memory recall of ictal events, longer duration, and ictal weeping 
(Avbersek & Sisodiya, 2011; Devinsky et al., 2011; Gates, 2002; Goldstein & Mellers, 
2012; Oto & Reuber, 2014; Mostacci et al., 2011).  However, some of these symptoms 
can also be observed in frontal lobe seizures and so are of limited utility in 
distinguishing these from DS (e.g. Goldstein & Mellers, 2012).   
 
Some studies have indicated that responsiveness/awareness is preserved more 
commonly in DS than in ES (Ali et al., 2010; W.L. Bell et al., 1998; M.C. Brown et al., 
1991; Francis & Baker, 1999; Mostacci et al., 2011; Reuber & Kurthen, 2011; Syed et 
al., 2011).  Furthermore, the following symptoms have also been reported to be more 
common in DS relative to ES: pre-ictal movements (D.B. Moore et al., 1998), ictal 
23 
 
stuttering (Vossler et al., 2004), ictal eye fluttering (Syed et al., 2011), post-ictal 
‘whispering’, and partial motor responses to commands (Chabolla & Shih, 2006).  On 
the other hand, DS are less likely to be accompanied by self-inflicted injury (e.g. 
tongue-biting) or incontinence (urinary/faecal), and occur less often at night or from 
sleep, relative to ES (Bazil & Walczak, 1997; M.C. Brown et al., 1991; French, 1995; 
Pegeuro et al., 1995).  Some post-ictal symptoms also seem to be less common after 
DS than ES, such as headache and fatigue (Ettinger, Weisbrot, et al.,1999).  Post-ictal 
breathing patterns may also be useful in distinguishing between DS and ES (Azar et 
al., 2008; Rosemergy et al., 2013; Sen, Scott, & Sisodiya, 2007).   
 
Important methodological limitations in studies of the semiology of ES and DS were 
noted by Avbersek and Sisodiya (2011), such as a lack of control groups in some 
studies, inadequate definition of the signs under scrutiny, raters not being blind to 
diagnosis, and failure to differentiate between different types of ES and DS (i.e. 
convulsive, atonic, absences).  Future studies might seek to address some of these 
limitations.   
 
1.3.6. Quality of life 
Patients with chronic seizure disorders are generally faced with a number of 
challenges, including psychological difficulties, psychosocial problems, and physical 
symptoms that may restrict and impinge on a patient’s well-being and lifestyle 
(Szaflarski & Szaflarski, 2004).  As such, the symptoms of DS have a considerable 
impact on those who experience the disorder.  Losses in social independence and 
reduced occupational functioning are often reported (Binder & Salinsky, 2007; 
Reuber, Howlett, et al., 2007; Scheepers et al., 1994; Twamley & Bortz, 1999), and 
patients with DS often receive some form of state financial assistance (Krahn et al., 
1997; Moore & Baker, 1997).  There is considerable debate about whether or not 
patients with DS should be permitted to drive, with many specialists recommending 
that they do not (Benbadis, Blustein, & Sunstad, 2000; Morrison & Razvi, 2011; Specht 
& Thorbecke, 2009).   
 
Studies have shown that patients with DS experience reduced quality of life (QoL) 
when compared to control groups (Al Marzooqi et al., 2004; Breier et al., 1998; 
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Cronje & Pretorius, 2013; Hopp et al., 2012; Karakis et al., 2014; LaFrance et al., 
2011; Strutt et al., 2011b; Szaflarski et al., 2003; Testa et al., 2007; van Merode et al., 
2004; Wolf et al., 2015).  Reduced QoL in DS seems to be related to the regularity 
of the attacks (Lawton et al., 2009), and only seems to improve after total cessation 
of seizures (Quigg et al., 2002).  Moreover, QoL has been reported to be predicted 
by symptoms of depression and dissociation in patients with DS (Mitchell et al., 2012), 
indicating the importance of addressing such symptoms within psychological 




A positive diagnosis of DS requires all other possible paroxysmal physiological and 
psychological phenomena to be excluded.  One of the most important differential 
diagnoses is that of ES.  In addition, other organic differential diagnoses include 
syncope, transient ischaemic attacks, migraines, substance-related events, 
hypoglycaemia, and sleep disorders (Benbadis & LaFrance, 2010; Duncan et al., 2011; 
Fritzsche et al., 2013; Griffith & Szaflarski, 2010; Mellers, 2005; 2009; Mihaescu & 
Malow, 2003; Petkar et al., 2006; Vossler et al., 1995).  Psychological/psychiatric 
differential diagnoses include anxiety/panic attacks, psychosis, depersonalisation 
disorder, factitious disorder, and malingering (Alper et al., 1995; Mellers, 2005; 2009).     
 
It often takes a considerable period of time for patients with DS to be referred to a 
specialist service for diagnostic investigation (Binder & Salinsky, 2007), although a 
subgroup of patients with a more significant history of psychological and medical 
complaints/interventions seem to be referred sooner (Bodde et al., 2012).  
Nonetheless, there is generally a considerable delay in reaching a diagnosis of DS 
(Jones et al., 2010; Seneviratne et al., 2011), with the average delay to diagnosis being 
approximately seven years (Alessi & Valente, 2013; Bodde et al., 2007; Dhiman, Sinha, 
Rawat, Harish, et al., 2013; Reuber, Fernández, Bauer, Helmstaedter, & Elger, 2002).  
The previous use of more AEDs and limited social support predict longer delays to 





1.4.1. Misdiagnosis of ES and DS 
Misdiagnosis of ES in patients with DS is a fairly common occurrence (Benbadis, 
2005b; 2009; Bowman, 1998; Devinsky et al., 2011; Dhiman, Sinha, Rawat, Harish, et 
al., 2013; Hubsch et al., 2011; Krahn et al., 1997; Mellers, 2005; Moore & Baker, 1997; 
Oto & Reuber, 2014; Parra, Iriarte, & Kanner, 1999).  However, due to increasing 
awareness and recognition of DS over time, patients with epilepsy may also be 
misdiagnosed with the former (Parra et al., 1999).   
 
The proportion of patients with DS taking AEDs ranges from 44 to 100% (Benbadis, 
1999; Bora et al., 2011; Bowman, 1993; Dworetzky et al., 2005; LaFrance & Syc, 2009; 
Lempert & Schmidt, 1990; Mitchell et al., 2012; Moore & Baker, 1997; Patidar et al., 
2013; Reuber. Pukrop, Bauer, Helmstaedter, et al., 2003).  Patients with DS may 
continue to be prescribed AEDs for prolonged periods of time (Bowman, 1998; 
Carton et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2010).  Interestingly, some individuals with DS report 
reductions or cessation of DS whilst using AEDs, which presumably reflects a placebo 
effect (Alessi & Valente, 2014).  Nevertheless, AED use entails considerable iatrogenic 
risk, including toxicity due to polypharmacy and possible teratogenic effects in female 
patients of child-bearing age (Francis & Baker, 1999; L.B. Holmes, Harvey, et al., 2001; 
Meador et al., 2009; Oto & Reuber, 2014; Vinten et al., 2005). 
 
1.4.2. Clinical assessment and investigations 
Patients with suspected DS often undergo numerous clinical assessments and 
investigations to determine the correct diagnosis (e.g. Ahmedani et al., 2013).  Clinical 
history is usually evaluated, including previous/current symptoms, onset and course 
of the disorder (Griffith & Szaflarski, 2010; Sirven & Glosser, 1998).  Descriptions of 
typical seizures are routinely sought from patients and a third party, and direct 
observation of an event is considered highly valuable (Mellers, 2009).  Standardised 
self- and witness-rated questionnaires measuring clinical symptoms can be useful in 
indicating possible DS (Azar et al., 2010; Syed et al., 2009), as they provide a means 
of quantifying the attacks systematically.  However, it is recommended that no single 
clinical sign should be relied upon during diagnostic evaluation (Alsaadi & Marquez, 
2005; Avbersek & Sisodiya, 2010; Boon & Williamson, 1993; Devinsky et al., 2011; 
Goldstein & Mellers, 2012; LaFrance, Baker, et al., 2013).  Information regarding 
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patients' social circumstances, psychosocial history, current emotional/mental 
functioning and psychiatric history may also be obtained (Francis & Baker, 1999; 
Schmutz, 2013). 
 
Routine electroencephalography (EEG) is often used to determine the 
presence/absence of abnormal electrophysiological activity inter-ictally and/or ictally.  
Patients with DS generally show a lack of ictal epileptiform abnormalities on EEG 
output (Davis, 2004; Hovorka et al., 2007).  However, EEG recordings may at times 
lead to misdiagnosis due to the fact that abnormal EEG activity unrelated to epilepsy 
can also occur in individuals who do not have epilepsy, including those with DS (e.g. 
Reuber, Fernández, Bauer, Singh & Elger, 2002).  Movement artefact is another 
possible confounding issue when assessing EEG recordings during seizures (Bowman, 
1998; Burnstine, Lesser, & Cole, 1991; Vinton et al., 2004).   
 
Video-EEG can be used to monitor electrophysiological brain discharges whilst 
simultaneously recording patients' typical ictal behaviour on camera.  This technique 
is usually carried out in epilepsy monitoring units on an inpatient basis, although 
outpatient video-EEG may be more appropriate in some cases (Benbadis et al., 2004; 
Devinsky et al., 2011; McGonigal et al., 2002; Seneviratne et al., 2012).  Video-EEG is 
considered the ‘gold-standard’ in differential diagnostic procedures for DS (Eddy & 
Cavanna, 2014; French, 1995; LaFrance & Plioplys, 2012; LaFrance & Devinsky, 2004; 
LaFrance, Reuber & Goldstein, 2013; Mellers, 2009; Oto & Reuber, 2014; Sirven & 
Glosser, 1998).  However, this method also has its limitations (Benbadis, 2009; Cragar 
et al., 2002).   
 
Seizure provocation techniques are sometimes used to increase the likelihood of 
capturing a typical attack during the monitoring process (Schachter, Brown, & Rowan, 
1996; Stagno & Smith, 1996).  These techniques include: injection of a placebo 
solution, application of a tuning fork to the upper head, hyperventilation, application 
of a moist swab to the temples/back of neck, olfactory stimulation, temple pressure, 
‘head-up tilting’, photo-stimulation, and hypnosis; some of which are presented with 
the verbal suggestion that the techniques are likely to induce a seizure (J.J. Barry, 
Atzman, & Morrell, 2000; Bazil et al., 1994; Benbadis, Johnson, et al., 2000; Bhatia et 
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al., 1997; Chen et al., 2011; Dericioglu, Saygi, & Ciger, 1999; Flugel et al., 1996; Goyal 
et al., 2014; Hoepner et al., 2013; Hovorka et al., 2007; Jędrzejczak et al., 1999; Khan 
et al., 2009; Kuyk et al., 1995; Kuyk, Spinhoven, & van Dyke, 1999; Lancman et al., 
1994; Martinez-Taboas, 2002; McGonigal et al., 2002; Ney, Zimmerman, & Schaul, 
1996; Ribai, Tugendhaft, & Legros, 2006; Schwarz, Bickford, & Rasmussen, 1955; 
Slater et al., 1995; Stagno & Smith, 1996; Staudenmeyer & Kramer, 1999; Wassmer, 
Wassmer, & Donati, 2003; Zaidi et al., 1999; Zalsman & Dror, 2002).   
 
One study suggested better long-term outcomes in patients who had undergone 
seizure induction at diagnosis (Gambini et al., 2014); however, these techniques have 
been debated extensively on ethical grounds as deception is often necessary 
(Devinsky & Fisher, 1996; Gates, 2001; Goyal et al., 2014; Iriarte et al., 2003; Kuyk et 
al., 1997; Leeman, 2009; Schachter et al., 1996; M.L. Smith et al., 1997; Stagno & Smith, 
1996; Updyke & Duryea, 2013; Whitaker & Rosenberg, 2001).  Measurement of 
serum prolactin, cortisol, and other hormones (e.g. growth hormone, thyrotropin) 
post-ictally can also be useful in distinguishing ES and DS, as levels of these hormones 
are found to be elevated following ES but not DS (Gates, 2002; Kuyk et al., 1997; Rao, 
Stefan, & Bauer, 1989).   
 
1.4.3. Behavioural signs 
Some behavioural signs can be used to assist in discriminating between patients with 
DS and ES.  For example, having a seizure in a physician’s office or in the presence of 
an audience is considered to be indicative of DS as opposed to ES (Benbadis, 2005a).  
The ‘teddy bear sign’ is another interesting behavioural indicator of DS.  Burneo et 
al. (2003) noted that significantly more patients with DS brought an age-inappropriate 
soft-toy to the monitoring unit than patients with ES.  Indeed, Hoerth and colleagues 
(2008) identified the ‘teddy bear sign’ as one of the strongest predictors of a DS 
diagnosis.  However, the teddy bear sign is low in sensitivity due relatively infrequent 
occurrence, and it is less useful in patients over 18 years old (Cervenka et al., 2013).   
 
Linguistic analysis has also been used to distinguish between patients with DS and ES, 
with considerable success (Cornaggia et al., 2012; Plug, Sharrack, & Reuber, 2009; 
Reuber et al., 2009; Reuber & Plug, 2009; Robson et al., 2012; Schwabe, Howell, & 
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Reuber, 2007).  When asked to describe their typical attacks, patients with DS tend 
to respond in characteristic ways, such as showing resistance to answering specific 
questions, reporting amnesia for the events, conceptualising them as phenomena 
arising internally, confabulation/reconstruction of events, and catastrophisation in 
descriptions of their disorder.   
 
1.4.5. Difficulties in the diagnosis of DS  
Once confirmed, a positive diagnosis of DS can lead to a number of beneficial 
outcomes, including improvements in seizure frequency (Farias, Thieman, & Alsaadi, 
2003; Martin et al., 1998; Mayor et al., 2012) and reduced healthcare utilisation 
(Ahmedani et al., 2013; Jirsch et al., 2011; Martin et al., 1998; McKenzie et al., 2010; 
Razvi, Mulhern, & Duncan, 2011).  Nonetheless, patients can respond to the diagnosis 
with a variety of emotions including relief, anger and anxiety (Duncan, Graham, & 
Oto, 2014a; Ettinger, Dhoon, et al., 1999; Karterud, Knizek, & Nakken, 2010; Riaz et 
al., 1998; Scheepers et al., 1994).   
 
Patients can be left confused by the diagnosis (Carton et al., 2003; Dickinson, Looper, 
& Groleau, 2011; Green, Payne, & Barnitt, 2004; R. Thompson et al., 2009; Wyatt, 
Laraway, & Weatherhead, 2014), and may feel concerned that their symptoms are ‘all 
in their head’ or that they are ‘crazy’ (Brown & Trimble, 2000; N.C. Thompson, 
Osorio, & Hunter, 2005, p.75).  Moreover, patients may interpret the diagnosis as 
implying deliberate feigning of symptoms (Katererud et al., 2010; N.C. Thompson, 
Osorio, & Hunter, 2005).  There can be fear of possible stigma related to a functional 
diagnosis, or concerns about not being believed by medical professionals (Green et 
al., 2004; Karterud et al., 2010; Wyatt et al., 2014).  These concerns may not be 
entirely unfounded, as some relevant healthcare professionals (e.g. inpatient nurses, 
psychiatrists, neurologists, general practitioners, emergency medicine physicians) 
seem to view DS as within the voluntary control of the patients to some extent 
(Baslet, 2012; Sahaya et al., 2012; Shneker & Elliott, 2008; Whitehead, Kandler, & 
Reuber, 2013; Whitehead & Reuber, 2011; Worsley et al., 2011).   
 
Some factors, however, seem to facilitate coping with a diagnosis of DS.  These 
include achieving a good understanding of possible psychological mechanisms 
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underlying the seizures, possessing an internal locus of control, receiving respectful 
treatment by healthcare professionals, meeting others with the disorder, and being 
given a clear indication as to what to expect in terms of follow-up and treatment 
(Dickinson et al., 2011; Karterud et al., 2010).  A number of protocols have now been 
developed to standardise and improve the way in which diagnoses of DS are 
presented to patients (Duncan, 2010; Hall-Patch et al., 2010; Mellers, 2009; Shen, 
Bowman, & Markand,1990).  Recently, guidelines have been published, providing a 
staged approach to the diagnosis of DS (LaFrance, Baker, et al., 2013), with four levels 
of diagnostic certainty that can be achieved depending on the data available.  
 
1.5. Treatment 
Many patients with DS are treated with ‘standard medical care’, involving presentation 
of the diagnosis, gradual withdrawal of AEDs, follow-up with a neurologist, and/or 
referral to psychiatry or psychology (LaFrance, Rusch, & Machan, 2008).  Confirming 
and presenting the diagnosis of DS to patients is widely seen as the initial step in 
treating the disorder (Baslet, 2012; Brown & Trimble, 2000; LaFrance, Reuber, et al., 
2013; Lesser, 2003).  Simply receiving the diagnosis can bring about improvements in 
symptoms for some patients (Farias et al., 2003; Gambini et al., 2014; Lesser, 1996; 
Oto & Reuber, 2014).   
 
Psychological treatment approaches in the literature suggest  a range of possibly 
beneficial approaches, including cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT; Conwill et al., 
2014; Goldstein et al., 2004; 2009; 2010; Kuyk et al., 2008; LaFrance et al., 2009; 
2014), psychodynamic psychotherapy (Reuber, Burness, et al., 2007), 
psychoeducation (Baxter et al., 2012; Mayor et al., 2013; N.C. Thompson et al., 2013), 
group psychotherapy (J.J. Barry et al., 2008; Conwill et al.. 2014; Metin et al., 2013; 
Prigatano, Stonnington, & Fisher, 2002; Zaroff et al., 2004), behavioural techniques 
(DeLeon, Uy, & Gutshall, 2005), hypnotherapy (H.R. Miller, 1983; Moene et al., 2002), 
mindfulness-focused approaches (Baslet & Hill, 2011; Baslet et al., 2014), paradoxical 
intention therapy (Ataoglu et al., 2003; Chapleau et al., 2013) eye movement 
desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR; Chemali & Meadows, 2004; Kelley & 
Benbadis, 2007; Kelley, Benbadis, & Adams, 2005), and integrated therapies (Howlett 




Some biological interventions have also been explored.  The use of selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs; e.g. sertraline, venlafaxine) have been associated with 
positive results in two studies (LaFrance et al., 2010; Pintor et al., 2010).  Moreover, 
biofeedback (Swingle, 1998) and electroconvulsive shock therapy (Blumer, Rice, & 
Adamolekun, 2009) have also been used to treat DS, although the known risks and 
side-effects associated with the latter should contraindicate its use.  Research has also 
started to explore the efficacy of transcranial magnetic stimulation in patients with 
conversion disorders including those with DS (Parain & Chastain, 2014), although the 
possible risks of this technique should also be considered.   
 
At present, empirically sound research into the efficacy of treatments for DS is fairly 
sparse, with only a few published controlled trials.  A Cochrane Review of controlled 
treatment trials in this patient group (Baker et al., 2007; Brooks et al., 2007) identified 
only three studies meeting the inclusion criteria of either full- or quasi-randomisation 
to treatment groups.  Nevertheless, the situation is gradually improving.  For example, 
a multi-centre randomised control trial of CBT (with or without sertraline) has 
recently been published in the US (LaFrance et al., 2014), and another is in progress 
in the United Kingdom (Goldstein et al., in progress; ISRCTN05681227).  However, 
there are a number of challenges faced by patients, clinicians and investigators in 
receiving, providing and evaluating therapeutic interventions for DS respectively.  
These include treatment adherence, attitudes and expectations of patients and 
clinicians, secondary gain from illness roles, drug interactions, frequent seizures 
leading to poor attendance at appointments, availability and funding, to name just a 
few.   
 
1.6. Outcomes 
Studies have shown that outcomes have generally been poor to moderate in this 
patient group (LaFrance & Devinsky, 2002), with only a proportion of patients 
showing seizure remission or improvements at follow-up.  Rates of seizure cessation 
have varied between 17-55% (Aboukasm et al., 1998; An et al., 2010; Arain et al., 
2007; Betts & Boden, 1992a; Bodde et al., 2007; Duncan et al., 2011; Duncan, Graham, 
& Oto, 2014b; Ettinger, Devinsky, et al., 1999; Ettinger, Dhoon et al., 1999; Hovorka 
31 
 
et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2010; Jongsma et al., 1999; Kanner et al., 1999; Krahn et al., 
1997; Kristensen & Alving, 1992; Lempert & Schmidt, 1990; McKenzie et al., 2010; 
Patidar et al., 2013; Reuber, Pukrop, Bauer, et al., 2003; Riaz et al., 1998; Selwa et al., 
2000; Silva et al., 2001; Walczak et al., 1995), although higher rates have been 
reported on occasion (e.g. Gambini et al., 2014).  However, patients who continue 
to have seizures at follow-up often report lower frequencies and/or reduced severity, 
compared to baseline (Aboukasm et al., 1998; Betts & Boden, 1992a; Bodde et al., 
2007; Buchanan & Snars, 1993; Duncan, Graham, & Oto, 2014b; Ettinger Devinsky, 
et al., 1999; Ettinger, Weisbrot et al., 1999; Gambini et al., 2014; Hovorka et al., 2007; 
Krahn et al., 1997; Patidar et al., 2013; Riaz et al., 1998; Selwa et al., 2000; N.C. 
Thompson, Osorio, & Hunter, 2005; Walczak et al., 1995; Zhang et al., 2009). 
 
Poorer outcomes have been found to be associated with a number of variables 
including comorbid psychiatric diagnoses and psychopathology at baseline (Bodde et 
al., 2007; Durrant, Rickards, & Cavanna, 2011; Kanner et al., 1999; Lempert & 
Schmidt, 1990; McKenzie et al., 2010; Reuber et al., 2003; Walczak et al., 1995), longer 
duration of disorder (Lempert & Schmidt, 1990; Selwa et al., 2000; Walczak et al., 
1995), worse reported occupational functioning (Duncan et al., 2011; Ettinger, 
Devinsky, et al., 1999), receiving social security benefits (McKenzie et al., 2010), later 
age at seizure onset/diagnosis (An et al., 2010; Reuber et al., 2003), more negativism 
(Bodde et al., 2007), attending the first clinic visit unaccompanied (Arain et al., 2007) 
and more ‘dramatic’ or motor ictal symptoms (Arain et al., 2007; Betts & Boden, 
1992a; Durrant et al., 2011; Reuber et al., 2003; Selwa et al., 2000).   
 
Furthermore, female gender (McKenzie et al., 2010), comorbid ES (Durrant et al., 
2011), lower educational attainment (Arain et al., 2007; Reuber et al., 2003), a below 
average or lower intelligence quotient (IQ) score (McDade & Brown, 1992), worse 
perceived general health (Ettinger, Devinsky, et al., 1999), atypical magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) results (Kanner et al., 1999), less positive current/childhood 
relationships (Durrant et al., 2011; Ettinger, Dhoon, et al., 1999) and a history of 
violent behaviour (McDade & Brown, 1992), have also been linked to worse 
outcomes.  On the other hand, acceptance of the diagnosis by patients and caregivers 
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seems to be associated with more positive outcomes (Duncan, Graham, & Oto, 
2014a; Ettinger, Devinsky, et al., 1999).  
 
1.7. Summary and conclusions 
Dissociative seizures (DS) are transient episodic events that superficially resemble 
epilepsy, but have no clear organic basis.  Patients present with a wide variety of 
symptoms, which vary within and between individuals with the disorder.  Differential 
diagnosis is complex and often considerably delayed, and can include numerous 
diagnostic tests.  At present, within a limited evidence base, the best documented 
treatments include CBT, psychoeducation and integrated psychotherapies.  The 
currently available research indicates variable outcomes, with many patients 
continuing to have seizures, reduced quality of life and poor psychosocial functioning, 





Chapter 2.  The aetiology of dissociative seizures 
Contemporary perspectives on the aetiology of DS (e.g. Bodde et al., 2009; Mellers, 
2009; Oto & Reuber, 2014; Reuber, 2009) incorporate a wide range of environmental 
/ social, psychological and biological factors, variously conceptualised as predisposing, 
precipitating, and perpetuating variables.  Predisposing variables are those typically 
present during development, which increase the risk of the development of the 
disorder at some later stage.  Precipitating factors occur in close proximity to the 
onset of the disorder and are thought to directly trigger the first occurrence of 
symptoms.  Perpetuating variables are those factors serving to maintain the disorder, 
once initiated.  Some authors (e.g. Bodde et al., 2009; Reuber, 2009) further 
differentiate ‘shaping’ factors (factors influencing the development of seizures rather 
than a different type of symptom) and/or triggering factors (those contributing to the 
initiation of individual seizures).    
 
The current chapter presents an overview of the empirical literature on the possible 
aetiological factors in DS.  The review is based on the literature search described in 
Chapter 1.  Only literature referring to variables of direct relevance to the current 
thesis is discussed in detail.  The chapter begins with biological factors, continues with 
social / environmental variables, before summarising findings regarding psychological 
variables in patients with DS.  The chapter then provides an outline of theoretical 
perspectives on the disorder.  The overall aim of the chapter is, therefore, to give a 
general account of the aetiology of DS.  Literature concerning dissociative and 
emotional processes in DS is discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
2.1. Biological factors 
 
2.1.1. Medical comorbidity and correlates 
Many patients with DS report multiple health symptoms and some have considerable 
medical histories, including neurological conditions, suspected or actual cancer, asthma, 
obesity, diabetes, gastro-oesophageal disease, allergies, ulcers and cardiovascular 
disease / hypertension (deWet et al., 2003; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Jiminez, Sharma, 
 34 
 
& Dar, 2014; Lempert & Schmidt, 1990; Marquez et al., 2004; Al Marzooqi et al., 2004; 
Park et al., 2014; Tojek et al., 2000), although it is possible that some of these could be 
misdiagnosed functional symptoms (see section 2.3.2).   
 
Nonetheless, DS have also been reported following invasive or risky medical 
procedures, such as general anaesthesia (Lichter et al., 2004; Ramos & Brull, 2013), and 
neurosurgical procedures (Alessi & Valente, 2013; Davies et al., 2000; Glosser, Roberts, 
& Glosser, 1999; Markoula et al., 2013; Ney et al., 1998; Parra et al., 1998; Reuber, Kral, 
et al., 2002).    DS can occur during pregnancy, although most often these are not ‘de 
novo’ (Brady & Huff, 1997; Carlson & Caplan, 2011; DeToledo, Lowe, & Puig, 2000; 
Devireddy & Sharma, 2015; Jain et al., 2013). 
 
Reuber (2009) categorised physical illness and minor surgical procedures with other 
adult life events that might serve as precipitating factors in DS.  It is possible that pain, 
distress and trauma due to physical illness, for example, could act in the same way as 
other stressors in the disorder (see section 2.2.2. below), by elevating levels of 
emotional distress or arousal to intolerable levels and thereby triggering the initial 
onset of the disorder.  However, such experiences might also serve to predispose to 
the disorder (Oto & Reuber, 2014), perhaps by increasing attentional allocation to 
bodily experiences.  On the other hand, physical illnesses/symptoms might also 
perpetuate DS, by contributing to ongoing psychological distress.   
 
2.1.2. Head injury 
A history of reported head injury is also relatively common in patients with DS, 
although rates range substantially from 4-100% (Ahmedani et al., 2013; An et al., 2010; 
Asadi-Pooya, Emami & Emami, 2014; E. Barry et al., 1998; Bowman, 1993; Elliott & 
Charyton, 2014; LaFrance & Syc, 2009; LaFrance, DeLuca, et al., 2013; Lancman et al., 
1993; Mökleby et al., 2002; Reuber et al., 2011; Salinsky et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 
1994; Snyder et al., 1994; Westbrook, Devinsky, & Geocadin, 1998), and reported head 
injuries tend to be minor in this group (E. Barry et al., 1998; LaFrance, DeLuca, et al., 
2013; Westbrook et al., 1998).  Rates of head injury have been found to be higher in 
patients with DS relative to those with somatisation disorder, healthy controls 
(Mökleby et al., 2002), and those with ES (Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Locke et al., 2006).  
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Indeed, a history of head injury has been found to be predictive of a diagnosis of DS 
rather than ES (Elliott & Charyton, 2014).   
   
The wide variation in rates of head injury reported in previous studies could be due 
to methodological differences, such as the inclusion of patients with 
possible/confirmed comorbid ES in some instances (e.g. LaFrance & Syc, 2009; 
Mökleby et al., 2002).  Moreover, only a few studies mentioned whether loss of 
consciousness occurred during the head injury (e.g. Lancman et al., 1993; Locke et al., 
2006; Reuber et al., 2011), or whether the reported head injuries were antecedent to 
the onset of DS or not (e.g. An et al., 2010; LaFrance, DeLuca, et al., 2013).  
Nonetheless, it is possible that head injury could act both as a predisposing and 




Patients with DS are more likely to have normal structural neuroimaging results than 
patients with ES (Drane et al., 2006; Dworetzky et al., 2005; Karakis et al., 2014; Locke 
et al., 2006; Rotge et al., 2009; Szaflarski et al., 2003; Szaflarski & Szaflarski, 2004).  
However, structural MRI abnormalities have been found in patients with DS, with rates 
of 18-65% (Devinsky, Mesad, & Alper, 2001; Hovorka et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2010; 
Reuber, Fernández, Helmstaedter, Qurishi, & Elger, 2002).   Abnormalities reported 
include Arnold-Chiari malformation, (sub)arachnoid cysts, gliosis, neurosurgical 
lesions, generalised atrophy, changes characteristic of multiple sclerosis and medial 
temporal sclerosis (Benbadis, Tatum, et al., 2000; Hovorka et al., 2007; Reuber et al., 
2002), and are most often noted in the right hemisphere (Devinsky et al., 2001).  
However, the elevated rates of MRI abnormalities could be linked to the inclusion of 
patients with comorbid ES in some studies (e.g. Devinsky et al., 2001; LaFrance & Syc, 
2009).  Nevertheless, abnormal findings have also been reported in DS patients 
without comorbid ES (e.g. Hovorka et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2010; Reuber, Fernández, 
Helmstaedter, Qurishi, & Elger, 2002).   
 
Advanced volumetric analyses (i.e. voxel based morphometry, cortical thickness 
analysis) have recently revealed possible changes in neural matter in regions associated 
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with motor control, command and integration (right hemisphere motor and premotor 
areas, bilateral cerebellum), relative to healthy controls (Labate et al., 2012).  However, 
there was no mention of patients’ current/previous use of AEDs in this report.  It is 
known that phenytoin, for example, is associated with cerebellar atrophy (e.g. de 
Marco et al., 2003; Ney et al., 1994), and so, exposure to such medications may have 
influenced the results of the study.   
 
Functional 
Possible differences in functional neural activity during wakeful resting have been 
reported in patients with DS, relative to healthy controls.  Hypometabolism has been 
observed in regions associated with emotional control (i.e. anterior cingulate cortex) 
and spatial awareness (i.e. parietal cortex), with positron emission tomography 
(Arthuis et al., 2014).  Moreover, connectivity alterations have been reported in 
regions important for emotion, sensorimotor control, attention, executive functioning, 
and the ‘default mode network’ (i.e. neural regions usually active during wakeful rest), 
with functional MRI techniques (Ding et al., 2013; 2014; Li et al., 2014; van der Kruijs 
et al., 2012; 2014).   
 
Interestingly, some of the connectivity differences were significantly correlated with 
scores on measures of dissociation in the DS patients in two studies (van der Kruijs 
et al., 2012; 2014). Moreover, connectivity values between the insula and 
supplementary motor area were positively correlated with seizure frequency in one 
study (Li et al., 2014).  However, some patients included in the studies were currently 
(van der Kruijs et al., 2012) or had recently been (Ding et al., 2013; 2014; Li et al., 
2014) taking medication including AEDs; therefore, this represents a possible 
confound.  Furthermore, patients with ES and psychiatric comorbidity were excluded 
from these studies, thereby limiting the generalizability of the findings.   
 
Further research is necessary in this area, particularly extending the functional 
neuroimaging research beyond resting state studies, to include studies utilising 
psychological tasks during scanning.  Nonetheless, it seems that functional alterations 
in neural networks and non-specific structural abnormalities may be predisposing 
neurobiological factors in this patient group, although these relationships are as yet 
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poorly understood (Reuber, 2009).   
 
2.1.4. Electrophysiology 
Patients with DS are less likely to show abnormalities on EEG output than patients 
with ES (Ali et al., 2010; Drane et al., 2006; Karakis et al., 2014; Locke et al., 2006; 
Rotge et al., 2009; Schramke et al., 2007).  Nevertheless, non-specific and/or inter-ictal 
EEG abnormalities are frequently found in patients with DS (Jawad et al., 1995; Lelliott 
& Fenwick, 1991; Snyder et al., 1994; Xue et al., 2013); with around 40-50% of patients 
showing such signs (Hovorka et al., 2007; Mökleby et al., 2002; Reuber, Fernández, 
Bauer, Singh, & Elger, 2002).   Resting state spatial EEG patterns have recently been 
used to discriminate patients with ES and DS, with 92% accuracy (Xu et al, 2014).    
 
In addition, a proportion of patients with DS exhibit epileptiform EEG changes 
(Reuber, Fernández, Bauer, Singh, & Elger, 2002).  Recently, intracranial recording 
detected altered activity in the parietal cortex of a patient during a DS, despite a lack 
of overall EEG alteration associated with the seizure (Arzy et al., 2014).  Moreover, 
Krishnan et al. (2011) observed that the gradual electrophysiological ‘entrainment’ 
that is typically observed leading up to seizure occurrence was more likely to be ‘reset’ 
after an ES than after DS.  In fact, no such resetting occurred in the patients who 
experienced DS.  Together, these findings indicate subtle peri-ictal electrophysiological 
differences in individuals with DS, although the meaning of these findings is as yet 
unclear.  
 
Some EEG studies have examined electrophysiological changes after the presentation 
of specific stimuli in patients with DS.  For example, more rapid auditory event-related 
potentials (ERPs; Drake et al., 1993), and altered frontocentral ERPs during a 
‘mismatch negativity’ paradigm (Gene-Cos et al., 2005) have been reported in patients 
with DS (relative to those with ES and healthy controls respectively).  Furthermore, 
reduced ‘sensory gating’ in patients with DS (relative to healthy controls) has also 
been observed in two studies (Almis et al., 2013; Pouretemad et al., 1998), suggestive 
of reduced automatic filtering of irrelevant sensory information.  
 
The observed electrophysiological differences in DS could be linked to the structural 
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and functional brain abnormalities described previously.   Such differences could have 
emerged during development, or might be a result of minor head injuries and 
comorbid neurological illness in this group.  As such, these differences may interact in 
predisposing an individual to developing DS. 
 
2.1.5. Autonomic nervous system (ANS) functioning  
Heart rate variability (HRV) refers to the degree of variation in the interval between 
successive heart beats.  Low levels of HRV are associated with reduced activity of the 
vagus nerve and parasympathetic ANS, and thus increased ANS activation.  Reduced 
HRV at rest, as measured by several parameters, has been observed in patients with 
DS relative to healthy controls (Bakvis, Roelofs, et al., 2009; Ponnusamy, Marques, & 
Reuber, 2011; Roberts et al., 2012).  However, some investigators have failed to find 
such differences (Müngen, Berilgen, & Arikanoglu, 2010).   
 
Patients with DS showed no differences in HRV relative to those with ES, when at rest 
(Ponnusamy, et al., 2011).  On the other hand, patients with DS show higher levels of 
peri-ictal HRV compared to those with ES (Müngen et al., 2010; Ponnusamy, Marques, 
& Reuber, 2012).  Together, these findings suggest generally elevated levels of 
sympathetic arousal in patients with DS (relative to healthy individuals), which are 
reduced during and around the time of a DS.  A speculative interpretation is that the 
DS somehow serves as a mechanism to reduce sympathetic arousal.    
 
Findings regarding peri-ictal heart rate have been variable.  Reinsberger et al. (2012) 
found that DS patients’ heart rates were elevated pre-ictally and reduced post-ictally, 
compared to patients with ES.  Moreover, Opherk and Hirsch (2002) reported that 
heart rate was significantly lower in DS relative to ES, both ictally and post-ictally.  
Again, this would suggest that autonomic arousal is somehow inhibited or reduced 
during and immediately after a DS.     
 
Patients diagnosed with DS also display elevated basal cortisol levels relative to healthy 
control participants, when measured using salivary sampling methods (Bakvis, 
Spinhoven, Giltay, et al., 2010).  This supports the notion that DS are associated with 
a state of ongoing elevated stress reactivity (HPA; hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis).  
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Together, the available literature seems to indicate an overall pattern of elevated 
sympathetic ANS activation at rest in patients with DS, in addition to reduced 
sympathetic activation during and after seizure occurrence.   
 
It is possible that generally elevated ANS activation could constitute a predisposing 
or precipitating factor, increasing the risk of the onset of the disorder.  However, an 
acute elevation in ANS activation may also trigger individual seizures (Goldstein & 
Mellers, 2006).  Moreover, reductions in ANS activation during and after a seizure 
might represent part of the dissociative mechanism that occurs during DS.  
 
 
2.2. Social / environmental factors 
 
2.2.1. Traumatic experiences 
General trauma  
A systematic review of studies on traumatic experiences in DS was published by 
Fiszman and colleagues (2004).  On the basis of 17 studies that included control 
groups and evidence of DS based on video-EEG, lifetime rates of general trauma were 
reported to vary between 76 and 100%.  Traumatic experiences reported by patients 
with DS include abuse, experiencing/witnessing violence, bereavement(s), witnessing 
trauma/death, accidents, bullying, combat- or war-related experiences, and medical 
trauma (Baillés et al., 2004; Bowman & Markand, 1996; Chen & Izadyar, 2009; Duncan 
& Oto, 2008; Moore & Baker, 1997; Myers, Perrine, et al., 2013; Quinn et al., 2012; 
Reuber, Howlett, et al., 2007; Salinsky et al., 2012; Scévola et al., 2013; Snyder et al., 
1994; Tojek et al., 2000; Turner et al., 2011).   
 
Of the studies reviewed presently, the proportion of DS patients reporting at least 
one type of trauma varied widely, ranging between 10 and 100% (An et al., 2010; 
Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Bodde et al., 2013; Bora et al., 2011; Bowman, 1993; Bowman 
& Markand, 1996; Dikel, Fennell, & Gilmore, 2003; Duncan & Oto, 2008; Hingray et al., 
2011; LaFrance & Syc, 2009; Myers et al., 2013; Reuber, Howlett, et al., 2007; Rosenberg 
et al., 2000; Scévola et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2011; Wolf et al., 2015), with over half of 
these studies citing rates of 70% or more.  Reports of dual or multiple traumatic life 
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events are not uncommon, with rates ranging from 24-74% (Bodde et al., 2013; 
Bowman, 1993; Duncan & Oto, 2008; Myers et al., 2013).   
 
Patients with DS report higher rates of overall lifetime and childhood trauma 
compared to control groups (Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Dikel et al., 2003; Ozcetin et 
al., 2009; Proença et al., 2011; Reuber, Howlett, et al., 2007; Rosenberg et al., 2000; 
Scévola et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2011; van Merode et al., 2004), although there have 
been exceptions (e.g. Lally et al., 2010; O’Brien et al., 2015).  Moreover, trauma history 
is significantly predictive of a diagnosis of DS rather than ES, with specificity of 86% 
and sensitivity of 76% (Arnold & Privitera, 1996).   
 
A history of trauma is associated with reduced quality of life in individuals with DS 
(Myers et al., 2012; Wolf et al., 2015).  Patients with DS and a history of trauma are 
also more likely to report higher levels of general psychopathology, dissociation, and 
PTSD symptoms.  In addition, they are also more likely to have additional psychiatric 
diagnoses (particularly affective or anxiety disorders), and a history of suicidal 
behaviour (Hingray et al. 2011; Lally et al., 2010; Myers et al., 2013).  Duncan and Oto 
(2008) identified distinct predictors of different types of trauma in patients with DS 
(e.g. gender, age, comorbidities).  These findings suggested subgroups of patients with 
potentially distinct aetiological factors contributing to the development of the 
disorder.       
 
Sexual abuse 
Rates of lifetime sexual abuse in patients with DS vary considerably in the literature, 
ranging from 0 to 80% (Alper et al., 1993; An et al., 2010; Arnold & Privitera, 1996; 
Asadi-Pooya, Emami & Emami, 2014; Baillés et al., 2004; Bakvis, Roelofs, et al., 2009; 
Bakvis, Spinhoven, Giltay, et al., 2010; Betts & Boden, 1992b; Binzer, Stone, & Sharpe, 
2004; Bowman, 1993; Bowman & Markand, 1996; Duncan & Oto, 2008; Duncan et al., 
2011; Ettinger, Dhoon, et al., 1999; Holman et al., 2008; Jawad et al., 1995; Koby et al., 
2010; Kuyk, Spinhoven, Boas, & van Dyke, 1999; Lancman et al., 1993; Litwin & Cardeña, 
2000; Moore & Baker, 1997; Myers et al., 2013; Reuber, Howlett, et al., 2007; Scévola 
et al., 2013; Scheepers et al., 1994; Schramke et al., 2010; Selkirk et al., 2008; Silva et 
al., 2001; Spinhoven et al., 2004; Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004; Strutt et al., 2011a,b; 
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Thomas et al., 2013).  Only five studies reported rates below 10% (An et al., 2010; 
Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Asadi-Pooya, Emami & Emami, 2014; Jawad et al., 1995; Silva 
et al., 2001), and around 50% of studies reported proportions between 20 and 40% 
(Alper et al., 1993; Binzer et al., 2004; Duncan & Oto, 2008; Duncan et al., 2011; 
Ettinger, Dhoon, et al., 1999; Koby et al., 2010; Kuyk et al., 1999; Myers et al., 2013; 
Reuber et al., 2007; Scévola et al., 2013; Schramke et al., 2010; Selkirk et al., 2008; 
Spinhoven et al., 2004; Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004; Strutt et al., 2011a,b; Thomas et 
al., 2013).  Of the studies reviewed here, the average rate of lifetime sexual abuse was 
approximately 30%.  
 
Studies reporting childhood sexual abuse (CSA) separately suggest its occurrence in 
between 17 and 85% of patients (Akyuz et al., 2004; Bowman, 1993; Bowman & 
Markand, 1996; 1999; Dikel et al., 2003; Koby et al., 2010; Lally et al., 2010; McDade & 
Brown, 1992; Portuguez et al., 2007; Prigatano, Stonnington, & Fisher, 2002; Reilly et al., 
1999; Salmon et al., 2003).  Seventy-five percent of these studies reported rates of 
CSA between 30 and 75% (Akyuz et al., 2004; Bowman, 1993; Bowman & Markand, 
1996;1999; Dikel et al., 2003; Koby et al., 2010; Portuguez et al., 2007; Reilly et al., 1999; 
Salmon et al., 2003).  Only two studies cited rates below 30% (Lally et al., 2010; 
McDade & Brown, 1992). The average rate of CSA across all studies was 
approximately 44%.  In contrast, the reported rate of CSA in the general population 
is approximately 4.8% (Radford et al., 2011).  A systematic review and meta-analysis 
of studies reporting rates of sexual abuse in patients with DS suggested an average 
rate of 35.7%, compared to 16.6% in comparison groups (Sharpe & Faye, 2006).  
Patients were nearly three times as likely as controls to have a history of CSA (Odds 
Ratio of 2.940).   
  
Regarding sexual assault/rape in adulthood, the findings have been more consistent, 
ranging from 23 to 36% (Bowman, 1993; Bowman & Markand, 1996; Koby et al., 2010; 
Lally et al., 2010; Reilly et al., 1999; Salmon et al., 2003).  The average rate of adulthood 
sexual trauma across these six studies was 29.7%. In comparison, statistics suggest 
that approximately 20% of women in the general population have experienced some 




Patients with DS have been found to report significantly higher rates of sexual abuse 
than patients with ES (Akyuz et al., 2004; Alper et al., 1993; Binzer et al., 2004; Dikel 
et al., 2003; Holman et al., 2008; Kuyk et al., 1999; Litwin & Cardeña, 2000; Salmon et 
al., 2003; Scévola et al., 2013; Schramke et al., 2010; Strutt et al., 2011a,b), healthy 
controls (Bakvis, Roelofs, et al., 2009; Bakvis, Spinhoven, Giltay, et al., 2010; Ozcetin et 
al., 2009), and those with conversion movement disorder (Driver-Dunckley et al., 
2011; Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004).  However, a number of studies showed no 
statistically significant differences between DS and comparison groups (Arnold & 
Privitera, 1996; Berkhoff et al., 1998; Jawad et al., 1995; Koby et al., 2010; Lally et al., 
2010; Proença et al., 2011; Rosenberg et al., 2000), or did not include inferential 
statistics for the direct comparison of DS with another group (Betts & Boden, 1992b; 
Bowman & Markand, 1999; McDade & Brown, 1992; Reilly et al., 1999; Reuber, Howlett, 
et al., 2007; Spinhoven et al., 2004).   
 
The duration of sexual abuse has been found to distinguish between patients with ES 
and those with DS, with longer duration significantly predicting the latter diagnosis 
(Litwin & Cardeña, 2000).  Some studies have indicated that sexual abuse/assault is 
more common in female patients with DS (Bowman & Markand, 1996; Salmon et al., 
2003; Selkirk et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2013), which is possibly reflective of the general 
tendency for females to be at higher risk of abuse in general (DiTomasso & Routh, 
1993).   
 
A history of sexual abuse has been linked to a wide variety of characteristics in 
patients with DS, including a history of other mental health diagnoses, self-harm, 
diagnosis of personality disorder, other medically unexplained symptoms (MUS), more 
frequent emotional antecedents to seizures, the use of more than two AEDs, receiving 
state benefits, a history of physical abuse, younger age at seizure onset, longer time to 
diagnosis, previous referral to secondary care mental health services, convulsive / 
‘abreactive’ DS, more severe DS, prodromal symptoms, flashbacks, nocturnal DS, self-
injurious ictal symptoms, and ictal urinary incontinence (Betts & Boden, 1992b; 
Duncan & Oto, 2008; Selkirk et al., 2008).   
 
In summary, it seems that sexual abuse, particularly during childhood, is more common 
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in patients with DS than a number of control groups and the general population.  
Furthermore, patients with DS who have a history of sexual abuse have poorer mental 
health and more severe/complex DS, compared to those who do not.   
 
Physical abuse 
Lifetime rates of physical abuse have also ranged enormously, from 1 to 100% across 
samples (Alper et al., 1993; An et al., 2010; Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Asadi-Pooya, 
Emami, & Emami, 2014; Baillés et al., 2004; Bakvis, Roelofs, et al., 2009; Bakvis, 
Spinhoven, Giltay, et al., 2010; Bowman, 1993; Bowman & Markand, 1996; 1999; Dikel 
et al., 2003; Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011; Duncan & Oto, 2008; Duncan et al., 2011; 
Ettinger, Dhoon, et al., 1999; Koby et al., 2010; Lancman et al., 1993; Litwin & Cardeña, 
2000; Moore & Baker, 1997; Myers et al., 2013; Scévola et al., 2013; Selkirk et al., 2008; 
Spinhoven et al., 2004; Strutt et al., 2011a,b; Thomas et al., 2013).  There were 26 
studies reporting physical abuse rates without specifying an age range, with an average 
percentage of 37%.   
 
Childhood physical abuse is reported by 6-80% of patients with DS (Akyuz et al., 2004; 
Bowman, 1993; Bowman & Markand, 1996; 1999; Koby et al., 2010; Ozcetin et al., 2009; 
Portuguez et al., 2007; Reilly et al., 1999; Salmon et al., 2003; Snyder et al., 1994).  
Across the 10 studies citing rates of physical abuse in childhood, the average rate was 
54%.  Regarding physical abuse/assault in adulthood, rates of 13-52% have been 
reported in the literature (Bowman, 1993; Bowman & Markand, 1996; 1999; Koby et 
al., 2010; Reilly et al., 1999; Salmon et al., 2003), with an average rate of 30%.  Bowman 
and Markand (1996) and Thomas et al. (2013) found higher rates of physical abuse in 
female patients.  However, Koby and colleagues (2010) reported that physical abuse 
was more frequently claimed by male patients.      
 
Significantly higher rates of physical abuse have been reported in DS samples 
compared to control groups, including those with ES (Akyuz et al., 2004; Alper et al., 
1993; Kaplan et al., 2013; Koby et al., 2010; Salmon et al., 2003; Strutt et al., 2011a,b; 
Tojek et al., 2000) and healthy controls (Bakvis, Roelofs, et al., 2009; Ozcetin et al., 
2009); although other studies have failed to find such differences (Arnold & Privitera, 
1996; Bakvis, Spinhoven, Giltay, et al., 2010; Berkhoff et al., 1998; Kuyk et al., 1999; 
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Litwin & Cardeña, 2000; Proença et al., 2011).     
 
Psychological abuse 
Rates of lifetime psychological/emotional abuse are high in patients with DS, ranging 
from 37-74% of patients reporting such experiences, with an average of 49% (Bakvis, 
Roelofs, et al., 2009; Bakvis, Spinhoven, Giltay, et al., 2010; Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011; 
Kuyk et al. 1999; Strutt et al., 2011a,b).  Between 33 and 61% of patients with DS 
report childhood psychological abuse or neglect (Akyuz et al., 2004; Bowman & 
Markand, 1999; Portuguez et al., 2007; Reilly et al., 1999; Salmon et al., 2003).  
Furthermore, reports of adulthood psychological abuse indicated a rate of around 
38% (Reilly et al., 1999; Salmon et al., 2003).  Some investigators have also found that 
rates of emotional abuse and/or neglect are higher in patients with DS than patients 
with ES (Proença et al., 2011; Salmon et al., 2003; Strutt et al., 2011a,b), conversion 
movement disorders (Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011), and healthy controls (Ozcetin et 
al., 2009), although not in every study (Kuyk et al., 1999).   
 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
The review by Fiszman et al. (2004) noted that rates of both lifetime and current 
PTSD were higher in DS patients than in the general population.  Lifetime or current 
PTSD has been reported in between 0.5% and 76.9% of patients with DS (Abubakr et 
al., 2003; Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Bowman, 1993; Bowman & Markand, 1996; Chen & 
Izadyar, 2009; Dikel et al., 2003; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Hingray et al., 2011; Myers 
et al., 2013; O’Brien et al., 2015; Rosenberg et al., 2000; Scévola et al., 2013).  PTSD 
has been found to be more common in patients with DS relative to those with ES in 
some studies (Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Koby et al., 2010; Salinsky et al., 2012), although 
this difference was only observed in male patients in the study of Koby et al. (2010).  
Moreover, the sample studied by Salinsky et al. (2012) consisted of war veterans only, 
which limits the generalisability of those findings.  Nevertheless, Rosenberg et al. 
(2000) reported that the factor with most predictive power for a diagnosis of DS 
(rather than ES) was PTSD diagnosis.  Similarly, PTSD was the only psychiatric 
diagnosis that significantly distinguished veterans with DS from those with ES in a 




Evaluation of research on trauma and DS  
There is considerable variability in the quality of research in this area.  One important 
limitation of many studies is the omission of a comparison group, particularly as 
population base-rates have not been provided.  There is also a wide range of 
techniques used to assess trauma history, frequently involving retrospective review of 
case notes and self-report measures, both of which have limitations.  Only one study 
(Betts and Boden, 1992b) included the criterion of independent corroboration (at the 
time of disclosure) for reports of abuse.  Furthermore, only a few studies have blinded 
the investigator(s) to diagnosis or the hypotheses of the study (Arnold and Privitera, 
1996; Rosenberg et al., 2000).  Another issue is that some investigators do not report 
separate statistics for different types of abuse which can make interpretation difficult 
(e.g. Elliott and Charyton, 2014; Krahn et al., 1997; Wolf et al., 2015).  Traumatic and 
stressful life events are also confounded in some studies (e.g. Gambini et al., 2014). 
 
Some investigators failed to match comparison groups on gender (e.g. Alper et al., 
1993; Litwin & Cardeña, 2000).  Furthermore, several studies included small sample 
sizes of less than 20 patients, thereby limiting statistical power (Arnold & Privitera, 
1996; Berkhoff et al., 1998; Litwin & Cardeña, 2000; Rosenberg et al., 2000).  In contrast 
to many others, the studies carried out in Iran (Asadi-Pooya, Emami, & Emami, 2014), 
China (An et al., 2010) and Spain (Baillés et al., 2004) reported much lower rates of 
sexual and physical abuse in their samples of patients with DS.  Rates of 
occurrence/disclosure of abuse may have been affected by cultural factors in these 
samples. 
 
Sharpe and Faye (2006) noted that many of the samples included in past studies have 
been recruited in specialist medical settings, which might have biased the samples 
towards particularly severe, chronic or complex cases.  Van Merode et al. (2004) 
circumvented this problem by conducting a controlled prospective study of individuals 
experiencing their first seizure from the general population.  Further studies of this 
nature would be valuable.  Nonetheless, the research literature suggests that traumatic 
experiences are an important contributing factor in DS.  Traumatic experiences, 
particularly in childhood, have been proposed to be important predisposing/causal 
factors in several aetiological models of DS (Bodde et al., 2009; Mellers, 2009; Oto & 
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Reuber, 2014; Reuber, 2009).  The current review supports this hypothesis.   
 
2.2.2. Stressful life events  
Patients with DS report a variety of stressful life events.  For example, stressful 
circumstances were identified in 58% of one sample of patients with DS (Alessi and 
Valente, 2013).  Furthermore, Bodde et al. (2013) reported elevations in scores on the 
Everyday Problem Checklist in their DS group, relative to normative standards.  
Stressors described in the literature include divorce, bereavement, major 
surgery/illness, accidents (e.g. road traffic), legal issues, encountering a former abuser, 
general relationship problems, work-related problems, inescapable negative life 
circumstances, physical assaults/injuries and some ‘positive’ events such as changes in 
job status/employment, and expecting a baby (Alessi & Valente, 2013; Bowman, 1993; 
Bowman & Markand, 1996; 1999; Dickinson et al., 2011; Grimaldi et al., 2009).   
 
Patients with DS perceive significantly more stress in daily life (Frances et al., 1999), 
and report more psychological distress in response to adverse life events, relative to 
healthy controls (Testa et al., 2012).  Moreover, relative to those with ES, patients with 
DS receive higher scores on the Stress subscale of the Personality Assessment 
Inventory (Testa et al., 2011), endorse a greater number of stressful life events, 
perceive them as more stressful (Tojek et al., 2000), and report higher levels of worry 
and tension (Krishnamoorthy et al., 2001).   
 
More life events in the year prior to disorder onset are reported by patients with DS 
than control groups with ES (Binzer et al., 2004) or medically unexplained motor 
disorders (Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004).  Driver-Dunckley et al. (2011) found that 
63% of their sample of DS patients could identify at least one stressor that was 
perceived as triggering or worsening their seizures.  Approximately 90% of a Turkish 
sample of DS patients were able to identify stressful events or stimuli prior to losing 
consciousness (Almis et al., 2013).  Therefore, in at least some patients with DS, acute 
or chronic stressors may contribute to seizure initiation on an ongoing basis.  
However, not all patients with DS identify stress or emotion as seizure triggers, and 
they have been found to be more likely to deny stressful life circumstances than 




Stressful or adverse life events are often discussed as precipitating factors in previous 
accounts of DS (Mellers, 2009; Oto & Reuber, 2014; Reuber, 2009).  However, multiple 
or chronic stressors occurring during development could also predispose to the 
development of DS, perhaps by influencing stress reactivity, psychopathology or 
dissociative/somatoform tendencies.  Moreover, psychological perspectives on stress 
assume an important role of cognitive factors such as appraisal and self-efficacy (i.e. 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1987).  There is some literature suggesting that coping strategies 
and illness-beliefs are less adaptive in patients with DS than comparison groups (see 
section 2.3.1. and 2.3.5).  Therefore, it seems that life events/circumstances may 
interact with cognitive factors and maladaptive coping skills in elevating patients’ stress 
levels and contributing towards DS.    
 
2.2.3. Relationship dysfunction 
Signs of dysfunction have been reported within the families of patients with DS 
(Hovorka et al., 2007; Lancman et al., 1993; Moore & Baker, 1997; Silva et al., 2001).  
The characteristics differing between the families of patients with DS and control 
groups include: higher rates of divorce/separation (Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004), 
emotional over-involvement (Salmon et al., 2003; Stanhope et al., 2003), less cohesion 
(P.M. Moore et al., 1994), less emphasis on moral/religious values (P.M. Moore et al., 
1994), reduced value on intellectual pursuits (P.M. Moore et al., 1994), lack of 
emotional warmth (Binzer et al., 2004; Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004), abnormal role 
definition and boundaries (Krawetz et al., 2001), atypical 
expressiveness/communication (Salmon et al., 2003; Stanhope et al., 2003), rejection 
(Binzer et al., 2004; Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004), overall family dysfunction (LaFrance 
et al., 2011), somatisation in family members (Wood et al., 1998), criticism (Wood et 
al., 1998),  high levels of control (Salmon et al., 2003), and general family distress 
(Wood et al., 1998).   
 
Tojek and colleagues (2000) reported that patients with DS described significantly 
poorer childhood relationships with their fathers than controls with ES.  Moreover, 
‘unspeakable dilemmas’ and emotional ‘double-binds’ have been observed by some 
investigators (Bowman & Markand, 1999; J.L. Griffith et al., 1998).  Patients with DS 
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may also exhibit dysfunctional (fearful) attachment styles relative to patients with ES 
(Holman et al., 2008), although another study (Lally et al., 2010) failed to replicate this 
finding. 
 
It is important to note that some of the above-mentioned studies found differences 
in patient-reported perceptions of family functioning (e.g. Binzer et al., 2004; Salmon 
et al., 2003), whereas others examined the perceptions of family members themselves 
(e.g. Krawetz et al., 2001; Wood et al., 1998).  It is possible that both types of rating 
are somewhat biased by the respondent, and so more observational studies with 
objectively defined criteria and impartial raters might be beneficial (e.g. Stanhope et 
al., 2003).  Nevertheless, family dysfunction, particularly in childhood may serve as an 
important predispositional factor (Mellers, 2009), and/or mediate the influence of 
abuse (Salmon et al., 2003).   
 
Problems in adult interpersonal relationships are also evident in some patients with 
DS.  For example, 59% of one adult sample claimed to have at least one relationship 
currently causing emotional conflict (Silva et al., 2001).  Schramke et al. (2010) noted 
that ‘marital instability’ significantly predicted a diagnosis of DS.  Relationship 
disturbances in adulthood (e.g. workplace bullying, marital conflict) could potentially 
act as the precipitating stressor in disorder onset, and/or may trigger DS on an 
ongoing basis.  Moreover, Reuber (2009) discusses social isolation and dependence on 
others as potential consequences of living with DS, which may also come to 
perpetuate the disorder.   
 
 
2.3. Psychological factors 
 
2.3.1. Coping styles 
Patients with DS report more use of escape/avoidant coping strategies, relative to 
healthy controls (Cronje & Pretorius, 2013; Frances et al.,1999; Goldstein et al., 2000; 
Myers, Fleming, et al., 2013).  Bodde and colleagues (2013) found that avoidant 
behavioural strategies were preferred by their sample of patients with DS.  Moreover, 
Goldstein and Mellers (2006) noted more agoraphobic-type avoidant behaviours in 
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their sample of patients with DS, relative to those with ES.  However, some studies 
have failed to find differences between patients with DS and ES on coping measures 
(Frances et al., 1999; O’Brien et al., 2015; van Merode et al., 2004).   
 
‘Distancing’ strategies are also reported more commonly in DS patients, compared to 
healthy controls (Cronje & Pretorius, 2013); but not relative to patients with ES 
(Frances et al, 1999).  Dimaro et al. (2014), more recently, observed elevated levels of 
‘experiential’ avoidance in patients with DS, relative to those with ES and healthy 
control participants.  This type of avoidance includes cognitive avoidance of unwanted 
or unpleasant psychological states, such as negative emotions and mental distress 
(similarly to distancing).   
 
Interestingly, Goldstein et al. (2000) observed a positive correlation between 
escape/avoidance strategies and trait dissociation scores in their DS group, suggesting 
that avoidant responses to stressful situations were linked to a tendency to dissociate.  
Moreover, patients with DS are also less likely to use active or ‘planful problem-solving’ 
strategies than healthy individuals (Frances et al.,1999; Goldstein et al., 2000; Testa et 
al., 2012).  Other authors have reported reduced use of ‘task-oriented’ coping 
techniques (Myers, Fleming, et al., 2013).   
 
Individuals with DS, therefore, seem more likely to respond to distressing 
situations/experiences with behavioural, cognitive and affective avoidance. The use of 
avoidant coping strategies has been conceptualised as a perpetuating factor by some 
authors (e.g. Mellers, 2009; Reuber, 2009).  Avoidant/escape coping strategies may 
contribute to the maintenance of current anxiety levels (Frances et al., 1999), and thus 
might contribute to ongoing seizure reoccurrence.  However, a pre-existing tendency 
towards avoidance of undesired emotions/situations also might contribute to the risk 
for developing DS, perhaps by increasing a tendency towards somatoform and 
dissociative symptoms more generally.  
 
2.3.2. Psychopathology 
Psychiatric diagnoses / history  
Patients with DS often present with one or more current/past psychiatric diagnoses 
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(Abubakr et al., 2003; Ahmedani et al., 2013; Baillés et al., 2004; Baslet, Roiko, & Prensky, 
2010; Bora et al., 2011; Bowman, 1993; 2001; d’Alessio et al., 2006; Direk et al., 2012; 
Galimberti et al., 2003; Gambini et al., 2014; Gazzola et al., 2012; Hixson et al., 2006; 
M.D. Holmes, Dodrill, et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2010; Kanner et al., 1999; 
Krishnamoorthy et al., 2001; Kristensen & Alving, 1992; Marchetti et al., 2009; Mazza 
et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2012; Mökleby et al., 2002; Moore & Baker, 1997; O’Sullivan 
et al., 2007; Prigatano et al., 2002; Schramke et al., 2010; Seneviratne et al., 2011; Snyder 
et al., 1994; Turner et al., 2011).   
 
Furthermore, comorbid formal psychiatric diagnoses have been reported to be 
elevated in patients with DS, relative to those with somatisation disorders (Mökleby 
et al., 2002) and ES (e.g. Galimberti et al., 2003; Salinsky et al., 2012; Scévola et al., 2013; 
Szaflarski et al., 2003), although not consistently (Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Binzer et 
al., 2004; Direk et al., 2012).  Additional psychiatric diagnoses are associated with 
poorer outcomes in patients with DS (see Chapter 1, section 1.6).   
 
However, a variety of techniques have been used to assess psychiatric diagnoses across 
studies, including retrospective examination of clinical notes, self-report 
questionnaires and structured or unstructured clinical interviews.  Furthermore, 
current and historical psychiatric diagnoses are not always differentiated.  Intellectual 
disability is reported as a psychiatric diagnosis in some studies, but not others, and 
crucially, studies also differ with regard to whether the diagnosis of DS itself is included 
in the rates of psychiatric morbidity reported.  Many investigators also only assess a 
limited number of psychiatric diagnoses, usually those known to be common in DS.  
 
Additional psychiatric disorders in DS have been argued to be causal of the seizure 
disorder by some authors (e.g. Marchetti et al., 2009).  However, an alternate 
viewpoint is that the additional disorders are associated with, but not causal of DS.  
For example, depressive symptoms might develop or worsen as a result of living with 
DS, rather than DS being caused by pre-existing depression.  Depression may share 
some causal factors with DS and once developed, could trigger or exacerbate the 
occurrence of DS by increasing the individual’s general emotional distress.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that many patients with DS have no other psychiatric 
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diagnoses aside from the diagnosis of DS itself (e.g. O’Brien et al., 2015).    
 
Psychopathological symptoms 
Inventories such as the Symptom Check List – Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994) 
or the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1993) have been used to examine 
symptoms of general psychopathology in DS samples.  Such measures examine a range 
of psychopathological symptoms (e.g. somatisation, depression, anxiety).  Patients with 
DS tend to receive higher scores than control groups on such measures, suggesting 
elevated psychopathology in one or more domains (Kuyk et al., 1999; Lally et al., 2010; 
Prueter et al., 2002; Reuber, House, et al., 2003; van Merode et al., 2004).   
 
The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991), Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI) or MMPI-2 (Hathaway & McKinley, 1943; 1989), and the 
Millon Multiaxial Inventory of Assessments (MCMI; Millon, 1977) have also been 
administered by some investigators.  Scales on the MMPI/MMPI-2 are often elevated 
in patients with DS (e.g. Baillés et al., 2004; M.C. Brown et al., 1991).  The most 
commonly elevated scales are Hypochondriasis and Hysteria, with scores often higher 
in patients with DS relative to those with ES (Binder et al., 2000; Bodde et al., 2011; 
Derry & McLachlan, 1996; Drake et al., 1993; Hixson et al., 2006; Kalogjera-Sackellares 
& Sackellares, 1997; Owczarek, 2003; Owczarek and Jędrzejczak, 2001; Slater et al., 
1995; Strutt et al., 2011b; Wilkus & Dodrill, 1989).  On the PAI, one or more of the 
subscales (Conversion, Somatisation, Health Concerns) on the Somatic Concerns 
scale are often found to be elevated relative to norms or control groups (e.g. Gale & 
Hill, 2011; 2012; O’Brien et al., 2015; Testa & Brandt, 2010; Wolf et al., 2015).  Moreover, 
scores on such measures often conform to specific patterns in patients with DS, such 
as the ‘conversion V’ on the MMPI (e.g. Drake et al., 1992; Slater et al., 1995) and the 
‘NES indicator’ pattern on the PAI (M.T. Wagner et al., 2005).   
 
An important issue in interpreting these findings is that items on some scales of the 
MMPI or PAI may relate to the seizure symptoms themselves and so might confound 
results.  In addition, interpretation of MMPI and PAI scores can be problematic because 
the measures examine both personality characteristics and symptoms of 
psychopathology.  Reuber, Pukrop, et al. (2004) further discuss some of the 
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shortcomings of using the MMPI in this population. 
 
Affective symptoms and disorders 
Patients with DS often report depressive symptomology (Ettinger, Devinsky, et al., 
1999; Farnam et al., 2010; Hixson et al., 2006; Mazza et al., 2009; Mökleby et al., 2002; 
P.M. Moore et al., 1994; Prueter et al., 2002; Strutt et al., 2011a,b; Szaflarski & Szaflarski, 
2004; Testa et al., 2011; 2012; A.W. Thompson et al., 2010; M.T. Wagner et al., 2005; 
Xue et al., 2013).  Scores on depression inventories have been found to be elevated 
compared to healthy controls (Bewley et al., 2005; Hixson et al., 2006; Mazza et al., 
2009; Mökleby et al., 2009; P.M. Moore et al., 1994; O’Brien et al., 2015; Testa et al., 
2011; 2012; Urbanek et al., 2014; Xue et al., 2013) and neurology patients (Farnam et 
al., 2008).  Furthermore, higher depression scores predict reduced quality of life in 
patients with DS (Karakis et al., 2014). 
  
Several studies have indicated that patients with DS report more total or somatic 
depressive symptoms than patients with ES (Asmussen et al., 2009; Karakis et al., 2014; 
LaFrance et al., 2011; Mazza et al., 2009; Szaflarski & Szaflarski, 2004; Testa et al., 2011; 
A.W. Thompson et al., 2010; M.T. Wagner et al., 2005).  However, a comparable number 
of studies have found no such differences (Bewley et al., 2005; Hixson et al., 2006; P.M. 
Moore et al., 1994; Prigatano & Kirlin, 2009; Salmon et al., 2003; Strutt et al., 2011b; 
Testa et al., 2012; Wolf et al., 2015).  Patients with DS also report comparable levels 
of depression as patients with somatoform disorders (Mökleby et al., 2002) and 
conversion movement disorders (Grimaldi et al., 2009; Hopp et al., 2012).  However, 
patients with ES (Hoppe & Elger, 2011; Kanner et al., 2012), somatoform (e.g. De Waal 
et al., 2004), and conversion movement disorders (e.g. Feinstein et al., 2001) may also 
report elevated rates of depression relative to healthy individuals. 
 
Patients with DS often meet criteria for a formal diagnosis of depression (Abubakr et 
al., 2003; Alessi & Valente, 2013; Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Bowman 1993; Bowman & 
Markand, 1996; Conwill et al., 2014; Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011; Elliott & Charyton, 
2014; Ettinger, Dhoon, et al., 1999; Hixson et al., 2006; Jones et al., 2010; Kanner et al., 
1999; 2012; Lempert & Schmidt, 1990; Marchetti et al., 2009; Mökleby et al., 2002; 
O’Sullivan et al., 2007; Patidar et al., 2013; Schramke et al., 2010; Snyder et al., 1994; 
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Strutt et al., 2011a,b).  Fiszman and Kanner (2010) reviewed findings from studies using 
DSM diagnostic criteria, and reported prevalence rates for depression in patients with 
DS ranging from 21-60%.  Diagnoses of depression have been found at higher rates in 
patients with DS than ES in some studies (e.g. Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Schramke et 
al., 2010), but not all (e.g. Scévola et al., 2013).   
 
Bipolar disorder is generally less common in DS than depression (Alessi & Valente, 
2013; Bowman, 1993; Bowman & Markand, 1996), but it has been reported significantly 
more commonly in some samples of patients with DS compared to those with ES 
(Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Salinsky et al., 2012).  Suicide attempts, suicidal ideation and 
self-harm behaviors have been reported a number of times in DS samples (Akyuz et 
al., 2004; Alessi & Valente, 2013; d’Alessio et al., 2006; Duncan et al., 2011; Elliott & 
Charyton, 2014; Ettinger, Devinsky, et al., 1999; Moore & Baker, 1997; Rechlin et al., 
1997; Snyder et al., 1994; Stewart et al., 1982; Testa et al., 2011; A.W. Thompson et al., 
2010).   
 
Mood disturbance may be a trait characteristic that predisposes an individual to 
developing DS.  Furthermore, an episode of major depression, for example, might 
precipitate the onset of DS.  Ongoing affective disturbance may also perpetuate the 
disorder, contributing to the emotional distress that might trigger individual seizures.  
Finally, affective symptoms such as depression may well be a consequence of living 
with DS for some patients. 
 
Anxiety symptoms and disorders 
Symptoms of anxiety have been found to be elevated in patients with DS relative to 
healthy participants (Bewley et al., 2005; Hixson et al., 2006; Mökleby et al., 2002; 
O’Brien et al., 2015; Testa et al., 2011; 2012; Urbanek et al., 2014; Xue et al., 2013).  
However, when patients with ES and DS have been compared on self-reported anxiety, 
findings have been mixed.  A number of investigators have reported comparable scores 
(Bewley et al., 2005; Dimaro et al., 2014; Hixson et al., 2006; Prigatano & Kirlin, 2009; 
Salmon et al., 2003; Strutt et al., 2011a; Wolf et al., 2015), whereas others have 
reported higher anxiety scores in DS samples relative to ES (Holman et al., 2008; 
Karakis et al., 2014; Lawton, Baker, & Brown, 2008; P.M. Thompson, Batzel, & Wilkus, 
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1992; A.W. Thompson et al., 2010; van Merode et al., 2004).  Conversely, Akyuz et al. 
(2004) found the opposite pattern (higher scores in the ES group).   
 
It has been suggested that patients with DS experience increased physiological anxiety 
symptoms generally (Testa et al., 2011; A.W. Thompson et al. 2010) and during their 
attacks than ES patients, despite not necessarily experiencing heightened subjective 
fear (Frolov, Korinevskaya, & Vorob’eva, 2003; Goldstein & Mellers, 2006).  Patients 
with DS report more peri-ictal panic symptoms than those with ES (Hendrickson et 
al., 2014).  Furthermore, patients with DS also score higher on a measure of ‘fear 
sensitivity’ (Hixson et al., 2006). 
 
Current or previous diagnoses of anxiety disorders have been observed frequently in 
patients with DS (Alessi & Valente, 2013; Bowman & Markand, 1996; Conwill et al., 
2014; Dworetzky et al., 2005; Galimberti et al., 2003; Hixson et al., 2006; Hovorka et 
al., 2007; Kuyk et al., 2003; LaFrance & Syc, 2009; LaFrance et al., 2011; Patidar et al., 
2013; Schramke et al., 2010; P.M. Thompson, et al., 1992; A.W. Thompson et al., 2010), 
although the prevalence of anxiety disorders is more variable across studies than 
depression (Fiszman & Kanner, 2010).  Nonetheless, some studies have noted higher 
rates of current or previous anxiety disorders in DS patients relative to patients with 
ES (Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Krishnamoorthy et al., 2001; LaFrance et al., 2011; Scévola 
et al., 2013; Schramke et al., 2010).  Anxiety disorder has also been reported to 
significantly predict a diagnosis of DS rather than ES (Elliott & Charyton, 2014).  Panic 
disorder (Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Krishnamoorthy et al., 2001; Schramke et al., 2010; 
Snyder et al., 1994) and PTSD (Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Bowman, 1993; Bowman & 
Markand, 1996; d’Alessio et al., 2006; Dikel et al., 2003; Dworetzky et al., 2005; Fiszman 
& Kanner, 2010; Rosenberg et al., 2000; Scévola et al., 2013) are commonly comorbid 
with DS.  
 
As with depression, elevated levels of anxiety may act as a predisposing factor in DS.  
Furthermore, high levels of anxiety could act as a precipitant to the onset of the 
disorder and may also trigger individual episodes.  Anxiety may also serve to 
perpetuate the disorder, by increasing the likelihood of using psychological and 





Medically unexplained symptoms and disorders 
Additional MUS are often reported by patients with DS (Alessi & Valente, 2013; 
Bowman, 1993; Dimaro et al., 2014; Dixit et al., 2013; Duncan et al., 2011; Salmon et 
al., 2003; P.M. Thompson, et al., 1992; A.W. Thompson et al., 2010).  For example, 
Duncan et al. (2011) reported that 57.4% of their sample of patients with DS 
experienced additional functional symptoms.  Patients with DS report more 
somatoform symptoms than patients with ES (R.J. Brown et al., 2013; Dimaro et al., 
2014; Dixit et al., 2013; Hill & Gale, 2011b; Reuber, House, et al., 2003; Testa et al., 2011; 
A.W. Thompson et al., 2010) and healthy controls (Dimaro et al., 2014; Testa et al., 
2011).  Scores on measures of somatisation predict a diagnosis of DS rather than ES 
(Dimaro et al., 2014; Hill & Gale, 2011b; Reuber, House, et al., 2003).  Importantly, 
higher somatisation scores have been linked to worse outcomes (Reuber, House, et 
al., 2003) and reduced quality of life (LaFrance & Syc, 2009; Wolf et al., 2015) in patients 
with DS.  In addition, somatisation has been reported to mediate the relationship 
between the diagnosis of DS and reduced quality of life (Wolf et al., 2015).   
 
Patients with DS often present with additional conversion or somatoform diagnoses, 
or meet criteria for these (Alessi & Valente, 2013; Bowman & Markand, 1996; d’Alessio 
et al., 2006; Dixit et al., 2013; Galimberti et al., 2003; Krishnamoorthy et al., 2001; 
LaFrance & Syc, 2009; Mökleby et al., 2002; O’Sullivan et al., 2007).  Somatoform 
disorders have been found at higher rates in patients with DS than those with ES 
(Dixit et al., 2013), or those with mixed ES and DS (Kuyk et al., 2003).  Elevated levels 
of bodily awareness were also observed in one group of patients with DS, relative to 
patients with ES (Tojek et al., 2000).  Medically unexplained pain is a particularly 
common comorbid diagnosis in patients with DS (Bowman & Markand, 1996; Driver-
Dunckley et al., 2011; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Mökleby et al., 2002; O’Sullivan et al., 
2007).  Several authors have reported higher rates of chronic pain (Drane et al., 2006; 
Dworetzky et al., 2005; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Gazzola et al., 2012) and fibromyalgia 
(Drane et al., 2006) in patients with DS relative to those with ES, and the presence of 
chronic pain has also been found to predict a diagnosis of DS rather than ES (Elliott 




A general tendency to experience MUS may act as a predisposing factor for the 
development of DS.  However, an episode of severe/multiple MUS might precipitate 
the initial occurrence of DS.  Furthermore, after the onset of the seizure disorder, 
additional MUS may perpetuate DS by contributing to high levels of emotional distress 
and/or disproportionately focusing attention on somatic processes.  Bodde et al. 
(2009) also note that dissociation and somatisation may act as the triggering 
mechanism for DS, whereby emotional/mental states are transformed into a seizure 
(see Chapter 3).   
 
Intellectual disability 
Intellectual disability (ID) is identified in a proportion of patients with DS.  For 
example, rates of approximately 9-30% (Duncan & Oto, 2008; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; 
Gambini et al., 2014; Moore & Baker, 1997) have been reported in previous samples.  
Furthermore, Duncan and Oto (2008) assessed potential differences between DS 
patients with and without ID.  It was reported that comorbid ES,  AED use at diagnosis, 
history of ‘pseudostatus’, and immediate situational triggers for individual DS were 
more common in the ID group relative to the non-ID group.  Pre-existing cognitive 
impairment could, therefore, act as a predisposing factor for developing DS (Bodde et 
al., 2009; Reuber, 2009), and may represent a unique subgroup of patients, with 
different risk factors and triggering mechanisms than patients without ID (Duncan & 
Oto, 2008).    
 
2.3.3. Personality traits and disorders  
Studies report rates of personality disorder in the range of approximately 18-85% in 
patients with DS (Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Baillés et al., 2004; Bowman & Markand, 
1996; d’Alessio et al., 2006; Direk et al., 2012; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Galimberti et 
al., 2003; Harden et al., 2009; Hovorka et al., 2007; Kanner et al., 1999; Kuyk et al., 
2003; O’Brien et al., 2015; Rechlin et al., 1997; Salinsky et al., 2012; Scévola et al., 2013).  
Rates of personality disorder have been found to be higher in DS patients than control 
groups (Binzer et al., 2004; Direk et al., 2012; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; Salinsky et al., 
2012), although not consistently (i.e. Arnold and Privitera, 1996; Scévola et al., 2013).  
Nonetheless, individuals with comorbid DS and personality disorder seem to have 
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poorer outcomes than those without personality disorder (Drake et al., 1992).  
 
‘Cluster B’ personality disorders are the most commonly reported, particularly 
borderline (BPD) and histrionic personality disorders (Arnold & Privitera, 1996; Baillés 
et al., 2004; Binzer et al., 2004; Bowman & Markand, 1996; d’Alessio et al., 2006; Direk 
et al., 2012; Galimberti et al., 2003; Harden et al., 2009; Hovorka et al., 2007; Lacey, 
Cook, & Salzberg, 2007; LaFrance & Syc, 2009; O’Brien et al., 2015; Rechlin et al., 1997; 
Scévola et al., 2013; Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004; P.M. Thompson, et al., 1992; Turner 
et al., 2011).  Higher rates of BPD have been observed in patients with DS relative to 
those with motor conversion symptoms (Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004) and patients 
with ES (Binzer et al., 2004; Scévola et al., 2013).   
 
Patients with DS share a number of clinical similarities with patients with BPD, such 
as trauma history, high levels of dissociative symptoms, affect dysregulation and 
increased risk of suicidal thoughts and behaviours (Lacey et al., 2007).  Nevertheless, 
several authors have also reported ‘cluster C’ personality disorders in patients with 
DS, most often of the avoidant type (d’Alessio et al., 2006; Arnold & Privitera, 1996; 
Bowman & Markand, 1996; Direk et al., 2012; Hovorka et al., 2007; Kanner et al., 1999), 
although rates of ‘cluster C’ personality disorders have been found to be higher in 
patients with mixed ES and DS compared to those with DS only (Kuyk et al., 2003). 
 
Some investigators have explored personality traits in patients with DS using 
dimensional self-report measures.  For example, Reuber, Pukrop, et al. (2004) found a 
greater extent of personality abnormality in patients with DS relative to patients with 
ES, as assessed with the Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology (DAPP; 
Livesley & Jackson, 2002).  Borderline personality features were the most common 
pattern in the DS group.  Furthermore, one study reported differences between 
patients with ES and DS on the ‘big five’ personality dimensions (i.e. neuroticism, 
openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion), measured with the NEO-
PI-R (Cragar et al., 2005).  However, no differences on this measure were reported in 
another study (Testa & Brandt, 2010).  More studies of normal personality variation 




As noted in section 2.3.2, responses on measures such as the MMPI/MMPI-2 and the 
PAI have been examined in patients with DS in numerous studies.  The findings usually 
include atypical scores on several dimensions in DS samples, mostly linked to 
somatisation, conversion and concerns about bodily health.  However, as previously 
mentioned, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these scales reflect current 
psychopathology or more stable personality traits; therefore, alternative and more 
focused personality measures are preferable.  
 
Particular personality characteristics (e.g. emotional dysregulation, somatisation, 
avoidance) may serve as predisposing factors in some patients who develop DS.  
However, it could also be argued that personality features might perpetuate the 
disorder.  For example, individuals high in trait emotional dysregulation may be more 
likely to encounter stressful situations (e.g. interpersonal conflict) and respond with 
higher levels of distress, thereby creating more situational/emotional triggers for the 
reoccurrence of seizures.  On the other hand, avoidant tendencies are likely to 
negatively affect general functioning (e.g. reducing social, occupational or educational 
functioning), which could maintain elevated levels of emotional distress, and thus 
perpetuate the disorder.  Nonetheless, it seems that no single personality pathology 
uniquely characterises patients with DS.   
 
2.3.4. Exposure to symptom ‘models’ 
It is not unusual for patients with DS to report the presence of epilepsy in their family 
members (Asadi-Pooya & Emami, 2013; Dickinson et al., 2011).  Rates of reported ES 
in family members of patients with DS range from around 15 to 50% (Asadi-Pooya, 
Emami, & Emami, 2014; Bodde et al., 2007; LaFrance & Syc, 2009; LaFrance et al., 2011; 
Lancman et al., 1993; Reuber et al., 2011; Moore and Baker, 1997; Wadwekar et al., 
2014), although most are between 30-50%.  Patients with DS are more likely to report 
having a relative with epilepsy than patients diagnosed with ES (Gazzola et al., 2012; 
Locke et al., 2006; Schramke et al., 2010; Tojek et al., 2000) or general psychiatric 
outpatients (Jawad et al., 1995), although not in every study (i.e. Bautista, Gonzales-
Salazar, & Ochoa, 2008).   
 
It is possible that in some cases, the family member may in fact also be displaying DS 
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rather than ES.  Nevertheless, the occurrence of seizures in relatives may contribute 
to the development of DS in patients exposed to these, by serving as a shaping 
(predispositional) factor (Bodde et al., 2009; Mellers, 2009; Reuber, 2009).  Exposure 
to such symptom models may influence the development of the specific form of 
symptoms with which patients present.   
 
2.3.5. Cognitive factors: locus of control, self-efficacy and illness-
representations 
Locus of control (LOC) refers to the extent to which an individual attributes events 
to internal or external causes (Rotter, 1990).  Patients with DS report a more 
externally-oriented health-related LOC than healthy controls (Goldstein et al., 2000), 
and a more external general (i.e. non-health specific) LOC compared to patients with 
ES (Stone, Binzer, & Sharpe, 2004).  These findings suggest that patients with DS are 
more likely to perceive external causes for events, with reduced perception of internal 
control or influence.  In contrast, P.M. Moore and colleagues (1994) found no 
significant differences between patients with DS, ES or healthy controls on a measure 
of LOC.  It is possible that the different measures used between studies might account 
for the variable findings.  
 
Nonetheless, other differences have emerged in the beliefs and representations that 
patients with DS have about their disorder and/or illness in general.  Patients with DS 
ascribe greater influence of other people on their seizure disorder (Strutt et al., 
2011b), are less likely to attribute their illness to psychological factors, and show more 
denial of stressful life events (Stone, Binzer, & Sharpe, 2004), relative to patients with 
ES.  However, some authors have reported broadly similar illness representations in 
patients with DS and control groups.  For example, Hopp and colleagues (2012) found 
that patients with DS had similar levels of (health-related) self-efficacy to patients with 
movement disorders in a number of domains (managing disease and symptoms, doing 
chores, exercise and social activities).   
 
Furthermore, an experimental study of implicit attitudes to illness failed to identify 
any specific biases in the DS group relative to those with ES or healthy control 
participants (Testa & Brandt, 2010).  Whitehead and colleagues (2013) also identified 
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few differences in illness beliefs between patients with DS and ES.  Nevertheless, 
important differences between patients with DS and their neurologists emerged in 
the latter study.  For example, neurologists were more likely to attribute DS to 
psychological factors, whereas patients were more likely to perceive an influence of 
physical factors on the disorder. 
  
In summary, patients with DS generally have a more externally-oriented (general and 
health-related) LOC than control groups, and are less likely to perceive psychological 
influences on their seizures than patients with ES and expert clinicians.  Such beliefs 
and tendencies may act as perpetuating factors in DS (Mellers, 2009; Reuber, 2009).   
 
2.3.6. Neuropsychological / cognitive abilities 
There have been some reports of reduced neurocognitive functioning in DS samples 
relative to normative standards (Kalogjera-Sackellares & Sackellares, 1999; Reuber, 
Fernández, Helmstaedter, Qurishi, & Elger, 2002; Snyder et al., 1994; Strutt et al., 2011a) 
or non-clinical control groups (Almis et al., 2013; Binder et al., 1998; Bodde et al., 2013; 
O’Brien et al., 2015; van der Kruijs et al., 2012).  Differences in various cognitive 
domains have been reported, including aspects of memory, general intellectual 
functioning, executive skills, motor performance, general processing speed, attention, 
and verbal fluency.  However, performance in DS samples is often in the low average 
or borderline ranges, rather than significantly impaired as in ID.   
 
Patients with DS perform equivalently or worse than patients with ES on some 
neuropsychological tests (Binder et al., 1998; Bortz et al., 1995; M.C. Brown et al., 
1991; Dodrill, 2008; Drane et al., 2006; Holman et al., 2008; K.A. McNally et al., 2009; 
Slater et al., 1995; van Merode et al., 2004; Wilkus, Dodrill, & Thompson, 1984; Wilkus 
& Dodrill, 1989), including tests of general intellectual functioning, verbal, visual and 
autobiographical memory, attention, and set-shifting.  However, it is possible that the 
deficits observed in patients with DS may be associated with reduced effort, 
psychopathological factors, seizure occurrence, or decision-making deficits, rather 
than due to organic brain dysfunction as in ES (Binder & Campbell, 2004; Binder et al., 
1998; Drane et al., 2006; K.A. McNally et al., 2009; Myers et al., 2014; Prigatano & Kirlin, 
2009; Williamson et al., 2005; 2012), although the findings on reduced effort are 
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inconsistent (Cragar et al., 2006; Dodrill, 2008).  
 
Performance on neuropsychological tests has been found to be associated with clinical 
characteristics in patients with DS, including seizure types (worse performance in 
patients with major motor seizures; Hill & Gale, 2011a), duration of DS disorder, age 
at seizure onset, and seizure frequency (L.C. Black et al., 2010).  Moreover, inaccuracies 
in self-reported cognitive functioning have been reported in this group, often involving 
underestimation of their abilities (Breier et al., 1998; Fargo et al., 2004).   
 
The mild cognitive deficits observed in patients with DS may be related to neurological 
factors (i.e. minor head injury).  The deficits could also be a consequence of medication 
use (i.e. AEDs), psychopathology (i.e. depression), or other psychological factors (i.e. 
motivation), alone or in combination.  However, the possibility remains that pre-
existing subtle deficits in cognitive functioning might predispose toward developing 
DS in some individuals.  Moreover, such deficits might also precipitate or perpetuate 
the disorder by negatively affecting information processing and/or responding in 
complex or challenging situations.   
 
2.4. Summary and evaluation of literature review 
A range of variables contribute to the occurrence of DS and no one universal pattern 
of biopsychosocial factors is consistently associated with the disorder.  In terms of 
predisposing factors, the following are likely candidates: a propensity for 
somatisation/dissociation, psychopathology, personality characteristics, developmental 
adverse life experiences and/or family dysfunction, intellectual disability or 
‘neurological burden’ (subtle brain abnormalities & mild cognitive deficits), 
chronic/severe medical conditions, exposure to symptom models, and avoidant coping 
styles.  Many of these factors are likely to be inter-related and might interact in 
contributing to the disorder.   
 
There is evidence that DS may be precipitated by: acute increases in perceived stress, 
adverse or otherwise disruptive life events, and acute psychopathological disorders.  
In addition, perpetuating factors might include ongoing psychopathology or life 
stresses (e.g. dysfunctional relationships), avoidant coping strategies, and maladaptive 
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cognitive representations (particularly illness-related).  Less is known about the 
processes that trigger individual seizures, although intense emotion, stressful 
situations, and dissociation of mental or somatic processes are likely to play a role in 
many patients.    
 
There are many challenges to overcome in conducting research on the aetiology of 
DS.  One of the core challenges is that of identifying an appropriate control group.  
Furthermore, comparison groups must be matched carefully on variables relevant to 
the study design.  Many studies do not blind investigators or participants to diagnostic 
category, so there is often a risk of investigator and participant bias on research 
findings.  Moreover, cross-sectional research designs are used frequently, which make 
the direction of causality difficult to ascertain (Fiszman et al., 2004).  Methodologically, 
longitudinal, prospective studies might overcome some of these limitations (Sharpe & 
Faye, 2006), although these might be difficult to implement.   
 
In addition, across studies investigating the same variables (e.g. trauma, stressful life 
events, psychopathology), a variety of measures have been used and in some cases, 
standardised measures are not included.  Many studies are retrospective in design and 
based on analysis of patients' records, with variables often not measured in a 
systematic or explicit way.  Small sample sizes can also increase the risk of Type 2 
errors.  Some research groups have included patients with mixed ES and DS, whereas 
others include patients with DS only, making interpretation complex.   
 
Furthermore, many studies adopt the criterion of video-EEG evidence for inclusion 
of patients, which might introduce bias into the samples recruited.  In some locations, 
video-EEG is not widely available due to the expense and technology required.  
Moreover, many suitable research participants might be unnecessarily excluded from 
studies due to having received the diagnosis through expert opinion or other 
diagnostic procedures.  Given that DS is a (relatively) rare condition, and analyses are 
increasingly focusing on subgroups of patients, the video-EEG criterion may not be 
entirely pragmatic in all studies.  There is also a possible inherent bias in recruiting 
patients from specialist neurology/epilepsy services, as mentioned in section 2.2.1.  
Previous studies often include patients with varying length of seizure disorder 
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(chronicity), which may be an additional confound.  Patients who have experienced DS 
for a prolonged period of time may represent a particularly complex subgroup, 
differing on a number of psychological variables to those with DS of shorter duration.   
 
When investigating the various risk factors for DS, it is important to take account of 
the baseline rates of these factors in the general population.  Reuber (2008) also 
suggests the importance of identifying the nature of the relationships between risk 
factors and DS more specifically (i.e. examining which particular aspects of the risk 
factors influence the development of DS over others).  Furthermore, the effects of 
specific risk factors on the development of DS may be mediated by other important 
(‘third’) variables.  For example, the experience of trauma/abuse or difficult childhood 
circumstances (e.g. family dysfunction) may influence the development of DS through 
changes in affective processing style.  In order to assess such possible influences, these 
potentially mediating psychological variables should be measured and included in 
research on the disorder.    
 
 
2.5. Theoretical perspectives and models 
 
2.5.1. Historical perspectives 
 ‘Hysterical’ symptoms including convulsions, have been documented since the early 
texts of ancient Egypt and Greece, with the ‘wandering uterus’ as the suggested causal 
mechanism (D.N. Black et al., 2004; Isaac & Chand, 2006; Kozlowska, 2005; Tasca et al., 
2012; Trimble, 2010).  Emotionally-caused seizure-like events were also recorded in 
ancient Babylonian culture (Francis & Baker, 1999; LaFrance & Schachter, 2010).  
Moreover, hysterical phenomena were described during the middle ages, but often 
attributed to witchery (Trimble, 2010).  However, Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893) 
brought the phenomena of hysteria back into the domain of medicine during his work 
at La Salpêtrière during the nineteenth century, with the “grande attaque” being 
considered the most extreme hysterical symptom (Faber, 1997).   
 
Following Charcot, his student Pierre Janet systematically developed the concept of 
dissociation as a narrowing of the range of conscious awareness, and proposed this 
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mechanism as the underlying process of hysterical symptoms, linked to previous 
traumatic experiences and ‘fixed ideas’ (van der Hart & Horst, 1989).  Janet’s 
contemporary and fellow student of Charcot, Sigmund Freud described the concept 
of conversion, along with Josef Breuer (R.J. Brown, 2004).  Freud proposed that 
hysterical symptoms represent psychic ‘energy’ converted into a symbolic physical 
symptom from unconscious emotional conflicts linked to previous traumatic 
experiences (V. Bell et al., 2011; D.N. Black et al., 2004; Trimble, 2010).  These conflicts 
or unacceptable emotions were said to be ‘repressed’ into the unconscious, in order 
to regulate the conscious awareness of negative affect (Nicholson, Stone, & Kanaan, 
2011).  Psychoanalytic accounts of conversion have had a clear influence on 
contemporary conceptualisations of DS.       
 
2.5.2. The role of trauma and emotion 
Following a psychodynamic approach, Betts and Boden (1992b) proposed that at least 
some types of DS are directly caused by previous sexual abuse.  For example, they 
suggested that an ‘abreactive’ type of seizure (i.e. stiffening, uncoordinated jerking, and 
pelvic-thrusting, back-arching) was 'acting out' a flashback of the traumatic events.  
Furthermore, the authors also linked the 'swoon' type of attack (i.e. collapse, 
unresponsiveness, limpness) to a dissociative state, allowing the patient to 'switch off' 
from painful memories or flashbacks from their traumatic past.   
 
Bowman (1993) proposed four different psychodynamic 'pathways' leading to the 
development of DS.  The most common of these involved patients with a history of 
childhood abuse, who exhibited considerable dissociative symptoms.  The onset of DS 
in such patients was often precipitated by a traumatic/stressful life experience that 
was proposed to be reminiscent of the original traumatic experience(s).  A second 
pathway involved rape during adulthood, either with no childhood abuse or in addition 
to childhood abuse.  In these patients, the DS were argued to be symbolic of the 
assault.  Thirdly, some patients did not report traumatic experiences per se, but 
instead had experienced multiple stresses that were said to have exceeded their 
coping capacity.  A final pathway was described as misdiagnosed panic attacks, some 




Additionally, Bowman and Markand (1996) reported that traumatic experiences were 
often rather remote in their sample, but that the onset of seizures was frequently 
precipitated by a recent stressful/traumatic experience that was in some way linked 
to the causal events.  Bowman and Markand (1999) further proposed that precipitating 
events lead to DS via four emotional mechanisms, including: provoking affect linked to 
remote trauma/abuse, increasing anger/frustration to an intolerable extent, triggering 
sadness or anxiety regarding possible losses, and stimulating affect linked to 
unspeakable or insoluble interpersonal conflicts.   
 
In summary, Bowman (2010) proposes that, for many patients, a combination of 
multiple stresses and traumas interact in overwhelming the individual's emotion 
regulation abilities.  Furthermore, these emotion regulation abilities are argued to be 
weakened by the dysfunctional family contexts in which they develop.   
 
2.5.3. Learning theory 
DS have been conceptualised from the perspective of learning theory by some 
authors.  This approach suggests that DS are learned behaviour patterns, acquired 
through operant and social learning mechanisms, such as positive and negative 
reinforcement and symptom modelling (Bautista et al., 2008; Sirven & Glosser, 1998; 
Volow, 1986).  Positive reinforcement could include the ‘primary gain’ of direct relief 
from unpleasant emotions such as anxiety (Moore & Baker, 1997; Ramani et al., 1980).  
Furthermore, negative reinforcement might be received in the form of avoidance or 
removal of undesired situations or demands (Baker et al., 1995; Frances et al., 1999; 
Ramani et al., 1980; Sirven & Glosser, 1998).  It has also been proposed that the 
adoption of the role of an individual with a chronic illness (i.e. the ‘sick role’) confers 
considerable ‘secondary gain’, whereby the individual is able to avoid undesirable 
demands or experiences (Slavney, 1994), or receives financial and social benefits, such 
as governmental financial assistance or attention/nurturance from significant others 
(Baker et al., 1995; Volow, 1986).   
 
Contemporary authors typically discuss learning/conditioning processes as shaping 
factors in the disorder, that allow symptoms to take the form of seizure-like episodes 
rather than a different form (e.g. Salmon et al., 2003).  Modelling of the symptoms of 
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DS could take place through observation of others’ seizures (e.g. family members with 
ES or DS), media representations of epilepsy, input from clinical epilepsy services (e.g. 
patients’ information literature, clinicians’ questions, diagnostic tests), and possibly 
modelling of one’s own seizures in the case of those with comorbid ES (Volow, 1986; 
Oto & Reuber, 2014).   
 
2.5.4. Family dynamics 
Another area that has been discussed with reference to the aetiology of DS is that of 
family systems.  Differences in areas such as emotional expression, control, and 
cohesiveness in the families of patients with DS may affect the development of 
emotional regulation and expression, and increase the tendency to experience 
psychological distress in physical ways (i.e. somatisation), or detach from difficult 
emotions (e.g. dissociation).  Salmon et al. (2003), for example, argued that DS might 
be a manifestation of a need for greater control, in situations where the individual 
feels powerless to exert their needs or wishes (Salmon et al., 2003).  The authors 
proposed a model in which poor parenting or adverse family dynamics may combine 
with abusive experiences to increase the risk of experiencing MUS in general.   
 
Furthermore, Quinn and colleagues (2010) noted that many psychotherapists 
experienced in DS saw the seizures as a means of expressing emotion.  This was 
viewed as a result of developing within dysfunctional interpersonal contexts (family 
systems) in which verbal communication of affect was censured, alongside 
encouragement/modelling of nonverbal affective expression.  An important role for 
disrupted attachment has also been proposed in the aetiology of DS (Holman et al., 
2008; Quinn, Schofield, & Middleton, 2008) 
 
2.5.5. Cognitive perspectives 
The core idea underlying cognitive accounts of conversion disorder/MUS is that the 
brain processes information in a hierarchical manner, with much of the basic motor 
and perceptual processing occurring low down in the system, relatively automatically, 
and below the level of conscious awareness.  It is argued that MUS (and DS) could be 
the result of such processes occurring in the lower parts of the cognitive system 




Hilgard's neodissociation theory (1994) has had considerable influence on 
conceptualisations of dissociative and conversion processes.  Based on hypnotic 
phenomena, Hilgard proposed the presence of a 'hidden observer' with access to 
knowledge and information not consciously available to the hypnotised individual.  The 
theory proposed the existence of a central control or ‘executive’ structure that plans, 
monitors, selects and controls the actions of subordinate cognitive/behavioural 
systems.  Once selected, these subordinate systems have some degree of autonomy 
and independence of functioning, and they exist within a hierarchical structure 
whereby any one may be dominant at a given time.  The subordinate control systems 
include sets of specific routines/schemata, developed on the basis of previous 
experience.  Hilgard argued that, under certain conditions, disruption to the 
connections between the central structure and the subordinate systems manifest in a 
loss of voluntary control/awareness of processes (e.g. memory, physical) carried out 
by the lower-level systems.  In other words, the actions and operations of the 
subordinate systems have been ‘dissociated’ from the executive control system.   
 
Subsequently, Oakley (1999) presented a cognitive model which sought to explain 
hypnotic, conversion and dissociative phenomena.  Oakley differentiated between 
evolutionarily ‘older’ subcortical neural systems that mediate relatively automatic 
behaviours and more recently developed ‘consciousness’ systems (i.e. the neocortex).  
According to this model, the consciousness systems include a ‘priority action system’ 
(PAS), in which processes of relevance to the most urgent challenges are prioritised 
for more elaborate processing.  The contents of the PAS are determined by an 
‘executive’ structure that is also within the consciousness systems, but that is separate 
from the PAS.  This executive structure was thought to be based in frontal neural 
systems and recruited when habitual or well-learned responses are not suitable, such 
as when confronted with novel situations or stimuli.   
 
Oakley makes the key distinction that we are only currently aware of the outcomes 
of the processes occurring in the executive system, but not the processes themselves.  
It is the material that is selected by the executive system that constitutes our 
subjective experience (i.e. the contents of the PAS), not the process itself.  According 
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to this model, it is possible to ‘fool’ the PAS into altered or aberrant subjective 
experiences, by inhibition of information flow into it, or by exaggeration or erroneous 
information being fed in.  In addition, either the executive system or internal/external 
stimulation can initiate behaviour without involvement of the PAS.  This model could 
be applied to explain the symptoms of DS.   
 
R.J. Brown (2004; 2006) also proposed a cognitive account of MUS.  According to this 
perspective, MUS are caused by automatic (preconscious) selection of the ‘wrong’ 
information for cognitive processing and automatic behavioural control by a primary 
attentional system (PAS).  In other words, erroneous information is selected at the 
stage of attentional allocation.  These erroneous ‘hypotheses’ are labelled ‘rogue 
representations’ and can be learned via direct and indirect exposure to physical states 
in the self and others, verbal suggestion and cultural knowledge about illness, bodily 
states and health.   
 
More specifically, R.J. Brown argues that DS might occur as a result of environmental 
or internal cues automatically activating a procedural representation or schemata, 
characterised by seizure-like behaviour, perceptions and cognitions.  The chronicity of 
MUS is thought to relate to repeated direction of attentional resources to the 
symptoms, which serves to increase the general level of activation in these ‘rogue 
representations’, thereby increasing the likelihood that such representations will be 
selected by the PAS automatically on an ongoing basis.  Crucially, because these 
processes occur below the level of conscious awareness, the individual is not aware 
of the falsity of the interpretation, and thus fully believes in the reality of the symptoms 
experienced.  Finally, this model attempts to take into account the influence of 
traumatic experiences.  It is argued that traumatic experiences increase the likelihood 
of bodily-focused attention as this provides a means of reducing attention to the 
distressing emotions and thoughts linked to such events.  Attentional resources are 
thus removed from self-regulation and instead allocated to bodily symptoms.          
 
Within cognitive accounts, MUS (and thus DS) are conceptualised as disruption of 
normal psychological processes, rather than as entirely pathological phenomena 
(Halligan, Bass, & Wade, 2000).  However, these cognitive accounts do not fully explore 
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the issue at the heart of conversion disorder (and dissociative disorders including DS): 
the central role of negative affect.  Furthermore, Carson et al. (2012) recommend that 
such cognitive models are integrated with other theoretical perspectives, such as 
neurobiological accounts, and those including attachment, emotional and relationship 
problems.  
 
2.5.6. Neurobiological accounts 
There have been a number of valuable reviews of neurobiological findings in patients 
with conversion disorders and/or DS.  Together, these reviews suggest that differences 
in pathways between several brain regions may play a role in DS and related 
conversion disorders (e.g. movement disorder), including regions of importance for 
emotion and its regulation (e.g. ventromedial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, anterior 
cingulate cortex), motor planning, execution and coordination (e.g. basal ganglia, 
motor cortex, cerebellum), cognitive/behavioural/motor control (e.g. dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex) and areas involved in awareness of self and the environment, such 
as parietal cortex (Nicholson & Kanaan, 2009; Nowak & Fink, 2009; Perez et al., 2014; 
Spence,  2006; Vuilleumier, 2014).  However, it has been noted that at present, there is 
too little evidence to propose a definite neurobiological model of conversion disorder 
(Carson et al., 2012; Nicholson & Kanaan, 2009).   
 
2.6. Conclusions 
Individuals diagnosed with DS are a complex and heterogeneous group.  There are 
biological, psychological, and social/environmental contributions to the aetiology of 
the condition, with possibly more than one pathway.  However, there remain large 
gaps in current understanding of the disorder.  Considerable knowledge has 
accumulated regarding the general psychological characteristics of patients with DS; 
however, there has been much less research on the specific psychological mechanisms 
underlying the occurrence of the seizures.  Experimental psychological research 
methods could be utilised more extensively to provide further insight into these 
psychological processes.  In accordance with this proposition, Chapter 3 outlines the 





Chapter 3. Dissociation, emotion and dissociative seizures  
The current chapter provides a discussion of the concept of dissociation, and how 
this psychological process might relate to DS.  Specifically, it is proposed that a 
dissociative mechanism might underlie the occurrence of DS.  The possible 
contributions of emotional processes to DS are also discussed, and a literature review 
of previous research pertaining to this is presented.  On the basis of the literature 
reviewed in the thesis so far, an aetiological framework is proposed, and a 
hypothetical model presented, aiming to combine affective, dissociative and cognitive 
accounts of DS.  Finally, the rationale, aims, and hypotheses of the current research 
are provided.    
 
 
3.1. The nature of dissociation 
 
3.1.1. Definitions and conceptualisation 
Stone (2006) succinctly defines dissociation as a “…disconnection of bodily 
perception, thoughts, emotions, memories and identity” (p.309).  However, the term 
has previously been used to refer to a variety of inter-related processes or constructs 
(R.J. Brown, 2002; E.A. Holmes et al., 2005; Kennedy et al., 2004).  Cardeña (1994) 
provided a useful summary of some of the different applications of the term 
‘dissociation’.  According to this account, there are three predominant ways in which 
the term has been conceptualised, including two different types of dissociation (1 and 
2) and a proposed function (3), as follows: 
 
1. dissociation as non-integrated mental modules/systems (e.g. dissociative amnesia, 
dissociative fugue, dissociative identity disorder, conversion disorders) 
2. dissociation as an alteration in consciousness involving a feeling of separation 
from the self or the environment (e.g. depersonalisation, derealisation) 
3. dissociation as a defence mechanism (i.e. serving to reduce emotional distress) 
 
Moreover, two superordinate forms of dissociation have been proposed by E.A. 
Holmes et al. (2005).  Detachment was proposed to involve the experience of “…an 
altered state of consciousness characterised by a sense of separation from certain 
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aspects of everyday experience, be it their body…their sense of self…or the external 
world” (p.5). This definition incorporates phenomena such as depersonalisation, 
derealisation, out-of-body experiences, and emotional numbing/blunting.  On the 
other hand, compartmentalisation was argued to be characterised by “…a deficit in 
the ability to deliberately control processes or actions that would normally be 
amenable to such control…” (p.7), as in the case of conversion disorders or 
dissociative amnesia, for example.  It was argued that the compartmentalised 
processes continue to operate, and are able to exert an influence on behaviour, 
emotion and cognition, albeit at a preconscious level.  Dissociative Identity Disorder 
(DID) is an example of a disorder involving severe and enduring compartmentalisation.   
 
Other authors have distinguished another sub-type of dissociation, namely 
somatoform dissociation.  This term refers to “…phenomena that are manifestations 
of a lack of integration of somatoform experiences, reactions, and functions” 
(Nijenhuis, 2001, p.9).  Thus, somatoform dissociation refers to the phenomena 
typically observed in somatoform disorders, such as conversion disorder.  Somatoform 
dissociation might represent a subtype of compartmentalisation (R.J. Brown, 2004). 
 
3.1.2. Pathological dissociation  
In the late nineteenth century, Pierre Janet proposed that psychological dissociation 
(‘désagrégations psychologiques’) is a pathological phenomenon, involving a disruption 
of the mind’s usually integrated processes, manifesting in particular processes being 
isolated or ‘split off ’ from conscious experience whilst simultaneously exerting 
control or influence over behaviour (R.J. Brown, 2002; 2004; Buhler & Heim, 2009; van 
der Hart & Horst, 1989;).  Janet’s perspective suggested that such tendencies towards 
dissociation are in some respect ‘constitutional’, in other words, a weakness or flaw 
in the individual’s personality (R.J. Brown, 2002; Nicholson et al., 2011).   
 
A distinction between non-pathological and pathological dissociation has been made 
more recently (e.g. Rodewald et al., 2010; Spitzer et al., 2006; N. Waller, Putnam, & 
Carlson, 1996).  It is recognised that some dissociative experiences are fairly common 
in the general population (Gershuny & Thayer, 1999; Stone, 2006), and that dissociation 
occurs on a continuum from relatively ‘normal’ daily experiences (absentmindedness, 
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absorption) to some of the more severe identity disturbances that characterise 
dissociative identity disorder, at the other end of the spectrum (Bernstein & Putnam, 
1986).  Nemiah (1981, as cited by Foa & Hearst-Ikeda, 1996) proposed that 
pathological dissociation may have two key features: an altered experience of personal 
identity and amnesia for events occurring during a dissociative episode.  Moreover, N. 
Waller and colleagues (1996) argue that pathological dissociation can be seen as a 
‘discrete latent variable’ (p.301), a ‘taxon’, that is qualitatively different to non-
pathological dissociation and is relatively rare in the general population.   
 
3.1.3. Methods of investigating dissociation 
A wide variety of tools have been used to assess dissociative experiences and 
disorders, most commonly self-report questionnaires and structured clinical 
interviews.  Self-report measures of ‘trait’ dissociative tendencies include the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), the Dissociation 
Questionnaire (DIS-Q; Vanderlinden et al., 1991), and the Multiscale Dissociation 
Inventory (MDI; Briere, 2002).  These measures examine dissociative experiences that 
occur on an ongoing basis in daily life.  However, there are also a number of self-report 
measures that assess ‘state’ dissociation, including the Peri-traumatic Dissociative 
Experiences Questionnaire (PDEQ; Marmar, Weiss, & Metzler, 1997), and the Clinician 
Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS; Bremner et al., 1998).  State 
dissociation refers to immediate dissociative experiences occurring at a given time-
point.    
 
Moreover, a self-report measure of somatoform dissociation has also been created 
(Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire, SDQ; Nijenhuis et al., 1996), which has been 
developed in a short-form (5 items, SDQ-5; Nijenhuis et al., 1997) and a longer form 
(20 items, SDQ-20; Nijenhuis et al., 1996).  On the other hand, the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D; Steinberg et al., 1993) is thought 
to be less susceptible to social desirability biases than self-report measures, and also 
allows diagnosis of dissociative disorders where present.  However, a highly qualified 
professional is required to administer the SCID-D and the interview is relatively time-
consuming; therefore, it may be less efficient than self-report measures and impractical 




3.1.4. Biological correlates of dissociation 
Whilst dissociation is not thought to be caused by a specific organic pathology, it is 
accepted that functional neurobiological differences might be associated with the 
phenomena (Kihlstrom, 2005).  Dissociative states might be triggered by high levels of 
autonomic arousal, such as during an acute traumatic event (Krystal et al., 1996; 
Marmar et al., 1998).  However, the pathophysiology of dissociation remains poorly 
understood (Krystal et al., 1996; van der Kruijs et al., 2011).  Investigators are now 
starting to attempt to investigate neurobiological processes correlated with 
dissociative and conversion phenomena using functional neuroimaging.  A number of 
studies have found functional neural differences in patients with dissociative disorders 
(e.g. Ghaffar, Staines, & Weinstein, 2006; Staniloui et al., 2012; Stone et al., 2007; van 
der Kruijs et al., 2012).   
 
 
3.2. The causal link between trauma and dissociation 
 
3.2.1. Trauma as a risk factor for elevated dissociation 
Elevated (somatoform and psychological) dissociative symptoms and pathological 
dissociation have been repeatedly found to be associated with previous traumatic 
experiences, particularly childhood abuse.  Studies have reported this relationship in 
both clinical and non-clinical samples (Anderson, Yasenik, & Ross, 1993; Boysan et al., 
2009; Briere et al. 2006; Chu & Dill, 1990; DiTomasso & Routh, 1993; Draijer & 
Langeland, 1999; Engel et al., 1996; Foote et al., 2006; Gershuny & Thayer, 1999; 
Goodwin & Sachs, 1996; Irwin, 1996; 1999; Isaac & Chand, 2006; Modestin et al., 1996; 
Mulder et al., 1998; Nijenhuis, Spinhoven, et al., 1998; Nijenhuis, van Dyck, et al., 2003; 
Roelofs et al., 2002; Ross & Ness, 2010; Sack, Boroske-Leiner, & Lahmann, 2010; Sar et 
al., 2000; 2007; G. Waller et al., 2001).   
 
Briere (2006), for example, reported that 90% of individuals from the general 
population with clinical elevations on one or more dissociation scales (on the MDI) 
had a history of trauma.  Moreover, a study of psychiatric inpatients (Draijer & 
Langeland, 1999) indicated that sexual abuse and physical abuse were highly predictive 
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of elevated dissociation scores.  Similarly, Nijenhuis, Spinhoven, et al. (1998) reported 
that physical and sexual trauma were predictive of somatoform dissociation, and 
sexual trauma was predictive of psychological dissociation, in psychiatric patients.  
Furthermore, Anderson and colleagues (1993) reported that 88.2% of a sample of 
female sexual abuse survivors met the criteria for a dissociative disorder in adulthood.  
These are just a small selection of studies that have indicated a strong association 
between traumatic life events, elevations in dissociation and/or the presence of 
dissociative disorder.  However, Kihlstrom (2005) noted several methodological 
limitations in this research literature, such as retrospective assessment of variables, 
uncorroborated reports of trauma/abuse and lack of clinical control groups in many 
studies.  Future studies should aim to address these limitations. 
 
3.2.2. Peri-traumatic dissociation 
Peri-traumatic dissociation is a well-documented phenomenon (Marmar et al., 1998), 
and provides one of the most compelling examples of the direct causal link between 
traumatic experiences and dissociation.  Peri-traumatic phenomena can include 
derealisation and depersonalisation (e.g. altered sense of time, out-of-body 
experiences), but also somatoform phenomena such as altered vision, pain perception 
or motor control.  Therefore, symptoms characteristic of both psychological and 
somatoform dissociation can occur in close proximity to traumatic events.   
 
During, or in the short-term aftermath of a traumatic experience, dissociation may 
well be an adaptive mechanism (R.J. Brown, 2002), by which the individual can continue 
functioning or responding in an adaptive manner, despite extremely intense negative 
affect.  In fact, symptoms of somatoform dissociation, such as motor inhibition and 
analgesia, have been proposed to serve a similar function to the typical animal 
defensive reactions observed in response to direct threat and/or injury, such as 
‘freezing’ (Nijenhuis, 2001; Nijenhuis, Vanderlinden, & Spinhoven, 1998).  Nevertheless, 
peri-traumatic dissociation is thought to be a risk factor for the later development of 
PTSD (Breh & Seidler, 2007; Ozer et al. 2003).  
  
3.2.3. Dissociation in PTSD 
Dissociative symptoms are among the core symptoms required for a positive 
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diagnosis of PTSD, including emotional numbing/constriction, ‘flashbacks’, and 
detachment.  Indeed, a key conceptualisation of PTSD is that the traumatic 
experiences have been dissociated from consciousness, potentially accounting for 
subsequent intrusive memories (Chu, 1996).  In fact, some authors have proposed the 
existence a distinct subtype of PTSD, characterised by elevated dissociative symptoms, 
which could represent a form of ‘emotional over-modulation’ (Lanius et al., 2010, p. 
640). 
 
3.2.4. Theoretical perspectives: trauma and dissociation 
Janet articulated clear links between hysteria/dissociation and traumatic experiences 
(Buhler & Heim, 2009), proposing that traumatic experiences can trigger the 
‘narrowing of the field of consciousness’. Janet further suggested that traumatic 
memories can remain in the mind in the form of subconscious 'fixed ideas' (Brown & 
van der Hart, 1998), which can be activated by external stimuli, and might continue to 
influence behaviour and experience.   
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that childhood trauma is specifically linked to higher 
levels of dissociation in adulthood, because the child more readily adopts a dissociative 
style of coping with emotionally overwhelming events (Chu, 1996).  Sack and 
colleagues (2010) argue that early traumatisation, particularly that of a sexual nature, 
can provoke a protective dissociative response in order to cope with the resultant 
psychological distress; this dissociative response manifests as “discontinuity between 
the self and body” (p.315).  This discontinuity could become a habitual way of managing 
psychological or physical pain.  
 
Putnam (1997) proposed a developmental model of dissociative psychopathology, in 
which repeated traumatisation during infancy or childhood disrupts the usual 
development of integrative functions of the mind, with dysfunctional attachment 
relationships compounding this process.  It was argued that these disruptions lead to 
the individual experiencing behavioural and mental states that are not integrated, 
otherwise known as dissociative states.  This model is known as the ‘discrete 




Furthermore, Van der Hart and colleagues (2004) have proposed a model of trauma-
related dissociation based upon the concept of ‘structural dissociation of the 
personality’ (p.907).  According to this model, dissociation involves encoding trauma-
related information in a ‘dissociated part of the personality’ (p.908), which would allow 
such information to be accessible in certain conditions only.  The authors argued that 
maintenance of structural dissociation is largely due to learning processes, including 
associative fear conditioning, evaluative conditioning and social learning processes.  
 
Dalenburg and colleagues (2012) conducted an extensive review of studies relevant 
to the trauma model of dissociation and concluded that there is a strong association 
between trauma and dissociative experiences (as a continuum), and between trauma 
and diagnoses of dissociative disorders.  The authors also proposed that dissociation 
occurs as a regulatory mechanism in response to extreme negative affect, such as fear.    
 
 
3.3. Dissociative seizures as dissociative phenomena 
As described in Chapter 1 (section 1.1), psychogenic seizures are classified as 
‘dissociative convulsions’ in ICD-10.  This term has been broadened to ‘dissociative 
seizures’ by some authors (e.g. Goldstein & Mellers, 2006; Schmutz, 2013), as the 
attacks can include phenomena that resemble ES that are not necessarily convulsive 
in nature (e.g. atonic episodes).  Many experts now propose that DS are a 
manifestation of dissociated mental processes, in at least a proportion of cases (Baslet 
et al., 2010; R.J. Brown, 2002; Harden, 1997; Kuyk et al., 1996; Goldstein & Mellers, 
2006; Mellers, 2009; Moore & Baker, 1997; Roberts & Reuber, 2014).   
  
3.3.1. The causal role of trauma in DS 
On the basis of elevated levels of trauma, particularly childhood abuse in patients with 
DS (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1), authors have proposed a prominent aetiological 
role for traumatic experiences.  It is possible that, in some cases, DS represent a 
manifestation of the dissociative subtype of PTSD (Fiszman et al., 2004; Reuber, 
Howlett, & Kemp, 2005).  Furthermore, as proposed by Bowman (1993), when a 
history of trauma is not present, it is possible that multiple stressors might also 
predispose towards dissociative tendencies and/or DS.  As suggested by Reuber and 
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colleagues (2005), the condition known as Prolonged Duress Stress Disorder may be 
of relevance to DS, as it is similar to PTSD in presentation, but thought to be caused 
by long-term stress during development, rather than acute/isolated traumatic events.   
 
3.3.2. Dissociative phenomena in patients diagnosed with DS 
Stone and Carson (2013) described a case series including a number of patients with 
DS who seemed to make a conscious choice to dissociate at the time of their seizures, 
termed ‘wilful submission’ to seizure onset.  Furthermore, as noted by Mellers (2009), 
many patients with DS anecdotally report feeling disconnected from their 
surroundings during seizures. Peri-ictal symptoms of depersonalisation/derealisation 
have also been found to be elevated in patients with DS relative to those with ES 
(Hendrickson et al., 2014).   
 
Rates of comorbid dissociative disorders are often high in samples with DS (Baillés et 
al., 2004; Bowman, 1993; 2010; Bowman & Markand, 1996; Litwin and Cardeña, 2000; 
Marchetti et al., 2009).  Patients diagnosed with DS have also been found to receive 
elevated scores on measures of trait dissociation such as the DES (Bowman, 1993; 
Mitchell et al., 2012).  Furthermore, several studies have reported higher DES scores 
in patients with DS relative to those with ES (Akyuz et al., 2004; Dikel et al., 2003; 
Goldstein & Mellers, 2006; Ito et al., 2004; 2009; Mazza et al., 2009; Proença et al., 
2011; Prueter et al., 2002; Reuber, House, et al., 2003; van der Kruijs et al., 2012; van 
Merode et al., 2004) and healthy controls (Goldstein et al., 2000; Ito et al., 2004; 
2009; Mazza et al., 2009; O’Brien et al., 2015).  However, DES scores have been 
reported to be comparable in patients with DS only and those with mixed ES and DS 
(Mitchell et al., 2012).  Interestingly, one study showed that DES scores were 
significantly higher in traumatised patients with DS, compared to those who did not 
report traumatic life events (Hingray et al., 2011). 
 
On the converse, some investigators have failed to find significant elevations in DES 
scores for patients with DS compared to those with ES (Alper et al., 1997; Bowman 
& Coons, 2000; Fleisher et al., 2002; Litwin & Cardeña, 2000). Nonetheless, using 
factor analysis, Alper et al. (1997) reported that their DS group showed significantly 
higher scores than the ES group on a factor described as 'depersonalisation-
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derealisation', and Bowman and Coons (2000) found that the patients with DS scored 
significantly higher on the SCID-D, relative to those with ES.  Moreover, the studies 
of Fleisher et al. (2002) and Litwin and Cardeña (2000) both had methodological 
limitations, namely the inclusion of patients with comorbid ES in the DS group, and a 
very limited sample size (DS n = 10) respectively.   
 
When other scales have been used to measure dissociation in patients with DS, 
findings have been mixed.  Ozcetin and colleagues (2009) and van der Kruijs et al. 
(2012) reported significantly higher scores on the DIS-Q in patients with DS relative 
to healthy control participants; however, Kuyk et al. (1999) failed to observe higher 
DIS-Q scores in DS patients relative to those with ES.  Interestingly, scores on the 
CADSS did not differ between groups (DS, ES) in one study, despite significant 
differences on the DES (Akyuz et al., 2004).  This finding highlights the importance of 
assessing dissociative phenomena using more than one measure, if possible.  The 
CADSS measures state dissociation, in contrast to the DES which assesses trait 
dissociative symptoms.   
      
A number of studies have also examined the presence of somatoform dissociation in 
patients with DS.  Kuyk et al. (1999), for example, found that somatoform dissociation 
discriminated between DS and ES groups, although psychological dissociation did not.  
Higher scores on the SDQ-20 in DS patients relative to those with ES have also been 
reported in other studies (R.J. Brown et al., 2013; Lally et al., 2010).  Furthermore, 
patients with DS have been shown to receive higher SDQ-20 scores compared to 
healthy control groups (van der Kruijs et al., 2012; Xue et al., 2013).  Spinhoven et al. 
(2004) observed elevated SDQ-20 scores in patients with DS, relative to normative 
samples.  Despite this, Bodde et al. (2013) reported that DS patients did not deviate 
from normative scores on either the SDQ-20 or the DIS-Q.  Two subtypes of 
dissociation were examined by Lawton et al. (2008), in patients with DS and ES.  
These were depersonalisation (‘detachment’) and somatoform dissociation 
(‘compartmentalisation’).  Whilst the DS group reported significantly elevated 
symptoms of the latter form of dissociation (relative to ES patients), this finding did 




Regarding comparisons of patients with ES and DS on dissociation measures, as noted 
by other authors (R.J. Brown, 2002; Lawton et al., 2008), some phenomena that occur 
during ES are superficially similar to dissociation, but many of them are not actually 
dissociative because they are caused by epileptogenic electrophysiological activity.  
Nevertheless, the superficial resemblance of ES symptoms to dissociative phenomena 
is likely to confound scores on measures such as the DES; therefore, comparing 
patients with ES and DS on such measures may not be informative.   
 
In summary, the current evidence generally supports the proposition that patients 
with DS experience elevated dissociative symptoms, relative to patients with ES and 
healthy controls.  The mixed findings are most likely due to methodological 
weaknesses, such as imprecise measures that do not differentiate different types of 
dissociation, inclusion of comorbid ES in DS samples, limited sample sizes, and lack of 
control for possible confounds (i.e. general psychological distress).   
 
3.3.3. Theoretical perspectives on dissociation and DS 
Several authors have proposed a shared mechanism underlying the dissociative and 
conversion disorders, and MUS more generally.  Kihlstrom (2005, p.242), for example, 
notes the common feature of “…divisions in consciousness, and dissociations 
between explicit and implicit memory and perception…”.  Bowman and Markand 
(1996) propose that dissociative, somatoform and conversion disorders may 
represent a spectrum of dissociative-somatic reactions to trauma.  In addition, V. Bell 
et al. (2011) conceptualised conversion/hysteria as a specific type of dissociation 
(compartmentalisation), entailing disconnection between elements of cognition and 
conscious awareness/control.  Similarly, Harden (1997) points out that both 
dissociation and conversion refer to phenomena over which the individual has no 
voluntary control or awareness.   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 2.5.5), R.J. Brown has presented a cognitive 
account of MUS (2004; 2006); however, he also applied this perspective to DS 
specifically (2002).  According to this perspective, DS may represent a previously 
learned behavioural routine, triggered by environmental cues without conscious 
awareness or executive control.  A cognitive control system was proposed to have a 
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key role in inhibiting the executive system and the information feedback from lower 
level systems.  This control system was proposed to be directly activated by 
environmental triggers.  The inhibition of executive control occurs after the activation 
of lower-levels subsystems, rather than before, in this model.  R.J. Brown (2002) argued 
that the behavioural routines could be learned through symptom modelling, or that 
they could be an innate and evolutionarily old defensive function.  In terms of 
environmental cues, triggers were proposed to include any stimuli associated with the 
learned behavioural routines, in addition to anxiety and/or associated thoughts, images 
or memories.  This theory proposes an intuitively and theoretically plausible account 
of DS; however, it does not explain in detail how anxiety or other intense affect might 
activate the cognitive control and behavioural systems.   
 
Not all authors agree that a dissociative account of DS applies to all cases.  Roberts 
and Reuber (2014), for example, assert that a dissociative mechanism only applies to 
a proportion of patients.  Schmutz (2013) also proposes that there are several 
subgroups of patients exhibiting DS, with different underlying psychological causation 
including somatoform dissociation, psychological dissociation, PTSD, conversion 
disorder, and adjustment disorders.  On the other hand, Bodde et al. (2009) and 
Bowman (2010) argue that dissociation is not the cause of DS, but instead is the 
psychological mechanism underling the seizures.   
 
3.3.4. Summary and conclusions: trauma, dissociation and DS 
Dissociation has been closely linked to traumatic and highly stressful life experiences, 
particularly those occurring in childhood.  It is possible that individuals subjected to 
severe or repeated trauma or multiple stressors during development may develop a 
habitually dissociative way of processing information and responding to stress, which 
can be termed ‘trait’ dissociation.  On the other hand, ‘state’ dissociation might serve 
to reduce the short-term emotional impact of an acute trauma, highly stressful event 
or intolerable levels of affective distress/arousal.  The presumed function of both trait 
and state dissociation is to reduce the subjective experience of intense or aversive 




Patients with DS often report trauma and/or multiple stressors in their histories.  An 
increasingly accepted perspective on the nature of DS is that they are a manifestation 
of a dissociative psychological process.  In the present thesis, it is proposed that 
dissociation, defined as an involuntary reduction/loss of normal control or awareness of 
bodily or psychological processes, constitutes the mechanism that is likely to underlie 
DS.  Moreover, it is suggested that this mechanism is potentially shared with other 
dissociative and conversion/somatoform disorders.  The next section explores how 
emotional processes might relate to an underlying dissociative mechanism in this 
disorder.     
 
 
3.4. The role of emotion in dissociative seizures: previous theoretical 
perspectives 
Emotions are central to most influential theories of dissociation (Oathes & Ray, 2008).  
As previously mentioned, dissociation is commonly thought to be a response to, 
and/or an unconscious attempt to cope with (negative) affective experience; it may 
also reflect failures in the integration of affect (Rodin, de Groot, & Spivak, 2002).  
Rodin and colleagues (2002) suggest that the shared feature between trauma, 
dissociation and somatisation is that they all involve altered processing of emotions.  
As proposed by Roberts and Reuber (2014), one manifestation of dissociation could 
be a loss of the usual connections between different aspects of emotional processing 
(e.g. subjective, physiological), or reduced integration of emotional responses into 
current consciousness or identity.  
 
Cutting across almost all theories of the aetiology of DS is the basic idea that an 
intolerance, avoidance, or difficulty coping with anxiety or emotional distress/arousal 
contributes to the occurrence of the episodes (Dimaro et al., 2014; Roberts & 
Reuber, 2014).  For example, Moore and Baker (1997) suggested that DS are likely 
to be a manifestation of high levels of emotional arousal.  Bodde et al. (2009) suggested 
that an increased tendency to dissociate is an 'emotional mechanism' (p.9) that serves 
to trigger the seizures (in some cases).  Authors generally concur that the seizures 
serve to release, express or avoid intense or over-whelming emotional states (e.g. 




Goldstein and Mellers (2006; 2012) have proposed a dissociative model of DS, 
suggesting that the episodes represent a “…dissociative response to emotional 
arousal.” (p.438). It was argued that during the seizures, patients experience 
autonomic signs of emotional arousal, which may be triggered by emotionally 
significant environmental cues, such as trauma-associated stimuli.  However, alongside 
the elevated physiological arousal, subjective states suggest that conscious awareness 
of the arousal and associated emotion is impaired.  This constitutes the basic 
mechanism by which DS may operate and may be the ultimate ‘reward’ for the patient 
– protection of the individual’s consciousness from the highly aversive affect.  The 
authors recommend further investigation of the subjective phenomena experienced 
by patients during their seizures, alongside physiological measures of autonomic 
arousal.   
 
Baslet (2011) more recently hypothesised that patients with DS may have reduced 
tolerance for arousal.  It was proposed that specific triggers (sensory, emotional, 
cognitive) might cause patients' arousal levels to deviate from their narrow tolerable 
level, initiating the occurrence of DS symptoms.  It was proposed that triggers might 
be difficult to identify in many instances, due to alterations in preconscious emotional 
information processing.  He further argued that some of the autonomous behaviours 
observed during DS (e.g. autonomic arousal, movements) might be 'pre-wired' 
responses that are not accessible to cognitive/voluntary control, and only occur in 
the absence of appropriate cognitive processing.  During DS, Baslet suggested that 
the cognitive, emotional and sensorimotor systems may be operating in an 
autonomous manner.  Furthermore, it was proposed that emotional arousal may act 
as a core trigger in the initiation of individual DS, directly influencing cognitive control 
and behavioural manifestations.  This mechanism was suggested to involve abnormal 
connectivity between 'emotion' areas of the brain (e.g. amygdala), the 
'executive'/cognitive integration areas (e.g. lateral prefrontal cortex), and areas 
involved in automatic (pre-wired) behavioural tendencies (e.g. sensorimotor areas).   
 
Furthermore, Roberts and Reuber (2014) also argued that emotion has a central 
contributing role in triggering DS.  They proposed three mechanisms by which 
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emotional states might lead to DS.  One is similar to the typical dissociative account 
of DS; that consciousness is reduced due to excessive inhibition of emotional 
processing.  Secondly, that the behavioural symptoms and loss of consciousness in DS 
are direct manifestations of intense emotional experiences, with no dissociative 
mechanism occurring.  Finally, they propose that minor fluctuations in emotion or 
affectively-conditioned innocuous stimuli may elicit DS preconsciously.   
 
The dissociative mechanism proposed by Roberts and Reuber (2014) assumes the 
involvement of excessive inhibition of emotion.  However, another possibility is that 
the emotional processes continue, yet it is just the awareness of these emotions that 
is inhibited.  This would still represent a dissociative mechanism, but would explain 
why patients with DS frequently experience symptoms of emotional arousal, without 
subjective experience of the emotion.  In the model proposed by Roberts and Reuber 
(2014), it is assumed that DS are distinguishable from the process of dissociation.  
However, it is proposed here that the seizure itself is a dissociative phenomenon; 
that is, a loss of integration between conscious awareness, voluntary control, and 
emotional experience.  Many, if not all DS involve disturbances of responsivity, 
voluntary control and alterations of consciousness/awareness.  These disturbances 
can be seen as dissociation in and of themselves.   
  
 
3.5. Emotion in patients diagnosed with DS: literature review 
 
3.5.1. Self-report measures 
General emotional distress 
As described in Chapter 2 (sections 2.2. and 2.3), patients diagnosed with DS 
experience considerable emotional distress on an ongoing basis.  They often report 
elevated stress in daily life, in addition to numerous recent or remote adverse life 
events.  Generally elevated symptoms of depression and anxiety are commonly 
reported in the literature.  Self-injurious and suicidal behaviours are also documented 
in some cases.  DS patients report elevations in fear sensitivity (Hixson et al., 2006), 
suggesting heightened anxiety levels in response to various stimuli and situations.  
Panic symptoms are also frequently reported in this group (e.g. Frolov et al., 2003; 
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Hendrickson et al., 2014; Silva et al., 2001; Witgert, Wheless, & Breier, 2005).  
Furthermore, one study reported heightened experience and expression of anger and 
hostility in patients with DS, in comparison with control participants (Mökleby et al., 
2002).  In summary, patients with DS seem to experience considerable emotional 
distress in daily life. 
 
Emotional dysregulation (ED) 
Numerous studies have indicated that patients with DS have difficulties in regulating 
their emotional states and reactions.  Personality traits associated with emotional 
under-control (e.g. BPD) are the most common patterns reported.  For example, 
Reuber, Pukrop, et al. (2004) found that patients with DS reported significantly greater 
trait ED than both healthy and ES control groups.  Moreover, several research groups 
have explored subtypes of ED in this group.  Bodde et al. (2013) reported that, relative 
to normative standards, patients with DS showed significant elevations on a number 
of subscales from the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefksi 
& Kraaij, 2007), which included ‘acceptance’ (tolerance of current emotion and 
acceptance of the negative experience), ‘rumination’ (focusing on the feelings and 
thoughts provoked by a negative experience), ‘self-blame’ (placing responsibility for 
events on the self) and ‘positive refocusing’ (channelling attention from the negative 
experience to more positive and rewarding stimuli or experiences).  Obviously, not 
all of these emotion regulation strategies are necessarily maladaptive.  One limitation 
of this study was the inclusion of a ‘cognitive’ measure of emotion regulation only 
(excluding behavioural strategies).  Nevertheless, the findings suggest that patients 
with DS may have different ways of consciously regulating their emotions, when 
compared to the general population.    
 
In addition, Gul and Ahmad (2014) reported that patients with DS scored higher on 
emotion suppression and lower on cognitive reappraisal than healthy control 
participants, as measured with the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 
2003).  Another sample of patients with DS scored comparably to healthy controls on 
the Affect Intensity Measure (Larsen & Diener, 1987), suggesting similarly intense 
emotional reactions between groups (Urbanek et al., 2014).  However, this sample 
reported a greater tendency to control anxious or dysphoric (unhappy) affective 
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states and expressed more negative beliefs about emotions, compared to the control 
group.   
 
On the other hand, some authors have identified subgroups of patients with DS who 
exhibit particular difficulties in ED.  R.J. Brown and colleagues (2013) reported that 
only a subgroup of their sample of DS patients showed deficits in ED relative to 
patients with ES, including difficulties in identifying, accepting and describing feelings, 
carrying out goal-directed behaviour, controlling feelings/actions, and using adaptive 
regulatory strategies.  The authors argued that this group could be characterised as 
showing an 'under-modulation of affect', with DS representing a mechanism by which 
intense emotional distress is interrupted and relieved.  However, several limitations 
were also noted by the authors, including the use of a postal survey, small sample size, 
and a lack of assessment of comorbid psychopathology or neurological illnesses/injury.   
 
Uliaszek and colleagues (2012) also identified two specific subgroups of patients with 
DS using cluster analysis.  One subgroup showed a pattern of generally high levels of 
ED; however, another subgroup reported particularly high levels of emotional 
regulation, specifically with regard to awareness of emotional reactions and the ability 
to maintain goal-driven behaviour despite such emotional reactions.  Furthermore, 
belonging to the high ED group significantly predicted a number of psychological 
variables (e.g. depression, anxiety, stress, dissociation).  As might be expected, the 
group high in ED also had significantly more comorbid psychiatric diagnoses than the 
low dysregulation group.   
 
Together, the findings suggest that a notable proportion of patients diagnosed with DS 
experience considerable ED, relative to normative standards and clinical control 
groups.  High levels of ED seem to be linked to increased general emotional distress, 
dissociation and reduced quality of life in this group.   
 
Alexithymia 
Patients with DS have been found to score higher on measures of alexithymia than 
control participants (Bewley et al., 2005; Kaplan et al., 2013; O’Brien et al., 2015; 
Urbanek et al., 2014).  However, findings have been inconsistent, with one study 
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(Urbanek et al., 2014) reporting elevations on all subscales of the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale-20 (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Tailor, 1994), and others finding no differences in 
alexithymia between DS patients and control groups (Myers, Fleming, et al., 2013; Tojek 
et al., 2000; Wolf et al., 2015).  On the other hand, Kaplan et al. (2013) reported that 
reduced scores for ‘identification of affective states’ significantly predicted a diagnosis 
of DS (rather than ES), and there was a non-significant trend of the same nature for 
‘describing emotions’.  Therefore, it seems that some aspects of alexithymia might be 
more prominent in patients with DS than others.  In fact, Urbanek et al. (2014) 
reported that scores on the ‘poor understanding of emotions’ subscale of the TAS-20 
was a highly significant predictor of a diagnosis of DS (relative to healthy control 
participants).   
 
Urbanek et al. (2014) also reported that a significantly larger proportion of their DS 
group scored in the alexithymic range on the TAS-20 than in the control group.  
However, whilst a large proportion of the DS sample included by Bewley et al. (2005) 
were classified as alexithymic on the TAS-20 (90.5%), the overall scores did not differ 
significantly from control groups (ES, healthy controls) once the influence of anxiety 
and depression was accounted for statistically.  Nonetheless, scores on two subscales 
were significantly higher in the DS group relative to the healthy control group, 
indicating worse identification and description of feelings.  R.J. Brown and colleagues 
(2013) reported that only a subgroup of patients with DS were more alexithymic than 
patients with ES (those with higher levels of ED, general psychopathology, and 
somatisation).  Hingray et al. (2011) found that scores on the TAS were high in DS 
patients with and without a history of trauma.  Interestingly, the study by Myers, 
Fleming, and colleagues (2013) identified significant associations between alexithymia 
and arousal (anxiety), intrusive experiences, dissociation, and avoidance (defensive) in 
the DS group.     
 
As yet, therefore, the findings are rather mixed regarding alexithymia in patients with 
DS.  Nonetheless, the current evidence points towards reduced proficiency at 
identifying, describing and understanding emotions in patients with DS.  Moreover, 
these difficulties seem to be linked to other important characteristics in this group, 




A notable proportion of patients with DS report emotional triggers as precipitants of 
individual DS (Lempert & Schmidt, 1990).  Moreover, many patients experience 
symptoms suggestive of anxiety, fear/panic and/or autonomic arousal prior to or 
during their seizures (Goldstein & Mellers, 2006; Hendrickson et al., 2014; Moore & 
Baker, 1997).  The findings of Goldstein & Mellers (2006) suggested elevated somatic 
anxiety symptoms in DS patients (compared to those with ES), in the absence of 
increased subjective anxiety.  This is indicative of some form of dissociation of 
physiological and conscious emotional experience.   
 
Evaluation of self-report studies 
Many of the limitations of self-report questionnaires have been discussed in previous 
sections/chapters.  One important weakness of such methods of relevance to 
emotional processes is that they only allow responses relating to processes of which 
patients are consciously aware.  Given that the psychological mechanisms underlying 
the symptoms of DS are presumed to take place below the level of conscious 
awareness, such mechanisms, by definition might be unamenable to examination using 
introspection (i.e. self-report).   
 
3.5.2. Experimental studies 
To date, there have been only a handful of published articles describing experimental 
or standardised investigation of affective processing in patients with DS.  One study 
incorporated a test of affect recognition and expression within a standardised test 
battery (Barrow Neurological Institute Screen for Higher Cerebral Functions; 
Prigatano, Amin, & Rosenstein, 1995).  The affective component included elements 
requiring verbal expression of affect, recognition of facial (pictorial) emotional 
expressions, responses to a humorous stimulus and general affect control during 
testing (Prigatano & Kirlin, 2009).  Patients with DS received lower scores on this 
affective subtest compared to those with ES.  Whilst this finding was indicative of 
deficits in affective processing, the findings did not indicate which aspects of the 
subtest had posed the greatest difficulty for the patients.  Moreover, the test was not 




Nonetheless, the same year, Bakvis, Roelofs, and colleagues (2009) carried out a 
laboratory-based experimental study of preconscious processing of emotional facial 
expressions in patients with DS, relative to healthy controls.  A masked emotional 
Stroop paradigm was used, which included the preconscious presentation of either 
angry, neutral or happy faces.  The faces and masks were presented in one of three 
colours, and participants were required to name the colour of the masking stimuli 
aloud.  Attentional bias scores were calculated for the happy and angry faces 
separately, by subtracting the average reaction time for each from that of the neutral 
condition.  This task was administered under a rest condition and when participants 
were under stress induced by the Trier Social Stress test (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & 
Hellhammer, 1993).  Performance of the DS patients was compared to that of healthy 
controls, with no significant differences noted under the stress condition.  However, 
under the rest condition differences emerged; DS patients had higher attentional bias 
scores for the angry faces compared to the healthy control group.  The authors 
interpreted this as hypervigilance to facial anger (threat).  These results are suggestive 
of a possible propensity for DS patients to allocate a disproportionate degree of 
attention to facial signals of threat, when in a resting state.  Furthermore, this 
attentional bias was positively correlated with basal hypercortisolism and self-
reported sexual traumatic experiences in the patients with DS.  The strengths and 
limitations of this study are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
An additional study by the same research group (Bakvis et al., 2011) assessed 
'approach-avoidance' behaviours towards happy and angry facial expressions, by 
measuring flexion or extension of participants’ arms respectively.  On this task, 
patients with DS were significantly slower in responding to angry facial expressions 
with the approach behaviour compared to avoidance behaviour; whereas, this effect 
was not evident in the control group.  This finding was still significant when anxiety, 
depression and medication effects were controlled in the analysis.  Furthermore, the 
increased reaction times for anger approach were positively correlated with baseline 
cortisol.  The effect disappeared after stress induction with the Cold Pressor test 
(Hines & Brown, 1936).  These findings suggested that, under resting conditions, the 
patients with DS showed a tendency towards behavioural avoidance of facial threat 
signals, and that this avoidance was linked to generally elevated stress levels. However, 
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a very small sample size was included in this study (DS n =12), and so replication in a 
larger sample might be beneficial.    
 
Another study by Bakvis, Spinhoven, Putnam, et al. (2010) reported that at baseline 
(prior to stress-induction), patients with DS showed higher levels of interference by 
facial distractor stimuli on a working memory task, relative to healthy controls.  It is 
possible that this finding could be linked to the general hypervigilance to social stimuli 
reported in previous studies, although the effect interference effect was across 
positive, negative and neutral faces in this study.  In addition, Gul and Ahmad (2014) 
reported that in a task-switching paradigm (evaluation of emotion or age of faces), 
patients with DS had significantly longer reaction times for categorisation of facial age 
compared to facial emotion.  Reaction times were longer when task-switching from 
the emotion to the age-discrimination task.  Together, the authors interpreted these 
findings as an attentional bias towards the emotional (happy/angry) aspects of the 
faces.  However, the relative effects of emotion categorisation for positive (happy) and 
negative (angry) faces were not examined separately in this study.  Moreover, Gul and 
Ahmad (2014) excluded patients who were over the age of 35 years and those with 
comorbid disorders (except mild anxiety, depression and stress); therefore the 
generalizability of the findings are limited.   
 
Another recent study (Dimaro et al., 2014) included the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006), to assess implicit beliefs about 
anxiety in patients with DS.  Reaction times towards consistent and inconsistent 
statements about anxiety-related states (i.e. worried, tense scared) or the opposite 
(i.e. calm, relaxed, secure) were measured.  The three groups tested (ES, DS, non-
clinical controls) did not differ on this measure; however, a key difference was that 
patients with DS had significantly greater discrepancies between their explicit and 
implicit anxiety levels, relative to both control groups.  The discrepancy was 
characterised by higher explicit anxiety than implicit anxiety.  However, it is unclear 
whether any screening criteria were used to recruit the non-clinical group, as no 
statement was made about exclusion criteria (e.g. medical conditions, substance use).  
Indeed, the clinical groups were also not described in detail; for example, no data on 
formal psychiatric history, length of seizure disorder, and/or use of medications was 
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provided.   
 
Another pertinent study was carried out by Roberts and colleagues (2012), in which 
responses to affective pictures (IAPS; International Affective Picture System; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) were investigated in patients with DS compared to non-
clinical controls (high or low in post-traumatic symptoms; PTS).  No between group 
differences were found for ratings of valence across the pleasant, unpleasant and 
neutral stimuli.  However, patients with DS rated the pictures as significantly more 
intense than both control groups (high and low PTS).  On closer inspection, there 
were no differences in ratings of emotional intensity for the unpleasant images.  On 
the other hand, patients with DS reported more intense emotional responses to the 
positive images, relative to the control group who were low in PTS, but not relative 
to those high in these symptoms.  For neutral images, however, the DS patients 
reported more intensity than both control groups.  The finding of increased intensity 
ratings in patients with DS was interpreted by the authors as suggestive of increased 
attentional focus on physical manifestations of arousal.  However, the lack of group 
differences on valence ratings indicated that patients with DS did not differ in the 
positivity/negativity of their subjective responses to the stimuli.   
 
Whilst there were no group differences in cardiovascular measures of emotional 
responding to the stimuli, baseline respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) was found to 
be lower in the DS group than in the PTS-low control group (Roberts et al., 2012). 
This is suggestive of decreased parasympathetic activity and, therefore, of higher levels 
of sympathetic activation at rest.  This finding concurs with the basal hypercortisolism 
observed in a DS sample by Bakvis, Spinhoven, Giltay, et al. (2010).  However, there 
were several methodological limitations to note in Roberts et al’s (2012) study, some 
of which were discussed by the authors.  One issue was the inclusion of a modest 
sample size (n = 18 in each group).  This may have reduced statistical power and thus 
may have been accountable for some of the negative findings described.  In addition, 
the DS sample were characterised by having elevated levels of PTS, which might be 
representative of only a subgroup of patients with DS.  In addition, the authors did 
not report the proportion of the DS group who also met criteria for a formal 




Of additional note is the fact that the DS group and the high-PTS control group both 
reported higher levels of general psychological distress compared to the low-PTS 
control group; however, these possible confounding factors were not incorporated 
into the analysis.  Therefore, it remains possible that the between-groups differences 
could have reflected general psychological distress or another type of 
psychopathology (e.g.  anxiety, depression).  Moreover, whilst neurological disorders 
were excluded from the sample, it was unclear how many participants had other 
organic health problems.  It also remains a possibility, therefore, that general medical 
conditions may have influenced the baseline RSA outputs.  Finally, a potential design 
problem with Roberts et al’s study was the presentation of random bursts of white 
noise throughout the experiment (detailed in a footnote in the published report).  It 
is possible that these white noise bursts may have been distracting/unpleasant for the 
participants, and so may have influenced the results observed.  
 
3.5.3. Summary: emotion in patients with dissociative seizures (literature 
review) 
When asked directly, patients with DS show heightened levels of a range of negative 
emotional states (e.g. depression, anxiety, fear, anger), in addition to considerable 
dysregulation of emotion.  Moreover, symptoms of autonomic arousal and/or panic 
have also been found to be elevated in patients with DS during their seizures.  In at 
least a proportion of patients with DS, identifying and describing emotions seems to 
be somewhat impaired (i.e. alexythmia). 
 
Furthermore, experimental findings indicate an attentional bias towards facial 
emotion, in addition to behavioural avoidance of such stimuli.  This bias may be linked 
to high levels of stress responsivity in this group (e.g. generally elevated HPA 
activation) and previous traumatic experiences.  In addition, patients with DS 
experience elevated intensity in their emotional responses to some types of affective 
images (neutral/positive).  As yet, there have been no functional neuroimaging studies 
of emotional processing in patients with DS, although this is an important area for 




3.6. An affective-dissociation model of dissociative seizures 
This section synthesises the currently available empirical and theoretical literature on 
the aetiology of DS.  Table 1 outlines a proposed general explanatory framework 
incorporating the possible aetiological factors thought to contribute to the 
occurrence of DS.  Within this framework, a variety of factors are proposed to 
increase the risk of developing DS (e.g. trauma, neurobiological factors, personality 
traits, psychopathology, dissociative tendencies, aberrant emotional processing – first 
column in Table 1), although it is probable that these predisposing factors vary 
between patients.  Furthermore, the various risk factors may interact in any one 
patient.  For example, neurobiological factors may create a pre-existing vulnerability 
that combines with developmental trauma/stressors to cause a dissociative processing 
style, personality disorder and/or psychopathology.  Moreover, the unique 
combination of these latter factors may be associated with abnormal emotional 
processing.  It is proposed that aberrant processing of emotional stimuli may be a core 
predispositional factor for DS, by elevating overall levels of emotional distress and 
arousal.   
 
The general predisposition towards psychological/somatoform dissociation could be 
shaped into seizure-like phenomena by symptom modelling and the iatrogenic 
influence of medical information (second column in Table 1).  Initial onset of the 
disorder might be precipitated by an acute increase in distress levels, which raises 
emotional distress to a ‘threshold’ level.  The factors which might contribute to this 
elevated distress are shown in the third column of Table 1.  It is likely that in many 
cases, more than one of these factors might be precipitate DS onset.  Table 1 also 
includes the variety of factors that might maintain/perpetuate the occurrence of 
seizures (fifth column) after the initial onset of the disorder.  The framework 
presented in Table 1 also includes triggering factors for the occurrence of individual 
seizures (fourth column).  The proposed triggering variables include acute states of 
stress/anxiety, aberrant emotional processing and crucially, dissociation of voluntary 
control and awareness of somatic/psychological processes.  In order to further specify 
this possible triggering mechanism for individual DS episodes, Figure 1 illustrates a 
hypothetical affective-dissociation model of this process.   
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At the top level of the model in Figure 1, it is proposed that aberrant emotional 
processing of environmental stimuli is present in patients with DS and is an important 
contributor to initiating individual seizures.  One aspect of this might be preconscious 
hypervigilance for the detection of threat-related emotional signals from others (e.g. 
angry facial expressions), as suggested by Bakvis, Roelofs, et al., 2009.  Furthermore, 
elevated physiological responding to affectively significant stimuli may also occur, but 
this may not be associated with subjective awareness of such responses (Goldstein 
and Mellers, 2006).  A key hypothesis is that these bodily affective responses to 
significant stimuli, processed consciously or preconsciously, might result in an 
accumulation of affective arousal, which may or not be associated with subjective 
anxiety/distress in the patient.  This accumulation of arousal might develop gradually 
(over hours or days) or rapidly (minutes), and may reach a hypothetical threshold level 
(Baslet, 2011).  This threshold may represent the maximum level of emotional 
arousal/distress that is tolerable, and may vary from patient to patient.  As patients 
may already experience heightened levels of arousal/distress in general, it is possible 
that relatively mild stressors or emotional stimuli could allow a rapid ascent towards 
this threshold.  
 
Reaching the threshold of arousal is proposed to trigger the onset of a dissociative 
mechanism, constituting a temporary but severe loss of control and awareness over 
emotion, cognition, behaviour, and sensation.  This represents the beginning of a DS 
episode.  When affective arousal/distress reaches the threshold level, some patients 
may consciously allow the dissociative mechanism to be initiated (Stone & Carson, 
2013); however, most patients will not experience any voluntary control over the 
initiation of this mechanism.  The proposed dissociative mechanism would serve the 
psychological function of reducing conscious awareness of the intolerable emotional 
distress, but also gives rise to the dysfunctional by-products of reduced awareness and 
control of other behavioural, cognitive and bodily processes.  Once the dissociative 
state has been initiated, it is likely that the patient will no longer have the ability to 




In cognitive terms, when the threshold of arousal is reached, it may cause a direct 
disruption to the usual control processes taking place between higher and lower 
cognitive systems.  This could constitute a temporary malfunction or inhibition of the 
‘executive control centre’ (possibly lateral prefrontal cortex).  At present, it is only 
possible to speculate how the elevated arousal levels might cause this disturbance.  
One possibility is via direct inhibitory outputs from limbic areas (e.g. amygdala) to the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC).  On the other hand, it might be that the biochemical effects 
of heightened arousal (e.g. adrenalin and cortisol release) may have a disruptive 
influence on prefrontal functioning, at a given level.  A similar hypothesis was suggested 
by Roelofs and Spinhoven (2007).  
  
Regardless of the specific mechanism(s), this temporary ‘shutting down’ or 
malfunctioning of the executive control centre could explain the variety of symptom 
types observed in DS.  On the one hand, loss of executive control over behavioural 
and sensorimotor subsystems could lead to losses in voluntary behaviour, such as falls, 
paralysis and verbal unresponsiveness (i.e. ‘negative’ behavioural symptoms of DS).  In 
addition, the malfunctioning executive control system might automatically activate 
inappropriate learned behaviours (i.e. behavioural ‘routines’) or emotional responses, 
such as pelvic-thrusting, weeping, back-arching, screaming or ‘tonic-clonic’ type 
movements (‘positive’ DS symptoms).  Loss of the usual top-down regulation/control 
that would typically modulate such behavioural and affective responses might permit 
these responses to continue autonomously during the DS, until executive control is 
once again restored (when the DS ends).  During the seizure, losses of awareness of 
one or more subsystems (behavioural/sensorimotor/affective/cognitive) might 
underlie the amnesia, perceived losses of consciousness, and perceptual alterations 
reported by some patients (e.g. deafness, blindness; i.e. ‘negative’ cognitive symptoms 
of DS).  
 
In terms of how this model relates to previous perspectives, in some respects, the 
current model attempts to integrate some of the basic ideas from cognitive models 
(e.g. R.J. Brown, 2002; Hilgard, 1994; Oakley, 1999), neurobiological perspectives (e.g. 
van der Kruijs et al., 2012; 2014), and affective/dissociative models (e.g. Baslet, 2011; 
Goldstein and Mellers, 2006; Roberts and Reuber, 2014).  As suggested by the cognitive 
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accounts, it is proposed that dysfunction in a superordinate control centre is crucial 
in the initiation of the dissociative response in DS.  It is argued here that this 
dysfunction is the core underlying cause of the variety of phenomena observed during 
DS.  However, a purely cognitive account, without reference to affective dysfunction 
is not an adequate explanation.  Therefore, a core role for abnormal emotional 
responding (i.e. affective arousal) is proposed.  As suggested by Baslet (2011) in 
relation to DS, the concept of a threshold of arousal is an important addition to the 
current model.   
 
In the current thesis, DS are conceptualised as a transient dissociative state.  The 
specific symptoms experienced by any one patient during such a state may vary, 
possibly depending on their unique neural organisation, connectivity patterns and 
learning history.  For example, the losses of control and awareness might not affect all 
lower level subsystems in every seizure.  The severity of an attack (i.e. the number, 
intensity and duration of symptoms experienced) may depend to some extent on the 
level of affective arousal present immediately prior to and during the DS.  However, it 
is presently argued that DS cannot occur in the absence of dissociation, as proposed 
by Roberts and Reuber (2014), because DS are inherently a manifestation of 
dissociation (i.e. a psychologically-mediated loss of voluntary control and/or 
awareness).   
 
 
3.7. Rationale, aims and hypotheses 
Many influential theorists now share the general idea that aberrant emotional 
processes, particularly related to autonomic arousal, are central to the aetiology of 
DS.  However, as noted by other authors (e.g. Roberts et al., 2012), there is still a 
paucity of research into emotional processing in patients with DS.  The overarching 
aim of the research presented in this thesis was, therefore, to further explore 
emotional processing in patients with DS, using experimental, laboratory-based 
techniques.  The research sought to examine preconscious, subjective and autonomic 
emotional responses to affective stimuli, including facial expressions and more general 





Investigating these processes was hoped to further inform the model proposed in 
Figure 1.  Specifically, empirical evidence of altered affective processing in patients 
with DS would provide further support for the proposition that such alterations might 
serve to trigger dissociative responses in patients with DS, and thus, the hypothesis 
that such alterations represent the proximal cause of individual DS occurrence.  
Another important aim was to measure other relevant psychosocial characteristics 
of the group, in order to examine the validity of the general aetiological framework 
presented in Table 1.  Moreover, the research sought to explore the extent to which 
these psychosocial variables related to any observed differences in emotional 
processing.  Finally, an additional aim was to elicit patients’ perceptions and 
interpretations of their emotional processing styles, and their understanding of how 
these processes relate to their symptoms, using qualitative techniques.  This aim was 
included to ensure greater depth and a patient-centred perspective on the research 
topic.  The previous empirical and theoretical literature, combined with the proposed 
model and explanatory framework outlined above, indicated several general 




1. Relative to healthy control participants, it was hypothesised that patients with 
DS would show an exaggerated preconscious attentional bias towards 
emotional facial expressions, particularly for threat-related expressions (i.e. 
anger).  This hypothesis was suggested by previous research (e.g. Bakvis, 
Roelofs, et al., 2009).  
 
2. Patients with DS were predicted to exhibit elevated autonomic responses to 
consciously processed emotional stimuli (i.e. skin conductance responses).  
Whilst this hypothesis was not supported by Roberts et al. (2012), the 
hypothesis required testing with additional psychophysiological methods (e.g. 






3. Patients with DS were hypothesised to show altered subjective emotional 
responses to consciously processed affective stimuli.  This hypothesis was 
derived on the basis of previous studies (e.g. Prigatano & Kirlin, 2009; Roberts 
et al., 2012).   
 
Background aetiological factors 
 
4. Patients with DS were predicted to report higher levels of adverse life events 
(i.e. trauma, abuse, stressful experiences) and childhood family dysfunction 
compared to healthy controls.  This would be expected on the basis of a large 
number of previous studies (see Chapter 2). 
 
5. Patients with DS were expected to report higher levels of trait psychological 
and somatoform dissociation, compared to healthy controls (see section 3.3). 
 
6. Patients with DS were predicted to exhibit higher levels of borderline 
personality tendencies and general psychological distress (anxiety/depression), 
compared to healthy control participants (see Chapter 2). 
 
In order to examine hypotheses 1-3, three experimental laboratory-based studies 
were conducted.  Hypothesis 1 was tested in an experiment measuring preconscious 
processing of emotional facial expressions (Chapter 6), which aimed to replicate and 
extend the findings of Bakvis, Roelofs, and colleagues (2009).  This experiment utilised 
an emotional Stroop paradigm, and included a larger sample of patients and controls 
than is typically reported in the literature (n = 40 in each group).  Furthermore, a 
second experimental study (Chapter 7) assessed autonomic and subjective responses 
to consciously processed facial expressions of emotion, in order to test hypotheses 2 
and 3.  A third experiment (Chapter 8) examined autonomic and subjective responses 
to consciously processed affective images, in order to further examine hypotheses 2 
and 3, with more varied stimuli.  Together, these studies would provide findings of 





Hypotheses 4-6 were examined with the use of self-report measures.  The findings 
relating to these psychosocial variables are summarised in Chapter 5.  The use of 
these measures had the potential to confirm and extend some of the factors proposed 
in the aetiological framework presented in Table 1.  Moreover, a qualitative study of 
patients’ perceptions and understanding of the role of emotions in DS is presented in 
Chapter 9.  This study aimed to explore patients’ insights into the possible emotional 
mechanisms and aetiological factors associated with DS, and also to generate novel 
hypotheses for testing in future studies. 
 
The present research also sought to explore whether there were relationships 
between emotional responding (as measured experimentally) and the psychosocial 
variables measured with self-report questionnaires.  Additional exploratory aspects of 
the research included an examination of potential relationships between aspects of 
emotional responding, psychosocial factors and seizure-related variables (e.g. seizure 
frequency, ictal symptoms, total seizure symptoms).  These exploratory analyses are 








Chapter 4. General methodology 
 
4.1. Pilot study 
Following confirmation of ethical approval (see section 4.2.1), a small pilot study was 
conducted including six control participants and two patients diagnosed with DS.  The 
aims of the pilot study were to assess the practical and technical feasibility of the tests 
and procedures, and to ensure the acceptability of the measures from participants’ 
perspectives.  On completion of piloting with control participants, some modifications 
were made to the procedures, in order to reduce the overall amount of time taken 
for testing, and to make the tasks more acceptable for participants.  Where 
modifications to the procedures were made, these are detailed in the methodology 
sections of the relevant chapters.  The summary given below is based on the final 





4.2.1. Recruitment process and ethical approval 
The quantitative aspects of the research were approved by the local research ethics 
committee (Joint South London and Maudsley & Institute of Psychiatry Research 
Ethics Committee; reference 08/H0807/82) in December 2008.  Recruitment for the 
quantitative studies commenced in January 2009 and continued until December 2012.  
A break in recruitment occurred from May 2010 to January 2011 due to the research 
student taking maternity leave.  The qualitative study received approval from the same 
committee in June 2010 as a substantial amendment to the original application.  
Recruitment of patients for the qualitative study commenced in January 2011 and 
continued until December 2012.  Approval letters for the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the research can be found in Appendices 1 and 2. 
 
Before taking part, all participants received an information sheet, usually one to two 
weeks prior to being contacted again.  Potential participants were reassured that 
participation was voluntary and that there was no obligation to agree.  For those who 
wished to participate, written informed consent was obtained, after thoroughly 
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discussing the study with the research student and having the opportunity to ask 
questions.  Appendices 3 to 8 include information sheets and consent forms for the 
quantitative and qualitative studies.   
 
On completion of the research, participants were reimbursed for time and loss of 
earnings at a rate of £30 for the quantitative studies (all completed in one testing 
session) or £15 for the qualitative study (completed during a separate session).  
Reimbursement was provided by the Department of Psychology (Institute of 
Psychiatry) as part of the research student’s postgraduate studentship.  An award was 
also obtained from the Central Research Fund (University of London) in June 2009 
for additional funding of travel expenses.  Therefore, as of July 2009, all participants 
were offered up to £20 for travel expenses, when receipts were provided.  This 
modification was approved as a substantial amendment by the local ethics committee 
in July 2009, and the approval letter can be found in Appendix 9.  The additional 
funding of travel expenses facilitated recruitment of the clinical sample, particularly 
because many patients travelled to London from considerable distances for clinical 
and research appointments.            
 
Patients diagnosed with DS were recruited from two clinical services in south 
London: the Department of Neuropsychiatry (outpatients) at the Maudsley Hospital, 
and the Department of Psychological Medicine at King’s College Hospital.  Both 
services were part of the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust.  
Consultants, registrars and junior doctors were made aware of the nature of the 
research and the inclusion/exclusion criteria, and identified potentially suitable 
candidates during assessment appointments or shortly thereafter.   
 
Initially, clinicians provided information sheets to patients during clinical 
appointments, by post, and/or requested permission for the research student to 
contact them about participation.  The research student then contacted patients 
within three weeks (but no less than one week) by telephone, unless the patient 
requested otherwise.  During the initial telephone conversation, a summary of the 
research procedures was provided, along with an overview of the possible 
disadvantages and advantages of participation.  At this stage, patients were able to ask 
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any questions or raise concerns, and the voluntary nature of the research was 
reiterated.  It was then determined whether the patient was willing to participate.   
 
For those who agreed, an appointment was made for the quantitative session.  
Written informed consent was obtained before participants commenced the research 
protocol.  Participants consenting to participate completed all quantitative aspects of 
the research in one session (reported in chapters 5-8).  This approach was taken in 
order that the required sample size of patients (n = 40) could be included, to ensure 
adequate statistical power for the study, in addition to the time constraints of data 
collection within a doctoral research programme.    
 
On completion of the first (quantitative) research session, patients were asked if they 
would consider taking part in the second, qualitative session (once recruitment for 
the latter study had commenced).  Patients who indicated an interest were then 
provided with the information sheet for the qualitative study (see Appendix 7) and 
the research student then contacted them between one and three weeks later to 
confirm whether they wished to participate.  If so, the same procedure took place as 
for quantitative research session.  Only a subsample of patients completed the 
qualitative study.   
 
Recruitment of healthy control participants was carried out via advertisement (see 
Appendix 10 for the wording of the advertisement), either on fliers distributed in the 
local area, or using adverts placed on local sections of internet websites such as 
Gumtree (www.gumtree.com).  The Institute of Psychiatry volunteer database 
(Mindsearch; www.mindsearch.iop.kcl.ac.uk; discontinued service) was also used for 
recruitment of some participants.  Potential candidates were initially screened for the 
eligibility criteria (see below) either by telephone or email.  This included several 
consistent screening questions, requesting self-disclosure of relevant details.  
Potential candidates were assured of the confidentiality of this information.   
 
Individuals not fully meeting the study eligibility criteria were thanked for their 
interest and provided with a brief explanation as to why they were not being invited 
to participate.  For those who met the study criteria, an information sheet and 
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consent form was provided and the research student contacted them between one 
and three weeks later to discuss it further.  For those who agreed to take part, an 
appointment was made and a confirmation letter sent. 
 
4.2.2. Eligibility criteria 
The following criteria were used to determine the eligibility of patients for this study:  
 having received a diagnosis of DS based on video-EEG monitoring or on the 
basis of consensus clinical opinion of two consultant neuropsychiatrists / 
neurologists  
 aged between 18-65 years  
 estimated intelligence quotient (IQ) scores of 70 or greater  
 fluency in English   
 absence of documented history of / current epilepsy or other major 
neurological conditions (e.g. degenerative diseases, significant traumatic brain 
injury) 
 absence of significant medical illness that may have affected the measures used 
(e.g. hyperthyroidism)  
 absence of current major depression, anxiety, substance dependence, or 
psychosis (these diagnoses are known to be associated with differences in 
emotional or cognitive functioning which may have confounded performance 
on the experimental measures) 
 having not undergone psychological treatment for DS at the time of 
recruitment 
 
The criteria applied for the determination of eligibility of control participants were as 
follows:  
 between 18-65 years of age 
 IQ scores of 70 or greater 
 absence of self-reported current / previous psychiatric diagnoses or treatment  
 absence of confirmed history of / current epilepsy or other neurological 
conditions 
 absence of current (self-reported) major medical conditions (e.g. 




All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  Control participants were 
matched to the patient sample as well as possible for the following demographic 
details: age, gender, handedness, socioeconomic status (using the simplified National 
Statistics – Socioeconomic Classification; NS-SEC; Office for National Statistics, 
2010), smoking status (yes/no) and years of education.  Matching of demographic 
characteristics was important due to the potential influence of these variables on the 
psychosocial variables and affective processing tasks. For example, affective 
responsivity has been found to be influenced by gender (Kret & De Gelder, 2012; 
Stevens & Hamann, 2012; Whittle et al., 2011), and age (Nashiro, Sakaki, & Mather, 
2011; Silvers et al., 2012; Sullivan, Ruffman, & Hutton, 2007).  Cigarette smoking was 
recorded for all participants due to its possible effects on ANS functioning (e.g. 
Kotamäki, 1995; Niedermaier et al., 1993). 
 
 
4.3. Materials and measures 
At the start of the first research session, a questionnaire was administered verbally 
to all participants, with the purpose of obtaining a detailed description of the sample, 
including those variables on which participants were to be matched (e.g. age, gender, 
education).  The following information was gathered in the questionnaire: 
 
1. full name and date of birth 
2. current age (years) 
3. gender (male, female, other) 
4. ethnic background: white, mixed ethnic backgrounds, Asian/Asian British, 
black/African/Caribbean/black British,  other 
5. Handedness (self-report: right, left, ambidextrous) 
6. Marital status (self-report: single, married, separated, cohabiting, widowed) 
7. Years of full-time education (or part-time equivalent) 
8. Highest qualification attained 
9. Current or most recent occupation (or that of the highest household wage 
earner) 
10. Medical conditions (current) 
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11. Prescribed medication (current) 
12. Psychiatric diagnoses (current, previous) 
13. Neurological illness/injury (current, previous) 
14. Smoking status (yes/no) 
 
For the patient sample, verification for some of the above (e.g. items 11, 12, 13 and 
14) and additional relevant clinical details were obtained by inspecting the medical 
case notes (after consent was obtained).  The following additional details were also 
recorded: 
 
 Age at seizure onset  
 Current seizure frequency (per month) 
 Diagnostic investigations undergone (i.e. routine-EEG, ictal-EEG, video-EEG, 
structural neuroimaging such as computed tomography or MRI) 
 
The study described in Chapter 5 involved the administration of several self-report 
questionnaires, which were completed by participants and scored manually by the 
research student.  All three experimental tasks (chapters 6-8) were conducted using 
an Acer laptop with a 17 inch screen.  These experiments were programmed with E-
Prime experimental software (Psychology Software Tools, Incorporated).  
Experimental stimuli were prepared using Microsoft Paint or Adobe Photoshop 
software, where necessary. 
 
Participants’ subjective or behavioural responses during testing were recorded with 
the integral laptop keyboard (Chapters 7 and 8) or with voice key registration 
(Chapter 6).  The psychophysiological measure (skin conductance responses; 
Chapters 7 and 8) was obtained with a Powerlab data acquisition system and 
associated LabChart data analysis software (ADInstruments).  Quantitative data were 
initially exported into Excel software (Microsoft Office) for initial organisation and 
extraction.  Subsequently, all statistical analyses of the quantitative data were 
conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, versions 20-22 (SPSS; 
IBM).  Qualitative data were collected with a digital recording device (Sony ICD-
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P520), transcribed verbatim into Microsoft Word files, and then analysed using paper-
and-pen methods and NVIVO (10th edition) software (QSR International, Limited).    
 
 
4.4. Research design and procedure 
The self-report questionnaire (Chapter 5) and experimental studies (Chapters 6-8) 
shared the same overall research design.  These studies adopted a between-groups 
cross-sectional approach.  All four studies included just one between-groups factor 
with two levels (diagnostic status: patient, control).  The within-subjects factors 
differed between studies and are detailed in the relevant chapters, as are the 
dependent variables.  The qualitative study (Chapter 9) involved recruitment of a 
subgroup of patients with DS, and the data were collected using semi-structured 
interviews. 
 
The overall procedures for the quantitative and qualitative research sessions are 
detailed in Figures 2 and 3 respectively.  Within the quantitative research session, the 
order of administration of tests was devised with consideration of the following 
issues: the requirement of obtaining psychophysiological measurements at 
approximately the same time of day and in uniform environmental conditions for 
every participant, potential order and interference effects, and ethical reasons.  All 
participants were requested to avoid smoking, taking caffeine or eating large meals 
within the hour prior to attending the research setting for the quantitative tests, due 
to the potential effects on the psychophysiological data.   
 
Participants were offered several breaks during the quantitative session, due to its 
considerable length.  Furthermore, the research student monitored the wellbeing of 
participants throughout both research sessions.  Participants were reminded that if 
they wished to withdraw at any time, not complete a given test, or return on another 
occasion to complete the research, they were welcome to do so without giving a 
reason.  Any participants showing signs of fatigue or distress were always given the 
opportunity to take a break or discontinue testing.  A list of local and national support 
and advice services was also offered, if participants indicated any sign of distress.  All 
participants were thanked for their time and reimbursed the specified amount.  
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Figure 2. Flowchart of the overall procedure for the first (quantitative) 
research session  
 
 
1-3 weeks later: initial telephone conversation (overview of study, screening 
questions, participant questions and concerns answered, confirm whether 
candidate wishes to participate) 
Indication of interest in participation: information 
sheet provided by clinician (patients) or SP (controls) 
Day before appointment: reminder of time/place of 
research session, confirm attendance 
Quantitative research session 1 
Overview, consent form, questions, demographic/screening questionnaire 
WASI (2 subtest) 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
Emotional Stroop test 
Emotion comprehension check 
Break (optional) 
Affective picture viewing task 
Break (optional) 
Facial expression processing task 
Awareness check (emotional Stroop stimuli) 
Lunch break 
 
Quantitative research session 2 
Self-report questionnaires: Traumatic Experiences Checklist; Post-traumatic 
Diagnostic Scale; Multi-dimensional Dissociation Inventory 
Break (optional) 
Neuropsychological tests: Benton Facial Recognition test; Object Decision subtest 
(Visual Object and Space Perception battery) Faces I, Family Pictures I subtests 
(Wechsler Memory Scale-III); Stroop test 
Break (optional) 
Self-report questionnaires: Family Environment Scale; Inventory of Altered Self-
Capacities; Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire; Ictal arousal symptoms 
(patients only) 
Break (optional) 
Debriefing, questions, check participant’s wellbeing 
Reimbursement and expenses 




confirmation letter & 
map sent to home 
address 
Declines participation: 
candidate thanked for their time 






Figure 3. Flowchart of the overall procedure for the second (qualitative) 
































Indication of interest in participation: 
information sheet provided by SP (in person 
or by post) 
1-3 weeks later: initial telephone conversation (overview of study, 
participant questions and concerns answered, confirm whether candidate 
wishes to participate) 
Agrees to participate: 
make appointment and 
confirmation letter & map 
sent to home address 
Declines participation: 
candidate thanked for 
their time and no further 
contact 
Day before appointment: reminder of time/place of 
research session, confirm attendance 
Qualitative research session  
Overview, consent form, questions 
Semi-structured interview 
Debriefing, questions, check patients’ wellbeing 
Reimbursement and expenses 
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4.5. Data analysis  
 
4.5.1. General analytical techniques 
Between-group comparisons on demographic and psychosocial variables were 
conducted with independent samples t-tests, chi-square, or Mann-Whitney tests.  
Furthermore, analyses of experimental data (Chapters 6-8) were carried out with 
mixed factorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) or Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), 
with group (DS, control) as the between-groups factor and with different within-
subjects variables for each experiment.  Where interactions or main effects were 
significant in the overall analysis, the simple effects were examined using one-way 
ANOVA or multiple pairwise comparisons (e.g. t-test).  In these main analyses, an 
alpha level of p < .05 was set as the criterion for significance, with p-values between 
.05 and .06 reported as non-significant trends.  When multiple tests were carried out, 
the family-wise error rate was taken into account by either adjusting the p-values 
with Bonferroni-Hochberg corrections (Hochberg, 1988) or adopting a more 
stringent alpha level when assessing significance (i.e. p < .01).  Trends were not 
considered in such analyses.   
 
Exploratory correlational analyses adopted Pearson’s or Spearman’s correlations, 
depending on whether the scores were normally distributed.  Moreover, Chapter 5 
included several exploratory univariate and multivariate logistic regression analyses, 
with the outcome variable representing group status (DS, control) and the predictor 
variables being scores on the self-report measures described in that chapter.  Some 
chapters report exploratory univariate and multivariate linear regression analyses.  
Again, an alpha level of p < .05 was adopted for determination of significance in the 
multivariate analyses (trends defined by p-values of .05 - .06); however, when multiple 
univariate analyses were carried out, a more stringent alpha level was used (p < .01) 
to control for familywise error.    
 
Qualitative data were analysed using techniques based on Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA; Smith & Osborn, 2008).  Further detail about this 




4.5.2. Power calculations 
Regarding the self-report data presented in Chapter 5, the power calculation 
indicated that an independent samples t-test would have 80% power to detect a large 
effect size (0.8), at an alpha level of p < .01, with a sample size of 39 per group 
(GPower 3.1; Faul et al., 2007; 2009).  When DS patients have previously been 
compared to healthy controls on the DES (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), for example, 
a large effect size of approximately 0.81 was demonstrated with only 20 participants 
in each group (Goldstein et al, 2000).  Therefore, the inclusion of 40 participants in 
each group in the self-report analyses would seem to provide adequate power to 
detect large effect sizes, should they be present.   
 
The between-groups analysis strategy (i.e. ANOVA, ANCOVA) utilised in Chapters 
6-8 was based on the following power calculation: for a two group ANCOVA, at 
p=0.05, a total sample of 74 was estimated to have 80% power to detect a medium 
effect size of 0.5 (G-Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007; 2009).  For the dependent measures 
included in the current research, the detection of such an effect size was considered 
sufficient.  Unfortunately, it was not possible to estimate an effect size for the results 
of Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009) because the exact mean and standard deviation values 
were not provided in the report (although they were presented graphically).  
Moreover, there are as yet no published studies of explicit facial expression 
processing in patients with DS.  However, Sierra et al. (2006) found effect sizes of 
approximately 3.64 and 9.33 for intensity ratings and SCRs respectively, in responses 
to disgusted facial expressions in patients with depersonalisation disorder relative to 
healthy controls (effect sizes calculated using Cohen’s d, with the control standard 
deviation as the denominator).   
 
Regarding affective picture viewing tests, on the basis of the descriptive data provided 
by Roberts et al. (2012), an estimated effect size of 1.08 was calculated for intensity 
ratings for neutral images (patients with DS relative to healthy controls).  Moreover, 
an approximation of the effect size obtained by Sierra and colleagues (2002) for SCR 
responses to unpleasant affective (IAPS) stimuli (depersonalisation disorder versus 
controls, 15 participants in each group) was 2.71.  For the same stimuli, the effect size 
for participants’ subjective arousal ratings was approximately 1.18.  Therefore, it 
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would seem that if a between-group effect is present, large effect sizes are likely to 
be observed, and the analytic strategy described above (ANOVA, ANCOVA) would 
be adequately powered to detect such differences with the proposed sample size.   
 
With regards to power considerations for the exploratory correlational analyses, 
according to GPower (v3.1; Faul et al., 2007; 2009), a sample size of 27 is sufficient 
to detect a correlation of r = 0.6 at p < .01 with 80% power.  As 26 was the lowest 
sample size included in most exploratory correlational analyses, it can be concluded 
that these analyses were sufficiently powered to detect relationships between 
variables, should those relationships exist.  However, some of the exploratory 
analyses may have been somewhat under-powered due to the unexpected but 
necessary analysis of psychophysiological data in subgroups of participants (Chapters 
7 and 8).   
 
For logistic regression analyses (Chapter 5), a commonly accepted standard is the 
inclusion of a minimum of 10 events per variable (EPV; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; 
Peduzzi et al., 1996).  The EPV refers to the frequency of the least common outcome 
(i.e. in this instance the value is 40, representing the number of DS patients included), 
divided by the number of predictor variables.  Therefore, with 40 ‘events’ (i.e. cases 
of DS), the inclusion of only four predictors could be justified in the multivariate 
logistic regression analyses.  Whilst some authors have suggested that lower EPV 
values may be sufficient to obtain stable and accurate regression coefficients 
(Vittinghoff & McCulloch, 2006), the 10 EPV rule was adopted to avoid any risk of 
‘overfitting’ the models obtained.  Moreover, according to Field (2013; based on 
GPower output), multivariate linear regression analyses with a sample size of 40 are 
adequately powered to detect a large effect size (R2 = .26), with four predictors.  
Therefore, once again, the multivariate regression analyses presented in Chapters 6-
8 included a maximum of four predictor variables in each model.         
 
4.5.3. Data exploration and assumption checks 
Initial exploration of all quantitative data involved visual inspection for input errors 
or outliers using boxplots and/or histograms.  Any clear data input errors were 
corrected.  Outlying data points (defined by z scores of 3.29 or more; Tabachnick & 
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Fidell, 2007) were removed from the relevant dataset if this significantly improved the 
distribution of the data.  If the distribution was not significantly improved by removing 
the data points, the outlying values were retained.  In cases where outliers were 
retained, the relevant analyses were carried out twice, once including and once 
excluding the outlying data points.  If no clear differences in results emerged, the 
results of the full dataset were reported.  If there was a difference in results, the 
findings from the modified dataset (i.e. outliers removed) were reported. 
 
For continuous numerical dependent variables, the normality assumption was 
assessed visually (histograms, Q-Q plots) and statistically using the Shapiro-Wilk (S-
W) test.  The S-W test was chosen because it has been found to be the most powerful 
of the four most readily available tests (Razali, Nornadiah, & Wah, 2011).  If the S-W 
test was significant (i.e. p < .05), the distribution was assumed to be non-normal.  
Skewness or kurtosis z-scores over 1.96 also indicated significant deviation from 
normality and facilitated identification of the nature of the violation (Field, 2013).  
Furthermore, where appropriate, the assumption of homogeneity of variances 
(homoscedasticity) was assessed with Levene’s test.  If the test statistic was significant 
(p < .05), it was assumed that heteroscedasticity was present and that this assumption 
was not met.     
 
If a non-normal distribution was present, or if there was significant heteroscedasticity, 
transformations were carried out to attempt to correct these features.  The 
transformations used were Naperian Logarithm, Logarithm (10), square root, square, 
cube and reciprocal.  If the transformed scores resolved the violations, these 
transformed scores were used in the analyses.  However, if the transformations did 
not improve the data, then untransformed scores were analysed with non-parametric 
techniques (i.e. Mann-Whitney U) if appropriate.  Any transformations conducted are 
detailed in the relevant results sections.  In cases where the use of non-parametric 
techniques was not appropriate (e.g. analysis of the factorial experimental data, mixed 
factorial ANCOVA), the planned parametric tests were carried out.  The use of 
ANOVA or ANCOVA with data that deviate somewhat from normality can be 
justified by the finding that ANOVA/ANCOVA models are generally robust to such 
violations (e.g. Glass, Peckham, & Sanders,1972; Levy, 1980; Schmider et al., 2010).  
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Moreover, Central Limit Theorem indicates that when sample sizes are sufficiently 
large (degrees of freedom of >20), one can assume the normality of the sampling 
distribution despite the appearance of non-normality in the distribution of the raw 
data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).    
 
Where relevant (repeated measures/within-subjects variables), the assumption of 
sphericity was tested using Mauchly’s test.  If this assumption was violated (i.e. a 
significant result on Mauchly’s test), corrections were made using the most 
appropriate technique.  Following Field (2013), the Greenhouse-Geiser correction 
was used if the estimate of sphericity was well under 0.75, whereas the Huynh & Feldt 
technique was applied where this estimate was equal to or exceeded 0.75.   
 
When regressions were carried out, the variables were checked for multicollinearity 
(Field, 2003; D. Howell, 1997).  Relevant diagnostics (tolerance, variance inflation 
factor (VIF) were checked to ensure that they were within acceptable limits (VIF < 
10; tolerance > 0.2), according to Myers (1990) and Menard (1995) respectively, as 
cited by Field (2013). After completing multivariate regression analyses, several 
additional assumptions were checked.  Cook’s distances were checked for all cases, 
to confirm the absence of influential cases on the regression statistics.  Cook’s 




Chapter 5. Psychosocial factors in patients diagnosed with dissociative 





As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, a number of methodological weaknesses and 
inconsistencies have been noted in the existing literature on psychosocial factors in 
patients with DS.  In relation to trauma history, some studies have reported 
exclusively on one or few specific types of life event (i.e. abuse and neglect), often 
failing to assess other potentially important experiences (Akyuz et al., 2004; Driver-
Dunckley et al., 2011; Gazzola et al., 2012; Koby et al., 2010; Stone et al., 2004).  
Other studies have reported on a wider range of life events, but have not provided 
explicit criteria on which traumatic events are defined (e.g. Bora et al., 2011; LaFrance 
& Syc, 2009; Turner et al., 2011).  Additionally, many studies have not included data 
on the perceived impact or significance of reported life events, although some 
investigators have examined symptoms of PTSD (e.g. Dikel et al., 2003; Rosenberg et 
al., 2000).   
 
In previous research, validated measures have not been used consistently to measure 
trauma, with retrospective analysis of case notes frequently reported (e.g. An et al., 
2010; Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011; Gazzola et al., 2012; Krahn et al., 1997; Lancman 
et al., 1993; O’Sullivan et al., 2007; Salinsky et al., 2012; Scheepers et al., 1994; Thomas 
et al., 2013).  Lack of matching for gender has also been an important weakness in 
some instances (e.g. Alper et al., 1993; Dixit et al., 2013; Gazzola et al., 2012; Kaplan 
et al., 2013; Litwin & Cardeña, 2000).  Moreover, many investigators have not 
assessed the extent to which trauma/abuse may have been associated with clinical 
characteristics such as DS severity.  Finally, analysis of whether the relationship 
between trauma and DS was mediated by other relevant variables (i.e. somatisation, 
general psychological distress) was often not included in previous work.  
 
A variety of methods have also been used to examine family functioning in patients 
with DS.  Whilst standardised self-report measures have been most common (e.g. 
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LaFrance et al., 2011; Salmon et al., 2003), qualitative techniques (e.g. J.L. Griffith et 
al., 1998; Stanhope et al., 2003) and interviews (e.g. Bowman & Markand, 1999) have 
also been described.  In some instances, specification as to whether the measures 
referred to childhood, current or lifetime family functioning has not been included 
(e.g. Hovorka et al., 2007; LaFrance et al., 2011).  Furthermore, some authors have 
not examined family functioning in relation to other psychosocial characteristics of 
the patient group, such as psychopathology, personality characteristics or trauma 
history (e.g. Krawetz et al., 2001).  However, one particularly interesting study 
suggested that family dysfunction (i.e. elevated control) may mediate the relationship 
of abuse to DS (Salmon et al., 2003).   
 
When examining psychopathology and personality characteristics in patients with DS, 
some previous investigators have not included control groups (e.g. Alessi & Valente, 
2013; Bowman & Markand, 1999; Ettinger, Dhoon, et al., 1999; Lempert & Schmidt, 
1990; Snyder et al., 1994).  Once again, a wide range of techniques have been used to 
assess these characteristics, including standardised or unstandardised interviews (e.g. 
Abubakr et al., 2003; Baillés et al., 2004; Dworetzky et al., 2005), medical case note 
review (e.g. Alessi & Valente, 2013; Dixit et al., 2013; Seneviratne et al., 2011), and 
self-report measures (e.g. Hixson et al., 2006; LaFrance & Syc, 2009; Prueter et al., 
2002).    
 
5.1.2. Rationale, aims and hypotheses 
One objective of the current study was to further explore adverse life experiences 
in patients with DS, by using a standardised measure with sound psychometric 
properties (Traumatic Experiences Checklist; TEC; Nijenhuis et al., 1999).  The 
measure assesses the presence of a wide range of life events; however, since not all 
events on the measure would be considered universally traumatic (e.g. poverty, 
divorce), the term ‘adverse’ life events will be used when discussing the findings on 
this measure.  An advantage of this questionnaire is that it assesses the perceived 
impact of each reported life experience, and thus provides an insight into subjective 
responses to life events.  In the current study, gender was also carefully matched 
between groups, to control for the known association between gender and 
trauma/abuse history.  Furthermore, symptoms of PTSD were assessed with a 
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standardised self-report measure (Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale; PDS; Foa et al., 
1997), in order to further explore the psychological impact of such events.   
 
Additionally, following Salmon et al. (2003), subscales from a psychometrically-sound 
measure of family functioning (Family Environment Scale; FES; Moos & Moos, 1981) 
were included in the study, which allowed clear hypotheses to be generated regarding 
the aspects of dysfunction that were likely to be observed (e.g. expressiveness, 
control).  A measure of psychological dissociation that had not previously been used 
with DS patients was also administered (Multiscale Dissociation Inventory; MDI; 
Briere, 2002), in order to assess several dimensions of psychological dissociation in 
this group.  Furthermore, a measure of somatoform dissociation was also included 
(SDQ-20; Nijenhuis et al., 1996), so that somatic manifestations of dissociation were 
captured.   
 
In order to explore personality functioning, a measure was selected that assesses 
aspects of behaviour/personality commonly associated with borderline personality 
disorder (Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities; IASC; Briere, 2000).  This measure 
was included to gain insight into which specific aspects of borderline ‘type’ tendencies 
may be particularly important in patients with DS.  Finally, a measure of the specific 
symptoms experienced by patients during their seizures was also included (Goldstein 
& Mellers, 2006), in order to examine whether any of the psychosocial variables were 
related to specific manifestations of the disorder.   
 
An important overall aim of the study was to assess these variables in patients with 
DS relative to healthy individuals.  On the basis of previous research findings, the 
following hypotheses were tested: 
 
1. Adverse life experiences:  
i. Patients diagnosed with DS were expected to report significantly more 
lifetime adverse life experiences than healthy control participants. 
ii. Rates of sexual, physical and emotional abuse were predicted to be 





2. Childhood family functioning: 
Elevated reports of childhood family control and reduced childhood family 
expressiveness were predicted in the DS group, relative to healthy controls. 
 
3. Psychological dissociation:  
The DS group were predicted to report significantly higher levels of 
psychological dissociation than the healthy control group, as measured by the 
MDI.  
 
4. Somatoform dissociation:  
A significant elevation in somatoform dissociation was predicted in the DS 
group, relative to the healthy control group. 
 
5. Psychological distress:  
Symptoms of anxiety and depression were hypothesised to be higher in the 
DS sample, compared to healthy controls. 
 
6. Borderline personality tendencies:  
The DS group were predicted to exhibit elevations in borderline personality 
traits, as measured by the IASC, compared to healthy controls.  On the basis 
of previous literature, affect dysregulation was expected to be higher in the 
patients than in the control group.    
 
In addition, the research sought to explore the ways in which these psychosocial 
variables related to each other in the DS group.  Moreover, a further objective was 
to carry out an exploratory assessment of the relative importance of these variables 
in differentiating patients with DS from healthy controls.  Therefore, those 
subscales/scales showing significant between-group differences were examined 
further in exploratory analyses.  Correlations were used to examine whether there 
were inter-relationships between the psychosocial variables, and whether any were 
associated with seizure-related factors (i.e. seizure frequency, length of seizure 
disorder, seizure symptoms).  Moreover, exploratory logistic regression analyses 
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were used to assess which variables best differentiated patients with DS from healthy 
controls, after accounting for the influence of other possibly confounding variables 
(e.g. years of education). 





Details regarding participant recruitment and ethical approval can be found in Chapter 
4 (section 4.2.1). 
 
5.2.2. Measures 
All measures included in the study were self-report questionnaires, as described 
below:  
 
Traumatic Experiences Checklist (TEC; Nijenhuis et al., 1999) 
This questionnaire provides an assessment of 29 types of potentially traumatic 
experiences, and has good psychometric properties.  The internal consistency is 
satisfactory (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86-0.9) and good concurrent validity is evident, for 
example, total TEC scores correlated strongly with the Stressful Life Events Screening 
Questionnaire (Goodman et al., 1998; r = 0.77).  From this measure, it was possible 
to identify the total number of traumatic experiences participants recalled (0-29) and 
also to examine the self-reported impact of those experiences (1-5; none-extreme).   
 
Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa et al.,1997)  
The PDS measures the presence and/or severity of current symptoms of Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), within the previous month.  The measure provides 
an overall PTSD symptom score, but also incorporates criteria used to determine a 
diagnosis of PTSD according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental 
Disorders – fourth edition (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
Participants who described moderate-extreme impact of at least one life event on the 
TEC were asked to complete the PDS.   
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The authors report good internal consistency for total scores (0.92), re-experiencing 
(0.78), avoidance (0.84) and arousal (0.84) subscales.  The three subscales correlate 
significantly with each other and with total symptom scores (r = 0.73-0.94; p < .001).  
Test-retest coefficients were found to be satisfactory (Kappa = 0.77-0.85).  The PDS 
has acceptable sensitivity (0.89) and specificity (0.75).  
 
Family Environment Scale (FES; Moos & Moos, 1981) 
The full FES comprises 10 subscales, assessing internal family processes, and how 
these relate to the external social environment.  There are three forms of the 
questionnaire; including a ‘real’ form (how the family is perceived to be in reality), an 
‘ideal’ form (how the individual would like the family to be), and an ‘expected’ form 
(how the family is expected to be in new situations).  The real form of this 
questionnaire was used in this study.  Patients were asked to complete the 
questionnaire with reference to their childhood family context.   
 
Several subscales were selected, based on previous research (Salmon et al., 2003), 
including: 
 
i. Cohesion: the extent to which family members act as a cohesive unit. 
ii. Expressiveness: the level of expression of emotions, thoughts and feelings. 
iii. Conflict: the presence of overt expressions of anger or hostility within the 
family. 
iv. Independence: the degree of autonomy and assertiveness in family members. 
v. Control: the use of rules and regulatory strategies in the family context.    
 
Each subscale includes nine statements for which respondents must provide a 
dichotomous response (true/false).  These answers yield scores between 0-9, which 
can then be converted to T-scores.  The measure assesses perceived family 
functioning only, from the perspective of the participant. 
 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) 
This scale was developed for use in general medical settings, measuring current (non-
somatic) symptoms of anxiety and depression.  It consists of 14 items, with seven 
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items examining anxiety and seven measuring depression.  Participants rate the extent 
to which they have experienced each symptom in the previous week.  Both subscales 
have a maximum score of 21, with scores of 8-10 identifying borderline/doubtful 
cases, and scores of 11-21 indicative of definite caseness.  The subscales show good 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha: anxiety = 0.78-.093; depression = 0.76-0.9 
(Mykletun et al., 2001; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).  It was predicted that the DS sample 
would report greater levels of general somatic complaints; therefore, this test was 
selected in order to avoid the anxiety and depression scores being inflated by physical 
symptoms.    
 
Multiscale Dissociation Inventory (MDI; Briere, 2002) 
This 30-item scale measures a variety of psychological dissociative symptoms.  
Participants rate the extent to which they have experienced each symptom during 
the last month.  Each of the six subscales has a maximum score of 25 and a minimum 
of 5.  The raw scores are converted to T-scores.  All six of the following subscales 
were administered: 
 
i. Disengagement: cognitive and/or emotional detachment from the immediate 
situation and stimuli. 
ii. Depersonalisation: Feeling separated from or alien to one’s own body or self. 
iii. Derealisation: feeling as though the environment and the stimuli within it are 
unreal or dream-like. 
iv. Emotional Constriction: a marked reduction in awareness and experience of 
emotions (positive or negative). 
v. Memory Disturbance: experiencing memory lapses (without organic cause). 
vi. Identity Dissociation: unstable identity states, experiencing more than one 
‘self’. 
 
For subscales 1-5 above, T-scores above 80 are considered clinically significant.  For 
subscale 6 (Identity Dissociation), a T-score above 95 suggests clinical relevance.  The 
psychometric properties of the scale suggest that the subscales are reliable across 
several samples (Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .77-.92).  The MDI subscales also 
correlated positively with scores on several other dissociation measures, including 
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the DES (r = .66-.81), and the Trauma Symptom Inventory – Dissociation subscale 
(TSI DIS; Briere et al., 1995; r = .62-.76), suggestive of good convergent validity.        
 
Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ-20; Nijenhuis et al., 1996) 
This scale measures the presence of physical symptoms which are conceptualised as 
resulting from somatoform dissociation.  These symptoms are those which would 
typically be considered medically unexplained.  Respondents rate the frequency of 
such symptoms in the previous year.  The SDQ-20 provides a score ranging from 20-
100 (20 items each with scores ranging from 1-5).  Higher scores are indicative of 
elevated somatoform dissociation.  Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was reported as 
.95, indicative of good internal consistency.  Scores from the SDQ-20 were also 
reported to correlate positively with scores on the Dissociation Questionnaire 
(Nijenhuis et al., 1996), suggesting adequate convergent validity.   
 
Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities (IASC; Briere, 2000)  
This scale assesses abilities that are involved with difficulties in the 
maintenance/regulation of identity, emotions, relationships and behaviour.  The IASC 
questionnaire provides scores on seven subscales which can be categorised into three 
groups, as follows:  
 
1. Relatedness 
i. Interpersonal Conflict: Reports of problems in relationships (e.g. the tendency 
to have turbulent, emotionally distressing relationships). 
ii. Idealisation-Disillusionment: Ambivalent feelings towards significant others 
(e.g. oscillating from extremely positive to extremely negative responses).  
iii. Abandonment Concerns: Sensitivity to abandonment by others (real, 
perceived); anticipation or anxiety about the loss of close interpersonal 
relationships. 
2. Identity 
i. Identity Impairment: Difficulties in maintaining a stable experience of personal 
identity and self, across time and situations.   
ii. Susceptibility to Influence: Tendencies towards being guided or unduly 
influenced by others, without sufficient consideration of the self. 
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3. Affect control 
i. Affect Dysregulation: Deficits in control and regulation of affect (e.g. intense 
mood swings, expression of anger, problems terminating unpleasant 
affective states). 
ii. Tension reduction activities: Externalisation of emotional distress (e.g. binge-
eating, sexual or self-injurious behaviours). 
 
Each IASC subscale comprises nine items, which are scored from 1-5.  Respondents 
indicate the frequency of each symptom in the previous six months.  Therefore, the 
total score for the scale is between 9 and 45.  These scores are converted to T-
scores.  The psychometric properties of the IASC include Cronbach’s alpha values 
ranging from .78-.93 for the seven subscales, suggesting good internal consistency 
(Briere & Runtz, 2002).  The average Cronbach’s alpha values were .89, .93, and .89 
in normative, clinical and university samples respectively.  Scores on all of the IASC 
subscales correlated significantly with the ‘borderline features’ subscale of the 
Personality Assessment Inventory (Morey, 1991) with values ranging from .61 to .86 
(all significant at p < .01).   
 
Ictal symptoms (Goldstein & Mellers, 2006) 
Seizure symptoms were assessed in the DS group using an abbreviated form of the 
questionnaire developed by Goldstein & Mellers (2006; see Appendix 11).  The 
questionnaire measures various symptom types, including: autonomic arousal, 
symptoms relating to the chest/abdomen, aspects of mental state, cognitive 
phenomena, and general seizure symptoms.  Each type of symptom is assessed with 
respect to patients’ most recent and most severe attacks.  The authors’ psychometric 
details on this scale indicated Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .621 to .883 across the 
subscales, suggestive of moderate to good reliability.      
 
5.2.3. Design and procedure 
The overall research design, procedures and order of administration of the 
questionnaires was described in Chapter 4 (section 4.4).  The dependent variables 




5.2.4. Data analyses 
The between-group data analyses, including statistical techniques, were also described 
in Chapter 4 (section 4.5).  Variables that differed significantly between-groups were 
considered for examination in the exploratory analyses.  The exploratory 
correlational analyses utilised non-parametric (Spearman’s rho) bivariate correlations, 
to assess inter-relationships between significant psychosocial variables (TEC, PDS, 
HADS, MDI, SDQ-20, IASC), and seizure-related variables (seizure frequency, 
duration of disorder, ictal symptoms).  Logistic regression analyses were conducted 
with group as the outcome variable (DS, control).  Variables which had been 
significant in the between-groups analyses were first tested with univariate binary 
logistic regression analyses, with YoE controlled by entry in the first step.  Variables 
that were significant in the univariate analyses (p < .01), and/or had theoretical 
significance, were then entered as predictors in multivariate binary logistic 
regressions.  Predictors were entered in blocks, with input of variables within blocks 
using the forced entry procedure.   
 
Mediation analyses (Field, 2013) were carried out for some variables.  The PROCESS 
custom dialog box (Hayes, 2012) for SPSS was installed and used to obtain the 
relevant statistics.  Where mediation effects were investigated, Sobel’s test (1982, as 





5.3.1. Demographic characteristics  
A summary of participants’ demographic characteristics can be found in Table 2.  No 
significant difference in age was found between the DS and control groups.  
Furthermore, the ratio of males to females did not differ between groups.  The 
proportion of participants with right-hand dominance also did not differ significantly 
between groups, neither did the proportion of smokers.  The ethnic backgrounds of 
the two groups can be found in Figure 4.  There was no significant difference in the 




Table 2. Demographic characteristics of the total sample (by group) 
 DS (n = 40) Control (n = 43) Test 
statistics 










U (83) = 
806, p = 
.622 
Gender  Male = 8 (20%) 
Female = 32 (80%) 
Male = 8 (18.6%) 
Female = 35 (81.4%) 
X2 (1, 
n=83) = 
.026, p = 
.872 
Handedness Right = 30 (75%) 
Left / ambidextrous 
= 10 (25%)  
Right = 38 (88.4%) 




2.5, p = 
.114 
Ethnicity White = 32 (80%) 
Non-white = 8 
(20%) 
White = 28 (65.1%) 
Non-white = 15 (34.9) 
X2 (1, 
n=83) = 
2.29, p = 
.130 
YoE 
 Mean (SD) 








U (83) = 
631, p = 
.035 
Qualifications GCSEs / none = 16 
(40%) 
Further / higher = 24 
(60%) 
GCSEs / none = 9 
(20.9%) 




3.58, p = 
.058 
Marital status Currently single = 
24 (60%) 
Long-term 
relationship = 16 
(40%) 




= 9 (20.9%) 
X2 (1, 
n=83) = 




1 = 18 (45%) 
 
2,3,4 or 5 = 22 (55%) 
1 = 18 (41.9%) 
 
2,3,4 or 5 = 25 (58.1%) 
X2 (1, 
n=83) = 
.083, p = 
.773 
Smoking Yes = 11 (27.5%) 
 
No = 29 (72.5%) 
Yes = 9 (20.9%) 
 
No = 34 (79.1%) 
X2 (1, n=83) 
= .489, p = 
.484 
SD = standard deviation   NSSEC: National Statistics Socio-economic Classification system 
IQR = interquartile range   1 = Higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations 
YoE: years of full-time education (or equivalent) 2 = Intermediate occupations 
DS = dissociative seizures   3 = Small employers and own account workers 
     4 = Lower supervisory and technical occupations 
     5 = Semi-routine and routine occupations 
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Figure 4. Self-reported ethnicity by group  
 
   
The DS group reported significantly fewer years of full-time education (YoE) than 
control participants.  Figure 5 shows educational details for the two groups.  A non-
significant trend indicated that attainment of further/higher education was somewhat 
more common in the control group, relative to the DS group.  In addition, a non-
significant trend indicated that patients with DS were more likely to be in a current 
long-term relationship (married/cohabiting), relative to the control group.  Details 
regarding the marital status of participants are available in Figure 6.   
 
On the basis of self-reported occupation, socioeconomic status (SES) was classified 
using the five class version of the National Statistics - Socioeconomic Classification 
system (NS-SEC; Office for National Statistics, 2010).  Participants were classified on 
the basis of their current/most recent occupation.  Those who were financially 
dependent on/interdependent with another party (e.g. spouse or parents), were 
classified according to the occupation of the highest wage earner in the 
household.  Those who were long-term unemployed or had never worked due to 














Figure 7 displays the number of participants (by group) in each of the five categories 
included in the NS-SEC.  The proportion of participants belonging to category 1 did 
not differ significantly between groups.  
 
Figure 7. Socioeconomic status by group 
 
 
5.3.2. Clinical details 
Medication and medical diagnoses 
A significantly larger proportion of DS patients were currently taking prescribed 
medication, relative to controls.  Details on medication use can be found in Table 3.  
A significantly greater percentage of participants in the DS group reported a current 
medical diagnosis, relative to controls.  The medical diagnoses disclosed by participants 
in each group are detailed in Table 4. 
 
Seizure-related characteristics (DS group) 
The mean (SD) current seizure frequency reported by the patient sample (per month) 
and the total duration of the seizure disorder (in months) can be found in Table 5.  
The number of patients who underwent specific diagnostic tests for DS are also 
presented in the same table.  
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Table 3. Medication details by group  
 Dissociative seizures 
(n = 40) 
Control 
(n = 43) 
Test 
statistics  
Medication  Yes = 29 (72.5%) 
No = 11 (27.5%) 
Yes = 10 (23.3%)  
No = 33 (76.7%) 
X2 (1, 
n=83) = 




Anti-epileptic = 17 
(42.5%) 
Anti-depressant = 16 
(40%) 
Proton pump inhibitor = 
8 (20%) 
Analgesics and anti-
inflammatories = 8 (18%) 
Hypertension reduction 
= 5 (12.5%)  
Benzodiazepine = 4 
(10%) 
Asthma medication = 4 
(10%) 
Oral contraceptive = 4 
(10%) 
Anti-dopaminergic = 2 
(5%) 
Cholesterol reducers = 2 
(5%) 
Hormonal treatment = 2 
(5%) 
Anti-psychotic = 1 (2.5%) 
Anti-allergy = 1 (2.5%) 
Anti-spasmodic = 1 
(2.5%) 
Diuretic = 1 (2.5%) 
Anti-vertigo = 1 (2.5%) 
Anti-cholinergic = 1 
(2.5%) 
Adrenergic agonist = 1 
(2.5%) 
Asthma medication = 4 
(9.3%) 
Anti-allergy = 1 (2.3%) 
Hormonal treatment = 1 
(2.3%) 
Anti-retroviral = 1 (2.3%) 
Cholesterol reducers = 1 
(2.3%) 







Table 4. Medical diagnoses by group 
 Dissociative seizures 
(n = 40) 
Control 






Yes = 23 (57.5%) 
 No = 17 (42.5%) 
Yes = 6 (14%) 
No = 37 (86%) 
X2 (1, 
n=83) = 





Gastrointestinal = 6 (15%) 
Hypertension = 5 (12.5%) 
Previous hysterectomy = 5 
(12.5%) 
Asthma = 4 (10%) 
Polycystic ovary syndrome 
= 2 (5%) 
High cholesterol = 2 (5%) 
Previous ovarian cancer = 2 
(5%) 
Alopecia = 1 (2.5%) 
Hernia = 1 (2.5%) 
Arthritis = 1 (2.5%) 
Hypothyroidism = 1 (2.5%) 
Erythema nodosum = 1 
(2.5%) 
Dyslexia = 1 (2.5%) 
Allergies = 1 (2.5%) 
Trigeminal nerve damage = 
1 (2.5%) 
Brugada Syndrome = 1 
(2.5%) 
Keratoconus = 1 (2.5%) 
Amenorrhea = 1 (2.5%) 
Hemochromatosis = 1 
(2.5%) 
Asthma = 4 (9.3%) 
Osteoporosis = 1 (2.3%) 
HIV = 1 (2.3%) 
Hypertension = 1 (2.3%) 
High cholesterol = 1 (2.3%) 





Table 5. Details of seizure disorder (dissociative seizures group) 
















Diagnostic tests Video-EEG = 27 (67.5%) 
Imaging (MRI/CT) = 32 (80%) 
Routine EEG = 36 (90%) 
SD = standard deviation; IQR = interquartile range  CT = computed tomography 




5.3.3. Psychosocial characteristics: between-group comparisons 
Traumatic Experiences Checklist (TEC) 
The statistics for the TEC are shown in Table 6.  The DS group reported significantly 
more total adverse life experiences and higher mean impact scores, relative to the 
control group.  In addition, significantly more participants reported having experienced 
sexual and physical abuse in the DS group, in comparison to controls.  However, there 
were no significant between-group differences in emotional neglect and abuse. 
  
Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) 
Statistical information for the PDS is available in Table 7.  There was a significant 
elevation of Total, Re-experiencing, Avoidance, and Arousal PTSD symptoms in the 
DS group, relative to healthy controls.  In addition, none of the control participants 
met the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD, whilst 66.7% of the DS patients completing 
the measure did. 
 
Family Environment Scale (FES) 
The statistics for the FES data are shown in Table 8.  After controlling for multiple 





Table 6. Traumatic Experiences Checklist (TEC) scores 
 DS 
n = 39 
Control 
n  = 43 
Test statistics 
Total 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
 
Sexual abuse  
     n (%) 
 
Physical abuse 
     n (%) 
 
Emotional abuse 
     n (%) 
 
Emotional neglect 
     n (%) 
 
Impact ratings 
     Mean (SD) 












































X2 (1, n = 81) = 12, 
p = .001 
 
X2(1, n=82) = 6.91, 
p = .009 
 
X2 (1, n = 82) = 
.339, p = .560 
 
X2 (1, n = 82) = 
3.26,p = .071 
 
U (83) = 493, p = 
.002 




Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
Table 9 displays the statistical details for the HADS analyses.  There were highly 
significant elevations in Anxiety and Depression scores in the DS group relative to 
healthy control participants; however, the mean scores in the DS group were only in 






Table 7. Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) scores 
 
 DS  
n = 29 
Control 
n = 28 
Test statistics 
Total 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Re-experiencing 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Avoidance 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Arousal 
     Mean (SD 


























t (55) = -7.17, p < 
.001  
 
U (57) = 190.5, p < 
.001  
 
U (57) = 87.5, p < 
.001  
 
U (57) = 107.5, p < 
.001  
SD = standard deviation; IQR = interquartile range; DS = dissociative seizures 
 
 
Multiscale Dissociation Inventory (MDI) 
Statistics for the MDI scores can be found in Table 10.  There were significant 
differences on all subscales, with the DS group consistently reporting higher scores 
than control participants.  The average scores were in the clinically significant range 
for the Disengagement, Depersonalisation, and Memory Disturbance subscales in the 
DS group, whereas the average scores were in the normal range for all subscales in 
the control group.   
 
Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ-20) 
Table 10 also displays statistics for the SDQ-20.   When all SDQ-20 items were 
included in the analysis, there was a significant elevation in scores in the DS group 
relative to the control group.  Furthermore, when the seizure-related item was 




 Table 8. Family Environment Scale (FES) scores 
 
 DS 
n = 36 
Control 





  Mean (SD) 
  Median (IQR) 
Expression 
  Mean (SD) 
  Median (IQR) 
Conflict 
  Mean (SD) 
  Median (IQR) 
Independence 
  Mean (SD) 
  Median (IQR) 
Control 
  Mean (SD) 
































U (79) = 598.5, p = 
.082 (p = .328) 
 
U (79) = 713.5, p = 
.549 (p = .575) 
 
U (79) = 554.5, p = 
.03 (p = .15) 
 
U (79) = 705, p = .491 
(.575) 
 
U (79) = 717.5, p = 
.575 
SD = standard deviation; IQR = interquartile range; DS = dissociative seizures 
 
 
Table 9. Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) scores 
 
 DS 
n = 40 
Control 
n = 43 
Test statistics 
Depression  
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Anxiety 












U (83) = 266.5, p 
< .001 
 
t (81) = -5.58, p 
< .001 




Table 10. Multiscale Dissociation Inventory T-scores (MDI) and 
Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire scores (SDQ-20) 
 DS Control Test statistics 
MDI 
Disengagement 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Depersonalisation 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Derealisation 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Emotional Constriction 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Memory Disturbance 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Identity Dissociation 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 








































U (82) = 258.5, 
p < .001 
 
U (82) = 360, p 
< .001 
 
U (82) = 296.5, 
p < .001 
 
U (82) = 447.5, 
p < .001 
 
U (82) = 211, p 
< .001 
 
U (82) = 537, p 
< .001 
SDQ-20 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
n = 37 
34.2 (7.2) 
34 (8) 




U (80) = 59, p < 
.001 





Inventory of Altered SeIf-Capacities (IASC) 
Table 11 displays the statistical values relevant to the IASC.  Patients with DS received 
higher scores than control participants on the following subscales: Identity 
Impairment, Abandonment Concerns, Affect Dysregulation, and Tension Reduction 







Table 11. Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities (IASC) T-scores 
 
 DS 
n = 37 
 
Control 







     Mean (SD) 
Idealisation-Disillusionment 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Abandonment Concerns 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Identity Impairment 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Susceptibility to Influence 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Affect Dysregulation 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
Tension Reduction Activities 
     Mean (SD) 










































t (78) = -2.21, p = 
.03 (p = .09) 
U (80) = 662.5, p 
= .199 (p = .398) 
 
U (80) = 457, p = 
.001 (p = .004) 
 
U (80) = 466, p = 
.001 (p = .004) 
 
U (80) = 733.5, p 
=.548  
 
U (80) = 348, p < 
.001  
 
U (80) = 465, p = 
.001 (p = .004)   





When asked about their most recent seizures, the most frequently reported 
symptoms by patients with DS were cognitive and autonomic arousal phenomena.  
With regards to their most severe seizure, the most frequent symptoms were mental 
state, autonomic arousal and cognitive symptoms.  In fact, during the most severe 
seizure, 100% of patients reported cognitive symptoms.  Table 12 displays the 
proportion of patients (n, %) reporting at least one of each symptom type, and the 




Table 12. Proportion of DS patients reporting at least one symptom for 
each ictal symptom type, and the average number of each symptom type 
reported across all patients  
 
n = 36 





Chest / abdomen 
          n (%) 
          Mean (SD) 
Mental state  
          n (%) 
          Mean (SD) 
Autonomic arousal  
          n (%) 
          Mean (SD) 
General symptoms 
          n (%) 
          Mean (SD) 
Cognitive  
          n (%) 




































5.3.4. Exploratory correlational analyses 
Correlations between the subscales of any one measure are not reported because 
these are predictable and of limited value in the current analyses.  Correlations that 
were significant at the specified alpha level (p < .01) in the DS group are reported in 
the tables below; however, when a significant relationship between two measures 
was observed in both groups, the finding is not discussed further in the text, due to 




Significant correlations for the TEC subscales can be found in Table 13.  TEC Total 
scores were positively correlated with MDI Depersonalisation and Emotional 
Constriction scores.  Furthermore, TEC mean impact scores were positively 
associated with HADS Depression scores.  Sexual abuse scores were positively 
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associated with MDI Identity Dissociation, and TEC physical abuse scores positively 
correlated with IASC Abandonment Concerns scores.  In the traumatised group, 
there was a significant correlation between PDS Arousal scores and TEC physical 
abuse scores.   
 
Table 13. Traumatic Experiences Checklist (TEC) correlations 
  DS   Control 





TEC mean impact 
  HADS Depression* 
TEC sexual abuse 
  MDI Identity Dissociation* 
TEC physical abuse 




























p = .005 
 
p = .006 
 
p = .006 
 
p = .002 
 
 
p = .001 


























p = .145 
 
p = .041 
 
p = .571 
 
 p = .567 
 
 
p = .620 
p = .085 
IASC = Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities; PDS = Post-traumatic diagnostic scale; HADS = Hospital Anxiety & Depression 
Scale; MDI = Multiscale Dissociation Inventory; DS = dissociative seizures  
* denotes correlation significant in the DS group only (p < .01) 
 
PDS 
Significant correlations between scores on the PDS and other variables are shown in 
Table 14.  In this subgroup of participants (those reporting at least moderate impact 
of one adverse life event on the TEC), PDS Total scores were positively correlated 
with HADS Anxiety and Depression scores, IASC Abandonment Concerns and 
Tension Reduction Activities.  Furthermore, PDS Total scores were also positively 
associated with ictal cognitive symptoms during patients’ most recent seizure.  PDS 
Arousal scores were positively associated with HADS Anxiety and Depression scores 
and IASC Tension Reduction Activities.  Moreover, PDS Avoidance scores were 
associated (positively) with a number of variables, including: HADS Depression 
scores, IASC Abandonment Concerns and Tension Reduction Activities, and MDI 
Disengagement and Memory Disturbance.   Finally, PDS Re-experiencing symptoms 




Table 14. Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) correlations 
 DS Control 
Variables n r / 
rho 




 HADS Anxiety* 
 HADS Depression* 
 IASC Abandonment Concerns* 
 IASC Tension Reduction  
Activities*   
 Ictal cognitive symptoms 
(recent)* 
PDS Arousal 
  HADS Anxiety* 
  HADS Depression* 
  IASC Tension Reduction 
Activities* 
PDS Avoidance 
  HADS Depression* 
  IASC Abandonment 
Concerns* 
  IASC Tension Reduction 
Activities* 
  MDI Disengagement* 
  MDI Memory Disturbance* 
PDS Re-experiencing 
















































p = .006 
p = .001  
p = .001 
 
p = .003 
 
p = .005 
 
p  < .001 
p = .002 
 
p = .005 
 
p < .001 
 
p = .001 
 
p < .001 
p = .009 














































p = .041 
p = .022 
p = .046 
 




p = .028 
p = .044 
 
p = .048 
 
p = .069 
 
p = .164 
 
p = .439 
p = .949 
p = .594 
IASC = Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities; HADS = Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale;  
MDI = Multiscale Dissociation Inventory; DS = dissociative seizures 




Statistical values for the correlations involving the two HADS subscales are presented 
in Table 15.  In addition to the associations already mentioned, scores on the Anxiety 
subscale of the HADS positively correlated with IASC Abandonment Concerns and 
ictal chest/abdomen symptoms (most recent seizure).  Moreover, the HADS 
Depression subscale was positively correlated with IASC Affect Dysregulation and 




Table 15. Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale (HADS) correlations 
  DS  Control 
Variables n r / 
rho 




  IASC Abandonment Concerns* 
  IASC Affect Dysregulation 
  Ictal CA symptoms (recent)* 
HADS Depression 
  IASC Affect Dysregulation* 
  IASC Tension Reduction 
Activities* 




















p = .004  
p < .001   
p = .004 
 
p = .001  
 
p = .001  




















p = .011 
p < .001 
 
 
p = .011 
 
p = .109 
p = .886 
IASC = Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities; MDI = Multiscale Dissociation Inventory;  
DS = Dissociative seizures; CA symptoms = chest / abdomen symptoms 




Significant correlations for the MDI can be found in Table 16.  Several of the MDI 
subscales were positively associated with IASC Tension Reduction Activities, 
including Depersonalisation, Derealisation, Emotional Constriction, and Identity 
Dissociation. In addition, the MDI Depersonalisation subscale was positively 
associated with ictal mental state symptoms (most recent and most severe seizures) 
and the total number of ictal symptoms (most recent seizure).  Moreover, MDI 
Derealisation scores were also positively correlated with ictal mental state symptoms 
(most recent and most severe seizures).  Finally, scores on the MDI Identity 
Dissociation subscale were positively correlated with ictal cognitive symptoms during 
patients’ most severe seizures. 
 
SDQ-20  
SDQ-20 scores were not significantly associated with any other variable measured at 
the desired alpha level, with the seizure-related variable included or excluded.    
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Table 16. Multiscale Dissociation Inventory (MDI) correlations 
  DS  Control 
Variables n r/rho p-value  n r/rho p-value 
MDI Depersonalisation  
  Ictal mental state symptoms 
(recent)* 
  Ictal mental state symptoms 
(severe)* 
  Ictal total symptoms 
(recent)* 
  IASC Tension Reduction 
Activities* 
MDI Derealisation 
  Ictal mental state symptoms 
(recent)* 
  Ictal mental state symptoms 
(severe)* 
  IASC Tension Reduction 
Activities* 
MDI Disengagement 








   IASC Tension Reduction 
Activities 
MDI Identity Dissociation 
   IASC Tension Reduction 
Activities* 




































































p < .001 
 
p < .001 
 
p = .002 
 
p = .007 
 
 
p < .001 
 
p = .002 
 
p = .002 
 
 








p = .008 
 
 
p = .003 
 














































































p = .025 
 
 








p = .005 
 
 
p = .109 
 
DS = dissociative seizures; IASC = Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities 




The statistics for the correlations of IASC subscales are displayed in Tables 13-16 
above.  All of the significant correlations for this measure have been described in 
previous sections.  
 
5.3.5. Exploratory regression analyses 
Adverse life experiences & group membership 
The first set of logistic regression analyses were carried out to examine the extent 
to which adverse life events would differentiate between patients with DS and healthy 
controls.  In the initial univariate logistic regression analyses, TEC mean impact scores, 
sexual abuse and physical abuse significantly differentiated DS patients from controls 
(see Table 17), after controlling for YoE.  Next, a hierarchical multivariate logistic 
regression was carried out, involving the following procedure: YoE was entered as 
the initial predictor variable in block 1, with the TEC variables (mean impact, sexual 
abuse, and physical abuse scores) entered simultaneously in block 2.  Once all 
variables had been entered, the overall model was highly significant (see Table 18) 
and correctly classified 70% of cases.  The only variable to retain significance in the 
final step was the reported experience of sexual abuse.  The presence of reported 
sexual abuse was associated with a three-fold increase (Odds Ratio = 3.59) in the 
likelihood of being diagnosed with DS.  
 
Psychological variables and group membership 
The second set of logistic regression analyses was carried out to establish the extent 
to which relevant psychological variables (see below) differentiated patients with DS 
from healthy controls, whilst controlling for YoE.   
 
Anxiety and depression 
Both HADS Anxiety and HADS Depression scores were found to be significant 
predictors of DS group membership, when assessed with univariate logistic 
regressions (controlling for YoE – see Table 19).  However, when entered 
simultaneously in block 2 of a hierarchical multivariate logistic regression model (YoE 
as block 1), only YoE and HADS depression scores remained significant (see Table 
 143 
 
20).  This model successfully classified 73.5% of cases, and each unit increase in HADS 
Depression scores increased the likelihood of a DS diagnosis by 1.45 times.     
 
Table 17. Individual logistic regression statistics for the independent 
prediction of TEC variables on DS group membership, with YoE as 
covariate 






TEC total scores 
Block 1: 
           YoE 
Block 2:  
          YoE 
          TEC total 
Model 
TEC mean impact scores 
Block 1:  
          YoE 
Block 2:  
         YoE 
         TEC mean impact* 
Model 
TEC sexual abuse 
(presence/absence) 
Block 1:  
          YoE  
Block 2:  
           YoE          
           TEC sexual abuse* 
Model 
TEC physical abuse 
(presence/absence) 
Block 1:  
          YoE 
Block 2:  
          YoE 





























































































p = .052 
p = .058 
p = .021 
p = .039 
p = .03 
p = .011 
 
p = .065 
p = .072 
p = .001 
p = .153 
p = .004 
p = .001 
 
 
p = .066 
p = .072 
p = .001 
p = .096 
p = .001 
p < .001 
 
 
p = .052 
p = .058 
p = .005 
p = .039 
p = .007 





























































TEC = Traumatic Experiences Checklist; YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.) 





Table 18. Hierarchical logistic regression statistics for the predictive 
value of TEC variables on DS group membership, with YoE as covariate 




Interval (CI, 95%) 
Block 1:  
     YoE 
 
Block 2:  
     YoE 
     TEC mean impact 
     TEC sexual abuse* 
     TEC physical abuse 




























p = .081 
p = .088 
 
p < .001 
p = .113 
p = .054 
p = .025 
p = .211 

















TEC = Traumatic Experiences Checklist; YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.) 




Table 19. Individual logistic regression statistics for the differentiation of 
group membership by HADS anxiety and depression scores, with YoE as 
covariate 






HADS Anxiety scores 
Block 1 
          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 
          HADS Anxiety* 
Model 
 
HADS Depression scores 
Block 1 
          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 















































p = .041 
p = .047 
p < .001 
p = .051 
p < .001 
p < .001 
 
 
p = .041 
p = .047 
p < .001 
p = .027 
p < .001 






























HADS = Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale; YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.) 






Table 20. Hierarchical logistic regression statistics for the prediction of 
DS group membership by HADS Depression and Anxiety scores, with 
YoE as covariate 







          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE* 
          HADS Anxiety 























p = .041 
p = .047 
p < .001 
p = .037 
p = .188 
p = .007 














HADS = Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale; YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.) 
* denoted significant variables (p < .05) 
 
Dissociation 
SDQ-20 scores and scores on all of the MDI subscales were significant predictors of 
DS group membership, when assessed with univariate logistic regressions (with YoE 
as covariate, see Tables 21 and 22).  SDQ-20 scores remained significant when the 
analysis was rerun with the seizure-related item removed. 
 
 
Table 21. Logistic regression statistics for SDQ-20 scores predicting DS 
group membership, with YoE as covariate 







          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 




















p = .075 
p = .082 
p < .001 
p = .533 
p < .001 













SDQ-20: Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire – 20 item version; YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.) 





Table 22. Individual logistic regression statistics for the predictive power 
of each MDI subscale scores on DS diagnosis, with YoE as covariate 










          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 




Block 1 (see MDI DENG) 
Block 2 
          YoE 




Block 1 (see MDI DENG) 
Block 2 
         YoE 




Block 1 (see MDI DENG) 
Block 2 
          YoE 




Block 1 (see MDI DENG) 
Block 2 
          YoE 




Block 1 (see MDI DENG) 
Block 2 
          YoE 
































































































































p = .052 
p = .058 
p < .001 
p = .044 
p < .001 




p < .001 
p = .126 
p < .001 




p < .001 
p = .213 
p < .001 




p < .001 
p = .03 
p = .001 




p < .001 
p = .242 





p < .001 
p = .086 
p = .007 



















































































MDI = Multiscale Dissociation Inventory; DENG = Disengagement; DEPR = Depersonalisation; ECON = Emotion 
Constriction; MEMD = Memory Disturbance; IDDIS = Identity Dissociation; YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.)  
* denotes significant variables (p < .01)  
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It was of interest to assess the relative predictive power of these different dissociative 
symptoms on group status.  However, due to power considerations (see Chapter 4, 
section 4.5.2), only two of the MDI subscales were selected for entry into the 
multivariate analysis along with SDQ-20 scores and YoE.  MDI Depersonalisation and 
Derealisation scores had previously been found to be correlated with ictal DS 
symptoms (mental state); therefore, these subscales were selected due to their 
potential significance to the occurrence of seizures in the DS group. 
 
Scores from the MDI Depersonalisation and Derealisation subscales were entered 
simultaneously with SDQ-20 scores in block 2 of a hierarchical logistic regression 
(block 1 = YoE), with group status as the outcome variable.  The final model was 
highly significant, indicating that dissociation was a strong predictor of DS diagnosis 
(see Table 23), successfully categorising 92.5% of cases.  However, only SDQ-20 
scores remained significant with all variables included in the model.  When the analysis 
was run again, excluding the seizure-related item from the SDQ scores, the same 
results occurred as in the initial analysis, although the model correctly classified 86.3% 
of cases in this second analysis. 
 
 
Table 23. Hierarchical logistic regression statistics for the predictive 
value of MDI Depersonalisation, Derealisation and SDQ-20 scores on 
group status, with YoE as covariate 







          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 
          MDI DEPR 
          MDI DERL 

























p = .075 
p = .082 
p < .001 
p = .728 
p = .862 
p = .09 
p < .001 















MDI = Multiscale Dissociation Inventory; DEPR = Depersonalisation; DERL = Derealisation;  
SDQ-20 = Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire – 20 item version; YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.) 




Borderline personality traits 
Univariate logistic regression analyses (with YoE as covariate) showed that all of the 
IASC subscales were significant independent predictors of DS diagnosis (see Table 
24).   
 
Table 24. Individual logistic regression statistics for the predictive power 
of IASC subscale scores on DS diagnosis, with YoE as covariate 
 








          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 




Block 1 (see IASC AC) 
          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 




Block 1 (see IASC AC) 
          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 




Block 1 (see IASC AC) 
          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 































































































p = .075 
p = .082 
p < .001 
p = .038 
p = .001 
p < .001 
 
p < .001 
 
 
p = .001 
p = .061 
p = .002 





p < .001 
p = .048 
p < .001 





p < .001 
p = .015 
p < .001 





























































YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.); IASC = Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities; AD = Affective Dysregulation;  
II = Identity Impairment; TRA = Tension Reduction Activities; AC = Abandonment Concerns; DS = dissociative seizures 
* denotes significant variables (p < .01) 
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Due to power considerations, only the IASC subscales that had been found to be 
correlated with other important variables (e.g. trauma, post-traumatic symptoms, 
anxiety, depression) were selected for entry into the multivariate analysis 
(Abandonment Concerns, Affect Dysregulation, Tension Reduction Activities). 
Scores for the selected IASC subscales were simultaneously entered into block 2, 
with YoE entered in block 1 and with group status as the criterion variable.  The final 
model was highly significant; correctly identifying 71.3% of cases.  Nevertheless, only 
the coefficients for the IASC AD subscale and YoE remained significant in the final 
model (see Table 25, Analysis 1).   
 
As both HADS anxiety and depression scores had been noted to be highly correlated 
with the IASC AD scores in the DS group, it was necessary to investigate the extent 
to which the predictive relationship of IASC AD to DS diagnosis could be explained 
by HADS scores.  Therefore, a further multivariate logistic regression was run with 
YoE in block 1, HADS Anxiety and Depression scores entered in block 2, and IASC 
AD scores entered in block 3.  Whilst the final model including these subscales was 
highly significant, the addition of IASC AD scores in the last block did not significantly 
improve the fit of the model.  Only the HADS depression scores remained significant 
in the final model, suggesting that the effect of IASC AD on DS diagnosis might be 
attributable to the raised depression scores in that group (see Table 25, Analysis 2).  
A mediation analysis was carried out to examine this further.  This analysis showed 
that there was a significant indirect effect of IASC AD scores on group membership 
through HADS Depression scores (b = .045, z = 2.74, p = .006).  With HADS 
Depression scores included in this model, the direct effect of IASC AD scores to 
group membership was not significant (b = .034, z = 1.77, p = .077).    
 
Sexual abuse history, depression, somatoform dissociation and group 
membership 
The first set of analyses reported above indicated that, of the variables relating to 
adverse life events, a history of sexual abuse was the most important predictor of DS 
group membership.  The second set of analyses showed that, of the possible 
psychological variables associated with DS, the presence of depression and 




Table 25. Hierarchical logistic regression statistics for the predictive 
relationship of IASC subscales to DS diagnosis, with YoE and HADS scores 
as covariates 






Analysis 1  
 
Block 1 
          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE* 
          IASC AC 
          IASC AD* 
          IASC TRA 
Model 
 
Analysis 2  
 
Block 1 (see Step 1 above) 
          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 
          HADS Anxiety 
          HADS Depression*  
Model        
Block  3 
          YoE 
          HADS Anxiety 
          HADS Depression* 

















































































p = .075 
p = .082 
p < .001 
p = .029 
p = .735 
p = .028 
p = .287 






p < .001 
p = .054 
p = .189 
p = .009 
p < .001 
p = .227 
p = .053 
p = .563 
p = .019 
p = .232 





















































IASC = Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities; AD = Affective Dysregulation; TRA = Tension Reduction Activities;  
AC = Abandonment Concerns; HADS = Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale; YoE = Years of full-time education (or equiv.) 
DS = dissociative seizures 






A final set of exploratory analyses were, therefore, conducted to examine whether 
the predictive relationship of self-reported sexual abuse to DS diagnosis might be 
explained by depression and/or somatoform dissociation scores.  Firstly, a 
multivariate hierarchical logistic regression was conducted, in which the following 
procedure was implemented: block 1 = YoE, block 2 = SDQ-20, HADS Depression, 
block 3 = TEC sexual abuse.  The statistics for these analyses can be found in Table 
26.  Within the final model, the only variable that remained significant was the SDQ-
20.  The overall model was highly significant and allowed accurate classification of 
91.1% of cases.  This analysis was run again with SDQ-20 scores calculated excluding 
the seizure-item.  A very similar pattern of findings was revealed, with the key 
difference that in the final model, HADS Depression scores remained significant, along 
with SDQ-20 scores.  Table 27 displays the statistical values for this analysis.  This 
adjusted analysis correctly classified 88.6% of cases.    
  
 
Table 26. Hierarchical logistic regression statistics: sexual abuse, 
somatoform dissociation (SDQ-20), depression (HADS Depression) and 
DS group membership 






Block 1  
          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 
          SDQ-20* 
          HADS Depression  
Model        
Block 3 
          YoE 
          SDQ-20* 
          HADS Depression 








































p = .094 
p = .101 
p < .001 
p = .593 
p < .001 
p = .073 
p < .001 
p = .997 
p = .594 
p < .001 
p = .106 
p = .997 

























YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.); SDQ-20 = Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire – 20 item version;  
HADS = Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale; TEC = Traumatic Experiences Checklist 





Table 27. Hierarchical logistic regression statistics: sexual abuse, 
somatoform dissociation (SDQ, minus seizure-item), depression (HADS 
depression) and DS group membership 






Block 1  
          YoE 
Block 2 
          YoE 
          SDQ* 
          HADS Depression*  
Model        
Block 3 
          YoE 
          SDQ* 
          HADS Depression*  








































p = .094 
p = .101 
p < .001 
p = .314 
p = .001 
p = .008 
p < .001 
p = .813 
p = .321 
p = .001 
p = .021 
p = .812 

























YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv.); SDQ-20 = Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire – 20 item version;  
HADS = Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale; TEC = Traumatic Experiences Checklist 





The results of the above regression analyses suggested that the relationship between 
sexual abuse and DS diagnosis might be mediated by somatoform dissociation (SDQ-
20 scores) and depressive symptoms (HADS Depression).  Therefore, mediation 
analyses were conducted with TEC sexual abuse (present/absent) as the predictor 
variable, group (DS, control) as the outcome variable, and SDQ-20 and HADS 
Depression scores as the mediating variables (with YoE as covariate).  In this analysis, 
TEC sexual abuse significantly predicted SDQ-20 scores (b = 7.41, t = 4.11, p < .001) 
and HADS Depression scores (b = 3.09, t = 3.24, p = .002).  With the mediating 
variables in the model, the direct effect of TEC sexual abuse on group was not 
significant (b = .004, z = .004, p = .997).  Furthermore, the mediating effect of HADS 
Depression was not significant (b = .746, z = 1.39, p = .163).  On the other hand, the 
mediating effect of SDQ-20 was significant (b = 2.79, z = 2.79, p = .005).   
 
Once again, the analysis was rerun with the seizure-related item removed from the 
SDQ scores.  In the adjusted analysis, the mediating effect of the SDQ scores 
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remained significant (b = 1.71, z = 2.48, p = .01) but HADS Depression was not a 
significant mediator (b = .977, z = 1.83, p = .068).  With HADS Depression and SDQ 
scores entered in this adjusted analysis, the direct effect of TEC sexual abuse on 
group was not significant.  This final mediation analysis is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Mediation analysis: TEC sexual abuse, SDQ, HADS Depression 






      b = 6.04, t = 3.89, p < .001                                       b = .282, z = 3.32, p < .001                                                   
 
              
 











5.4.1. Summary and interpretation 
Demographic and clinical characteristics 
The two groups were well-matched on most important demographic variables (e.g. 
age, gender, ethnic background).  However, patients diagnosed with DS reported 
significantly fewer years of education (YoE) than the comparison group; therefore, 
this was included as a covariate in subsequent analyses.  The patient group reported 
SDQ scores (somatoform 
dissociation 
Diagnosis of DS 
TEC sexual abuse 
(present/absent) 
HADS Depressions scores 
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taking significantly more prescribed medications than the control group.  This finding 
might be expected due to previous diagnoses of epilepsy and the prevalence of 
comorbid organic or medically unexplained symptoms/diagnoses in this group.  The 
most common medications reported in the DS group were AEDs, anti-depressants, 
proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) and analgesics/anti-inflammatories.  The two former 
classes of medication are likely to be related to the occurrence of seizures and 
depression/anxiety respectively.  The frequent prescription of PPIs in this DS sample 
seems to be related to relatively high rates of gastrointestinal complaints in that group 
(15%).   
 
Medical diagnoses were also significantly more common in the DS group relative to 
the control group.  In the DS sample, gastrointestinal complaints, hypertension and 
(a history of) hysterectomy were common.  On the other hand, the most common 
medical diagnosis reported in the control group was asthma.  This finding is in 
accordance with the suggestion that medical trauma or somatic distress may act as a 
contributing factor to the development of DS.  Many of the medical conditions 
reported by patients with DS were of a chronic/severe nature, and many necessitated 
surgical or medical interventions.  Moreover, common medical comorbidities 
included conditions that can be exacerbated or precipitated by stress (e.g. 
hypertension, gastrointestinal diagnoses).  
 
Another marked pattern was that, in female patients, diagnoses associated with 
reproductive health (e.g. polycystic ovary syndrome, amenorrhea, ovarian cancer) 
were common.  This raises the possibility that for female patients of child-bearing age, 
threat or harm to the healthy functioning of the reproductive system may act as a 
significant traumatic/stressful life event, and so might contribute to the development 
of DS or other dissociative/conversion symptoms.   
 
5.4.2. Adverse life events  
This study has further supported the proposition that DS are associated with high 
rates of adverse life events.  The patient sample reported overall rates of adverse life 
events that were higher than controls, with significantly greater perceived impact also 
reported.  A wide range of adverse events was endorsed by patients on the TEC.  
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These findings further confirm the possible importance of general trauma as an 
aetiological factor in the development and/or precipitation of DS.  The findings also 
indicate that subjective responses to adverse life events (impact ratings) are an 
important factor in this group. 
 
Interestingly, the total number of adverse life events reported by DS patients (TEC 
Total scores) correlated positively with scores on two MDI subscales, Emotional 
Constriction and Depersonalisation.  One speculative explanation for this might be 
that high levels of adversity could contribute to a tendency towards reduced/inhibited 
emotional experience and detachment from the subjective aspects of experience 
more generally, in this group.  As discussed in Chapter 3, dissociative symptoms such 
as these might serve a protective psychological function in some respects, by reducing 
the experienced emotional and subjective impact of adverse life events.   
 
The observed relationship between TEC mean impact and HADS Depression scores 
suggests that the perceived impact of adverse life events is linked to the more general 
emotional distress observed in patients with DS.  Perhaps higher levels of subjective 
traumatisation may lead to elevated emotional distress more generally.  On the other 
hand, when rating the perceived subjective impact of life events, patients may have 
been referring to the impact of life events on their emotional functioning (i.e. 
depression).  An alternative explanation is that the mood dysfunction could be 
primary, and cause patients to perceive greater impact of life events due to the 
negative bias associated with such symptoms.  In other words, existing mood 
dysfunction might influence patients’ subjective reactions to adversity.  One way of 
examining this relationship further might be to assess patients’ views on the impact 
of life events at different time points, such as before and after commencing treatment 
with anti-depressant medications.  This could provide an opportunity to explore 
whether the perceived impact of life events improves with amelioration of depressive 
symptoms.   
 
Regarding types of life event, on the basis of previous research findings, rates of abuse 
and were specifically examined in the current study.  In accordance with previous 
research and the hypotheses outlined in section 5.1, higher rates of lifetime sexual 
 156 
 
and physical abuse were observed in the DS sample, relative to controls.  Such 
experiences, therefore, seem to be important aetiological factors in this disorder, for 
a significant proportion of patients.  When explored further in the regression 
analyses, self-reported history of sexual abuse was found to be uniquely predictive of 
DS diagnosis, independently of the perceived impact of all adverse life events (TEC 
mean impact scores), and a history of physical abuse.   
 
The importance of sexual abuse in the aetiology of DS has been implicated widely in 
the literature (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1), and so this study is in line with previous 
findings.  A history of sexual abuse may be a useful indicator of the possibility of DS 
in patients being assessed with medically intractable seizures.  The fact that sexual 
abuse scores were positively correlated with MDI Identity Dissociation in the current 
study suggests that higher rates of sexual abuse may be associated with the 
development of the most severe and disruptive type of dissociative symptom (i.e. 
alterations in the experience of personal identity).  Again, this is in accordance with 
previous literature which indicates a relationship between dissociative identity 
disorder and sexual abuse (e.g. Anderson et al., 1993; Ross et al., 1991). 
 
Contrary to expectations, emotional abuse and neglect were not found at higher 
levels in this sample of patients, relative to healthy controls.  As discussed in Chapter 
2 (section 2.2.1), previous findings regarding emotional abuse and neglect have been 
variable, and it is has been suggested that such experiences might be mediated by 
family dysfunction in patients with DS (see Salmon et al., 2003).  The lack of group 
differences in emotional abuse/neglect in the current study could be linked to the fact 
that there were also no significant group differences in family functioning (see below).  
Together, the results suggest that, whilst this sample of DS patients had experienced 
higher rates of general trauma and sexual/physical abuse, emotional abuse/neglect was 
not a significant factor in this group.   
 
The above findings provide further evidence for the importance of traumatic life 
events in the aetiology of DS.  Whilst some authors advise against attempting to 
obtain trauma history from patients with DS during clinical assessment (i.e. Fritzsche 
et al., 2013), if traumatic history is sensitively and appropriately obtained at 
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assessment using a standardised measure such as the TEC, this could facilitate 
clinicians’ understanding of a patients’ presentation, and also might inform which 
treatment options are most suitable.   
 
5.4.3. Post-traumatic symptoms 
In the subgroup of participants claiming to have been affected at least moderately by 
any one life event on the TEC (DS = 29, controls = 28), significantly more patients 
with DS met criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD than controls. This traumatised DS group 
scored more highly than the traumatised control group for total PTSD symptoms, 
and all three symptom subtypes (re-experiencing, arousal, avoidance).   These findings 
are in accordance with previous studies indicating high rates of PTSD in patients with 
DS (e.g. Rosenberg et al., 2000), and are of considerable importance, both 
theoretically and clinically.  Pathological responses to traumatic life events may play 
an important role in the development of DS.  Unfortunately, only a subgroup of 
participants completed the PDS in the current study; therefore, it was not possible 
to include this variable in the logistic regression analyses.  However, future studies 
might aim to explore the extent to which PTSD symptoms mediate the relationship 
between traumatic experience and DS diagnosis.     
 
In the current study, PTSD symptoms were significantly correlated with several other 
important psychological variables in the DS group (but not in controls), including 
anxiety, depression, tendencies towards insecurity in relationships (IASC 
Abandonment Concerns) and the use of externalising behaviours to cope with 
emotional distress/tension (IASC Tension Reduction Activities).  Whilst causality 
obviously cannot be assumed in these relationships, it is possible that significant 
trauma-related psychopathology may contribute to current mood dysfunction, 
relationship problems and dysfunctional externalisation of negative affect in this 
subgroup of patients with DS.   
 
Some aspects of psychological dissociation (MDI Memory Disturbance, 
Disengagement) were positively related to PDS Avoidance symptoms.  In other 
words, avoidance of processing trauma-related information/affect was related to 
symptoms of dissociative amnesia and a tendency to be detached from current 
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surroundings/stimuli.  As dissociative symptoms are common in PTSD and the PDS 
Avoidance subscale includes some dissociative symptoms (e.g. “feeling distant or cut-
off from the people around you”), this is not an unexpected finding and supports the 
assertion that dissociation and trauma-related psychopathology are interlinked.   
 
Furthermore, PTSD symptoms (Total, Re-experiencing) were also related to ictal DS 
symptoms (cognitive and total respectively), indicating that elevated PTSD symptoms 
may be associated with worse DS symptoms, in the traumatised subgroup.  Again, an 
interesting direction for future research might be to examine the extent to which 
seizure symptoms improve after patients undergo trauma-focused psychological 
interventions.  It is possible that reductions in trauma-related psychopathology may 
be accompanied by reduced severity or frequency (or cessation) of DS symptoms, 
although this is a tentative hypothesis at present. 
 
Given that so many patients with DS have experienced trauma/adverse life events, 
perceive these experiences to have had a large impact on their lives, and many suffer 
from PTSD symptoms, it is likely to be beneficial for these issues to be addressed 
within psychological interventions, at least for this subgroup.  One such possibility 
might be the utilisation of techniques that focus on emotional processing of traumatic 
material, such as those with proven efficacy as PTSD interventions (e.g. prolonged 
exposure, EMDR) to address patients’ primary traumatic experiences (in patients 
who have disclosed significant trauma history/PTSD symptoms only).  Further 
examination of the role of trauma and PTSD symptoms in patients with DS seems to 
be of considerable importance.   
 
5.4.4. Childhood family functioning 
Unlike several previous reports, this study did not find evidence for elevated 
(perceived) childhood family dysfunction in the present sample.  In fact, of the five 
FES subscales included, only one (Conflict) came close to significance.  The lack of 
between-groups differences on the FES subscales was not supportive of the 
hypotheses proposed in section 5.1.  These findings are also contrary to those 




It is possible that the requirement to refer to childhood family functioning in the 
current study may have influenced these results.  In previous research, patients may 
have reported difficulties occurring in family dynamics across the lifespan; therefore, 
rates of dysfunction may have been inflated by this.  Moreover, it is possible that the 
lack of significant findings in the current study could be due to the stringency of the 
statistical methods used.  For example, a between group difference on FES Conflict 
scores was present at the p<.05 level; however, after correcting for familywise error 
with the Bonferroni-Hochberg procedure, this difference was no longer significant.  
This could represent a Type 2 error, and the use of this method may have been overly 
cautious.   
 
5.4.5. Anxiety and depression 
This study found evidence of elevated symptoms of anxiety and depression in patients 
with DS, relative to healthy controls.  This is in accordance with previous research 
findings (e.g. Bewley et al., 2005; Hixson et al., 2006; Mökleby et al., 2002), and the 
hypotheses presented in section 5.1.  However, mean scores for the DS group were 
within the non-clinical range for depression and suggestive of only mild caseness for 
anxiety, according to the guidelines described by Zigmond and Snaith (1983).  This 
suggests that these symptoms were not reflective of severe emotional distress at the 
time of the study.  The use of anti-depressant (40%) or anti-anxiety (10%) medications 
by a proportion of the sample (see Table 3) may have influenced the findings.  
 
Nevertheless, HADS Anxiety scores were significantly correlated with several other 
variables, including PDS Total and Arousal scores. This indicates some degree of 
generalised hyperarousal in patients with DS, which would accord with studies 
indicating hypervigilance to threatening stimuli and elevated basal cortisol (i.e. Bakvis, 
Roelofs, et al., 2009; Bakvis, Spinhoven, & Roelofs, 2009). HADS Anxiety scores were 
also associated with IASC Affect Dysregulation and Abandonment Concerns, 
indicating that general anxiety symptoms were related to more longstanding 
dysregulated affect, and insecurity in close relationships.    
 
Anxiety scores were also associated with ictal chest and abdomen symptoms during 
seizures, which could reflect somatic aspects of anxiety occurring during the DS (e.g. 
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shortness of breath, ‘butterflies’ in the stomach).  This might suggest that the seizures 
are either triggered by anxiety, or a way of releasing anxiety-related distress.  This is 
similar to the conclusions of Goldstein and Mellers (2006), although their findings 
related to the autonomic arousal subscale in patients with DS compared to those 
with ES.  Future studies might explore this relationship further, by more closely 
examining peri-ictal somatic anxiety symptoms in patients with DS.  Moreover, it 
might be of interest to examine possible improvements in DS symptoms after the 
completion of anxiety-focused treatment (e.g. cognitive behavioural therapy, 
anxiolytic medication).   
 
Whilst both anxiety and depression scores independently predicted a diagnosis of DS 
in univariate regressions, only depression remained significant when both subscales 
were examined using multivariate regression.  Therefore, whilst symptoms of anxiety 
may well be present in many patients with DS and seem to have important links to 
ictal symptoms, the presence of depressive symptoms is most characteristic of this 
group relative to healthy controls.  HADS Depression scores were positively 
correlated with a range of other psychological variables in the DS group, including 
PTSD symptoms (Total, Arousal, Avoidance), borderline personality features (IASC 
Affect Dysregulation, Tension Reduction Activities), and dissociative amnesia (MDI 
Memory Disturbance).  Regarding the relationships between depression and the IASC 
subscales, it is possible that the negative mood states associated with depression 
could increase the affect dysregulation scores, and it may be that this particular group 
cope with such negative affect by using externalising behaviours (i.e. tension reduction 
activities).   
 
An important finding was that when HADS Depression scores were entered into 
multivariate regression analyses with other significant predictors (SDQ scores, TEC 
sexual abuse) and with diagnosis as the outcome variable, HADS Depression scores 
remained a unique predictor of DS diagnosis, alongside SDQ scores.  Together, the 
above findings indicate that depression in patients with DS is an important factor that 
may contribute to the aetiology/perpetuation of DS, and may be associated with some 




5.4.6. Psychological and somatoform dissociative symptoms 
There were significant elevations on all subscales of the MDI, indicating that general 
psychological dissociation is a notable characteristic of patients diagnosed with DS.  
This is in accordance with much of the previous literature (see Chapter 3, section 
3.3.2).  Using a dimensional measure of psychological dissociation that has not 
previously been used in research on DS (MDI), this study provided the novel insight 
that a variety of different types of dissociative symptom are more common in patients 
with DS, compared to controls.  These included depersonalisation, derealisation, 
disengagement, identity dissociation, memory disturbance, and emotional 
constriction.  These various types of dissociation include examples of both 
‘detachment’ and ‘compartmentalisation’, as described by E.A. Holmes and colleagues 
(2005).   
 
Moreover, scores on some subscales of the MDI showed significant associations with 
other psychological and clinical variables in the DS group.  Relationships between MDI 
subscales and trauma-related variables have been discussed in previous sections.  
Importantly, some of the MDI subscale scores were positively associated with ictal 
symptoms (see below section 5.4.8.).  The additional finding that MDI Memory 
Disturbance subscale scores were positively correlated with HADS Depression 
scores suggested that psychologically-mediated memory problems (i.e. dissociative 
amnesia) were linked to general levels of emotional distress and negative mood.  It is 
possible that the altered mood state in depression could interfere with usual cognitive 
processes and, therefore, lead to memory difficulties or excessive forgetting.  On the 
other hand, depression and dissociative amnesia could be related via a third variable 
such as a history of trauma or PTSD avoidance symptoms.   
 
Interestingly, the MDI Depersonalisation, Derealisation, Emotional Constriction and 
Identity Dissociation subscales were all positively correlated with the IASC Tension 
Reduction Activities subscale.  Therefore, it seems that in patients with DS, a range 
of dissociative symptoms are associated with the use of dysfunctional externalising 
behaviours to cope with or express negative emotions.  A tentative hypothesis might 
be that ongoing restriction of emotional experience and a tendency to dissociate from 
subjective experiences, could result in episodes of overwhelming or excessive 
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emotion, thereby increasing the risk of using externalising behaviours as a means to 
manage the emotional states.  It is possible that such ‘tension reduction activities’ may 
serve the same purpose as DS; that is, providing immediate relief from intense and 
unmanageable emotional experience.  Obviously, more research is needed to further 
examine these processes.  The qualitative study described in Chapter 9 was designed 
with the aim of exploring patients’ understandings of such processes.      
 
In addition to psychological dissociation, scores on a measure of somatoform 
dissociation (SDQ-20) were also elevated in the patient group relative to healthy 
controls, and this difference remained when a seizure-related item was removed from 
the scores.  SDQ-20 scores were also found to be one of the most important 
predictors of a diagnosis of DS, in combination with symptoms of depression.  
Moreover, mediation analyses showed that somatoform dissociation was also found 
to account for the predictive relationship between the presence of sexual abuse and 
a diagnosis of DS.  These findings highlight the importance of somatoform dissociation 
in individuals with a history of sexual abuse who go on to develop DS.  It is possible 
that the experience of sexual abuse increases the general tendency towards 
alterations in voluntary control, awareness or experience of somatic processes 
(somatoform dissociation); which may then increase the risk of displaying dissociative 
seizure-like episodes (DS), possibly along with other medically unexplained 
phenomena.   
 
Some methodological and theoretical considerations should be discussed in relation 
to the dissociation measures.  For somatoform dissociation, when some of the 
analyses were run excluding the seizure-related SDQ item, most of the findings 
remained unchanged, although not all.  Many studies in the literature use measures of 
somatoform dissociation/somatisation which may include items about symptoms that 
occur during patients’ seizures.  Therefore, the patients will necessarily receive higher 
scores.  It could be argued that this represents a methodological circularity; that, 
patients who are known to have DS will score highly on measures that assess 
symptoms that may occur during DS.  However, given that other organic causation 
for the symptoms has (presumably) been excluded, those DS symptoms can be 
 163 
 
assumed to be manifestations of somatoform dissociation/somatisation.  Therefore, 
it could be argued that these symptoms should be included in such measures. 
 
Either way, if investigators wish to only measure non-DS somatoform symptoms, then 
it is important that they select measures that either do not include items that directly 
relate to DS, or that such items are removed from the analyses.  Furthermore, 
patients could be explicitly asked to complete the measures referring to symptoms 
that do not occur during their seizures.  However, this still leaves the problem of 
somatoform symptoms that occur peri-ictally.  For example, patients may experience 
sensorimotor alterations before or after their seizures, and it would be difficult to 
make the case that any such symptoms should be excluded from analysis.  Practically, 
it would be very difficult to ask patients to only endorse symptoms that do not occur 
‘any time’ around a seizure, particularly for those who experience multiple seizures 
in a day. 
 
The same issues can be raised about measures of psychological dissociation.  For 
example, the findings presented here indicate that many patients experience 
dissociative symptoms during their seizures.  These types of symptom (i.e. mental 
state symptoms) are those assessed with measures of psychological dissociation (i.e. 
derealisation, depersonalisation), and so it could be argued that the dissociation 
measures are just showing that the individual experiences DS, and nothing else.  
However, once again, these measures have value in that they are providing more 
evidence that patients experience dissociative symptoms peri-ictally, and possibly 
more generally.  Again, this provides further support to the idea that DS are 
dissociative phenomena. 
 
5.4.7. Borderline personality tendencies 
Several of the IASC subscales were elevated in DS patients, including Identity 
Impairment, Abandonment Concerns, Affect Dysregulation, and Tension Reduction 
Activities.  These findings are suggestive of dysfunctional personality characteristics 
in patients with DS, including difficulties regulating emotions, the sense of self and 
behaviour, and insecurity in close relationships.  As a number of studies have 
previously reported that ‘Cluster B’ personality traits are elevated in this group (e.g. 
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Direk et al., 2012; Scévola et al., 2013; Stone et al., 2004; see Chapter 2), these 
findings are not surprising.   
 
When Affect Dysregulation, Abandonment Concerns and Tension Reduction 
Activities were entered together in a multiple regression analysis, the only significant 
predictor of the DS diagnosis was Affect Dysregulation.  This suggests that 
dysregulated affect is a key feature of this patient group.  However, as mentioned 
previously, when depression and anxiety scores were entered into the model in a 
second step, Affect Dysregulation was no longer a significant predictor of DS 
diagnosis.  Furthermore, the mediation analysis confirmed that the relationship of 
Affective Dysregulation scores to DS diagnosis was mediated by HADS Depression 
scores. Therefore, once again, the importance of depressive symptoms in patients 
with DS is highlighted.   
 
A number of interesting correlations were observed between some of the IASC 
subscales and other psychological variables, all of which have been discussed in 
previous sections.  However, scores on the IASC subscales were not related to 
seizure-related variables, suggesting that these personality features may play a role in 
predisposing towards development of DS and associated psychological difficulties, but 
not necessarily in causing or worsening specific symptoms of the disorder, once 
initially triggered.   
 
5.4.8. Ictal symptoms 
The most commonly reported ictal symptoms were cognitive, mental state and 
autonomic arousal (AA) symptoms.  Whilst the current study did not include a 
seizure-comparison group, the mean number of AA symptoms reported by the DS 
group in the present study was closer to the mean of the DS group (2.64) from the 
Goldstein and Mellers (2006) study, rather than the mean of the ES group in that 
study (1.63).  These findings indicate that symptoms of physiological arousal, 
resembling the somatic manifestations of anxiety, are a common experience during 
DS.  These results support the proposition that elevated levels of emotional 
arousal/anxiety/distress may serve as an important factor in triggering DS (Baslet, 




The ‘mental state’ (MS) symptom type was also commonly reported in the current 
sample of patients.  The MS category primarily consists of symptoms resembling those 
of depersonalisation and derealisation, in addition to one item about faintness and 
dizziness.  The high rates of ictal MS symptoms observed in this study suggest that 
symptoms of dissociation, especially of the ‘detachment’ type are commonly 
experienced by patients during or around the time of their attacks.  Furthermore, 
scores on the MDI Derealisation and Depersonalisation subscales were significantly 
correlated with ictal MS symptoms, strengthening this proposition.  It could be that 
patients who experience more MS symptoms during their attacks also experience 
higher levels of depersonalisation and derealisation more generally (i.e. in daily life).  
On the other hand, the elevated MDI Depersonalisation and Derealisation scores 
could be directly reflecting higher levels of such symptoms during the seizures.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that symptoms of the ‘detachment’ type of dissociation are 
experienced by a significant proportion of patients with DS, either during their 
seizures, generally in daily life, or both.   
 
Other common ictal symptoms reported in the current sample were those belonging 
to the ‘cognitive’ category.  This category includes items that reflect cognitive 
manifestations of anxiety (e.g. wanting to escape a situation, embarrassment, fears of 
death, paralysis, or losing consciousness).  It is possible that these anxiety-related 
cognitions are possibly the result of the severe and probably rather frightening loss 
of control and voluntary physical functioning that patients experience during a DS.  It 
would be interesting to examine these symptoms in more depth, particularly during 
the peri-ictal period, in order to examine the progression of such experiences and 
how they relate to the onset and course of the attacks.   
 
A potentially valuable direction for future research, therefore, seems to be the further 
examination of patients’ peri-ictal subjective experiences.  For example, do patients 
experience a specific alteration in emotional experience, akin to ‘depersonalisation’ 
or ‘emotional constriction’ during their seizures?  It might be beneficial to develop 
measures that could quantify such experiences in more detail.  Such a questionnaire 
might involve a Likert-scale for a range of different emotions, such as fear, 
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contentment, calmness, anger, rage, and so on.  Alternatively, another possibility 
could be to provide patients with a measure of state dissociative experiences (e.g. the 
State Scale of Dissociation; Kruger & Mace, 2002), and request that patients complete 
the questionnaire immediately on recovery from seizures, with reference to their 
experiences during the seizures.  Furthermore, focused qualitative techniques could 
be used to explore patients’ emotional experiences, or lack thereof, during DS.  An 
obvious limitation of this approach would be the necessary exclusion of patients who 
report loss of awareness during their attacks.   
 
 5.4.9. Strengths and limitations 
A key strength of this study was the examination of a wide number of potentially 
important aetiological variables in one sample of patients with DS, and the inclusion 
of a matched control group.  This allowed an examination of how patients’ responses 
on these measures differed from those of healthy individuals, but also analyses of the 
interactions and relative importance of these variables within- and between-groups 
(e.g. exploratory analyses).  The two groups included in the study were well-matched 
on several variables that could have possibly influenced the findings obtained, such as 
gender, age and SES.  Moreover, clear definitions of each variable were provided, with 
standardised measures used for all.  This also permitted comparison of patients’ 
scores to normative standards, where relevant.  Furthermore, some of the measures 
had not been used in previous studies of patients with DS, such as the IASC and MDI, 
and so provided novel tests of some of the hypotheses set out in section 5.1.  The 
study has provided support for, and extended previous research findings pertaining 
to psychosocial factors in patients with DS, whilst also presenting novel findings that 
highlight possible avenues for future research.   
 
More specifically, the assessment of ictal symptoms provided a means by which 
relationships between seizure symptoms and psychosocial variables could be 
explored.  In addition, the use of the TEC to examine adverse life experiences 
provided information regarding a variety of life events in patients with DS, but also 
patients’ perceptions of the impact of these events.  This was examined in more detail 
with the PDS in traumatised patients, again, representing a thorough assessment of 
the effects of adverse life events in this group.  Many previous studies have not used 
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standardised measures or assessed the subjective impact of life events in patients with 
DS.   
 
Another strength of the study was the inclusion of a multidimensional measure of 
dissociation (rather than measures such as the Dissociative Experiences Scale), 
allowing an examination of different types of dissociative symptom and how these 
related to seizure symptoms, for example.  Moreover, measuring both somatoform 
dissociation and psychological dissociation in the same sample provided insight into 
the relative importance of these types of experience.  The use of the IASC also 
provided a structured assessment of patients’ personality functioning, particularly in 
relation to borderline features.  The findings on this measure not only indicate the 
possible aetiological contribution of such characteristics but also suggest implications 
for treatment-related processes (e.g. the presence of insecurity in relating to others, 
considerable affect dysregulation).          
 
There are some limitations that should be acknowledged, however.  The use of self-
report measures could be seen as a limitation when assessing some variables, due to 
possible biases arising from self-presentation concerns or demand characteristics.  It 
was also not possible to validate trauma reports and so the data was dependent on 
participant recollection and willingness to disclose.  Additional limitations in the 
current study pertain to statistical techniques.  Several of the variables were not 
normally distributed; therefore, non-parametric techniques were used in some 
analyses.  Non-parametric techniques are generally thought to have less power to 
detect effects (D. Howell, 1997); therefore, the use of such tests may have inflated 
Type 2 error rates (e.g. the unexpected negative findings on the FES).  In contrast, it 
could be argued that type 1 error rates were inflated by the use of multiple testing in 
some analyses.  However, the use of the Bonferroni-Hochberg (Hochberg, 1988) 
correction for multiple testing of subscales on the various measures is a rather 
conservative approach.  It is known that the Bonferroni correction is a very stringent 
method of controlling familywise error (i.e. Shaffer, 1995). The Hochberg adaptation 
to this method maintains good control of familywise error whilst improving power 




Due to the large number of tests carried out in the exploratory analyses, rather than 
utilising corrected p-values, a more stringent alpha level was selected (p < .01) by 
which to assess significance.  Again, caution should be exercised in interpretation of 
significant effects found in these exploratory analyses.  The hypotheses generated 
from these analyses should be tested using more stringent techniques in further 
studies.  An additional point regarding the multivariate regression analyses is that, 
whilst the models were significant, in some cases the rate of successful classification 
of group status was rather limited (e.g. approximately 70% accuracy), suggesting that 
some proportion of the variance was not explained by the variables entered.  
 
5.4.10. Summary and conclusions 
The findings presented in this chapter indicate high levels of adverse life events and 
considerable psychological impact of these experiences in patients with DS.  The 
importance of sexual abuse was highlighted for differentiating patients with DS from 
healthy controls, and together these findings suggest the possible utility of assessing 
traumatic background early in the clinical management of such patients.  The findings 
also provide further evidence that a range of psychopathological symptoms are 
elevated in patients with DS, relative to healthy control participants.  These include 
anxiety, depression, PTSD symptoms, and some borderline personality features.  
Moreover, elevated psychological and somatoform dissociation was also a feature of 
the patient sample.  Some of these phenomena were inter-related and some positively 
associated with seizure symptoms.   
 
Of the variables measured, somatoform dissociation and depression seem to be 
important variables characterising patients with DS relative to healthy controls. This 
study also suggested that these variables might mediate the relationship between 
sexual abuse and DS diagnosis.  Again, clinical applications involve the possibility of 
using a formal measure of somatoform dissociation and depressive symptomology at 
some stage during assessment of patients with DS, in addition to explicitly addressing 




Chapter 6.  Preconscious facial expression processing in patients 





The current chapter describes an experimental study of preconscious processing of 
emotional facial expressions in patients diagnosed with DS, in comparison to healthy 
control participants.  In Chapter 3 (section 3.6) it was proposed that aberrant 
responses to emotional stimuli, possibly occurring without patients’ full awareness, 
might contribute to triggering DS.  Furthermore, it was suggested that a general 
tendency towards altered preconscious emotional processing might be a 
predispositional characteristic that increases the risk of developing the disorder.  It is 
possible that preconscious attentional biases towards affective stimuli, particularly 
those of a negative or distressing nature, could increase overall levels of emotional 
arousal and stress in this patient group.  Such a bias might increase the likelihood of 
seizure reoccurrence, by elevating arousal or distress to unacceptable levels.  
Therefore, investigating the ways in which patients with DS process emotional stimuli 
at a preconscious level is an important avenue for research on DS. 
 
In discussing preconscious processing, it is important to define what is meant by this 
term.  Whilst widely accepted definitions of consciousness are rather elusive 
(Devinsky, 1997), Pinker (1997) proposed three distinct aspects of this enigmatic 
phenomenon.  The term ‘sentience’ generally refers to phenomenological experience, 
that is, one’s own individual, subjective and private existence.  On the other hand, 
‘access to information’ is the aspect of consciousness involving awareness of mental 
processes or the external world.  Finally, ‘self-knowledge’ involves accessing 
information pertaining to oneself, and might also be referred to as self-awareness.  
Since the 1980s, psychologists have started to pay more attention to the ‘access level’ 
of consciousness using experimental measures, including examining the processes that 
occur below the threshold of conscious awareness (Merikle, 2007).  Findings 
pertaining to automatic and unconscious cognitive processes could be viewed as one 
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of the major advances in the scientific understanding of consciousness in the last half 
century (Frith & Rees, 2007).    
 
Regarding the ‘access’ approach to consciousness, ‘conscious’ processes refer to 
content that is currently accessible (i.e. available to introspection, that which can be 
reported); the preconscious refers to information and material that is not currently 
within awareness, but of which we can become aware if attention is directed at it.  
Finally, unconscious processes are presumably those which are not accessible at all, 
despite the allocation of attention to them.  Responses to sensory information that 
occur relatively automatically and below the level of conscious awareness can be 
thought of as ‘zombie modes’, allowing quick but rather stereotyped responses to 
environmental stimuli (Crick & Koch, 2007).  Tamietto & de Gelder (2010) and 
Dehaene et al. (2006) discuss some of the various terms used to describe ‘non-
conscious’ processing of stimuli.  These terms include: implicit, subliminal, 
preattentive, automatic and preconscious.  Whilst these terms are distinguishable on 
the basis of subtle differences, they all refer to instances in which stimuli are 
processed without explicit awareness or attention.     
 
From an evolutionary perspective, it is likely that stimuli that had significance to the 
survival goals of our ancestors are more likely to be processed in an automatic or 
non-conscious fashion.  Öhman and colleagues (2000) argue that facial expressions, 
particularly those relating to threat (e.g. anger, fear), are innately salient stimuli for 
human beings because they confer crucial social signals that have considerable 
implications for survival.  Furthermore, there is evidence that such stimuli capture 
attention and can provoke autonomic responses without awareness (Eastwood, 
Smilek, & Merikle, 2003; Esteves, Dimberg, & Öhman, 1994; Öhman, 2002; Öhman, 
Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Pessoa et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2002; Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 
2001).   
 
6.1.2. Previous research using modified Stroop paradigms 
Since the pioneering work of Robert Zajonc (1980), there has been an enormous 
amount of research on what is now known as ‘automatic affective processing’.  One 
paradigm that has commonly been used to measure automatic or preconscious 
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emotional processing is the ‘emotional Stroop’ test (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 
1996).  This test is a modification of the classic Stroop test (Stroop, 1935).  In the 
emotional variant, the to-be-read words are selected to be in some way emotionally 
significant.  These might include positively or negatively valenced words (e.g. hate, 
fun, happy, misery), with neutral words included as a control condition.  The 
dependent variable is typically reaction time, although error rates can also be 
examined.  Increases in reaction time for a given stimulus condition are interpreted 
as being due to increased attentional allocation to such stimuli, that is, hypervigilance 
or an attentional bias.  In contrast, shorter reaction times are generally interpreted 
as evidence of automatic avoidance of the stimuli.  More errors on a particular 
condition would indicate greater cognitive interference by the stimuli in that 
condition.   
 
The emotional Stroop task has been used extensively in studies with a wide variety 
of clinical populations, including the anxiety disorders (e.g. generalised anxiety, PTSD, 
panic), major depression, and somatoform disorders.  Often, in such studies, rather 
than including words with general emotional content, words with some relevance to 
the condition under investigation are selected.  A further modification of the task is 
the use of emotionally-significant images, rather than words (e.g. Lee et al., 2009).  
Again, investigators have used pictorial versions of the test to study attentional biases 
in a wide range of psychological disorders (e.g. Harrison et al., 2010; Hermans et al., 
2006).  Within such tasks, many investigators present the emotional stimuli 
subliminally; most commonly using very short stimulus durations (milliseconds), 
and/or using masking stimuli.   There is debate about the exact duration of stimulus 
presentation that precludes conscious awareness, but it appears to be in the range of 
approximately 1-33 milliseconds; although individual differences are apparent (Esteves 
& Öhman, 1993; Maxwell & Davidson, 2004). 
 
Considerable research evidence has accumulated regarding automatic affective 
processing in clinical populations that are of relevance to DS.  There is a good evidence 
base for the proposition that symptoms of anxiety and anxiety disorders are related 
to increased allocation of attention to threat-related stimuli (e.g. Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Lim & Kim, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; 2002; B.P. Bradley et al., 1999; Vuilluemier, 
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2002), although other patterns have also been reported (e.g. Putman et al., 2004).  
Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence of attentional bias towards 
threatening/trauma-related stimuli in patients diagnosed with PTSD, as measured using 
emotional Stroop tasks, among others (Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000; R.J. McNally, 
English, & Lipke, 1993).   
 
Individuals with depression also show altered attentional allocation to affective 
stimuli.  A meta-analysis of studies investigating attentional biases to negative stimuli 
in depressed individuals (including emotional Stroop and dot probe tests), provided 
evidence for disproportionate allocation of attention to negative stimuli (Peckham, 
McHugh, & Otto, 2010).  It has been proposed that these biases towards allocating 
attention to negative stimuli may contribute to the core symptoms of depression, 
such as negative mood and anhedonia (Phillips et al., 2003).   
 
Individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (BPD) also seem to exhibit 
attentional biases towards negative and BPD schema-related stimuli (Arntz, Appels, & 
Sieswerda, 2000; Sieswerda et al., 2007).  In one of these studies, biases towards 
negative schema-related stimuli were significantly predicted by the severity of BPD 
symptoms (anxiety subtype), and reported childhood sexual and physical trauma 
(Sieswerda et al., 2007), suggesting the importance of examining the ways in which 
attentional biases relate to other characteristics of the clinical group being studied.  
Nevertheless, there have also been negative findings in the literature, in which biases 
have not been observed in patients with BPD (Wingenfeld et al., 2008).  In a fairly 
recent review, Baer et al (2012) concluded that, in general, attentional biases for 
negative stimuli are apparent in BPD, but that these are not necessarily specific to 
‘BPD-related’ themes (i.e. abandonment, vulnerability).   
 
A small number of investigators have also studied these processes in patients with 
dissociative diagnoses (Dorahy, Middleton, & Irwin, 2005; Hermans et al., 2006).  
Hermans and colleagues (2006), for example, utilised an emotional Stroop paradigm 
to assess DID patients’ responses to subliminally presented angry faces.  When the 
DID patients were tested in a ‘trauma-avoidant’ identity state, they showed 
significantly reduced reaction times to angry faces, compared to controls.  This was 
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interpreted as an adaptive avoidant response.  However, this study utilised a very small 
sample size, with only female student control participants included.  Moreover, no 
statistical comparisons were made on age or years of education, and no information 
was provided on psychiatric comorbidity or medications in the clinical group.  These 
weaknesses limit the interpretability of the results and highlight the importance of 
matching for, or controlling possible confounding variables.  
 
A tendency towards somatisation may also be associated with altered automatic 
processing of some types of stimuli.  Roelofs et al. (2002) carried out a meta-analysis 
of studies using the modified Stroop paradigm with patients diagnosed with chronic 
pain, and found evidence for attentional biases towards pain-related stimuli in that 
group.  Moreover, individuals diagnosed with somatoform disorder have also been 
reported to show increased interference to physical threat words compared to 
neutral words on an emotional Stroop task (Lim & Kim, 2005); however, performance 
on such tasks seems to be influenced by tendencies towards alexithymia (Mueller, 
Alpers, & Reim, 2006) and emotion suppression in these patients (Wingenfeld et al., 
2011).   
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.5.2), a landmark study was carried out in the 
Netherlands by Bakvis, Roelofs, and colleagues (2009), in which patients with DS and 
healthy control participants were tested with an emotional Stroop paradigm including 
negative (anger), neutral, and positive (happy) facial expressions.  The details of this 
study were provided previously, but in brief, patients with DS displayed significantly 
greater attentional bias towards angry faces relative to the control group (within a 
baseline condition, but not after stress-induction).  The attentional bias scores were 
positively associated with self-reported history of sexual abuse and elevated basal 
cortisol levels.  This study suggested that angry facial expressions caused a 
disproportionate preconscious reallocation of attention in the DS patients, indicating 
that these stimuli were particularly salient for this group.   
 
Bakvis, Roelofs, and colleagues’ (2009) study had a number of strengths, including the 
exclusion of patients taking medications, the inclusion of only patients diagnosed with 
video-EEG, the assessment of trauma history and physiological measures of stress 
 174 
 
reactivity (e.g. salivary cortisol), and the use of backward-masking and an awareness 
check to ensure that stimuli were processed subliminally.  This was an important 
piece of research, as it was the first experimental study in this patient group.  
Therefore, it was a novel approach to investigating psychological processes in DS.  It 
should be noted, however, that the study also had several important limitations.  
These included a small (19 patients, 20 controls) and potentially 
biased/unrepresentative sample, due to the likely exclusion of large numbers of 
patients due to medication or lack of video-EEG evidence for diagnosis.  Moreover, 
whilst information was provided regarding additional diagnoses in the clinical group, 
current symptoms of anxiety and depression, for example, were not measured.  It is 
well known that emotional processing is influenced by such symptoms; therefore, 
failing to consider the influence of these is a significant weakness.  Furthermore, there 
was no indication as to the severity or extent of the reported traumatic life events 
(e.g. sexual abuse).   
 
A number of studies have indicated the possible presence of subtle neurocognitive 
deficits, non-specific neurological anomalies, and a history of minor head injury in 
patients diagnosed with DS (see Chapter 2, sections 2.3.6, 2.1.3, and 2.1.2 
respectively).  Despite this, Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009) did not report data on 
cognitive abilities, such as general intellectual functioning or face processing.  It, 
therefore, remains a possibility that differences on the emotional Stroop test may 
have been influenced by such variables (although a classic Stroop test was included, 
on which patients performed similarly to controls).   
 
 
6.1.3. Rationale, aims and hypotheses 
The study described in the current chapter was conducted with several aims.  One 
important aim was to attempt to replicate the findings of Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009) 
in a larger and more representative sample of patients with DS recruited in London, 
UK.  The aim was to recruit a sample of 40 patients with DS and compare their 
performance to the same number of healthy controls, in order to provide a higher 
level of statistical power than the previous study.  Moreover, the study also set out 
to control for the possible influence of anxiety and depression, in order to provide a 
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more DS-specific assessment of performance on the experimental test.  Whilst 
anxiety and depression are commonly elevated in DS, they are also not uncommon 
in the general population, individuals with ES, and patients with other psychiatric 
diagnoses.   
 
In order to achieve the stated aims, an emotional Stroop task was devised that was 
as similar as possible to that described by Bakvis, Roelofs, et al (2009).  The test was 
administered to a group of patients diagnosed with DS and a group of healthy control 
participants.  Anxiety and depression scores (and YoE) were covariates in the 
research design.  On the basis of the literature (reviewed above), the following 
hypothesis was tested: 
 
After controlling for symptoms of depression and anxiety, patients with DS 
were predicted to show elevated attentional biases towards emotional faces, 
compared to the healthy control group.  This difference was expected be most 
apparent for angry facial expressions. 
 
Moreover, exploratory correlational analyses were carried out with the objective of 
exploring whether important psychosocial factors (those found to differ between-
groups in Chapter 5 and, therefore, assumed to be aetiologically relevant) were 
related to the attentional bias (AB) scores for happy or angry faces.  Relationships 
between AB scores and the following psychosocial variables were explored: 
psychological and somatoform dissociation, trauma history, anxiety, depression, post-
traumatic symptoms, and borderline personality characteristics (abandonment 
concerns, identity impairment, affect dysregulation, tension reduction activities).    
 
In addition, within the DS group, possible relationships between attentional bias 
scores and seizure-related variables (e.g. DS frequency, duration of DS disorder, ictal 
symptoms) were also explored.  These variables were included in the analysis 
because, if preconscious affective processing biases are in some way involved in 
predisposing towards DS or triggering individual attacks, such relationships might be 






The task was included in an initial pilot study, described in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1).  
No modifications were made to the procedures as a result of this pilot work, as the 
task was found to be generally acceptable to participants.  
 
6.2.1. Participants 
Details of recruitment procedures and inclusion criteria for this study were described 
in Chapter 4 (sections 4.2.1. and 4.2.2).  The final sample for this study included 43 




The facial stimuli used in the experiment were pictures of models displaying angry, 
happy or neutral facial expressions taken from the standardised ‘Pictures of Facial 
Affect’ set (Ekman and Friesen, 1976).  These stimuli have been standardised in 
normative samples cross-culturally.  Expressions of happiness, anger and neutrality 
were selected because they would provide examples of both positive and negative 
emotions, and a control condition.  These were also the emotions used in the study 
reported by Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009).   
 
Pictures of five male and five female models were utilised in order to minimise any 
gender effects within the stimuli.  This yielded a total of 30 stimuli.  The faces were 
cropped and superimposed on a black background, in order to standardise them and 
remove any potentially distracting features (e.g. hair, ears).  The grey-scale images of 
the faces were coloured in a transparent shade of red, yellow or green, which allowed 
the facial expressions and features to remain clearly visible.  Examples of these stimuli 
and a list of all the stimuli used can be found in Appendix 12.  The masking stimuli 
were neutral patterns (see Appendix 12), consisting of several high-contrast 
concentric ovals in red, green or yellow (identical shades to those used for the facial 
stimuli), presented on a black background.  These stimuli were constructed so that 
the outer edge would resemble the shape of the cropped faces, and so that they 





Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) 
The two subscale form of this test was administered to briefly assess current 
intellectual functioning (Matrix Reasoning, Vocabulary).  The reason for inclusion of 
this test was to ensure that the groups were matched on general cognitive abilities, 
as these may have influenced performance on the experimental task.   
 
The Matrix Reasoning subtest requires participants to select an item from an array, 
in order to complete a pattern or rule presented within a matrix.  The Vocabulary 
subtest involves the examiner presenting single words orally and visually, with the 
participant being required to provide a definition of the meaning of each word in turn.  
The two tests are associated with Performance and Verbal IQ respectively (PIQ, 
VIQ), and yield T-scores based on the normative data provided in the manual.  The 
combined T-scores from the subtests are used to calculate an overall Full Scale IQ 
score (FSIQ).  This test was selected as a time-efficient means of obtaining a good 
estimate of overall cognitive functioning, for participant matching purposes.  The time 
constraints of the testing procedures would not have allowed for the full Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 2008) to have been administered.    
 
Stroop Test (Golden & Freshwater, 2002) 
A standardised version of the Stroop test was administered to assess general 
executive functioning (response inhibition/attention/processing speed).  Given that 
the experimental task places some degree of load on executive skills, it was thought 
necessary to ensure that the groups were well-matched on this variable. 
 
The standard Stroop test includes three conditions.  The first condition (Word) is a 
basic reading test, in which respondents are asked to read a list of colour words (red, 
yellow green) all printed in the same colour (black), as quickly as possible for 45 
seconds.  The number of correctly read words is then recorded.  The second 
condition (Colour) requires respondents to say aloud the colour of a series of stimuli 
(xxxx) printed in red, yellow, or green.  The number of correctly labelled items is 
recorded.  The final condition (Colour-Word), requires respondents to name the 
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colour of the ink that each colour word is printed in, whilst ignoring the actual word.  
So, for example, respondents may have to say ‘green’ when the word ‘red’ is printed 
in green ink.  This condition requires respondents to suppress the automatic tendency 
to verbalise the written word, whilst simultaneously selecting and verbalising the 
correct colour of the ink for each item.  The total number correctly stated in 45 
seconds is once again recorded.  
 
On the basis of age, educational level, colour and word condition scores, predicted 
values for the ‘colour-word’ condition scores can be obtained from the normative 
data provided in the test manual.  It is then possible to calculate ‘interference’ scores 
by subtracting the actual colour-word score from the predicted colour-word score.  
Raw ‘interference’ scores are then used to calculate a T-score, for reference to the 
normative sample.  According to Jensen (1965) and Golden (1975), the Stroop test 
shows good test-retest reliability in the .70-.90 range (as cited by Golden & 
Freshwater, 2002).  
 
Benton Facial Recognition Test (short-form; Benton et al., 1983) 
This test requires participants to match faces presented simultaneously, on the basis 
of the physical features of the individual (identity).  This provides a basic measure of 
general perceptual processing of facial stimuli.  The test was included to ensure that 
participants in both groups had facial processing abilities that were within the normal 
range, due to the presentation of facial stimuli in the experimental task.  The short-
form test was used due to time constraints. However, the short-form scores are 
easily converted to the long-form equivalent, which can be adjusted with respect to 
a participant’s age and years of education.  Scores below 29 are interpreted as 




This was a mixed between- and within-subjects design with two independent 
variables: one between-subjects variable with two levels (Group: DS, control) and 
one within-subjects variable.  The within-subjects variable had three levels for 
absolute reaction times (RTs; facial expression type: happy, angry, neutral) and two 
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levels for attentional bias (AB) scores (facial expression type: happy, angry).  The 
dependent variables were absolute reaction times (RTs) or AB scores (see section 
6.2.5).   
 
There were 30 stimuli for each facial expression type (happy, angry, neutral), with ten 
of each colour (red, yellow, green).  The total number of trials was 90, with these 
being presented in a different pseudo-randomised order for each participant.  No 
more than two consecutive presentations of stimuli from the same condition (facial 
expressions type) or of the same colour were permitted, in order to avoid the 
possibility of order effects within stimulus presentation.          
 
6.2.4. Procedure 
Before commencing the task, participants were presented with standardised 
instructions on the screen, in white font (size 16-18; Tahoma style) on a black 
background.  These instructions can be found in Appendix 13.  The experimenter 
read each screen aloud for participants and checked for comprehension before 
moving onto the next screen.  Any questions that arose during this process were 
answered at the time.   
 
The task began with nine practice trials.  Practice trials consisted of a 750 millisecond 
(msec) presentation of a fixation cross (central white cross on black background), 
followed by the neutral pattern stimuli in red, yellow or green on each trial (a total 
of three of each colour in a random order).  Participants were requested to say aloud 
the colour of the pattern as quickly as possible. On successful registration with the 
voice key device, the pattern disappeared from the screen.  If voice key registration 
failed, the stimulus remained on the screen and participants were asked to respond 
again.  The inter-trial-interval (ITI) was fixed at two seconds, during which the screen 
was blank.   
 
Following completion of the practice items, and after any further questions had been 
answered, participants were prompted to begin the main task by pressing the space 
key.  Each trial started with presentation of a white fixation cross (750 msecs), 
followed by a facial stimulus, presented for 17 milliseconds in red, yellow or green.  
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The face was then masked immediately by a neutral pattern stimulus in the 
corresponding colour.  Participants were required to name aloud the colour of the 
masking stimulus as quickly as possible.  The masking stimulus remained on the screen 
until participants’ verbal response was registered by the voice key.  Presentation of 
the facial stimuli was set at 17 milliseconds because this was the minimum refresh 
rate for the laptop-integrated monitor used in the experiment.  This was four 
milliseconds longer than the duration of presentation used by Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. 
(2009); however, it is within the range of 0-33 milliseconds suggested to be the 
duration at which conscious awareness is precluded (see section 6.1).   
 
The experimenter coded the participants’ responses for each trial.  Responses were 
coded by the colour verbalised (i.e. red, yellow, green) or as a mistrial (x) for 
instances in which the voice key failed or in which the voice key was erroneously 
triggered by random noise.  Coding took up to two seconds per trial, during which 
the screen was blank.  The screen remained blank for a further two seconds after the 
trial had been coded.  This constituted a variable ITI of between approximately two 
and four seconds, in which participants viewed a continuous blank screen.   
 
In order to assess whether the facial stimuli had been consciously perceived, at the 
end of the task participants were asked whether they had been aware of seeing any 
additional stimuli on the screen, and responses were recorded.  If the response was 
affirmative, participants were asked what they had seen.  An objective awareness 
check was also carried out, after the emotional Stroop test (and two other 
experimental tests, see Chapters 7 and 8) had been completed.  This involved a 
forced-choice task in which 30 trials (identical to the experimental trials) were 
presented.  Participants were explicitly required to select which facial expression they 
had seen from three choices (happiness, anger, neutral), using the number keys on 
the keyboard.  There were 10 of each facial expression, presented in a pseudo-
randomised order.  This test was used as an objective measure of the degree to which 







6.2.5. Data analysis 
General statistical procedures and considerations were described in Chapter 4 
(section 4.5).  Only those aspects of the data analyses specific to the current study 
are outlined below. 
 
For the awareness check, correct responses were defined as correct selection of the 
emotion of the subliminally-presented facial expression.  Percentage correct scores 
(0-100%) were calculated for each participant, by condition (happy, angry, neutral).  
A mixed factorial ANCOVA was used to examine the effect of group (between-
subjects; DS, control) and facial expression (within-subjects; happy, angry, neutral) on 
percentage correct scores, whilst covarying for years of education (YoE).  
Furthermore, a binomial test was used to determine whether the percentage correct 
scores in each group were significantly different from chance performance.   
 
During data cleaning, RTs for correct responses on the emotional Stroop test were 
checked twice for accuracy of data input; any inaccuracies were corrected.  RTs were 
then removed if they fell below 150 or above 1500 milliseconds; as such RTs are 
suggestive of technical errors with voice-key registration or participant variables such 
as distraction, impulsivity or other processes that invalidate the responses.  
Furthermore, individual RTs were considered outliers and removed if they fell above 
or below 2.5 standard deviations from the group mean for each condition (happy, 
angry, neutral).  New overall group means for each condition were then calculated 
and subjected to analysis.  These two steps were also used by Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. 
(2009).  In addition, error rates were calculated by condition.    
 
The absolute RTs obtained on the emotional Stroop test were examined with a mixed 
factorial ANCOVA, with group (DS, control) as the between-groups factor and facial 
expression (happy, angry, neutral) as the within-groups factor.  YoE and anxiety and 
depression scores (HADS) were entered as covariates.  This analysis was conducted 
to assess possible group differences in speed of responding for all facial expression 
types, including neutral expressions.  The rationale for conducting this analysis was 
to examine whether or not there were differences between groups on overall 
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reaction times within the test.  Particularly, this allowed an assessment of whether 
the DS sample exhibited any general reductions in processing speed (as might be 
expected due to possible medication effects). 
 
Moreover, AB scores were calculated by subtracting the mean RT for the neutral 
condition from the mean RT for each expression (happy or angry), for each 
participant.   This method provides a gauge of how fast or slow RTs were for each 
emotional expression (happy, angry), relative to the neutral expressions, for each 
individual.  These scores were assessed with ANCOVA as described above, with AB 
scores as the DV and with expression (anger, happiness) as the within-groups factor.  
Calculation of AB scores followed the method described by Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. 
(2009).   
 
The exploratory correlational analyses consisted of bivariate correlations between 
AB scores and scores on the MDI (Depersonalisation, Derealisation, Disengagement, 
Emotional Constriction, Identity Dissociation, Memory Disturbance subscales),  
SDQ–20, TEC (total, mean impact, physical and sexual abuse scores), HADS (Anxiety, 
Depression subscales), PDS (Total, Arousal, Avoidance, Re-experiencing subscales), 
and the IASC (Abandonment Concerns, Identity Impairment, Affect Dysregulation, 
Tension Reduction Activities subscales).  Furthermore, possible relationships 
between AB scores and patient characteristics were also examined in the DS group, 
including seizure frequency, duration of DS disorder, medication use (AEDs, 
antidepressants), and ictal symptoms.  These were two-tailed correlations and a 





6.3.1. Participant characteristics 
The demographic characteristics of the control sample (n=43) included in this 
experiment were as described in Chapter 5 (see Table 2).  Thirty-eight patients with 
DS completed the current experiment. Table 28 provides the demographic 
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characteristics of this sample and statistical values for comparison with the control 
group.   
 
There were no significant between-group differences in age, or the proportion of 
female, right-handed, white participants or smokers.  Furthermore, the proportion of 
participants reporting ‘higher managerial, administrative or professional occupations’ 
(NSSEC) did not differ between groups.  There was an almost significant difference in 
years of education between-groups; therefore, this variable was included in the 
analysis of the experimental data.  Despite this, the proportion of participants having 
achieved further or higher education qualifications did not vary by group.  Being in a 
long-term relationship (married/cohabiting) was significantly more common in the DS 
sample relative to controls.   
 
Furthermore, significantly more participants in the DS group were taking prescribed 
medications and had general medical diagnoses, compared to the control group.  
Thirteen patients with DS (34%) were taking AEDs, most commonly sodium valproate 
(n = 3), pregabalin (n = 4), and carbamazepine (n = 3).  Sixteen patients reported 
taking antidepressant medications, most commonly SSRIs such as fluoxetine (n = 6) 
and citalopram (n = 4).   
 
For the DS group, the mean current seizure frequency was 20.4 per month (range 0-
274, standard deviation = 48.1), with the median being 4.33 (interquartile range = 
14.6).  The mean length of time since seizure onset was 90.9 months (range 9-432 
months, standard deviation = 88.4 months), with a median of 54 months (i.e. 4.5 
years; interquartile range = 96.8 months). 
 
 
6.3.2. Neuropsychological measures 
A summary of the findings for the neuropsychological measures can be found in 
Table 29.  As some measures were not completed by all participants, the number of 




Table 28. Characteristics of participants completing the preconscious 
facial expression processing experiment  
 Dissociative seizures 




Age in years  
     Mean (SD) 





U (81) = 720, p = .358 
Gender  Male = 8 (21%) 
Female = 30 (79%) 
X2 (1, n = 81) = .076,  p 
= .782 
Handedness Right = 29 (76%) 
Left = 6 (16%) 
Ambidextrous = 3 (8%) 
X2 (1, n = 81) = 2.05,  p 
= .152 
Ethnicity White = 30 (79%) 
Non-white = 8 (21%) 
X2 (1, n = 81) = 1.9, p = 
.168 
YoE 
     Mean (SD) 





U (81) = 616, p = .054 
Qualifications GCSEs or none = 14 
(37%) 
Further / higher = 24 
(63%) 
X2 (1, n = 81) = .251, p 
= .113 
Marital status Currently single = 22 
(58%) 
Long-term relationship 
= 16 (42%) 




1 = 17 (45%) 
2,3,4 or 5 = 21 (55%) 
X2 (1, n = 81) = .068, p 
= .794 
Medication use Yes = 27 (71.1%) 
No = 11 (28.9%) 




Yes = 23 (60.5%) 
No = 15 (39%) 
X2 (1, n = 81) = 19.04, p 
< .001 
Smoking Yes = 11 (29%) 
No = 27 (71%) 
X2 (1, n = 81) = .697, p = 
.404 
SD = standard deviation    NSSEC: National Statistics Socio-economic Classification system 
IQR = interquartile range   1 = Higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations 
YoE: years of full-time education (or equivalent) 2 = Intermediate occupations 
    3 = Small employers and own account workers 
     4 = Lower supervisory and technical occupations 
     5 = Semi-routine and routine occupations 





Table 29. Neuropsychological findings (emotional Stroop task) 
 DS Control Test 
statistics 
WASI n = 38 n = 43  
FSIQ (Mean, SD) 104.1 (14.7) 108.1 
(13.1) 
t (79) = 
1.29, p = 
.198 
Vocabulary T scores (Mean, 
SD) 
51.8 (11.3) 55.2 (9.8) t (79) = 
1.46, p = 
.148 
Matrix reasoning T scores    
          Mean (SD) 52.5 (8.9) 53.7 (9.5)  
          Median (IQR) 54.5 (10) 56 (15) U (81) = 
730, p = 
.410 
Benton Facial Recognition 
Test 
n = 37 n = 43  
          Mean (SD) 47.2 (4.4) 48.9 (3.5)  
          Median (SD) 49 (7) 49 (5) U (80) = 
631, p = 
.109 
Stroop test n = 37 n = 43  
          Mean (SD) 52.8 (8.3) 51.5 (9.01) t (78) = -
.656, p = 
.514 
SD = standard deviation; WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; FSIQ = Full-Scale IQ;  
DS = dissociative seizures 
 
 
On the WASI, there were no significant between-group differences in full-scale IQ, 
or on the Vocabulary or Matrix Reasoning subscales.  All participants scored over 
70 for WASI full-scale IQ.  In addition, the control and DS groups performed 
comparably on the standardised version of the Stroop test, with no statistical 
difference observed in interference scores.  The mean scores for both groups were 
in the normal range.  Performance on the BFRT did not differ statistically between 
the DS and control groups.  Moreover, the mean and median values for each group 
were in the normal range.  However, a minority of the participants (DS = 4; control 




6.3.3. Awareness check 
After covarying for YoE, there was no overall effect of group on the percentage of 
correct responses on the awareness test (F (1, 78) = 3.275, p = .074).  There was 
no overall effect of expression (F (2, 78) = 1.341, p = .265), and no interaction of 
expression by group (F (2, 78) = .402, p = .669).  The same pattern was observed 
when HADS Anxiety and Depression scores were added as covariates.  Binomial 
tests were carried out to determine whether performance differed from chance in 
each group, with a stringent alpha level of p < .01 as the criterion for significance.  
The results suggested that the mean percentage correct scores for angry faces were 
significantly above chance performance for the control group (p = .005), but not for 
the DS group (p = .21).  For happy faces, percentage correct scores were above 
chance for control participants (p < .001) and for DS patients (p = .005).  For neutral 
faces, percentage correct scores did not differ from chance in the DS group (p = 
.069) or the controls (p = .02), at the required alpha level.  
 
Despite the findings that scores deviated from chance performance for some 
expressions, Table 30 indicates that the scores on the awareness test were far from 
100% in all conditions, and that there was considerable range within groups, showing 
that some participants had very little awareness of the stimuli.  In addition, subjective 
reports showed that 79% of the DS group and 72% of controls had no awareness of 
having seen any facial stimuli during the test at all.  Those reporting awareness of 
having seen the stimuli often were not able to report exactly what they had seen (e.g. 
specific facial expressions).   
 
Table 30. Awareness check for subliminally presented stimuli 
 DS (n = 38) Control (n = 
43) 
Angry faces (% correct)   
          Mean (SD)  42.1 (24.2) 53.3 (24.7)* 
          Median (IQR)  40 (32.5) 60 (40) 
Neutral faces (% correct)   
          Mean (SD) 46.1 (23.3) 50.2 (25.9) 
          Median (IQR) 40 (30) 40 (40) 
Happy faces (% correct)   
          Mean (SD) 52.9 (22.9)* 60 (29.2)* 
          Median (IQR) 50 (30) 70 (50) 
DS = dissociative seizures; SD = standard deviation; IQR = interquartile range 




6.3.4. Emotional Stroop performance 
Error data 
With YoE and HADS Anxiety and Depression scores included as covariates, the 
ANCOVA revealed no significant effect of group on error rates (F (1, 76) = 1.81, p = 
.183); however, a significant effect of expression was evident (F (1.726, 152) = 8.104, 
p < .001) with neutral expressions receiving most erroneous responses, and happy 
faces least.  Nonetheless, there was still no significant interaction between group and 
expression (F (1.726, 152) = 1.11, p = .325), indicating that the same pattern of errors 
was apparent across both groups.    
 
Absolute RTs 
Figure 9 displays the means and standard deviations for absolute RTs.  For absolute 
RTs, after controlling for YoE and HADS scores (Anxiety, Depression), no significant 
main effect of expression (F (2, 152) = .391, p = .677), group (F (1, 76) = .208, p = 
.650), or interaction of group by expression (F (2, 152) = 2.61, p = .077) was observed.  
None of the covariates were significant.  
 






Figure 10 shows the descriptive statistics for AB scores.  After covarying for YoE and 
HADS Anxiety and Depression scores, a significant between-groups effect was 
observed in attentional bias scores (F (1, 76) = 4.356, p = .04), with the DS group 
showing significantly higher AB scores than control participants (see Figure 10).  
Within this analysis, there was no overall effect of expression (F (1, 76) = .830, p = 
.365), and no expression by group interaction (F (1, 76) = .558, p = .458).  The only 
covariate that was significant was HADS Depression scores (F (1, 76) = 4.13, p = 
.046), indicating that higher depression scores were associated with reduced AB 
scores.  Furthermore, there were no significant interactions between expression type 
and any of the covariates.   
 
 





In order to assess the possible influence of medication on AB scores, the ANCOVA 
was carried out twice more, with medication variables entered as additional between-
group factors.  When AED use was entered as an additional factor, neither the group 
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effect (F (1, 75) = 2.51, p = .117) nor the effect of AED use (F (1, 75) = 2.53, p = .116) 
were significant; however, HADS depression scores remained significant as a 
covariate (F (1, 75) = 4.98, p = .029).  When antidepressant use (yes/no) was entered 
as the additional factor, the group effect (F (1, 75) = 1.58, p = .213) was not significant, 
and neither was the effect of antidepressant use (F (1, 75) = 3.58, p = .062).  However, 
HADS Depression was a significant covariate (F (1, 75) = 5.85, p = .018).   
 
 
6.3.5. Relationship of AB scores to participant characteristics 
With a stringent alpha level of p < .01, there were no significant simple correlations 
between any of the variables examined and AB scores for either type of facial 
expression.  These analyses were carried out a second time using partial correlations 
controlling for YoE.  In this second set of analyses, a significant positive relationship 
was observed between seizure frequency and AB scores for happy faces (r = .682, p 
< .001).  Again, no other variable was significantly associated with AB scores for either 
facial expression.   
 
Due to the equivocal findings on the ANCOVAs for AEDs and antidepressants, point 
biserial correlations were conducted to examine whether the use of either AEDs or 
antidepressants was specifically related to AB scores for happy or angry faces 
separately.  None of these relationships were significant at p < .01.  However, whilst 
not meeting this more stringent alpha level, possible relationships were indicated 
between AB scores for happy faces and AED use (rpb = .271, p = .014) and 
antidepressant use (rpb = .222, p = .046).  
 
In order to examine the possible influence of medication on AB scores for happy 
faces more closely, a multivariate linear regression was carried out in the DS group 
(no controls were using AEDs or antidepressants), with happy AB scores as the 
outcome variable.  YoE, HADS Depression scores, AED and antidepressant use (yes, 
no), and seizure frequency were entered as the predictor variables in that order.  
Seizure frequency was included due to the finding that it was significantly associated 
with happy AB scores.  In this analysis (see Table 31), the model only became 
significant in the last two steps, involving the addition of medication (AEDs, 
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antidepressants) and seizure frequency respectively.  Both of these steps significantly 
added to the model.   
 
 
Table 31. Regression statistics for the predictive relationship of YoE, 
depression, medication (AED/antidepressants) and seizure frequency, on 
attentional bias scores for happy faces 
 
n = 38 b Confidence 
Interval  
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 AED = anti-epileptic drugs; YoE = years of full-time education (or equiv) 




The final model was highly significant (F (37) = 3.98, p = .006).  With all variables 
entered, HADS Depression scores and seizure frequency remained significant, with 
the former being associated with lower AB scores and the latter being associated 
with higher AB scores.  The influence of AED use was a non-significant trend in the 
final model.  To summarise, when the possible influences of YoE, depression, and 
antidepressant use were taken into account, more frequent seizures and (to a lesser 
extent) AED use, were predictive of elevated AB scores for happy faces.  However, 







6.4.1. Summary and interpretation 
This study attempted to replicate and extend the findings reported by Bakvis, Roelofs, 
et al. (2009); more specifically, the finding that patients with DS showed a specific 
preconscious attentional bias to threatening facial expressions (anger).  Another aim 
was to replicate the finding that such an attentional bias is related to reports of sexual 
abuse in the DS group.  Furthermore, the study was also designed to explore possible 




Using a forced-choice procedure modelled on that used by Bakvis et al. (2009), the 
awareness check data indicated that there were no between-groups differences in 
awareness of the facial stimuli, suggesting that differences in awareness levels should 
not have influenced performance on the emotional Stroop test.  However, both 
groups showed significantly better recognition of the stimuli than would be expected 
by chance, for one or more expressions.  These findings suggested that some degree 
of awareness of the stimuli may have been present in a proportion of participants.  
This is in contrast to the findings of Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009), who reported that 
their sample did not perform above chance level, in terms of awareness.  It is, 
therefore, possible that presenting the faces for 17 milliseconds increased the degree 
of awareness of the stimuli in this study. 
   
Emotional Stroop performance 
Absolute reaction times (RTs) 
The results indicated that there were no group, expression, or group/expression 
interaction effects on absolute mean RTs on the emotional Stroop task, after 
controlling for YoE and HADS scores.  Therefore, relative to each other, the two 
groups showed comparable overall processing/response speed.  This suggests that 
the differences in medication status between groups was not associated with an 
overall slowing of cognitive functioning (e.g. attention, processing speed) in the patient 
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sample.  Moreover, it seems that none of the facial expressions (happy, angry, neutral) 
were associated with significant changes in overall processing/response speed across 
the entire sample.   
 
Attentional bias (AB) scores 
Having ascertained that there were no absolute differences in RTs during the task, 
calculation of the AB scores allowed quantification of the extent to which the 
emotional facial expression stimuli (i.e. happy, angry) affected performance, relative 
to the neutral faces.  Thus, the relative effect of each emotional condition relative to 
the neutral condition was calculated for each individual and then averaged for each 
group.   
 
After controlling for YoE, depression and anxiety, patients with DS showed a 
significantly greater attentional bias to the emotional faces, relative to the healthy 
control group.  The lack of expression or interaction effects indicated that the pattern 
of performance was similar for each expression in both groups.  Only depression 
scores were found to be a significant covariate in this analysis.  This overall pattern 
of results suggested that, relative to control participants, and after the influences of 
YoE and depression were accounted for, patients with DS automatically allocated 
more attention to emotional faces compared to neutral faces.  In light of the findings 
of Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009), these findings support the hypothesis that patients 
with DS show some degree of hypervigilance for emotional facial expressions.  This 
study, however, suggests that this hypervigilance might apply to both positive and 
negative facial expressions. 
 
The finding that HADS Depression scores were a significant covariate in the analysis 
highlights the importance of examining the influence of these symptoms in studies of 
this nature.  It is well-established that patients with DS often present with some 
degree of depression and/or anxiety (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2).  However, it is 
important to tease out what characterises the emotional processing style of patients 
with DS, independently of the possible influence of comorbid depressive or anxiety 
symptoms.  Of particular note in this study was that higher depressive symptoms 
were associated with reduced attentional bias scores, suggesting that the presence of 
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depressive symptoms did not contribute to the elevated AB scores observed in the 
DS group.  The exploratory regression analysis supported this suggestion (Table 31).  
It seems that in patients with DS, elevated depressive symptoms seem to be 
associated with some degree of cognitive avoidance of emotional facial expressions.  
This pattern contrasts with previous literature, in which an attentional bias towards 
negative stimuli has been indicated in people with depression (Peckham et al., 2010).   
 
However, the analyses including AEDs and antidepressants as additional factors were 
somewhat difficult to interpret.  The addition of each of these variables as additional 
between-group factors (in separate analyses) led to the group effect no longer 
remaining significant in each.  Moreover, the effects of each drug type were not 
significant either.  These findings suggested that there might have been medication 
effects on the AB scores, but it is possible that due to a lack of statistical power (only 
13 patients were taking AEDs, for example), or other statistical considerations (e.g. 
inter-correlations between variables, unequal sample sizes for the medication 
variables), the effects of both group and medication were obscured.  Therefore, these 
analyses did not allow a conclusive exclusion of possible medication effects, nor did 
they confirm that medication effects were entirely responsible for the group effects 
observed in the previous analyses.  However, the fact that the absolute RTs were not 
significantly slower in the DS group suggested that medication in this group had not 
caused generally reduced cognitive processing speed.  
 
With regard to the exploratory analyses with psychosocial and seizure-related 
variables, when YoE was controlled for, a significant relationship was observed 
between seizure frequency and AB scores for happy expressions.  This finding 
suggests that those patients having the most seizures (which could be seen as a 
measure of disorder severity) preconsciously allocated more attention to positive 
facial expressions.  It is possible that, as a consequence of experiencing higher levels 
of symptoms and the associated social/occupational limitations this might entail, 
patients experiencing more frequent seizures might preconsciously seek out positive 
experiences and interpersonal interactions.  On the other hand, a pre-existing 
tendency to automatically attend to positive social cues or positive stimuli more 
generally might serve as a means of reducing, avoiding or coping with emotional 
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distress.  This tendency to ‘focus on the positive’ in the environment, or to be 
hypervigilant to signs of social approval, could be a psychological mechanism that 
somehow contributed to the development of DS.  Obviously, these interpretations 
are speculative and would require further examination in more focused studies.  
 
Importantly, the correlational analyses further examined the possible influence of 
relevant medications.  These analyses indicated the possible influence of AED and 
antidepressant use on AB scores far happy expressions.  When examined in the 
regression analysis in the DS group, it was apparent that AED use was associated with 
elevated AB scores for happy faces.  However, when seizure frequency was also 
added to the model, the influence of AEDs became non-significant (although a trend 
remained) and seizure frequency was found to exert an independent influence on 
happy AB scores, beyond the influence of AEDs.  This supports the above proposition, 
that the experience of having frequent seizures is uniquely associated with 
hypervigilance for happy faces in the DS group.  It should be noted, however, that 
whilst the final regression model was significant, the amount of variance explained 
was modest (approximately 38%); therefore, it is clear that other factors possibly 
contributed to the AB scores. 
 
Combined, the exploratory medication analyses suggested that AED use may have 
had some effect on AB scores in the DS group.  AEDs are known to have cognitive 
side effects (e.g. Aldenkamp, Krom, & Reijs, 2003; Drane & Meador, 2002) and some 
(e.g. carbamazepine, valproate, lamotrigine) influence mood and/or behaviour (Drane 
& Meador, 2002; Hixson & Kirsch, 2009; Reijs, Aldenkamp, & Krom, 2004).  The use 
of AEDs as psychotropic agents in the treatment of various psychiatric disorders is 
becoming more common (Nadkarni & Devinsky, 2005).  It is, therefore, possible that 
AED use contributed to the group differences in AB scores, either by alterations in 
cognitive processes (e.g. attentional dysfunction), or by influencing mood state.  On 
the other hand, it is possible that the effects of AEDs might be explained by a third 
variable, such as seizure severity or chronicity of the disorder.  Future studies might 
examine the influence of AED use on emotional processing in larger samples of 




6.4.2. Strengths and limitations  
An important strength of this study was the inclusion of a larger sample of patients 
with DS than that included by Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009).  This provided a 
satisfactory level of statistical power for the detection of possible group effects on 
performance on the emotional Stroop test.  Recruitment of this sample size depended 
on relative inclusiveness during the recruitment process (e.g. patients diagnosed on 
the basis of clinical consensus and currently taking medication were included).  On 
the one hand, this inclusiveness provided greater representativeness of the population 
being studied.  However, this also leaves open the possibility that some patients may 
have comorbid ES or a misdiagnosis (although this possibility also remains in those 
diagnosed with video-EEG, albeit to a lesser extent). 
 
An additional strength of the current study was the careful matching of the patient 
group with the control group.  As outlined in section 6.3, the two groups were 
comparable on many important variables.  Whilst there was an almost significant 
between-group difference in YoE, this was explicitly stated and taken into account 
within the statistical procedures carried out.  This level of control allowed an insight 
into the extent to which YoE affected performance on the experimental task, but also 
to examine the group differences once this possible confound had been statistically 
controlled for.   
 
A related issue is that relevant standardised cognitive measures were included in the 
test battery of the current study; therefore, it was possible to conclude with some 
degree of confidence that the groups were matched on general intellectual functioning 
and processing/recognition of faces, in addition to comparable performance on a 
standard Stroop test.  This allowed clearer interpretation of the findings on the 
experimental task, and ensured that they could not have been better explained by 
deficits in the measured cognitive domains.  Given the difference in YoE between 
groups, and the fact that YoE is generally highly correlated with IQ scores, the 
inclusion of the WASI was very important, in order to ensure that a significant 
difference in intellectual functioning was not present.  Furthermore, the exploratory 
evaluation of possible relationships between the psychosocial and seizure-related 
variables and AB scores, provided greater depth to the study.  Moreover, because of 
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the inclusion of a measure of anxiety and depression (HADS), it was also possible to 
examine the influence of general emotional distress (i.e. depression, anxiety) on AB 
scores, and to control for its influence.     
 
One key limitation of the current study was the possibility of medication effects; 
however, this will be discussed further in Chapter 10 as it also applies to the other 
experimental studies.  Furthermore, whilst there were no between group differences 
in awareness of the experimental stimuli in this study, both groups performed better 
than chance for one or more facial expressions, on the forced-choice awareness 
procedure.  This suggested that the 17 millisecond duration presentation time for the 
facial stimuli did not satisfactorily preclude conscious awareness of them.  Whilst 
participants were not directly and explicitly required to attend to the facial 
expressions, it is possible that some residual awareness was present.   
 
As mentioned, the exploratory correlational analyses yielded very few results that 
met the required significance level.  Furthermore, the relationship between AB scores 
and sexual abuse reported by Bakvis et al. (2009) was not replicated in this study.  It 
is possible that the adoption of a stringent alpha level (p < .01) may have led to Type 
2 errors in this regard; however, this was thought to be a necessary precaution to 
avoid the undesirable increase in risk of Type 1 errors caused by a large number of 
related tests.  Future work may focus on fewer variables, in order to reduce the 
requirement for such a stringent alpha level.  Further research in this area might also 
seek to include a larger sample size, so that a comparison of larger subgroups of 
medicated and unmedicated participants might be compared, whilst controlling for 
relevant confounds (anxiety, depression, cognitive functioning, education).  This 
would allow greater statistical power to be retained when examining the influence of 
these possible confounds.     
 
6.4.3. Summary and conclusions 
The results of the current study are partially supportive of the findings reported by 
Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009).  After controlling for YoE, anxiety and depression, an 
overall group effect on AB scores was observed (higher scores in the DS group).  
However, this elevation was not specific to angry faces in the current study, as it was 
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in that of Bakvis, Roelofs, and colleagues (2009).  Moreover, depression was found to 
covary with AB scores in this study, indicating that depressive symptoms in DS might 
influence preconscious emotional processing in a different way to individuals with 
depression only.  It was apparent that attentional biases for happy faces in the DS 
group were influenced by the frequency of patients’ attacks, and to a lesser extent, 
the use of AEDs.  Together, the results suggest that hypervigilance for emotional 
faces is likely to be characteristic of patients with DS, but that it is of considerable 
importance to measure and examine the relative influence of possible confounding 





Chapter 7. Conscious facial expression processing in patients diagnosed 
with dissociative seizures: subjective and autonomic responding 
7.1. Introduction 
7.1.1. Background 
In ‘The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals’ (1872), Charles Darwin 
discussed the nature of emotional expressions across species and proposed that they 
are genetically determined and a result of natural selection. Moreover, he argued that 
some emotional expressions are universal in human beings.  In the twentieth century, 
Paul Ekman and his colleagues gathered empirical evidence for the universality of facial 
expressions, identifying several that were expressed and recognised consistently 
across literate and preliterate peoples (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1971).  These 
expressions included anger, disgust, fear, happiness, surprise and sadness, and were 
later termed ‘basic’ emotions (Ekman, 1992).  Subsequent research has generally 
supported the universality hypothesis (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Matsumoto et al., 
2008).  The ability to recognise facial expressions of some emotions, therefore, seems 
to be a ‘hard-wired’ adaptation that likely served an important survival-related 
function in the evolutionary history of the species.  Probably the most important 
function is that of social communication.  Others’ facial expressions convey important 
information about their intentions towards us, but also about other significant stimuli 
in the environment.  Accurate and efficient interpretation of others’ emotional facial 
expressions is particularly important for successful social interaction, and the ability 
to form and maintain relationships.  
Experimental evidence has indicated that conscious or explicit processing of facial 
expressions can be affected in several psychological disorders that share similarities, 
or are commonly comorbid with, DS.  For example, there is a large empirical 
literature on facial expression processing in individuals with affective disorders, and 
whilst there are mixed findings, a meta-analysis including 51 studies (Kohler et al., 
2011) found evidence for moderate impairments in facial expression recognition in 
people diagnosed with major depression and bipolar disorder.  A number of variables 
were reported to be associated with reduced performance, including more severe 
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subjective symptoms of depression, younger age at testing, and fewer years of 
education.  These findings suggest the importance of measuring and controlling for 
variables such as symptom severity, age and educational history, in studies of this 
nature.   
Individuals diagnosed with PTSD have also been reported to show reduced sensitivity 
to and accuracy in recognising fear and sadness (e.g. Poljac, Montagne, & de Haan, 
2011), and to perceive higher levels of negativity in some basic facial expressions 
relative to traumatised controls without PTSD (Shin et al., 2005).  A recent meta-
analysis (Plana et al., 2014) summarised studies of emotion recognition in patients 
with PTSD and other anxiety disorders and concluded that, whilst deficits have been 
observed across the anxiety disorders, the effect size for emotion recognition deficits 
in PTSD is larger than in other anxiety disorders, such as generalised or social anxiety.    
 
A wide range of studies indicates that emotion recognition may also be atypical in 
patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (BPD).  Most consistently, 
reduced accuracy in recognition of emotional facial expressions has been reported in 
patients with BPD compared to controls (Bland et al., 2004; Levine, Marziali, & Hood, 
1997; Merkl et al., 2010; Nicol, Pope, & Hall, 2014; Unoka et al., 2011), although there 
have been differences in the extent of the reported deficits (i.e. how many emotions 
are affected).  Conversely, Wagner & Linehan (1999) and Lynch et al. (2006) reported 
increased rather than decreased sensitivity for detection of emotional facial 
expressions in patients with BPD relative to controls.  Furthermore, Minzenburg, 
Poole, and Vinogradov (2006) only observed deficits in recognition of combined 
prosodic and facial emotional expressions, rather than in either of these 
independently.  Despite the inconsistencies, Daros, Zakzanis, and Ruocco (2013) 
conducted a meta-analysis of studies assessing facial expression recognition in patients 
with BPD compared to healthy controls, and concluded that there was evidence for 
reduced recognition of specific negative emotions (i.e. anger, disgust) and neutral 
stimuli in the BPD group.   
 
Some investigators have also explored facial affect recognition in patients with 
depersonalisation disorder (DPD).  Montagne et al. (2007), for example, reported 
reduced recognition of angry facial expressions in patients with DPD relative to non-
 200 
 
clinical control participants, whereas Sierra and colleagues (2002) found that patients 
with DPD rated disgusted facial expressions as subjectively less intense relative to 
healthy and clinical (anxiety) control groups.  In the latter study, the DPD group also 
exhibited reduced skin conductance responses to the disgusted facial expressions 
relative to the anxious group, and a similar trend relative to the healthy control group.  
It was interpreted that DPD provides a mechanism by which psychophysiological 
anxiety responses are inhibited or ‘blunted’ (p.229).   
 
There have, however, been few studies of explicit facial expression processing in 
somatoform/conversion disorders.  Pedrosa and colleagues (2009) observed reduced 
accuracy of recognition of facial expressions in individuals with somatoform diagnoses, 
relative to healthy control participants.  This deficit was no longer significant when 
alexithymia scores were examined as a covariate, suggesting that emotion recognition 
difficulties were related to alexithymic tendencies in that group.  Nonetheless, Pollatos 
and colleagues (2011) also examined facial expression recognition in patients with 
mixed somatoform diagnoses relative to healthy controls, reporting reduced 
recognition of sad and neutral faces, in addition to lower parasympathetic activity 
during the task.  Moreover, lower ratings of emotional arousal in the emotional faces 
were also noted, relative to the control group.   
 
Differences in findings within populations may well be attributable to variations in 
methodology between studies.  For example, some investigators have included non-
clinical traumatised individuals as control groups (Barnett Veague & Hooley, 2014; 
Wagner & Linehan, 1999), whereas others have included controls with unknown 
trauma history.  Moreover, some studies include patients with comorbid psychiatric 
disorders, whereas others have excluded individuals with diagnoses other than that 
of particular interest in the study (e.g. Minzenburg et al., 2006).  Another factor that 
can affect results in this area is the wide variety of different tasks used to examine 
facial expression recognition.  The most common task involves a forced-choice 
procedure whereby participants select an emotional label from a limited selection of 
alternatives.  However, Wagner & Linehan (1999), for example, used a test that allowed 
participants to freely choose the emotion label they ascribed to the faces.  Moreover, 
Dyck et al. (2008) found that patients with BPD showed deficits on a time-constrained 
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task, but not on a task that did not include a time limit.  Domes et al. (2008) also 
included a test which involved blends of emotions expressed in each face, with the 
ratio varying in a systematic manner.  It was found that when the ratios were highly 
ambiguous (50:50), patients with BPD were more likely to perceive anger than 
controls, indicating a potential bias toward perceiving threat in uncertain social cues.   
 
Studies also vary in the extent to which groups are matched on possible confounding 
variables, such as gender, age, ethnicity and educational background.  For example, 
Levine et al. (1997) did not match groups for sex or marital status, so these factors 
may have influenced the results in this study.  The gender of the models used in the 
facial stimuli may also influence the results in some clinical groups (Barnett Veague & 
Hooley; 2014).   Furthermore, whilst there are exceptions (e.g. Montagne et al., 2007), 
many studies failed to include a measure of general face processing abilities.  Therefore, 
in several studies, it is not possible to conclude that the observed emotion recognition 
deficits were not due to difficulties in perceptual processing of the faces.   
 
7.1.2. Rationale, aims and hypotheses 
There are currently no published experimental studies of conscious (explicit) facial 
expression processing in patients with DS.  As outlined in Chapter 3, there are 
experimental studies in which facial expressions have been included as distractor 
stimuli, and the findings suggest that automatic or preconscious processing of these 
stimuli may be altered.  However, in none of these studies have patients been explicitly 
requested to attend to the emotional expressions, or to evaluate this feature 
consciously.  Only one published report described an evaluation of explicit emotion 
recognition in patients with DS, which was incorporated within a standardised 
neuropsychological test battery (Prigatano & Kirlin, 2009).  The group of patients with 
DS showed reduced overall performance on this subscale relative to patients with ES.  
However, because the subscale also included items on prosodic emotional expression, 
responses to a humorous stimulus and general affective control (assessed on the basis 
of the appropriateness of behaviour), the results were not clearly due to facial affect 




Therefore, the current experiment was designed to assess participants’ subjective, 
conscious responses to facial expressions of emotion, when these were presented at 
durations ensuring conscious perception of the stimuli, and when the task explicitly 
required participants to evaluate the emotional expressions presented.  Furthermore, 
the study sought to examine autonomic responding to the facial expression stimuli, 
by including a skin conductance measure.  The term ‘skin conductance response’ 
(SCR) refers to a “…phasic, usually elicited, increase in skin conductance” (Lykken & 
Venables, 1971, p. 657), and this typically reflects increased activation of the 
sympathetic nervous system.  The SCR is influenced by psychologically-mediated 
sweat production in the eccrine sweat glands (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000), usually 
influenced by stimulus novelty, unexpectedness, intensity, and significance.  As such, 
the SCR can be seen as part of an ‘orienting response’ (Dawson, et al., 2000).  Whilst 
it is not possible to conclusively interpret the psychological significance of a positive 
SCR, higher levels of experimental control can reduce the uncertainty.  In the present 
study, positive SCRs were interpreted as a sympathetic arousal response to the facial 
stimuli presented.  This measure was included to establish whether similar or different 
patterns of responding would occur in the subjective and physiological domains.  
These processes were compared in patients with DS and healthy controls.   
 
Another aim of the study was to carry out exploratory analyses examining the extent 
to which any differences in subjective or physiological responses to facial expressions 
presented in the current task were related to the preconscious attentional bias scores 
reported in Chapter 6.  Moreover, a final objective was to assess whether relevant 
psychosocial and seizure-related variables in the DS group were associated with any 
observed differences in subjective or physiological responses to the stimuli.   
 
On the basis of the literature reviewed above, the following hypotheses were tested: 
1. Patients with DS were expected to show reduced accuracy in recognition 
of emotional facial expressions, relative to the healthy control group.  It was 
expected that this deficit would be specific to negative facial expressions. 
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2. Patients with DS were predicted to perceive increased intensity of emotion 
in facial expressions, relative to healthy control participants.  Once again, this 
effect was expected for negative facial expressions only.  
3. Differences in physiological responses (SCRs) to facial expressions of 
emotion were hypothesised to be observed in patients with DS, relative to 
healthy control participants.  On the basis of the model proposed in Chapter 
3 and previous findings, it was expected that patients would show higher levels 
of autonomic arousal compared to healthy controls, particularly for negative 
facial expressions. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, an experimental task was devised which involved 
the presentation of several types of facial expression, for a time period that allowed 
participants to intentionally and consciously process their emotional content (i.e. six 
seconds per stimulus).  Dependent variables were participants’ accuracy in 
categorising the expressions with emotion descriptors, subjective ratings of the 
intensity of the facial expressions, and SCRs.  The responses of the patients with DS 




During the pilot study (see Chapter 4, section 4.1), it became clear that the facial 
expression processing task was too long (taking around 45 minutes).  This was due 
to the number of levels of the within-subjects independent variable (facial expression 
type: happiness, anger, fear, disgust, neutral, sadness, surprise), plus the requirement 
of a relatively long ITI due to the psychophysiological data collection (see below).  
Therefore, the number of within-subjects conditions were reduced and the ITI was 
shortened.  The final design is presented in Section 7.2.3.   
 
7.2.1. Participants 
Details of recruitment procedures and eligibility criteria for this experiment were 
described in Chapter 4 (sections 4.2.1. and 4.2.2).  Forty-three healthy control 







The stimuli used in this task were taken from a standardised set of grey-scale images 
of actors pulling a variety of facial expressions (Pictures of Facial Affect; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1976).  Three of the 14 actors included in the set had not posed a fearful 
facial expression; therefore, images of these actors were not used in the task.  Of the 
remaining images, normative ratings were examined and the images of the six (three 
male, three female) actors with the highest overall recognition rates were selected as 
the experimental stimuli.   
 
Initially, all seven facial expressions were included (i.e. happiness, sadness, fear, anger, 
disgust, surprise, neutral).  The faces were digitally cropped for standardisation and 
to focus attention specifically on the facial expression.  The cropped faces were 
positioned centrally against a black background, to maximise contrast.  Examples are 
shown in Appendix 14.  On completion of the pilot study, the number of facial 
expression types was reduced from seven to five, by removing the sadness and 
surprise conditions.  The removal of 12 stimuli from the task allowed a reduction of 
approximately 20 minutes for its completion.   
 
Skin conductance recording apparatus 
SCR data were gathered using a Powerlab data acquisition system (ADInstruments) 
which was connected to the laptop, and attached to a ‘Galvanic Skin Response’ 
Amplifier (ADInstruments).  Stainless steel field electrodes were used to obtain SCR 
recordings.  The use of dry electrodes (i.e. no electrolyte gels) was recommended 
with the particular amplifier used, because of the application of a low constant voltage 
(22mVrms@75Hz; ADInstruments, 2008).  SCRs were recorded online with LabChart 
software (v6.0, ADInstruments).  The experimental software (E-Prime) and LabChart 
software were programmed to interact, in order that markers could be placed onto 
the SCR traces for each individual stimulus.  A parallel port card drive (PCMCIA, 
Quatech.com) and custom-made cable (MLACX, ADInstruments) were used to 






Emotion label comprehension check 
Prior to commencing the experimental task, participants’ comprehension of the 
emotional descriptors was checked.  Participants were asked to describe the 
experience of each emotional state (e.g. happy, fearful, angry, neutral, disgusted).  If 
participants found this difficult, they were asked to give an example of a situation in 




Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) 
As described in Chapter 6 (section 6.2.2.), the two subscale form of this test was 
administered to assess current intellectual functioning. 
 
Benton Facial Recognition Test (BFRT; short-form; Benton et al., 1983) 
Chapter 6 (section 6.2.2) provides a description of this test.  It was included to assess 
general perceptual processing of facial stimuli. 
 
Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997) 
The Faces 1 subtest of the WMS-III was administered to measure short-term memory 
for facial stimuli (recognition).  The facial expression processing task in the current 
study required participants to retain facial stimuli in short-term memory, in order to 
provide subjective responses during the ITI.  Therefore, measuring (or controlling 
for) short-term memory for such stimuli is important, to ensure that group 
differences on this variable did not influence performance on the facial expression 
processing task.  The raw scores on the Faces I subtest can be transformed into scaled 
scores on the basis of age, which can then be compared to normative comparison 
groups.   
 
7.2.3. Design 
The experiment had a mixed factorial design, with one between-groups factor 
(diagnostic status: DS, control) and one within-groups factor (facial expression: anger, 
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happiness, fear, disgust, neutral).  The dependent variables were subjective ratings 
(selection of emotion descriptor from multiple-choices, ratings of emotion intensity) 
and SCRs.  Several measures of SCR were examined, including amplitude and 
response frequency.  These measures are outlined further below (section 7.2.5). 
There were six examples of each facial expression yielding a total of 30 stimuli (trials).  
A list of the stimuli included in the final design can be found in Appendix 14.  The 
stimuli were presented in a novel pseudo-random order for each participant.  No 
more than two stimuli with the same expression were presented consecutively.   
 
7.2.4. Procedure 
Participants were seated approximately half a metre from the laptop computer, 
placed on a desk.  At the start of the session, the SCR electrodes were attached and 
participants were asked to relax and sit quietly during a five-minute habituation 
period.  Following the five minute rest period, participants’ comfort and well-being 
was checked and any necessary amendments were made (e.g. loosening sensors 
slightly, altering chair).  When participants were ready, the experimental task 
commenced.  Standardised instructions (Appendix 15) were presented on the 
computer screen, and read aloud by the experimenter.  The instructions were 
presented in white font (size 16-18; Tahoma style) on a black screen.  Any questions 
were answered at this time. 
 
Once participants were satisfied that they understood the task, they completed three 
practice trials, including pictures of the same actor posing happiness, disgust and 
neutrality (images of this actor were not included in the experimental trials).  After 
participants had completed the practice trials and asked any remaining questions, they 
commenced the experimental trials.  The experimental trials and practice trials were 
identical.  Each trial started with a 15-second presentation of a central white fixation 
cross, presented against a black background.  This duration of ITI was selected in 
order to ensure that SCRs elicited by each stimulus were clearly distinguishable 
(Boucsein et al., 2012).     
 
Following offset of the fixation cross, a face showing one of the target emotions was 
presented for six seconds.  This presentation time was selected because SCRs 
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typically reach their peak between one and four seconds after stimulus onset 
(Boucsein et al., 2012; Dawson et al., 2000).  Immediately after stimulus offset, 
participants were presented with a screen asking them to select which of the five 
emotions was expressed in the face, with numbers next to each descriptor indicating 
how participants could make their choices (see Appendix 16 for a screenshot).  The 
order of the multiple options was randomised on each trial.  After the participant 
chose a descriptor, the second rating screen appeared (Appendix 16).  This required 
that participants judge how intense the emotion had been, on a scale from 0-7.  After 
a response was registered, the fixation cross appeared again, starting the ITI.  At the 
end of the task, a thank-you screen appeared and any questions were answered. 
 
7.2.5. SCR data acquisition, extraction and reduction 
All participants were requested to avoid smoking and consuming caffeine in the hour 
preceding the start of the research session.  The SCR electrodes were placed on the 
distal phalanges of the index and middle fingers of the non-dominant hand.  The distal 
phalanges were selected as SCR amplitudes may be greater at these sites (Scerbo et 
al., 1992).  In accordance with Boucsein et al. (2012), no specific pre-treatment of the 
hands was carried out.  
 
A constant voltage (22mVrms) was applied.  SCR was sampled at 100 Hz.  A 1Hz 
(second-order, low-pass) filter was applied to reduce noise in the signal.  The SCR 
signal was calibrated for each participant prior to the experimental task, in order to 
detect a range from 0-50 microSiemens (µS).  Prior to data extraction, the SCR traces 
for all trials were visually inspected for obvious noise and/or artefact.  In the context 
of biosignal processing, Gratton (2000, p. 912) defines noise as “…any phenomena 
observed in the data other than the signal(s) of interest to the investigator.” Any trials 
that included clear noise/artefact were excluded from the analysis.  For SCR data, 
these would include non-specific skin conductance changes during any baseline period 
or extreme increases in skin conductance suggestive of movement, respiratory, or 
other physiological artefact.   
 
Baseline values for each stimulus were calculated from the mean values during the 
one second immediately prior to stimulus onset, following M.M. Bradley et al. (2001), 
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for example.  The maximum value (microSiemens; µS) occurring between one and 
four seconds after stimulus onset was taken as the peak SCR amplitude for each trial 
(Dawson et al., 2000).  Any trials in which there was a decrease in amplitude or a 
value of 0µS were assigned a value of 0µS.   
 
The amplitude of SCRs for a given stimulus type can be taken as the mean of the 
positive responses to that stimulus type, excluding values of zero (Dawson et al., 
2000).  Responses of .01µS or greater were coded as a positive SCR and these values 
were included in an analysis of SCR amplitude.  A minimum of between .01 and .04 
µS is considered a positive SCR (Boucsein et al., 2012; Dawson et al., 2000).  The 
value of .01µS was adopted here in order to reduce the likelihood of excluding 
genuine SCRs from the results.  Positive amplitude values were averaged for each 
facial expression type, by participant.  These values were then used to calculate 
average SCR amplitudes for each facial expression type, by group.  
 
Furthermore, the percentage of valid trials (i.e. trials not including noise/artefact) in 
which a positive SCR occurred (i.e. values over .01µS) was calculated for each 
participant by facial expression type, and averaged by group.  This provided a measure 
of the frequency with which positive SCRs were observed for each facial expression, 
by group.  Finally, for each participant, dichotomous coding classified whether they 
had shown one or more positive SCRs for each facial expression (i.e. response, no 
response).  This yielded a more absolute measure of responsivity, by facial expression 
type and group.   
 
 
7.2.6. Statistical analysis 
Subjective measures 
Mean accuracy scores (0-6) were entered as the dependent variable in a mixed 
factorial ANCOVA, with group (DS, control) as the between-subjects variable and 
facial expression (happiness, anger, disgust, fear, neutral) as the within-subjects 
variable.  The covariates were YoE, and HADS Anxiety and Depression scores.  The 
mean intensity scores were entered as the dependent variable in a separate but 




Skin conductance responses 
SCR amplitude and magnitude data were analysed separately with mixed factorial 
ANCOVAs as described for the subjective ratings.  The percentage of trials in which 
positive responses were observed was also entered as the dependent variable in a 
similarly constructed analysis.  Chi-square tests were used to assess the relative 
proportion of each group showing at least one positive SCR for each facial expression. 
 
Exploratory analyses 
Exploratory correlational analyses were carried out to assess potential relationships 
between background psychosocial factors and any significant dependent variables in 
the facial expression processing task. The psychosocial variables included were those 
which had been found to differ between groups (see Chapter 5, section 5.3) as 
follows: the MDI (Disengagement, Depersonalisation, Derealisation, Emotional 
Constriction, Memory Disturbance, Identity Dissociation subscales), SDQ-20, IASC 
(Abandonment Concerns, Identity Impairment, Affect Dysregulation, Tension 
Reduction Activities subscales), HADS (Anxiety, Depression subscales), TEC (total 
scores, sexual abuse, physical abuse, mean impact scores), and PDS (Total, Re-
experiencing, Avoidance, and Arousal scores).   
 
In addition, seizure-related variables were included in the correlational analyses, to 
examine whether facial expression processing alterations might be associated with 
specific aspects of patients’ seizures.  These variables included seizure frequency, 
duration of the disorder (DS), and ictal symptoms (total, cognitive, mental state, chest 
abdomen, autonomic arousal, general).  Furthermore, the use of AEDs and 
antidepressants were also entered into correlations with the dependent variables, to 
assess possible influences on performance.  Pearson’s or Spearman’s correlations 
were used, depending on the distribution of scores.  Two-tailed tests were used and 
alpha levels were set to p<.01 to reduce the likelihood of type 1 errors caused by 
multiple testing.  Any significant simple correlations were carried out a second time 
as partial correlations controlling for YoE, to check if the relationships remained 





7.3.1. Participant characteristics 
Demographic details and clinical characteristics are as described in Chapter 5 (Tables 
2-5).  As previously described, there was a between-groups difference in years of 
education (YoE); therefore, YoE was entered as a covariate in all analyses described 
in the present chapter.  The groups did not significantly differ on any other 
demographic variable, although there was a trend for more DS patients to be in long-
term relationships compared to controls.  A greater proportion of the DS group 
were also taking medication and had medical diagnoses, relative to the control group. 
 
7.3.2. Neuropsychological measures 
A summary of the statistics for the neuropsychological measures can be found in 
Table 32.  There were no significant differences in full-scale IQ scores between-
groups.  The mean score for both groups fell within the average range, based on the 
normative data for this test.   There were also no overall group effects on Vocabulary 
or Matrix Reasoning subtest scores.  Furthermore, there were no between-groups 
differences on the Faces I subtest of the WMS-III, with the mean scores for each 
group indicating average performance on this measure.   
 
However, there was a borderline significant between-group difference on the BFRT, 
with the DS group performing worse than the control group.  Whilst the median and 
mean scores for each group were in the average range, closer examination of the 
data indicated that a small number of participants in each group scored within the 
borderline/impaired range on this measure (control = 1; DS = 4).  Once these 
participants were excluded from the analysis, no significant differences were observed 
in BFRT scores, or any of the other neuropsychological measures.   
 
In order to ensure that any potential differences on the experimental task could not 
be accounted for by poor perceptual processing of the facial stimuli, the main analyses 
were run twice, once including these participants, and once when these participants 
were excluded.  If the results differed on exclusion of these participants, this is 




Table 32. Neuropsychological findings (facial expression processing task) 





FSIQ (Mean, SD) 
Vocabulary (Mean, SD) 
Matrix reasoning  
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 




52.1 (8.9)   
54 (10) 




53.7 (9.5)  
56 (15) 
 
t (81) = 1.5 
t (81) = 1.6 
 
U (83) = 746  
 
p = .137 
p = .118 
 
p = .298 
BFRT (all participants) 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
BFRT (minus scores 
<40) 
     Mean (SD) 
     Median (IQR) 
n = 39 
46.9 (4.4) 
47 (7) 




n = 43 
48.9 (3.5)  
49 (5) 









U (77) = 
598.5 
 




p = .158 
WMS-III  
Faces scaled scores (Mean, 
SD) 
n = 39 
10.9 (3.2) 
n = 43 
11.1 (2.9) 
 
t (80) = .285 
 
p = .776 
DS = dissociative seizures; SD = standard deviation; df = degrees of freedom; IQR = interquartile range;  
WASI = Wechsler Abbreaviated Scale of Intelligence; FSIQ = Full-scale Intelligence Quotient; BFRT = Benton Facial 
Recognition Test; WMS-III = Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition 
 
 
7.3.3. Emotion label comprehension check 
All participants were able to provide definitions of the emotion labels, or gave 
relevant examples of situations that might trigger or be associated with each emotion.  
This suggested that all participants had acceptable and comparable levels of 
understanding of the emotion descriptors. 
 
7.3.4. Subjective ratings 
Recognition accuracy 
Two participants in each group had outlying scores on one or more condition and 
their scores influenced the results; therefore, these participants were excluded from 
the analyses.  Figure 11 displays the descriptive statistics for accuracy scores.  The 
mixed factorial ANCOVA revealed that after covarying YoE and HADS scores 
(Anxiety and Depression), there were significant main effects of expression (F (3.38, 
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250.4) = 4.19, p = .005) and group (F (1, 74) = 8.56, p = .005) on accuracy.  Closer 
inspection of the estimated marginal means indicated inferior performance in the DS 
group (mean = 4.85, standard error = .079, 95% CI = 4.69, 5.01), compared to the 
control group (mean = 5.21, standard error = .075, 95% CI = 5.06, 5.36). The effects 
also remained significant when participants scoring in the borderline or impaired 
range on the BFRT were removed from the analysis (expression at p<.05, group at 
p<.01).    
 
Across all participants, neutral faces were recognised least accurately (marginal mean 
= 4.82, standard error = .134, 95% CI = 4.02, 4.55) and happy faces were recognised 
most accurately (mean = 5.87, standard error = .037, 95% CI = 5.8, 5.95). There was 
no interaction between expression and group (F (3.38, 250.4) = .695, p = .573).  
Moreover, YoE (F (1, 74) = 2.17, p = .145), HADS Anxiety (F (1, 74) = 1.13, p = .292) 
and HADS Depression scores (F (1, 74) = .245, p = .622) were not significant 
covariates in the analysis.   
 







In order to examine the effects of medication on accuracy scores, the ANCOVA was 
rerun twice, with AED use and antidepressant use entered as additional between-
group factors respectively.  The group effect remained significant (F (1, 73) = 6.1, p = 
.016) after entering AED use in the analysis; however, the effect of AED use was not 
significant (F (1, 73) = .865, p = .356).  When antidepressant use was added to the 
ANCOVA, the group effect was significant (F (1, 73) = 6.94, p = .01), whereas the 
effect of antidepressants was not (F (1, 73) = .057, p = .811).   
 
Perceived intensity 
Descriptive statistics for the intensity ratings can be found in Figure 12. For intensity 
ratings, there was a significant effect of expression (F (1.74, 134.2) = 7.22, p = .002), 
but no main effect of group (F (1, 77) = .131, p = .719), and no group by expression 
interaction (F (1.74, 134.2) = 2.34, p = .107).  Neither HADS Anxiety (F (1, 77) = .03, 
p = .862) nor Depression scores (F (1, 77) = .091, p = .764) were significant 
covariates; however, YoE was a significant covariate (F (1, 77) = .463, p = .034).  
Regarding the expression effect, the perceived intensity in neutral expressions was 
lowest and the perceived intensity of fear was rated highest. 
 
 
7.3.5. Skin conductance responses 
SCR data for four control participants were not usable due to technical failures or 
participants’ behaviour (e.g. excessive movement artefact).  Table 33 displays the 
descriptive statistics for all SCR variables described below.   
 
Total trials included 
Due to data loss associated with the exclusion of trials in which noise/artefact were 
observed, it was important to establish whether there were any systematic 
differences in the number of trials retained for analysis, by group or expression.  A 
mixed factorial ANOVA showed that there were no group (F (1, 77) = .482, p = .49) 
or facial expression (F (3.12, 240.5) = .862, p = .465) effects on the number of trials 









With YoE and HADS scores (Anxiety and Depression) as covariates, there were no 
significant main effects of group (F (1, 74) = .062, p = .804) or facial expression (F (4, 
296) = 1.52, p = .196) on the percentage of (retained) trials on which positive SCRs 
were observed.  The interaction between facial expression and group was also non-
significant (F (4, 296) = .406, p = .805).  YoE (F (1, 74) = 1.03, p = .314), HADS 
Depression (F (1, 74) = 1.52, p = .222), and HADS Anxiety scores (F (1, 74) = .005, 
p = .943) were not significant covariates.  
  
Chi-square tests showed that there were no significant differences in the percentage 
of participants in each group showing at least one positive SCR for anger (X2 (1, 79) 
= 1.57, p = .210), disgust (X2 (1, 79) = .027, p = .869), fear (X2 (1, 79) = 1.13, p = .288), 
happiness (X2 (1, 79) = .111, p = .739) and neutral (X2 (1, 79) = .412, p = .521).  
Moreover, there were no group differences in the proportion of autonomic 
‘responders’ in each group, defined as those participants showing at least one positive 
SCR in every condition (X2 (1, 79) = .01, p = .922).
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Table 33. Skin conductance response (SCR) descriptive statistics (facial expression processing task) 
 n DS Control 
Total number of 
trials retained for 
analysis (0-6)  
(Median, IQR) 
(Mean, SD) 
DS = 40 
Control = 
39 
Anger: Mdn =  6 (1); Mean = 5.53 (.716) 
Disgust: Mdn = 6 (1); Mean = 5.5 (.817) 
Fear: Mdn = 6 (1); Mean = 5.63 (.667) 
Happiness: Mdn = 6 (1); Mean = 5.6 (.744) 
Neutral: Mdn = 6 (1); Mean = 5.63 (.628) 
Anger: Mdn = 6 (1); Mean = 5.66  (.621) 
Disgust: Mdn = 6 (1); Mean = 5.51 (1.1) 
Fear: Mdn = 6 (1); Mean = 5.67 (.662) 
Happiness: Mdn = 6 (1); Mean = 5.6 (.628) 







DS = 40 
Control = 
39 
Anger: Mdn = 20 (50); Mean = 28.6 (25.7) 
Disgust: Mdn = 22.5 (33.3); Mean = 23.7 (21.3) 
Fear: Mdn = 16.7 (29.2); Mean = 23.3 (20.6) 
Happiness: Mdn = 18.3 (16.7); Mean = 25.3 (19.5) 
Neutral: Mdn = 20 (23.3); Mean = 28.7 (20.6) 
Anger: Mdn = 33.3 (33.3); Mean = 31.8 (21.4) 
Disgust: Mdn = 16.7 (33.3); Mean = 23.03 (21.8) 
Fear: Mdn = 20 (16.7); Mean = 27.9 (20.1) 
Happiness: Mdn = 33.3 (33.3); Mean = 29.9 (24.2) 




positive SCR  
n (% of group) 
DS = 40 
Control = 
39 
Anger: 28 (70%) 
Disgust: 27 (67.5%) 
Fear: 30 (75%) 
Happiness: 32 (80%) 
Neutral: 34 (85%) 
Anger: 32 (82.1%) 
Disgust: 27 (69.2%) 
Fear: 33 (84.6%) 
Happiness: 30 (76.9%) 
Neutral: 31 (79.5%) 




DS = 16 
Control = 
16 
Anger: Mdn = .169 (.291); Mean = .232 (.238) 
Disgust: Mdn = .222 (.465); Mean = .363 (.376) 
Fear: Mdn = .17 (.281); Mean = .323 (.423) 
Happiness: Mdn = .097 (.242); Mean = .164 (.147) 
Neutral: Mdn = .326 (.599); Mean = .395 (.359) 
Anger: Mdn = .29 (.824); Mean = .607 (.822) 
Disgust: Mdn = .303 (.526); Mean = .514 (.767) 
Fear: Mdn = .553 (.821); Mean = .71 (.859) 
Happiness: Mdn = .564 (1.05); Mean = 1.05 (1.4) 
Neutral: Mdn = .349 (.632); Mean = .528 (.517) 







Typically, log or square root transformations are used to normalise SCR values 
(Boucsein et al., 2012; Dawson et al., 2000).  In this instance, neither of these 
transformations successfully normalised the SCR amplitude values for all conditions.  
Moreover, removal of two cases with outlying values on one or more condition (one 
from each group) also did not normalise the distribution of the data.  Nonetheless, 
the planned factorial ANCOVA was conducted (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.3).   
 
The results of the analyses were considerably different when the two outliers were 
excluded; therefore, the results stated below refer to those obtained with the outliers 
excluded.  Due to the removal of the outlying participants and those with a score of 
zero on any one condition, this analysis was carried out with a reduced sample size 
(DS n = 16; control n = 16).  These participants can be called ‘responders’.  
 
The ANCOVA showed that there was no main effect of facial expression (F (3.2, 
86.4) = .417, p = .754) and no interaction between expression and group (F (3.2, 86.4) 
= 1.65, p .181).  YoE (F (1, 27) = .031, p =.861), HADS Anxiety (F (1, 27) = .333, p = 
.569) and Depression (F (1, 27) = .022, p = .883) were not significant covariates.  
However, there was a borderline significant main effect of group (F (1, 27) = 4.04, p 
= .055), with the DS group showing a trend towards reduced SCR amplitudes relative 
to the control group.   
 
All participants in this subgroup had scores in the normal range on the BFRT.  
Moreover, the group effect remained a non-significant trend when the main 
ANCOVA was run again twice, with AED use (F (1, 26) = 4.06, p = .054) and 
antidepressant use (F (1, 26) = 4.12, p = .053), as additional between-group factors in 
the analysis.  In these respective analyses, the effects of AED use (F (1, 26) = .472, p 
= .498) and antidepressant use (F (1, 26) = .2, p = .659) were not significant.    
 
7.3.6. Exploratory analyses 
The exploratory correlational analyses focused on variables for which between-





Statistics for the correlations that were significant at the p < .01 level in the DS group 
are presented in Table 34, in addition to the relevant statistics for control participants.  
Recognition accuracy scores for neutral faces were negatively correlated with IASC 
Abandonment Concerns (AC) and TEC total scores.  These correlations were not 
significant in the control group.  The relationship between accuracy for neutral faces 
and IASC AC scores remained significant after controlling for YoE (r = -.462, p = 
.007), as did the correlation with TEC total scores (r = -.456, p = .008). 
 
Table 34. Significant correlations (p <.01) for facial expression 
recognition accuracy scores 
  DS Control 




Neutral        
IASC  



























Fear       
IASC 













Happiness       
Emotional Stroop 
  Attentional bias scores 
(Happy) 
































DS = dissociative seizures; IASC = Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities; FES = Family Environment Scale;  
TEC = Traumatic Experiences Checklist 
* denotes correlations that remained significant after controlling for YoE with partial correlations (p < .01) 
 
 
Furthermore, a positive correlation between recognition accuracy scores for fearful 
faces and IASC Affect Dysregulation scores was observed in the DS group, but not 
in the control group.  However, this relationship did not remain significant at p < .01 
 218 
 
after YoE was taken into account (r = .366, p = .036).  Accuracy for recognition of 
happiness was negatively correlated with AB scores for angry and happy facial 
expressions on the emotional Stroop test (see Chapter 6).  After controlling for YoE, 
the correlation with happy attentional bias scores no longer met the alpha level 
adopted here (r = -.344, p = .05), whereas the correlation with angry AB scores did 
(r = -.57, p = .001).   
 
SCRs 
Table 35 displays the statistics for the SCR amplitude correlations that were 
significant in the DS group.  There was a highly significant negative correlation 
between SCR amplitude for happy expressions and ictal mental state symptoms (most 
recent seizure).  When YoE was controlled for using a partial correlation, this 
relationship was no longer significant at the required alpha level (r = -.670, p = .012).  
There was also a highly significant negative correlation between SCR amplitude for 
neutral faces and TEC mean impact scores.  This correlation was not significant in the 
control group.  However, after controlling for YoE, the relationship was no longer 
significant (r = -.451, p = .122) in the DS group either.   
 
Table 35. Significant correlations (p < .01) for SCR amplitude scores 
(facial expression recognition task) 
  DS   Control 




Happiness       













Neutral       
TEC mean impact 16 -.645 .007 15 -.367 .178 
TEC = Traumatic Experiences Checklist; DS = dissociative seizures 




Differences between autonomic responders and non-responders 
As a means of exploring possible differences between autonomic responders and non-
responders, exploratory analyses (t-tests, Mann-Whitney, chi-square tests) were 
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carried out to assess possible differences in relevant demographic characteristics (e.g. 
age, gender), psychosocial variables (e.g. trauma scores, dissociation, borderline 
personality features), and clinical details in the DS group (e.g. medication use, ictal 
symptoms, duration of disorder).  Again, only p-values of less than .01 were 
considered significant in these analyses.  None of the tests provided values that 





7.4.1. Summary and interpretation 
The present study sought to extend previous research by experimentally testing 
explicit, conscious processing of emotional facial expressions in patients with DS, 
whilst simultaneously measuring SCRs elicited by these stimuli.  Moreover, 
exploratory analyses were carried out to identify whether there were any 
relationships between the dependent measures in this study and relevant psychosocial 
variables (Chapter 5) or AB scores (Chapter 6).  In addition, possible relationships 
between seizure-related variables and the dependent measures in the current study 
were examined.   
 
Subjective responses 
The significant effect of expression on accuracy scores showed that accuracy varied 
significantly by expression type; however, the lack of a significant interaction between 
group and facial expression type suggested that this pattern was consistent between 
groups.  The finding that happiness was most easily recognised is in accordance with 
other studies, which have shown that happiness is generally well-recognised (e.g. Hall 
& Matsumoto, 2004) and agreed upon in cross-cultural studies (e.g. Biehl et al., 1997).  
In contrast, neutral facial expressions were least accurately recognised in the current 
study.  Again, this finding might be expected, as neutral expressions are inherently 
more ambiguous than expressions of specific emotions.   
 
The between-groups difference in accuracy scores suggested that individuals 
diagnosed with DS are less accurate than healthy control participants in identifying 
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the emotional meaning of others’ facial expressions.  This finding was independent of 
the possible influence of depression, anxiety, educational level, medication and general 
face processing abilities.  As such, it provides relatively robust evidence of facial 
expression processing difficulties in this population, thus supporting Hypothesis 1.  
However, the expected specificity for deficits in recognising negative facial 
expressions was not supported by this study.  Instead, the findings suggested that 
recognition accuracy was affected across the range of facial expressions, including 
happiness and neutrality.  The lack of significant group effects (or interactions) for the 
perception of emotional intensity in facial expressions indicated that this sample of 
individuals with DS were generally accurate in assessing the extent/level of emotional 
arousal displayed facially.  This finding does not support Hypothesis 2, in which it was 
predicted that patients with DS would perceive elevated levels of emotional intensity 
in facial expressions.   
 
The observed deficit in facial expression recognition is similar to that observed in 
patients with BPD, depression, depersonalisation disorder and PTSD, although the 
impairments have often been restricted to negative and/or neutral expressions in 
those groups.  Nevertheless, the results suggest that patients with DS misinterpret 
others’ emotional states to a greater extent than controls, and so it is possible that 
this might negatively affect patients’ relationships and daily interactions.  For example, 
instances in which another person is experiencing a neutral or positive emotional 
state could be misinterpreted as reflecting some variation of negative emotion, or 
different intense negative emotional expressions could be confused by patients.  
 
The negative correlation between recognition accuracy for neutral facial expressions 
and abandonment concerns indicates that misinterpreting these signals is linked to 
maladaptive relationship schemata.  Furthermore, the finding that reduced recognition 
accuracy for neutral faces was associated with higher TEC total scores suggests that, 
in patients with DS, difficulties in identifying neutrality in facial expressions might 
somehow be related to adverse/traumatic life experiences.  It is possible that 
traumatic experiences involving interpersonal relationships (e.g. abuse) might be 
associated with a lack of consistency between others’ facial expressions and their 
behaviour, or between others’ facial expressions and the emotional consequences for 
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the individual viewing the expression (e.g. a neutral face in an abuser could be 
associated with abusive behaviour and/or intense negative affect in the victim).  If such 
experiences occurred during development, they might result in facial expressions 
being perceived as unpredictable and inconsistent, or as signalling threat when none 
is present.  Interestingly, facial expression recognition deficits in individuals with BPD 
have been reported to be associated with childhood trauma (i.e. physical and 
emotional abuse; Nicol et al., 2014).   
 
The negative correlation between recognition of happy faces and preconscious 
attentional bias towards angry faces on the emotional Stroop test suggests that a 
greater tendency to perceive negative emotions or neutrality in happy faces is 
associated with preconscious hypervigilance for angry faces.  Combined, these 
tendencies might lead patients with DS to perceive more hostility and less social 
acceptance or positive regard in other people.  If this were the case, it would be likely 
to contribute to elevated emotional distress and relationship difficulties.  Further 
research is required to explore the ways in which preconscious and conscious 
processing of social emotional signals are related in patients with DS. 
 
Autonomic responses 
The findings relating to SCRs did not support Hypothesis 3, which predicted 
heightened levels of autonomic responding to the facial expression stimuli.  There 
were no group differences in the frequency of positive SCRs or the proportion of 
each group showing such responses across the facial expression types.  Moreover, 
the amplitude data indicated that for those participants classified as ‘responders’, 
those with DS showed reduced SCR amplitudes relative to controls.  This finding is 
similar to that observed in depersonalisation disorder, in which reduced autonomic 
responding has been observed for facial expressions of disgust (Sierra et al., 2006).  
However, in the current study, patients with DS were shown to have reduced SCR 
amplitudes across facial expression types (including neutral), rather than for any one 
specific expression. 
 
The SCR findings indicate that, as a group, patients with DS are equally likely to exhibit 
autonomic responses to facial expressions as healthy controls; however, those 
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patients who are consistently responsive to such stimuli show an overall reduction in 
the extent of these responses.  The findings indicate that when emotional facial 
expressions are available for conscious processing and attention is explicitly directed 
at them, a subgroup of patients with DS show inhibited autonomic responding to 
these, and that this inhibition is not emotion-specific.   
 
It could be the case that this reduced autonomic responding reflects some form of 
habituation or desensitisation to the facial expressions.  Repeated previous 
experience of perceived or actual negative facial expressions could lead to a 
dampening of autonomic responses to these.  On the other hand, it could be part of 
a dissociative response to these potentially threatening or distressing social cues.  Skin 
conductance changes are relatively slow responses, and so, they may well occur after 
conscious awareness of the stimuli has been achieved.  In this particular disorder, 
whilst hypervigilance for emotional facial expressions might occur at a preconscious 
level, conscious awareness of the stimuli may be associated with rapid inhibition of 
emotional responses to them, thus leading to abnormally low SCR amplitudes.  
Ontogenetically, this mechanism might develop as a means of automatically detaching 
or distancing the individual from the physiological and subjective experience of 
emotional responding to the stimuli.  As yet, these are tentative hypotheses. 
 
7.4.2. Strengths and limitations                
As with previous chapters, only the strengths and limitations specific to the current 
chapter are presented in this section.  An important strength of the study was the 
collection of both subjective and autonomic measures of emotional responding to 
consciously perceived facial expression stimuli.  This the first study to experimentally 
examine conscious (explicit) facial expression processing in this clinical group, and the 
inclusion of the SCR measure allowed a direct comparison of conscious and more 
automatic responding to such stimuli, in the same participants.   
 
The findings have provided an important insight into the possibility that patients with 
DS may experience reduced autonomic arousal in response to facial expressions, 
coinciding with difficulties in consciously differentiating their emotional meaning.  The 
present study also included measures of general face processing, intellectual 
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functioning, and depression/anxiety, and this allowed a closer examination of the 
possible influence of these variables on the measures of emotional responding.  In the 
present study, none of these variables (or medication effects) sufficiently accounted 
for the observed reduction in subjective recognition or autonomic arousal, in 
response to the facial expressions.   
 
Another strength of the study included the use of well-known standardised facial 
expression stimuli, which have been found to elicit high levels of agreement cross-
culturally.  These stimuli have been used widely in similar research and, therefore, 
improve comparability with other studies and allow more precise replicability of the 
current paradigm.  One possible limitation of these stimuli is that the ethnicity of the 
actors is limited (all actors are Caucasian), and studies have shown that recognition 
of facial expressions can be affected by the ethnicity of the model and that of the 
respondent (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).  Future studies might seek to utilise more 
ethnically diverse stimuli sets.  Nonetheless, as the groups in the present study were 
reasonably well-matched in terms of ethnicity, this factor is unlikely to have been 
influential in the current study.  
 
Another possible limitation relating to the facial stimuli is that some were included in 
both the experiment described in Chapter 6 and that described in the current 
chapter.  The stimulus set includes a limited number of actors, some of whom did not 
pose all facial expressions (i.e. fear).  Given that the experiment described in Chapter 
6 required ten different actors (five male and five female), and the present study 
required six actors (three male, three female) and an additional actor for the practice 
items, it was not possible to avoid some duplication of stimuli between the tasks.  
Moreover, the stimuli (actors) were selected on the basis of the normative ratings, 
as the best exemplars of the emotions being displayed (i.e. having received the highest 
normative ratings).  Moreover, the stimuli were coloured and presented subliminally 
in the emotional Stroop test, whereas they were grey-scale and presented 
supraliminally in the current experiment.  Nevertheless, it is a possibility that prior 
exposure to some of the facial stimuli might have influenced the findings reported 
here.  Nonetheless, as both groups underwent the same order of administration of 
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the computerised tests, any influence of prior exposure should have been consistent 
between groups.    
 
Due to the length of the experiment (necessitated by the ITI required for SCR 
recording), it was necessary to restrict the number of conditions included, which 
could be viewed as a limitation. Only one positive condition (happiness) was included, 
whereas three negative conditions (anger, disgust, fear) were examined, along with 
neutrality.  It could be argued that the group effect provides stronger evidence for 
impaired recognition of negative expressions, due to the combined possible influence 
of three negative conditions.  Future studies might seek to balance the number of 
positive and/or reducing the number of negative conditions.    
 
Moreover, the inclusion of neutral facial expressions as an additional condition in the 
current study is another issue to consider.  In the current study, the neutral condition 
was included as an experimental condition as it was thought to be of interest to 
examine patients’ responses to such ambiguous expressions.  Whilst some studies 
include neutral expressions as a control condition only (i.e. as a comparison 
condition), neutral expressions may be processed differently in some psychological 
disorders and so might not represent a genuine (unemotional) control condition.  For 
example, there is some evidence to suggest that patients with BPD (see Daros et al., 
2013), somatoform disorders (Pollatos et al., 2011) and depression (e.g. Leppänen et 
al., 2004) tend to show altered recognition of neutral facial expressions compared to 
control groups.  In the current study, the significant expression effect combined with 
the lack of interaction between group and expression (on accuracy scores) did not 
suggest that the DS group were specifically impaired in recognising neutral 
expressions, but rather that both groups found these expressions the most difficult 
to distinguish from the other expressions. 
 
Regarding SCR measurement and analysis, this study followed generally accepted 
standards in most respects (i.e. Boucsein, 1992; Dawson et al., 2000; Lykken & 
Venables, 1971).  However, the apparatus included in the present study included the 
use of dry (stainless steel) electrodes, recommended by the manufacturer of the 
psychophysiological recording equipment (ADInstruments).  In contrast, the generally 
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accepted recommendations (see Boucsein et al., 2012) refer to the use of silver-silver 
chloride (Ag/AgCl) electrodes with an electrolyte paste or gel.  Nonetheless, as both 
groups’ SCRs were recorded with the same electrodes in the current study, the use 
of the dry electrodes is not likely to explain the group differences observed.  Future 
studies might seek to replicate the present findings using the recommended electrode 
type.  Moreover, the inclusion of other psychophysiological measures (e.g. 
electrocardiogram, electroencephalography) could be included in further studies of 
facial expression processing in this group.  The use of functional neuroimaging 
techniques to examine the correlates of central nervous system activity during similar 
tasks is also an important direction for additional studies.   
 
7.4.3. Conclusions 
Together, the findings of the present study are suggestive of a reduction in 
psychophysiological and subjective responding to emotional facial expressions in 
patients with DS, relative to healthy individuals.  This pattern of responding may have 
become a habitual way of responding to others’ emotional expressions within the 
context of significant traumatic life events.  It is possible that reduced subjective and 
somatic responding to others’ facial expressions could represent a habituated 
response to others’ emotional cues.  On the other hand, it could be regarded as a 
dissociative response that allows the individual to remain detached from potentially 
threatening or distressing social signals, or to avoid conscious awareness of their 
meaning altogether.  Either way, it is likely that reduced recognition and autonomic 
responding to facial expressions may lead to difficulties in interpersonal functioning 
and elevate levels of emotional distress.  Therefore, this emotional response style 
could serve as a predisposing factor for the development of DS, but might also 
contribute to triggering and maintaining the occurrence of DS on an ongoing basis.       
 
 







Chapter 8.  An experimental study of subjective and autonomic 






The findings presented in previous chapters suggest that there may be important 
differences in how patients with DS process and respond to emotional facial 
expressions, relative to healthy control participants.  However, the possibility remains 
that patients with DS may also differ in their responses to other emotional stimuli, 
beyond those purely in the social domain.  It was, therefore, considered to be of 
interest to examine affective responses to more general emotional stimuli, including 
those representing different types of emotionally significant objects or scenes.  The 
aim of this study was to assess the same subjective and autonomic response domains 
as in Chapter 7, but in relation to more general affective stimuli.  Images from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005) were selected for this 
purpose, being the most widely used standardised stimuli in this area. 
 
The IAPS images (Lang et al., 2005) provide emotion researchers with a standardised 
set of stimuli with which to conduct readily replicable and comparable studies.  The 
images vary considerably, depicting a wide range of scenes, objects and people.  The 
scenes also vary on three affective dimensions: valence (positive, negative, neutral), 
level of arousal (low to high) and ‘dominance’ (control).  The availability of detailed 
normative data, based on large samples of adults and children, allows the investigator 
to select appropriate images on the basis of normative ratings of the three affective 
dimensions.  The most commonly used ratings in published research are the valence 
and arousal scales.  The IAPS images have now been utilised widely in research on 
emotional processing in healthy and clinical populations, including studies of 




Some investigators have examined responsivity to IAPS images in individuals 
diagnosed with psychological disorders that are related to DS, such as borderline 
personality disorder (BPD).  For example, Herpertz and colleagues (1999) reported 
that their sample of patients with BPD showed reduced SCR magnitude for all three 
valence categories of IAPS stimuli, relative to healthy controls.  This study was 
suggestive of inhibited autonomic responding to these stimuli in that group.  However, 
Marissen, Meuleman, and Franken (2010) observed greater event-related potentials 
for negative IAPS stimuli in patients with BPD relative to a healthy control group.  
Feliu-Soler et al. (2013) more recently reported comparable physiological (salivary 
cortisol) and subjective (SAM) emotional responses to negative IAPS stimuli in a larger 
sample of BPD patients relative to healthy controls.   
 
More recent research indicates that patients with BPD may show altered subjective 
responses (increased arousal, greater negativity) for particular types of visual images, 
such as those suggestive of sexual abuse (Sauer et al., 2014).  This highlights the fact 
that such patients may respond differentially to stimuli that are of potential 
aetiological relevance to their disorder, or to the symptoms and schemata present.  
However, an important caveat is that these findings did not survive statistical 
correction for depressive symptoms and the stimuli included were not standardised 
IAPS images, but instead consisted of images sourced from the internet.  Nonetheless, 
this raises the importance of careful selection of affective images in this type of study, 
with consideration of the extent to which particular types of images could be of 
immediate relevance to the patient group being studied.  It also points to the 
important decision of whether or not to statistically control for possibly confounding 
psychological symptoms, such as depression or anxiety.  Together, the findings in 
patients with BPD suggest that physiological and subjective responsivity to IAPS 
stimuli may vary with the particular measures obtained and with the stimuli selected.  
More research is needed to further clarify subjective and psychophysiological 
response tendencies to IAPS stimuli in individuals with BPD.   
 
There are a variety of other methodological issues to be considered when 
interpreting the results of studies such as those discussed above.  For example, it is 
known that symptoms of state dissociation can influence dependent variables when 
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studying groups who tend to experience elevated dissociative symptoms such as 
those with BPD or PTSD (e.g. Ebner-Primer et al., 2005); therefore, measuring and 
taking into account such symptoms is important.  Moreover, the treatment history of 
patients included is also a factor.  As with many samples recruited within mental 
health services, possible medication effects need be considered.  In addition, the 
majority of BPD patients included in the study of Herpertz et al. (1999) had 
undergone an intensive inpatient treatment programme, which may well have 
included emotion regulation training, and the development of coping skills, for 
example.  Such skills may have allowed the patients to regulate their responding to a 
greater extent than control participants, who were documented to have had no 
psychiatric treatment in their histories.  Moreover, gender is also a consideration in 
recruiting participants.  For example, Herpertz et al. (1999) restricted their sample 
to female patients only, which obviously limits the ability to generalise the results to 
male BPD patients.  
 
8.1.2. Rationale, aims & hypotheses 
When the present experiment was devised, there had been no experimental studies 
of affective picture processing in patients with DS.  However, one study of this nature 
was published during data collection for the present thesis.  As described in Chapter 
3 (section 3.5.2), Roberts and colleagues (2012) measured subjective (valence, 
arousal), behavioural (facial, bodily), and autonomic (heart rate, heart rate variability) 
responses to IAPS stimuli in patients with DS.  These stimuli were presented within 
a paradigm that allowed conscious and explicit processing of the stimuli.  The DS 
group were similar to healthy controls in the valence of their emotional responses to 
the images, but they reported more emotional arousal in response to the neutral and 
positive images than the control group.   
 
The elevations in arousal ratings in the DS group were discussed in relation to the 
tendency to somatise, the authors suggesting that patients with DS may experience 
emotion in primarily visceral ways.  However, the investigators did not examine 
whether somatisation scores correlated with or predicted the intensity ratings in the 
DS group.  Moreover, reduced respiratory sinus arrhythmia (an indicator of heart 
rate variability) at baseline was also reported in the DS group, interpreted as evidence 
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for an underlying vulnerability to affective dysregulation.  Heart rate variability 
differences in patients with DS have also been reported by other authors (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.1.5).  The general strengths and weaknesses of this study were 
discussed in Chapter 3.  Whilst the findings are highly relevant to the current study, 
the findings did not contribute to the aims, rationale or hypotheses of the present 
research. 
 
The current experiment was designed with the aim of assessing subjective and 
autonomic responding to IAPS stimuli.  It was intended that this study would provide 
an insight into any differences between patients with DS and healthy controls, in 
subjective emotional responses to general affective stimuli.  Previous studies had not 
examined such responses, at the time the research was designed.  Moreover, the 
study aimed to assess whether autonomic responding to these stimuli differed 
between patients with DS and healthy controls.  An additional aim was to carry out 
exploratory analyses to assess how seizure-related variables (i.e. seizure frequency, 
ictal symptoms) and psychosocial factors (i.e. trauma, dissociation, BPD features) 
might relate to any observed differences in affective responding.   
 
On the basis of the available literature and the model presented in Chapter 3 (section 
3.6), the following hypotheses were tested: 
 
1. Patients with DS were predicted to report more negative ratings for the 
affective pictures, relative to the healthy control group.  It was expected that 
these differences would be apparent for negative images only. 
 
2. Patients with DS were predicted to display elevated ratings of arousal for 
the affective pictures, relative to the healthy control group.  It was expected 
that these differences would be apparent for negative images only. 
 
3. Higher levels of autonomic responding (i.e. more frequent and higher 
amplitude of SCRs) were predicted to be observed in patients with DS, 
relative to the healthy control group.  These differences were expected to 




In order to test these hypotheses, an experiment was devised that was as similar in 
structure as possible to that described in Chapter 7.  The difference in the current 
experiment was the use of the IAPS stimuli, instead of facial expressions, and the use 
of different subjective response scales (section 8.2.2).  In the present study, the 
dependent variables were subjective ratings (arousal, valence) and autonomic 
responses (SCRs).  The responses of the DS sample were compared to those of a 




After initial piloting of the task, it was clear that the task was too long.  Therefore, 
the number of stimuli in each condition was reduced from eight to six, and the ITI 
was reduced from 25 seconds to 15 seconds.  No other changes were made to the 
experiment after piloting.  The final design is reported below. 
 
8.2.1. Participants 
Details of recruitment procedures and inclusion criteria for this study were described 
in Chapter 4 (sections 4.21. and 4.2.2).  The final sample for this study included 42 
control participants and 39 patients diagnosed with DS.  The two participants who 
did not complete the task had asked to refrain from doing so, due to fatigue during 




The hardware and software used to acquire subjective responses in this task were 
identical to those described in the previous chapter (section 7.2.2).  However, the 
experimental stimuli used in the current task were taken from the IAPS set (Lang et 
al., 2005).  On the basis of the normative arousal and valence ratings provided with 
this set, stimuli were selected from each of the following categories: positive/high 




Six pictures were chosen from each category with consideration given to several 
issues.  Pictures with very extreme and graphic content were excluded; these 
included items depicting severe mutilations, frontal nudity, direct interpersonal 
violence and explicit sexual scenes.  Pictures were selected that were maximally 
representative of their category (in terms of normative scores) but that were also 
considered appropriate for the testing situation.  It was also intended to include as 
much variety of content as possible within each condition.  A list of all of the pictures 
used in the study can be found in Appendix 17, with examples of each condition.  In 
order to assist participants in making their subjective responses to the stimuli, two 
digitised versions of the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) were used (arousal, valence), 
each with a nine-point scale.  The SAM displays can be found in Appendix 18.              
 
Skin conductance recording apparatus 
All apparatus used to acquire and analyse the SCR data was identical to those 
described in Chapter 7 (section 7.2.2). 
 
Neuropsychological measures 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) 
See Chapter 6 (section 6.2.2) for a discussion of the inclusion of this test. 
 
Visual Object & Space Perception Battery (VOSP; Warrington & James, 1991) 
One subtest (Object Decision, OD) of the VOSP was included to assess general 
object perception/recognition.  This test was used to measure whether there were 
any between-groups differences in perception of visual stimuli.  Each page of the test 
includes four black shapes presented on a white background.  Three of the shapes 
are nonsense shapes that do not represent actual objects, whereas one shape does 
constitute the silhouette of a real object.  Participants are requested to select the real 
object on each page.  The VOSP OD subscale has clinical cut-off scores of 15 
(participants aged <50 years) and 14 (individuals aged >50 years), below which a 






Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997) 
The Family Pictures I subscale was administered to measure immediate memory for 
complex visual scenes (recall).  The use of the Family Pictures I subtest is relevant to 
the current chapter as it examines participants’ ability to retain complex visual scenes 
in short-term memory.  The experimental task described presently requires 
participants to retain scenes of varying complexity in short-term memory, in order 
that they can provide their subjective responses during the ITI.  Therefore, controlling 
for short-term memory for such stimuli is important, to ensure that no between-
groups differences in memory ability were responsible for any differences on the task 
itself.  The raw scores on the Family Pictures I subtest can be transformed into scaled 
scores on the basis of age, based on normative data.   
 
8.2.3. Design 
The experiment was a mixed factorial design with one between-groups factor 
(diagnostic status: DS, control) and one within-groups factor (emotional category: 
neutral, negative/high arousal, negative/low arousal, positive/high arousal, positive/low 
arousal).  The dependent variables were subjective ratings of valence (0-9, negative-
positive), arousal (0-9, high-low) and SCRs.  Several measures of SCR were examined, 
including amplitude and response frequency.  These measures were outlined in the 
previous chapter (section 7.2.5).  There were six stimuli in each emotional category, 
yielding 30 experimental trials.  These stimuli were presented in a new pseudo-
random order for every participant, with no more than two stimuli from the same 
condition presented consecutively.   
 
8.2.4. Procedure 
Prior to commencing the experimental task, all participants underwent a five-minute 
habituation period with the physiological sensors attached.  Following this, the 
research student went through the standardised instructions with the participant 
(Appendix 19).  These instructions were based on those provided in the IAPS manual 
(Lang et al., 2005), with some modifications.  The instructions were presented in 
white font (size 16-18, Tahoma style) against a black background on the computer 




The task began with three practice trials, with three stimuli that were normatively 
rated as low in arousal.  Participants practised rating these stimuli before proceeding 
to the main task.  The experimental trials consisted of a 15-second presentation of a 
central white fixation cross, against a black background.  This ITI was selected due to 
the requirements of the SCR recording.  After the fixation cross, the target stimuli 
were presented on the screen for six seconds as described by M.M. Bradley et al. 
(2001).  Immediately after stimulus offset, the two rating screens were presented 
consecutively.  The order of the two screens was randomised for each participant.  
Participants were instructed to make their ratings using the number keys.  On 
completion of the ratings, the ITI (fixation) commenced again before the next stimulus 
was presented.  On completion of all trials, a screen appeared with a thank-you 
message.  Any remaining questions were answered and the participant’s wellbeing 
was also checked. 
 
8.2.5. SCR data acquisition, extraction & reduction 
All methods for acquiring, extracting and reducing the SCR variables were as 
described in the previous chapter (see section 7.2.5.). 
 
8.2.6. Statistical analysis 
Subjective measures 
Mean ratings on the arousal and valence scales (0-9) were entered as the dependent 
variables in two mixed factorial ANCOVAs with group (DS, control) as the between-
subjects factor and condition (neutral, negative/high arousal, negative/low arousal, 
positive/high arousal, positive/low arousal) as the within-subjects factor.  Covariates 
for these analyses are detailed in the relevant sections below.   
 
Skin conductance responses 
SCR amplitude data were analysed separately with mixed factorial ANCOVAs as 
described for the subjective ratings.  The percentage of trials in which positive 
responses were observed were also entered as the dependent variable in a similarly 
constructed analysis.  Chi-square tests were used to assess the relative proportion 





The exploratory analyses proceeded as described in Chapter 7 (section 7.2.6).  The 
same psychosocial and seizure-related variables were included as described in that 
section.  In addition, the methods used were similar to those described in the 
previous chapter.  Only the dependent variables found to differ significantly between-





8.3.1. Participant characteristics 
Forty-two control participants and 39 patients with DS completed the experiment.  
Demographic characteristics of the included sample are shown in Table 36.  There 
were no significant group differences in age, gender, ethnicity, handedness, marital 
status, smoking, and socio-economic status.  However, the control group reported 
significantly more years of education (YoE) than the DS group and there was a non-
significant trend for control participants to be more likely to have completed 
further/higher education.  YoE was, therefore, entered as a covariate in subsequent 
analyses.  
 
Patients with DS (n = 28, 71.8%) were more likely to be taking prescribed medication 
than the control group (n = 10, 23.8%; X2 (1, 81) = 18.7, p < .001).  Moreover, a 
higher proportion of the DS group (n = 22, 56.4%) reported the presence of a current 
medical diagnosis (X2 (1, 81) = 15.9, p < .001) than in the control group (n = 6, 14.3%).  
Fourteen patients with DS (35.9%) were taking anti-epileptic drugs (AEDs), most 
commonly sodium valproate, carbamazepine, pregabalin and levetiracetam.  Fifteen 
patients (38.5%) with DS were taking anti-depressant medications, most commonly 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs).  The most common SSRIs reported 
were fluoxetine (n = 6), citalopram (n = 3) and sertraline (n = 3). 
 
In the DS group, the average (median) length of time since seizure onset was 60 
months (range = 9-432; interquartile range = 90).  The median reported seizure 






Table 36. Demographic characteristics (by group) for participants 
completing the affective picture experiment 
 
 DS 
(n = 39) 
Control 
(n = 42) 
Test 
statistics 
Age in years 
(Mean, SD) 





t (79) = -
.212, p = 
.832 
Gender  Male = 8 (20.5%) 
Female = 31 (79.5%) 
Male = 7 (16.7%) 
Female = 35 (83.3%) 
X2 (1, 
n=81) = 
.198, p = 
.656 
Handedness Right = 29 (74.4%) 
Left / ambidextrous = 
10 (25.6%)  
Right = 37 (88.1%) 
Left / ambidextrous 
= 5 (11.9%)  
X2 (1, 
n=81) = 
2.53, p = 
.112 
Ethnicity White = 31 (79.5%) 
Non-white = 8 
(20.5%) 
White = 28 (66.7%) 




1.68, p = 
.195 
YoE 
     Mean (SD) 








U (81) = 
600, p = 
.036 
Qualifications GCSEs / none = 15 
(38.5%) 
Further / higher = 24 
(61.5%) 
GCSEs / none = 8 
(19%) 




3.75, p = 
.053 
Marital status Currently single = 24 
(61.5%) 
Long-term 
relationship = 15 
(38.5%) 
Currently single = 33 
(78.6%) 
Long-term 








1 = 18 (46.2%) 
2,3,4 or 5 = 21 
(53.8%) 
1 = 18 (42.9%) 




.089, p = 
.765 
Smoking Yes = 10 (25.6%) 
No = 29 (74.4%) 
Yes = 9 (21.4%) 
No = 33 (78.6%) 
X2 (1, 
n=81) = .2, 
p = .655 
SD = standard deviation   NSSEC: National Statistics Socio-economic Classification system 
IQR = interquartile range   1 = Higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations 
YoE: years of full-time education (or equiv.)  2 = Intermediate occupations 
DS = dissociative seizures   3 = Small employers and own account workers 
4 = Lower supervisory and technical occupations 




8.3.2. Neuropsychological measures 
The neuropsychological findings are displayed in Table 37.  There were no significant 
differences in full-scale IQ, Vocabulary or Matrix Reasoning scores between groups.  
A significant between-groups difference was observed on the VOSP OD subscale, 
with the DS group performing significantly better than the control group.  Inspection 
of z-scores indicated that one outlier was present in the control group; however, a 
significant difference remained after removing this participant’s score.  Furthermore, 
the significant difference remained after removal of any participants scoring below 
the cut-off on the test.  
 
 
Table 37. Neuropsychological findings (affective picture task) 





FSIQ (Mean, SD) 
 
 
Vocabulary T scores 
(Mean, SD) 
 
Matrix Reasoning T scores 
(Median, IQR) 























t (79)  
= 1.5 
 
U (81)  
= 725.5  
 




p = .125 
 
 
p = .376 
VOSP OD 
Median (IQR) 
n = 38 
18 (3) 
n = 42 
17 (3) 
U (80)   
= 551.5 
p = .016 
WMS-III  
Family Pictures scaled 
scores (Mean, SD) 
 
Visual Immediate (Mean, 
SD) 














t (78) =  
-2.99 
 




p = .004 
 
 
p = .213 
DS = dissociative seizures; SD = standard deviation; df = degrees of freedom; IQR = interquartile range;  
WASI = Wechsler Abbreaviated Scale of Intelligence; FSIQ = Full-scale Intelligence Quotient;  
VOSP OD = Visual Object & Space Perception Battery – Object Decision subscale;  







There was no overall between-groups difference on the Visual Immediate Index 
(including Faces I and Family Pictures I scores).  However, there was a significant 
difference on the Family Pictures 1 subtest, with the DS group again performing 
better than the control group.  Inspection of z-scores did not reveal any outliers on 
this subtest.   
 
8.3.3. Subjective ratings 
Valence 
Figure 13 displays the descriptive statistics for the valence ratings.  Due to the 
existence of several possible covariates for entry into the analysis (VOSP OD, WMS-
III Family Pictures I. HADS Anxiety, HADS Depression, YoE), and the possibility of 
loss of statistical power if all were included, correlations between the possible 
covariates and valence ratings for each condition were examined, across the entire 
sample.  YoE was not significantly correlated with valence ratings for any of the 
conditions; therefore, it was not entered into the analysis.  Moreover, HADS 
Depression scores did not correlate significantly with valence ratings for any 
condition; therefore depression scores were also not entered into the model. 
 




The mixed factorial ANCOVA indicated that there was no main effect of group (F 
(1, 75) = .701, p = .405) and no interaction between group and condition (F (2.38, 
178.4) = .659, p = .544).  The only (marginally) significant covariate was anxiety (F 
(1, 75) = 3.95, p = .051), which had a negative influence on valence ratings in all 
conditions except for positive low arousal images.  There was a highly significant 
main effect of condition (F (2.38, 178.4) = 15.5, p < .001), as might be expected.  
Pairwise comparisons indicated that all conditions differed significantly from each 
other, with the highest valence ratings for both positive conditions, and the lowest 
ratings for both negative conditions.  The negative high arousal condition elicited the 
most negative ratings, and the positive low arousal condition the most positive.   
 
Arousal 
Figure 14 displays the descriptive statistics for the arousal ratings.  Correlational 
analyses indicated that VOSP OD scores were not significantly related to arousal 
ratings for any condition; therefore, VOSP OD was not entered as a covariate.  
Moreover HADS Depression scores were not entered as a covariate for the same 
reason.  With the remaining covariates entered (YoE, HADS Anxiety, WMS-III 
Family Pictures I), the analysis revealed that there was no overall main effect of group 
(F (1, 75) = 1.14, p = .289) and no interaction between group and condition (F (3.28, 
246.2) = .371, p = .792).  None of the covariates were significant.  However, there 
was a significant main effect of condition (F (3.28, 246.2) = 5.39, p = .001).  Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the negative high arousal condition elicited the highest 
arousal ratings, and the positive low arousal condition elicited lower arousal ratings 
than all other conditions. 
 
 
8.3.4. Skin conductance responses (SCRs) 
Table 38 shows the descriptive statistics for all SCR variables described below.  SCR 
data for two of the control participants who completed the experiment were not 






Figure 14. Arousal ratings by condition and group (IAPS task) 
 
 
Total trials included 
A mixed factorial ANOVA showed that, for the total number of trials retained for 
the SCR analysis, there was a marginally significant main effect of group (F (1, 78) = 
3.84, p = .053), with significantly more trials retained for the DS group (estimated 
marginal mean = 5.91; standard error = .061, 95% CI = 5.79, 6.03) than the controls 
(estimated marginal mean = 5.74, standard error = .059, 95% CI = 5.62, 5.86).  On 
the other hand, there was no main effect of condition (F (3.84, 299.4) = .617, p = 
.644), and no interaction between condition and group (F (3.84, 299.4) = .690, p = 
.594).  This finding suggested that there was less noise and artefact present on trials 
in the DS group than in the control group, indicating that patients moved less and 
had more steady breathing than controls during the experiment.    
 
Percentage of positive responses 
Correlations indicated that, of the potential covariates, only HADS Anxiety (p = 
.024) and Depression (p = .005) scores correlated with the proportion of positive 
responses for at least one condition; therefore, both of these sets of scores were 
entered as covariates.  
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Table 38. Skin conductance response (SCR) descriptive statistics (affective picture task) 
 n DS Control 
Total number of 
trials retained for 
analysis (0-6)  
(Median, IQR) 
(Mean, SD) 
DS = 39 
Control = 
40 
Neutral: Mdn =  6 (0); Mean = 5.9 (.384) 
Negative High: Mdn = 6 (0); Mean = 5.9 (.384) 
Negative Low: Mdn = 6 (0); Mean = 5.9 (.339) 
Positive High: Mdn = 6 (0); Mean = 6 (0) 
Positive Low: Mdn = 6 (0); Mean = 5.9 (.339) 
Neutral: Mdn = 6 (0); Mean = 5.7 (.64) 
Negative High: Mdn = 6 (0); Mean = 5.8 (.53) 
Negative Low: Mdn = 6 (0); Mean = 5.8 (.577) 
Positive High: Mdn = 6 (0); Mean = 5.7 (.716) 







DS = 39 
Control = 
40 
Neutral: Mdn = 16.7 (50); Mean = 30.3 (29.3) 
Negative High: Mdn = 33.3 (50); Mean = 35.5 
(30.4) 
Negative Low: Mdn = 33.3 (33.3); Mean = 38.5 
(25.5) 
Positive High: Mdn = 33.3 (50); Mean = 39.7 
(26.7) 
Positive Low: Mdn = 33.3 (66.7); Mean = 34.7 
(29.1) 
Neutral: Mdn = 33.3 (38.3); Mean = 34.2 (26.7) 
Negative High: Mdn = 41.7 (50); Mean = 42.3 
(28.1) 
Negative Low: Mdn = 33.3 (33.3); Mean = 35.7 
(23.9) 
Positive High: Mdn = 33.3 (48.3); Mean = 38.6 
(26.2) 





positive SCR  
n (% of group) 
DS = 39 
Control = 
40 
Neutral: 27 (69.2%) 
Negative High: 31 (79.5%) 
Negative Low: 34 (87.2%) 
Positive High: 34 (87.2%) 
Positive Low: 29 (74.4%) 
Neutral: 34 (85%) 
Negative High: 36 (90%) 
Negative Low: 35 (87.5%) 
Positive High: 34 (85%) 
Positive Low: 35 (87.5%) 




DS = 20 
Control = 
23 
Neutral: Mdn = .291 (.83); Mean = .604 (.83) 
Negative High: Mdn = .762 (.91); Mean = .845 
(.733) 
Negative Low: Mdn = .434 (.54); Mean = .539 
(.44) 
Positive High: Mdn = .609 (.81); Mean = .903 
(1.17) 
Positive Low: Mdn =  .527 (.82); Mean = .649 
(.595) 
Neutral: Mdn =  .296 (.56); Mean = .417 (.45) 
Negative High: Mdn =  .63 (.94); Mean = .657 
(.624) 
Negative Low: Mdn =  .456 (.77); Mean = .512 
(.443) 
Positive High: Mdn = .416 (.57); Mean = .433 
(.417) 
Positive Low: Mdn = .268 (.51); Mean = .437 
(.399) 




With the covariates entered, the effect of group was not significant (F (1, 75) = 1.97, 
p = .165) and neither was the effect of condition (F (4, 300) = 1.17, p = .323).  HADS 
Anxiety was not a significant covariate (F (1, 75) = .089, p = .766), however, HADS 
Depression was (F (1, 75) = 4.87, p = .03).  Parameter estimates (beta values) 
indicated that higher HADS Depression scores were associated with a reduction in 
the percentage of positive responses. 
 
There were also no significant differences in the proportion of each group showing 
at least one positive SCR response for neutral (X2 (1, 79) = 2.79, p = .095), negative 
high arousal (X2 (1, 79) = 1.69, p = .193), negative low arousal (X2 (1, 79) = .002, p = 
.966), positive high arousal (X2 (1, 79) = .078, p = .780), and positive low arousal (X2 
(1, 79) = 2.22, p = .137) images.   
 
Amplitude 
Scores for participants who did not show at least one positive response for all 
conditions were removed from the analysis.  The participants included can, therefore, 
be termed ‘responders’.  There was no significant difference in the proportion of 
responders in each group (X2 (1, 79) = 1.01, p = .314).  Moreover, removal of two 
outliers from the control group significantly influenced the results obtained.  
Therefore, these participants were removed from the analysis.  The sample included 
in the analysis, therefore, consisted of 23 control participants and 20 patients with 
DS. 
 
None of the potential covariates significantly correlated with SCR amplitude scores 
for any condition. However, due to the finding that HADS Depression scores had 
significantly covaried with the proportion of positive SCRs observed in the previous 
analysis, this variable was entered as a covariate in order to ensure that this possible 
influence on SCR amplitude was accounted for.  The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of group (F (1, 40) = 5.86, p = .02), and a significant main effect of condition 
(F (3.29, 131.6) = 2.81, p = .037), on SCR amplitudes.  HADS Depression scores were 
also a significant covariate (F (1, 40) = 4.19, p = .047), with higher depression scores 
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being associated with reduced SCR amplitude values.  However, the interaction 
between group and condition was not significant (F (3.29, 131.6 = 2.28, p = .077). 
 
The estimated marginal means indicated that the main effect of group was due to 
significantly higher SCR amplitudes in the DS group (estimated marginal mean = .789, 
standard error = .105, 95% CI = .577, 1), relative to the control group (estimated 
marginal mean = .421, standard error = .097, 95% CI = .226, .617).  The main effect 
of condition reflected significantly higher SCR amplitudes for the negative high arousal 
condition relative to the neutral (p = .023), negative low arousal (p = .018), and 
positive low arousal (p = .038) conditions.  Negative high arousal and positive high 
arousal conditions did not elicit significantly different SCR amplitudes (p = .517).  
Negative beta values for the covariate across all conditions indicated that HADS 
Depression scores were associated with reduced SCR amplitudes, as might be 
expected.   
 
In order to control for the possible effects of medication in the DS group, AED and 
antidepressant use were added as additional factors in two further runs of the 
ANCOVA.  When AED use was added, the group effect remained significant (F (1, 
39) = 6.24, p = .017), but the effect of AED use was not (F (1, 39) = .537, p = .468).  
The effect of HADS Depression as covariate was a non-significant trend with AED 
use in the model (F (1, 39) = 3.95, p = .054).  When antidepressant use was entered, 
the effect of group remained significant (F 1, 39) = 6.61, p = .014); however, the effects 
of antidepressant use (F 1, 39) = .844, p = .364) and the covariate of HADS 
Depression (F (1, 39) = 1.79, p = .188) were not significant.  
 
8.3.5. Exploratory analyses 
The exploratory analyses were carried out only in relation to the SCR amplitude data, 
because this was the only variable found to differ significantly between groups.  
 
Correlations between SCR amplitudes and psychosocial / seizure-related 
variables 
Statistics for the correlations meeting the required alpha level (p <.01) are presented 
in Table 39.  As in Chapter 7, partial correlations were carried out to examine 
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whether the significant correlations remained so after controlling for YoE.  In 
addition, because HADS Depression scores had significantly covaried with SCR 
amplitude in the present study, this variable was also controlled for in the partial 
correlations.   
 
Table 39. Significant correlations (p < .01) for SCR amplitude scores 
(affective picture task) 
  DS   Control  




Neutral       
HADS Anxiety 20 -.614 .004 23 -.077 .725 
Negative high 
arousal 
      
Ictal symptoms – AA* 
(most severe seizure) 
18 
 





MDI ECON 19 -.625 .004 23 .15 .495 
Positive high 
arousal 
      
TEC Mean Impact 19 -.635 .004 23 -.096 .662 
Positive low 
arousal 
      
IASC AD* 18 -.751 .000 23 -.139 .527 
HADS = Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale; AA = autonomic arousal; MDI ECON = Multiscale Dissociation Inventory – 
Emotional Constriction subscale; TEC = Traumatic Experiences Checklist; IASC AD = Inventory of Altered Self-Capacities – 
Affect Dysregulation subscale  
* denotes correlations remaining significant after controlling for YoE and HADS Depression scores (p < .01) 
 
 
In the DS group, SCR amplitude values for the negative high arousal condition were 
positively correlated with ictal autonomic arousal symptoms (most severe seizure); 
whereas they were negatively correlated with emotional constriction scores (MDI 
ECON subscale).  Whilst the former association remained significant after controlling 
for YoE and depression (r = .633, p = .009), the latter did not (r = - .467, p = .068).  
SCR amplitude for the neutral condition was negatively correlated with anxiety scores 
(HADS); however, this also did not remain significant in the partial correlations (r = 




For the positive high arousal condition, SCR amplitude negatively correlated with 
TEC mean impact scores; however, this did not survive correction for YoE and 
depression scores (r = -.302, p = .239).  Finally, SCR amplitude for positive low arousal 
images was negatively correlated with affect dysregulation (IASC), and this remained 
significant after the effects of YoE and depression were taken into account (r = - .707, 
p = .002).   
 
Differences between autonomic responders and non-responders 
Exploratory analyses (t-tests, Mann-Whitney or chi-square tests) did not reveal any 
significant differences (p < .01) in demographic factors, psychosocial variables or 
clinical characteristics (DS group) between ‘responders’ and ‘non-responders’ in 
either group.  Importantly, the proportion of individuals using AEDs or 





8.4.1. Summary and interpretation 
This experiment was conducted with the aim of further exploring differences in 
affective processing in patients with DS.  A key aim was to investigate affective 
processing beyond that involving emotional facial expressions.  Specifically, the study 
sought to identify whether there were any differences in affective responses to 
consciously processed images, displaying varied affectively significant content.  The 
experiment included five conditions, which varied by valence (positive, negative, 
neutral) and arousal level (high-low).  The inclusion of both subjective 
(valence/arousal ratings) and autonomic (SCR) dependent measures was to permit an 
examination of subjective reactions concurrently with a more automatic and implicit 
measure of emotional responsivity.  Moreover, a final aim was to carry out 
exploratory analyses to examine the extent to which any differences on the 
dependent measures were related to psychosocial factors (e.g. trauma, dissociation) 






After controlling for relevant covariates, there were no between-groups differences 
or interactions between group and condition, for either valence or arousal ratings.  
Furthermore, there were significant main effects of condition for both types of rating.  
The negative conditions elicited the most negative ratings and the positive conditions 
elicited the most positive responses, suggesting that the manipulation was successful.  
Moreover, the negative high arousal condition was rated as most emotionally 
arousing, whereas the positive low arousal condition was rated as least emotionally 
arousing.  These findings are in accordance with the normative data (see Lang et al., 
2005). 
 
Similarly to Roberts et al. (2012), the current findings relating to valence indicated 
that patients with DS are similar to healthy control participants in the valence (i.e. 
positivity/negativity) of their subjective responses to affective images.  This suggests 
that a fundamental qualitative difference in conscious/subjective affective responses 
to significant stimuli was not apparent in the DS group.  These findings do not support 
Hypothesis 1.  Furthermore, the lack of between group differences in arousal ratings 
indicated that the DS group were not different to healthy controls in their conscious 
experience of emotional arousal in response to the stimuli.  This finding does not 
support Hypothesis 2 and is contrary to the findings reported by Roberts et al. (2012), 
which suggested that patients with DS may perceive greater intensity in their 
emotional reactions to positive and neutral IAPS images (particularly compared to 
controls low in post-traumatic symptoms; PTS).  Nevertheless, the findings of the 
current study are in accordance with a recent report that patients with DS score 
similarly to healthy controls in the subjective intensity of their emotional reactions, 
as measured by the Affect Intensity Measure (Urbanek et al., 2014). 
 
However, in Roberts et al’s (2012) study, it is possible that the findings could have 
been related to general psychological distress and psychological symptoms such as 
anxiety and depression in the DS group, as these were found to be higher in the 
patients, relative to the low-PTS control group.  The investigators did not analyse the 
extent to which such symptoms correlated with, or predicted intensity ratings, nor 
were they controlled for statistically (i.e. using ANCOVA).  Nonetheless, the DS 
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group in that study were comparable to the high-PTS control group on most 
measures of psychological symptoms and yet, differences remained for intensity 
ratings in response to neutral images.   
 
It is possible that the differences in findings between this study and that of Roberts et 
al. could be due to the particular images included in the experiments.  Images that 
might be highly emotionally distressing for patients were excluded from the current 
study (e.g. scenes depicting interpersonal violence) for ethical reasons.  Examination 
of the specific items included by Roberts et al. (2012) indicates very little 
comparability with the images presented in the present study.  Therefore, it is highly 
likely that this may have contributed to the divergent results.  The IAPS stimuli are 
so varied in content that, unless studies explicitly aim to include the same images, 
different samples may find the selection of presented images more or less relevant to 
their specific concerns/life experiences and so, differing affective reactions may be 
elicited.  Moreover, a further difference between the studies was the way in which 
the stimuli were grouped.  Roberts and colleagues grouped stimuli into three 
conditions (positive, negative, neutral), whereas the images included in the current 
study were categorised by both valence and arousal.  Therefore, it is possible that 
this difference may have contributed to the differences in findings for arousal ratings.     
 
Another possibility is the influence of trauma.  Almost all of the sample included by 
Roberts et al. (2012) reported a history of trauma and significant PTS, whereas, the 
current sample was somewhat more diverse with respect to this variable (although a 
history of trauma was still common).  Another difference between this study and that 
of Roberts and colleagues (2012) was the criterion of video-EEG evidence for 
diagnosis of DS in the latter, in contrast to a slightly less conservative approach in the 
current study.  It could be the case that the patients in the former study consisted of 
a biased sample in this regard, possibly comprising more severe or chronic cases, or 
those for whom diagnosis was more complex on the basis of clinical features.         
 
An additional possible source of difference was the use of a 5-point Likert scale in the 
study of Roberts et al., and a 9-point Likert scale in the current study.  Perhaps, 
including a larger scale for responses in the current study encouraged participants to 
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make more fine-grained judgements of their emotional arousal, with more subtle 
variations than a 5-point scale would allow.  Another difference was in the 
experimental procedure, in that the ITI was set to 15 seconds in the current study, 
but it was unspecified and reported to average seven seconds by Roberts et al.  A 
longer ITI was included in the current study to ensure that SCR responses had 
returned to baseline levels before the consecutive stimuli were presented.  With a 
shorter ITI, it is possible that affective arousal in response to individual images had 
not returned to baseline before presentation of subsequent stimuli.  Therefore, it is 
possible that arousal accumulated in participants undergoing the procedure in the 
study of Roberts et al.  Indeed, it has been found that physiological responses to IAPS 
stimuli may accumulate with prolonged exposure (i.e. J.C. Smith, Bradley, & Lang, 
2005).  On the other hand, having a relatively long wait between stimuli in the current 
study may have allowed participants to experience less ongoing arousal, due to having 
a period of relaxation between successive stimuli. 
 
To summarise, the currently available findings on subjective responses to consciously 
perceived affective images (IAPS) in patients with DS are mixed.  Both Roberts et al. 
and the current study failed to find evidence for alterations in the valence (positive-
negative) of emotional responses to affective images.  However, the findings regarding  
arousal are more complex, with one study finding greater subjective arousal in 
response to positive and neutral images in patients with DS (Roberts et al., 2012), in 
contrast to the current study which found no differences in the subjective experience 
of arousal to similar stimuli.   
 
The evidence from both studies suggests that patients with DS do not differ from 
controls in their conscious experience of emotional arousal or valence in response 
to negative affective images.  This latter conclusion is in contrast with Hypotheses 1 
and 2 of the current study, which proposed that such differences would be specific 
to stimuli of this type.  Patients with DS also appear to experience similar levels of 
pleasantness as do controls, in their responses to positive pictures.  However, with 






Significantly more trials were retained for analysis in the DS group, relative to the 
control group. However, there were no between-groups effects on the proportion 
of participants showing positive SCRs, or on the frequency of positive SCRs (i.e. the 
proportion of trials on which positive responses were observed).  Instead, depression 
was found to covary significantly with the frequency of responses, with higher 
depression scores associated with lower positive SCR frequency.  
On examination of SCR amplitudes exhibited by participants who can be classed as 
‘responders’, a significant group effect was observed.  Responders in the DS group 
had significantly higher mean SCR amplitudes than responders in the control group.  
This effect was independent of the influence of depression, which was a significant 
covariate (associated with reduced SCRs).  There was a main effect of condition, with 
SCR amplitude values highest for the negative high arousal condition.  However, there 
was no interaction between group and condition.  Furthermore, when relevant 
medications were added to the model (AEDs, antidepressants), the group effect 
remained significant.  Therefore, it can be concluded that the effects of these 
medications did not account for the between-group findings.  Furthermore, the 
exploratory analyses indicated that there were no significant differences between 
responders and non-responders (by group) that might account for these results, 
including demographics, psychosocial variables, seizure-related and clinical variables.     
 
Therefore, it is apparent that at least a subgroup of DS patients show elevated 
autonomic reactivity to affectively significant images, and that this tendency cannot be 
explained by depression or by the most commonly used medications in that group.  
This finding provides initial support for the hypothesis that elevated autonomic 
arousal in response to emotionally significant stimuli may be a predispositional, 
perpetuating and/or triggering factor for DS (see Chapter 3, section 3.6).  The 
observed autonomic hyper-reactivity could contribute to general emotional distress, 
difficulties in interpersonal relationships and/or coping with stressful life events.  
Previous research, for example, has indicated that elevated SCRs for threatening IAPS 
images are associated with the perceived impact of life events in healthy individuals 
(Najström & Jansson, 2007).  The presently reported autonomic hyper-reactivity may 
 249 
 
also be linked to previous reports of reduced heart rate variability and elevated HPA-
axis activity (see Chapters 2 and 3), for example.       
 
As hypothesised in Chapter 3 (section 3.6), it is possible that an accumulation of 
autonomic arousal could reach a threshold, at which a DS is triggered.  Ongoing 
autonomic hyper-reactivity to affective stimuli might contribute to such an 
accumulation.  Indeed, the positive association between SCR amplitudes for negative 
high arousal images and ictal autonomic arousal symptoms, further supports the idea 
that general autonomic responsivity during highly negative emotional states is indeed 
associated with the occurrence of such symptoms during DS.  However, it should be 
noted that the current findings appear to apply to a subgroup of patients only.  
Moreover, of course, the findings from the exploratory analyses must be interpreted 
with caution due to the possibility of Type 1 error associated with multiple 
correlations being carried out on the same dataset.  Further research is necessary to 
examine these relationships in more detail. 
 
The negative correlation observed between SCR amplitudes and affect dysregulation 
in the DS group is rather difficult to interpret, as a positive correlation between these 
two variables would be more intuitively plausible (i.e. higher affective dysregulation 
scores being associated with elevated SCR amplitudes).  It is possible that this 
relationship is mediated by a third variable, most likely depressive symptoms.  
Nevertheless, the direction of the relationship suggests that elevated affect 
dysregulation does not seem to contribute to the general elevation in SCRs observed 
in the main analysis and, therefore, is not discussed further.   
 
8.4.2. Strengths and limitations         
The strengths and limitations of the current study that also apply to one or more of 
the other studies presented in the thesis are discussed in Chapter 10 (section 10.2).  
However, there are a number of strengths that are particular to this experiment.  
This study is one of only two studies that have examined emotional responding to 
general affective stimuli in this patient group, using laboratory-based experimental 
techniques.  This has extended previous research in the field, which had previously 
focused on emotional facial expressions only.  Moreover, an additional strength was 
 250 
 
the use of five separate conditions, in which not only valence, but arousal level were 
manipulated.  This adds to the study carried out by Roberts and colleagues (2012), in 
which the stimuli were only classified by valence.   
 
As with the experiment described in Chapter 7, an additional strength is the inclusion 
of both subjective and autonomic (somatic) measures of emotional responding, 
thereby allowing simultaneous assessment of these response domains in the same 
participants.  Another strength of this study was the fact that relevant 
neuropsychological tests were administered, in order to ensure that any differences 
observed could not be attributed to cognitive factors.  Moreover, the use of statistical 
control for relevant psychological variables (i.e. depression, anxiety) allowed a more 
rigorous test of the hypothesis that differences were associated with a diagnosis of 
DS, over and above the presence of general psychological distress in the DS group.   
 
On an ethical level, this study aimed to ensure the emotional wellbeing of participants 
by excluding images that might have caused acute emotional distress.  Indeed, all 
participants reported that they had not felt unusual levels of distress either during or 
after completion of the experiment.  Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
emotional wellbeing of the participants was maintained by taking a relatively 
conservative approach to stimulus selection.  However, this could also be seen as a 
limitation.  Patients with DS may differ from controls specifically in their responses 
to particular types of stimuli, such as those of relevance to their trauma histories.  As 
such, excluding particular groups of stimuli may limit the potential for observing 
important differences between patients with DS and control groups.  Moreover, it 
could be argued that stimuli should be selected to be specifically relevant to the 
patient group, in a personalised fashion, as is the case in some studies of PTSD and 
BPD that involve personalised trauma scripts (e.g. Elzinga et al., 2003; Schmahl et al., 
2004).  Perhaps, in order to fully understand DS, and how aetiological factors relate 
to emotional responsivity in this group, it may be necessary to include stimuli that 
are likely to elicit stronger responses.   
 
The study had a few other limitations.  One possible weakness could be a loss of 
power linked to the inclusion of five different emotional conditions.  Whilst this 
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allowed a more detailed analysis of the possible effects of valence and arousal level, 
perhaps categorising stimuli on just one of these dimensions (as in Roberts et al., 
2012) may have allowed the retention of greater statistical power.  It should be noted 
that the exploratory correlational analyses with SCR amplitudes may have been 
statistically underpowered (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.2), as was the case in Chapter 
7.  It might also be argued that the inclusion of only six images in each condition was 
insufficient.  Initially, eight images had been included; however, the number was 
reduced after the pilot study due to the experiment being too lengthy, with 
participants losing concentration.  The length of the experiment was also increased 
by necessity of a long ITI due to the measurement of SCRs.  A future possibility could 
be to conduct a study that involves subjective responses only, which would allow a 
greater number of trials in each condition and shorter ITIs.  Limitations relating to 
the psychophysiological measurements were discussed in Chapter 7 (section 7.4.2).     
 
8.4.3. Conclusions 
The findings of this study suggest that patients with DS are similar to healthy controls 
in their subjective emotional reactions to general affective images.  However, those 
participants who were deemed to be autonomic ‘responders’ in the DS group 
displayed significantly elevated SCR amplitudes relative to ‘responders’ in the control 
group.  The use of AEDs or antidepressants, and depressive symptoms did not 
account for this finding.  Therefore, the study shows that at least a subgroup of 
patients with DS exhibit exaggerated autonomic responses to general affective stimuli, 
possibly on an ongoing basis.  Combined with the subjective findings, this suggests 
that elevated somatic emotional responses occur in the absence of altered subjective 
emotional responses, in this subgroup.  This pattern might reflect a dissociative 
mechanism, in which patients’ conscious awareness of their somatic responses to 
affective stimuli is disrupted.  Hypothetically, this could allow autonomic arousal to 
build up over time, without patients being aware of it.  As suggested in Chapter 3 
(section 3.6), such an accumulation of somatic arousal might contribute to triggering 
DS on an ongoing basis. The correlation between elevated SCR amplitudes for 
negative high arousal images and ictal autonomic arousal symptoms, tentatively 
supports this hypothesis.  However, further examination of this relationship warrants 




Chapter 9. Emotion and dissociative seizures: a phenomenological analysis 
of patients’ perspectives 
 
9.1. Introduction 
The quantitative findings presented in previous chapters suggest a complex and 
potentially divergent style of emotional processing in patients with DS.  Whilst the 
use of quantitative measures has several known strengths (i.e. large data sets, efficient 
data collection, reduction of bias in data collection/analysis, hypothesis testing), an 
important limitation in the exclusive use of such measures is the lack of insight gained 
into the phenomenological experience of the individuals being studied.  In other 
words, the person behind the numbers is obscured, and the many valuable insights 
they might provide are not given adequate examination.  Qualitative techniques can 
be used to provide an insight into the unique meanings that individuals ascribe to their 
experiences (Willig, 2013).   
 
Increasing numbers of investigators have adopted qualitative techniques in studies of 
DS in the last decade, often based on in-depth interviews with patients, or qualitative 
analysis of patients’ interactions with clinicians.  For example, several investigators 
have used such techniques to examine patients’ reactions to receiving the diagnosis 
of DS (Carton et al., 2003; Karterud et al., 2010; R. Thompson et al., 2009; Wyatt et 
al., 2014).  These studies highlighted several themes in patients’ responses to the 
diagnosis, particularly feelings of confusion about the nature of the disorder, but also 
those of relief and feeling like a ‘normal’ person again (i.e. due to not having a chronic 
neurological condition). These findings have important implications for the ways in 
which diagnoses are communicated, and the extent to which patients are supported 
thereafter.  Issues relating to provision,  and patients’ experiences of treatment, have 
also been examined qualitatively (e.g. Baxter et al., 2012; Fairclough et al., 2014; Quinn 
et al., 2010; McMillan et al., 2014; Wyatt et al., 2014). 
 
Other authors have adopted qualitative techniques in investigating DS patients’ 
experiences and understanding of their disorder.  The study by Carton et al. (2003), 
for example, reported themes relating to patients’ conceptualisations of their attacks.  
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Some patients experienced their seizures as a release of accumulated emotion, stress, 
or as in some way related to previous traumatic experiences.  However, patients 
were also often confused about the way in which these processes inter-related, 
particularly as they often noted a lack of temporal contiguity between the triggering 
event and the occurrence of the DS.  Moreover, patients reported a range of factors 
that seemed to contribute to the aetiology of the disorder, such as stressful events 
(e.g. pain, interpersonal problems), the experience of anxiety or panic symptoms, and 
a possible disproportionate allocation of attention to bodily processes.  Many of the 
sample also reported considerable negative consequences of DS on other areas of 
life, such as employment, self-esteem, social isolation and anxiety. 
 
Dickinson and colleagues (2011) used thematic content analysis to explore patients’ 
perspectives on their disorder and noted that a theme emerged whereby patients 
linked their disorder to both early (e.g. head injury, physical assault, exposure to 
epilepsy) and recent (e.g. divorce, bereavement, legal proceedings) life events.  Again, 
many patients expressed confusion about the aetiology of their disorder.  Moreover, 
Green et al. (2004) also noted considerable confusion in patients’ accounts of their 
disorder, pertaining to both terminology and the possible causal processes involved.  
These latter authors also noted a distinct tendency to discuss DS dualistically as either 
organic or psychological, rather than acknowledging the possibility that psychological 
factors can interact with physical processes.  Two studies also sought to examine 
patients’ representations of their illness by examining the ways in which such patients 
described their attacks during interactions with clinicians (Plug et al., 2009; Robson 
et al., 2012), with important differences observed in the ways in which patients with 
ES and DS talked about their attacks. 
 
It is clear that qualitative techniques can yield a range of valuable insights, many of 
which having important clinical implications.  Furthermore, qualitative studies can 
generate hypotheses for testing with quantitative techniques.  In addition, such studies 
provide an important opportunity for the involvement of patients in the research 
process, ensuring that their views are represented in a formal medium and thus given 
validation.  During the process of conducting the quantitative aspects of the research 
presented in this thesis, many patients were keen to share their perspectives on how 
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their emotional states might, or might not, relate to the onset of their disorder and 
the ongoing occurrence of seizures.  The aim of the present study was, therefore, to 
present idiographic data as a means of enriching the findings presented in the thesis.  
The study sought to explore the following research questions: 
 
1. How do patients with DS perceive their general emotional functioning? 
 
2. To what extent can patients with DS reflect on and understand the 
possible role of emotions in the onset of the disorder and/or ongoing 
seizure generation? 
 
3.  How do patients with DS perceive their ability to recognise and 
understand the emotions of others?   
 
In order to investigate these questions, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with a subsample of patients who had completed the quantitative aspects of the 




The research followed as closely as possible the recommendations made by 
proponents of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (Smith & Osborn, 2008).  




Recruitment for the study commenced in January 2011 and ended in August 2012.  
Eligibility criteria were as outlined in Chapter 4 (section 4.2) for the DS patients.  All 
patients who had completed the quantitative aspects of the research during the 
period outlined above were offered an information sheet for the present study in 
person and, if interested, were contacted within three weeks (but no less than one 




As suggested by Smith and Osborn (2008), there is no single correct sample size for 
studies using IPA.  The sample size (n = 15) included in the current study was within 
the range that has been used in other such studies, with recruitment terminating 
when no additional themes emerged during preliminary analyses of the transcripts.  
 
9.2.2. Procedure 
All patients provided written informed consent on arrival at the interview location 
(see Appendices 7 and 8 for the information sheet and consent forms respectively).  
Data were collected with semi-structured interviews lasting between approximately 
30 and 90 minutes.  Fourteen of the interviews took place in a psychology laboratory, 
and the remaining interview was conducted in the patient’s home.  An interview 
schedule was designed prior to data collection, in order to ensure that the interview 
covered topics of relevance to the research questions outlined above.  The interview 
schedule can be found in Appendix 20.  The schedule was used as a guide only, being 
applied flexibly depending on the particular topics on which each participant wished 
to elaborate.  The schedule included open-ended questions of direct relevance to the 
research topic, in addition to potential prompts for use only if necessary.  The same 
schedule was utilised in all interviews.     
 
The interviews were digitally recorded, with patients’ permission.  On completion of 
the interview, participants were given the opportunity to ask questions.  Patients’ 
wellbeing was checked before leaving the building.  The same interviewer (the 
research student) carried out all interviews.  The interviewer was a British Caucasian 
female postgraduate student (SP), in her late twenties/early thirties during data 
collection.   
 
9.2.3. Data analysis 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim by the research student, as soon as possible 
after they were completed.  Transcriptions were anonymised by giving each 
participant a unique participant number.  The transcripts included all spoken words, 
pauses, and non-verbal utterances (e.g. laughs), but not prosodic features (as 
recommended by Smith & Osborn, 2008).  In IPA, the analyst engages actively with 
the transcript and aims to interpret the meanings implicit in the data.  The following 
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steps are recommended in IPA and are, therefore, the steps that were taken in 
analysing the data reported here. 
 
1. Identification of themes in the first transcript:  
The first transcript was read several times, with initial notes being made on the 
transcript freely when sections were thought relevant or meaningful.  No ‘rules’ 
governed how the initial notes were made, with annotations including paraphrasing, 
possible meanings, repetitions, associations, contradictions, use of language, among 
others.  After this, the transcript was read again, and emergent themes noted, with 
specific phrases or words being selected to encapsulate categories of notes made in 
the first stage. 
 
2. Theme connection: 
A list of possible themes was devised, based on those emerging from the first 
transcript, but listed separately (in a new document).  The list of possible themes was 
examined for potential inter-relationships, with some of the themes seeming to 
cluster together, whereas others were relatively unique.  As themes were organised 
into categories and clusters, these were checked back against the transcripts to 
ensure that the meaning of the emerging theme classification accurately reflected 
what the participant had said.  During this process, relevant quotations from the text 
were placed under relevant theme titles.  The clusters of themes were categorised 
into superordinate themes at this point.   
 
3. Adding additional transcripts to the analysis 
The themes developed from the first transcript were used as an initial classification 
by which to examine the second transcript.  Similarities were sought and relevant 
quotations from the second transcript were added to the relevant existing theme.  In 
addition, new emerging themes from the second transcript were added to the overall 
classification, where no overlap was present with existing themes.  This process 
continued with all subsequent transcripts, until no new themes seemed to emerge.  
A final classification scheme of themes was then developed, checking this back against 
the raw data from the transcripts.  The classification was refined by including those 




9.2.4. Quality and reflexivity 
During data analysis and writing up of the results, notes were made when there was 
a possible influence of the research student’s background or characteristics on 
interpretation of the data; efforts were made to minimise the influence of such 
characteristics on the interpretations made.  The research student’s primary 
supervisor (LG) independently examined a subsample of transcripts, blind to the 
themes that had been identified by the student.  The themes identified by the 
supervisor were very similar to those identified by the student; however, some small 
modifications were subsequently made to the hierarchy of themes.  Furthermore, a 
preliminary summary of the main findings was sent to two patients who had 
participated in the study (with prior consent agreed).  One of the patients responded, 
confirming that the summary was understandable, acceptable and reflected her 






Fifteen participants were included in the study.  The demographic characteristics and 
duration of DS disorder for each participant are presented in Table 40. 
 
9.3.2. Overview of themes 
Several superordinate themes emerged during the analysis, partially reflecting the 
types of question included in the interview schedule.  These were themes relating to: 
patients’ general emotional functioning, the relationship between emotions and DS, 
stressful/adverse life events, relating to others, resilience, protective factors, and 
coping strategies.  The themes and subthemes are presented with representative 
quotations in Tables 41 to 45.  Some of the sub-themes seemed to fit into more than 
one category; however, for simplicity, they were placed under the superordinate 
category that best represented the meaning of the theme for the patients.  Where 




9.3.3. General emotional functioning 
One cluster of themes related to patients’ perceptions of their general emotional 
functioning (see Table 41).  These included the frequent experience of negative affect, 
affect dysregulation, inhibited emotional experience/expression, rumination, and a 
strong connection between emotion and bodily states.  For some, the phenomena 
described seemed to represent long-term tendencies rooted in development.  
However, other patients indicated these experiences were more specific to a given 
time in their lives.  The difficulties in emotional functioning were directly attributed 
to the ongoing experience of seizures in some cases.  Patients often felt that the 
experience of the chronic and severe seizure symptoms had caused a deterioration 
in their emotional well-being.  In some instances, the degree of deterioration in 
emotional state since the onset of DS led to patients’ perceiving alterations in 
personality and sense of ‘self’ as a consequence, described as being like ‘a different 
person’.    
 
Negative affect 
A theme common to almost all patients was the experience of aversive affective 
states. Patients often felt that their current experience of negative affect was 
exacerbated by, or a direct consequence of the symptoms of DS or other somatic 
concerns (statements 1 and 2).  Moreover, others described previous periods of 
depression in relation to stressful/traumatic life events or circumstances (statements 
3 and 4).  Some patients described a specific lack of emotional wellbeing and positive 




Lability of mood state was also a common feature, with patients describing frequent 
extremes of emotion often occurring within short periods of time (i.e. a day), labelled 
‘ups and downs’ (statements 7 – 10).  One patient felt that this tendency had 
worsened since the onset of DS (statement 11).   
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Occupational history Educational 
background 
Time since DS 
onset (months) 
1 40s F White British Self-employed/homemaker GCSEs / O levels 48 
2 40s F White British Homemaker/professional Undergraduate degree 84 
3 50s F White British Homemaker None 120 
4 30s M White British Professional Postgraduate degree 33 
5 30s F White British Administration Undergraduate degree 192 
6 50s F Mixed Professional Postgraduate degree 84 
7 20s F Black African Professional Postgraduate degree 84 
8 30s F White British Homemaker GCSEs / O levels 120 
9 50s F White British Professional Undergraduate degree 44 
10 30s M White British Intermediate occupation GCSEs 15 
11 50s M White British Unemployed/disability None 276 
12 30s M Mixed Intermediate occupation Diploma 168 
13 30s M White British Service occupation None 192 
14 20s F White British Unemployed/disability None 120 
15 50s F White British Intermediate occupation GSCEs / O levels 30 
M = male; F = female
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Table 41. Themes relating to general emotional functioning 
Theme Sub-theme Typical statements 
Negative affect Current negative affect 
related to somatic 




related to difficult life 
events / circumstances 
 
Long-term lack of positive 
affect  
1. “Sometimes I allow myself to have bad days....I just feel horrific and awful, and I just 
wallow...” (P1) 
2. “I get…especially since all my health issues started, I get very depressed, due to all the 
things that are going on with me.” (P12) 
  
3. “I recognise I was depressed as well, and I didn’t have any sort of help from that...” (P9) 
4. “I used to be in huge emotional pain...my life was really hard emotionally...I went through 
a very difficult time, I was depressed…” (P6)  
 
5. “It’s been like that, off and on, it’s more negative than it is positive...since I was really 
young...”  (P13) 
6. “I wouldn’t say I’ve ever felt really happy…I wouldn’t say, for the past like 15 or 20 years, 
I’ve been happy, I can’t remember a time in my life...” (P7)  













7. “I’m not, I don’t think I’ve ever been sort of somewhere ‘in the middle’, for a very long 
time it is up and down...It’s just constant, it can be constant, so in one day it can be: you 
get up in the morning, you’ll feel fine, but then something happens or your mood might 
suddenly change, for no reason, you feel a bit lower, and that’s how it is....” (P8) 
8. “My bad moods are...they’re really bad...When I’m in a bad mood, I’m really unhappy.  
It’s severe. When I’m in a good mood...nothing can go wrong.” (P14) 
9. “I could be feeling fine, and somebody could say something to me, and I could go down, 
depending on, you know, what they’re saying.” (P2) 
10. “Just the little things, can make my day like, the worst day ever really.” (P7) 
11. “…before my attacks, I was quite wavy anyway....as opposed to a calm sea...but since 
the attacks...my emotions have changed, are much more dramatic...the wavy lines are 












Difficulties calming down 
linked to inhibiting 
emotions 
 
12. “I cry, if I get, if it got too much, I’ll cry.  I sit and cry.” (P3) 
13. “I kind of, blow up at inappropriate things at home.  Well not inappropriate, but really 
small things at home.” (P5) 
14. “...if someone brings up the past that’s mainly when it happens, that’s when I’ll get 
aggressive and go at someone.” (P14) 
15. “You know, it comes out of me…in a sense where, I’ll smash a plate or a cup.” (P11) 
 
16. “I’m not good at calming down.  It takes me forever…when I hold things in, and think 
what I’m saying, and I have to hold back a little bit, that’s when I can’t calm down.” (P8) 
17. “Once I cross the line, then it’s avalanche...and I think that’s because I bottle it all up…so, 
there is a line.  The point of no return I suppose.” (P2) 
Inhibited experience / 
expression of negative 
emotions 








Bottling-up emotions and 









18. “I have to accommodate certain negative influences, so I think they leave me flat, rather 
than down.  Numb.  Shutting it off.  Like, blocking it.” (P2) 
19. “...even before I had seizures, over the years I couldn’t understand that at times of great 
stress I’d always felt quite well and happy….” (P15) 
20. “I very much compartmentalise stuff…with very strong emotions, be it very good ones 
or very bad ones, I tend to close off from them... (P4) 
 
 
21. “I tend to not show what I feel...when I’m not happy I don’t want people to know that 
I’m not happy.” (P7) 
22. “I don’t like trusting my true emotions to people….” (P2) 
23. “Throughout my entire life and throughout any stresses and strains I’ve had, the way I’ve 
always dealt with it, is – the worse I’m actually feeling, the happier I will be to people around 
me.  I hide my feelings very much so…I just, you know, put on this sort of happy face...”  
(P15) 
24. “But even my best friends, you know, they’ve come to see me, so I don’t have to be 




Inhibition of emotions 











Insights into links with 
seizures / negative 
consequences 
25. “I think, one of the things about my family life, and my upbringing, was that very 
strong emotions are not ok, and they’re not shown.  Which I guess ties into the seizures in 
some way.”  (P4) 
26. “I feel myself, it’s about how I was emotionally as a child…because I was very sensitive 
and the problems that I faced, I suppressed that.  I forget about that for many many years.  
You know, it went out of my mind completely.” (P6) 
27. “Again, I don’t really like to show my emotions in front of him…as a kid he always told 
me ‘don’t cry in front of people, girls don’t cry’...He is a very shut-down person...” (P5) 
28. “Erm, my own personal background, even at that time, meant that I had no control over 
my situation…so I didn’t talk about it all the time.  In fact, I think I was so successful at 
getting other people to talk to me, because it stopped them talking about me.” (P2) 
 
29. “Sometimes...I want to hold things back...but I know, because of the seizures and 
everything, I know that’s the worst thing you can do, to keep it all in to yourself.  You’ve got 
to speak to someone about it.”  (P8) 
30. “So it was all about carrying on, covering up, not being able to say anything.  Particularly 
in some very stressful situations…I know that was internalising the emotions, and...I know 
how it affected me too.” (P2) 










31. “...it just starts getting worse, I just start thinking about it, and the negative thoughts 
start getting even worse and worse and worse.”  (P13) 
32. “I have to keep processing it.  I keep processing it, over and over and over...it’s like a 
little nag, and it won’t go away, no matter what I try to do, it won’t go away.  It’s like I have 
to keep thinking about it...” (P9) 
33. “I analyse things a lot…I tend to attribute reasons....”  (P2) 






34. “I’m always getting the pain…it’s just like all of the time, even for small things, if I get 
angry or something like that....it’s just like very quick, and then I feel very tense....it can take 
















Physiological responses to 
acute affective arousal 
35. “I get these jerks, you know, and I recognise if I’m feeling a bit anxious, it’s like a build-
up, and my body will jerk, and then the anxiety goes.” (P9) 
 
36. “...if something’s upset me…perhaps the day after, or the day after that, I will feel very 
exhausted…and you know, if I allow myself time enough, then it will make me feel physically 
not well...” (P15) 
 
37. “If I’m upset I won’t sleep...and then when I do sleep I have really strange weird dreams 
that are sort of connected to what I’m upset about...” (P5) 
38. “I mean night-times, there’s the night traumas, the nightmares, night sweats…there is 
a connection with the nightmares with the bullying.” (P13) 
  
39. “If I’m particularly angry or excited...I can feel a change in my heart beat...” (P12) 
40. “...when I get angry, I get a bit shaky…I’ve had a lot going on this week, to the point 
the other day, when I was very angry, I was shaking...” (P8) 
41. “Sometimes I get hot, and I tend to, it’s sometimes like the anger is boiling up inside 
me, and my heart races a bit, if it’s something really bad...If I get really angry, I shake, 
which is quite embarrassing.” (P5)     
 




Discrete episodes of excessive emotional expression were also a commonality in the 
sample, including weeping (statement 12), aggression (statements 13 and 14), and 
destructive behaviours (statement 15).  Some patients also recognised that they 
experienced difficulties in calming down once upset, and that these patterns might be 
linked to the ongoing ‘bottling-up’ of their emotions (statements 16 and 17).  The 
‘ups and downs’ and excessive emotional expression described above were attributed 
to specific triggers by some patients, including reminders of past life events (statement 
14), interpersonal interactions or conflict (statement 9), and other daily life events 
(statements 7, 10, and13).   
 
Inhibited experience and expression of negative affect   
A very common theme emerged pertaining to a marked pattern of inhibited 
experience of negative emotion.  This was most commonly referred to as ‘closing 
down’ or ‘shutting off’ unwanted feelings or mood states (statements 18 - 20).  This 
theme was linked to another coping strategy involving behavioural/social ‘shutting 
down’ (see section 9.3.7).   
 
Patients frequently talked of “bottling-up” unpleasant emotions, that is, inhibiting 
expression of such emotions to others (statements 21 and 22).  A linked feature was 
that of “putting on a brave face”, presenting an artificially positive, cheerful or 
confident persona to others, despite this being incongruent with the actual affective 
state being experienced (statements 23 and 24).  This sub-theme was connected to a 
belief that the expression of feelings and emotions might be a burden to others; 
therefore, for some patients, inhibited expression of emotion was a means of trying 
to ‘protect’ others (see section 9.3.6. below).   
 
These tendencies towards experiential or expressive emotional inhibition were often 
described as long-standing (e.g. statement 23), and were attributed to 
events/situations that had occurred during childhood/adolescence in some cases 
(statements 25 – 28).  Some patients referred to a possible relationship between 
these tendencies and the occurrence of seizures (statement 25), and/or indicated that 





Rumination about unpleasant emotions or upsetting experiences were commonly 
described (statements 31 – 33).  For some, these ruminative thoughts were referred 
to as somewhat intrusive and not within voluntary control (e.g. statement 32).  
Whereas, for others, this tendency was described as more of a controlled analysis of 
emotional episodes (e.g. statement 33). 
 
Emotions linked to physical feelings 
Many patients perceived strong interconnections between emotional states and 
physical symptoms and experiences.  For example, emotion was described as causing 
physical discomfort or pain (statement 34), motor symptoms (statement 35) and/or 
tiredness/exhaustion (statement 36).  Several patients also experienced sleep 
disturbances such as insomnia and night-terrors as a result of stress or anxiety 
(statements 37 and 38).  Moreover, some patients were able to describe acute 
awareness of physiological changes (e.g. heat, shaking, heart-racing) during acute 
emotional arousal (statements 39 – 41).   
 
 
9.3.4. Stressful/adverse life experiences or circumstances 
Patients reported a wide range of stressful and/or adverse events and circumstances.  
For some, isolated and remote traumatic incidents were discussed, whereas for 
others there were more generalised or ongoing problems.  Several themes emerged 
in relation to this topic, reflecting the key areas in which patients experienced 
difficulties.  These included interpersonal problems, the experience of abuse, somatic 
concerns and symptoms, and generally stressful circumstances.  Table 42 includes 
examples of patients’ statements. 
 
Relationship/interpersonal problems 
Some patients described current relationship problems, including conflict (statements 
42 and 43), intimate relationship breakdown (44) and difficulties in forming 
relationships with others (statement 45).  Other patients referred to relationship 
problems that had affected them in the past (statements 46. and 47).   
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Table 42. Themes relating to stressful/traumatic life experiences or circumstances 
Themes Sub-theme Typical statements 
Relationship / 
interpersonal problems 











42. “I know for example that there is an ongoing situation with me, where conversations 
are being misrepresented...and it feels terribly unjust and terribly unfair...and this has 
gone on for several years.”  (P2) 
43. “Me and (anon) don’t have a good relationship...And we will row from the moment we 
get up to the moment we go to sleep.” (P5) 
44. “My partner said he was moving out, so that’s what happened.” (P8) 
45. “I find it hard to actually make friendships.  I mean I try and get out there, around 
people, and I just can’t do it.”  (P13) 
 
46. “…when my parents got divorced…it’s quite a wounding thing…you know, I was 
very cross and very bitter, and I carried that for a long time.” (P1)   
47. “…for the first five or maybe six years of my marriage, I cried constantly because it 
was so awful…it just destroyed me….” (P15) 














 48. “The only thing I can’t understand…is when a person hits a child.  I really do not 
tolerate that.  You know, I have to say something.  Because of having been a battered child 
myself.” (P11) 
49. “I was in an abusive childhood, so my (anon) was an alcoholic, you can’t explain that 
to your friends.  So, you bury it...” (P2) 
50. “I think...when I was a child, I went through quite a bit of child abuse...and I think I 
locked that away, and I know because I just got on with it...my way was to kind of get on 
with it...I don’t think on it at all, sometimes I’m kind of, not angry, I’ll be upset that I had 
to suffer that, and now it’s still affecting my adult life.” (P10) 
51. “So, when she, when I was beaten, I hate her, I hate the pain, and I hate not being 
able to express my pain, my physical pain, my emotional pain, I hate not being able to cry, 
I thought that was, you know, pure cruelty.” (P6) 
 267 
 
Adulthood abuse 52. “...he’ll shout and he’ll scream, and throw things...last week I was making a drink and 
I’d got the boiling kettle in my hand…and he just walked up behind me and pushed me.” 
(P5) 
53. “I just went out for that walk, early in the morning, walked around the corner, bang 
bang bang, got my head kicked in, got beaten up…” (P11) 
54. “…and then the intimidation started and the mental bullying started…and that was 
it.” (P13) 
55. “When I think back, there was a (anon) there (workplace) who was a bit of a bully 




 56. “…currently my situation at the moment is quite stressful…” (P2) 
57. “I’ve had so many things happen, to me, during my life…” (P1) 


















58. “Oh I’ve always got aches and pains, because of the arthritis that I have, on a day-to-
day basis....there’s always elements of pain in my daily life...” (P1) 
59. “Most days, I end up with a bad headache throughout the day…I’ve been to the 
neurologists and I’ve told them about it, and I’ve had brain scans, and they’re just not 
finding anything.” (P13) 
60. “I have pain all the time.  Like in my leg, it’s just like, all the time.  Nobody can do 
anything about that...” (P7) 
 
61. “I very rarely sleep anyway.  I haven’t been asleep at all last night, and I had about 
an hour and a half the night before.” (P12) 
62. “I don’t go more than probably three, three and a half hours a night...the mind’s 
constantly active.” (P10) 
63. “Sleep, that’s the main thing at the moment....I keep waking up constantly, for no 
reason, and sometimes you think it’s time to get up...and then I can’t get back to sleep 
again.” (P8) 




A recurrent theme was the experience of interpersonal abuse, often during childhood 
(statements 48 - 51).  Some patients described having ‘locked away’, buried or 
suppressed these experiences and appeared to have some insight into how the 
experiences had affected them (statements 49 and 50).  For some patients, abusive 
experiences had also occurred during adulthood, including domestic abuse (statement 
52), physical assault (statement 53), and workplace bullying (statements 54 and 55).   
 
Generally stressful circumstances 
Some patients tended to describe their lives as generally stressful, and/or traumatic.  
For some, there was a chronic or long-term nature to the stressors and often multiple 
stressors or traumas were reported.  Rather than discussing specific incidents, these 
patients made more general references to difficult circumstances or events 
(statements 56 and 57).   
 
Somatic concerns and symptoms 
Almost all of the patients described additional somatic illness, symptoms or concerns.  
The most commonly reported were pain (statements 58 – 60) and sleep disturbances 
(statements 61 – 63).   
 
9.3.5. The role of emotions in DS 
A number of perspectives were expressed in relation to the ways in which patients 
felt that their emotions might be linked to the occurrence of DS.  These themes 
included linking DS occurrence to life stressors and traumatic events, viewing DS as 
a release of built up emotion, and an inconsistent temporal relationship between 
emotional triggers and DS. Furthermore, several patients described 
emotions/experiences that commonly occurred post-ictally.  Representative 
quotations can be found in Table 43. 
 
DS onset linked to stress / trauma 
Stressful circumstances or elevated stress levels were often described as having 
occurred at the time of the onset of the disorder, or leading up to that point (i.e. first 
seizure occurrence).  Such experiences included medical/somatic crises or 
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procedures (statements 64 – 67), traumatic life events (i.e. physical/sexual assault; 
statements 68 and 69), and relationship breakdown or crises (statements 72 and 74).  
Other stressors included moving home (statement 71), occupational stress 
(statement 73), and bereavement (statements 70 and 73) and physical/mental 
exhaustion (statements 72 and 73).  Some patients described multiple life stressors 
occurring prior to DS onset (statements 70 - 73). 
 
DS as emotional ‘relief’ after a ‘build up’ 
DS were associated with switching off from emotional distress or strong emotions 
by several patients (statements 75 - 76).  Some patients felt that their seizures had 
originally been triggered by a build-up of emotional distress (statements 77 and 78).  
Feelings of well-being or relief following a seizure were also described (statements 79 
and 80). 
 
Inconsistent emotional triggers for DS 
The relationship between DS occurrence and emotional states or triggers was 
perceived as unpredictable by the majority of patients, with DS sometimes occurring 
at times of stress or anxiety and sometimes not (statements 81 and 82).  Indeed, in 
several cases, patients specifically described having seizures during times in which they 
felt happy or relaxed (e.g. statement 82).  One patient mentioned that her DS used 
to be preceded by fear consistently, but that now they seemed to be triggered by the 
experience of any strong emotion, rather one consistent emotional state (statement 
83).  
 
Post-ictal emotions / experiences 
During DS, the seizures were most often perceived as a state of total lack of emotion, 
during which they reported not feeling anything at all and ‘shutting off’ from their 
feelings (see previous section).  On the other hand, emotional reactions and 
experiences after DS were more common, including frustration (statement 84), 
tiredness (statements 85), weeping (statement 86), but also relief in some cases (see 





Table 43. Themes relating to the role of emotions in DS 
Theme Sub-theme Typical statements 
DS onset linked to 




























64. “…they followed a long period of intense physical pain.  The pain came first, the attacks 
came after.” (P2) 
65. “I had to go into hospital for minor surgery, I had general anaesthetic, I came out of the 
anaesthetic, and ended up staying in for a week...they hadn’t a clue what it was, and it kind of 
all went from there...” (P1) 
66. “I got sick, and I was told I had meningitis...and so, they started around then....”  (P5) 
67. “In 2004 I had a major physical failure.  I had the seizures, I had the stomach, I had to 
have surgery, I had breast cysts, I had cysts on my uterus….” (P6) 
 
68. “I’d been attacked, shortly before that…” (P5) 
69. “I was ok-ish then.  I just went out for that walk…got beaten up...it all stemmed from 
there...” (P11)  
 
70. “Prior to all that, I lost my wife, my daughter, er, I gave up the alcohol…yeah so I was sort 
of, I’d had a few sad moments, bereavements, before the actual…erm, the first seizure.” (P11) 
71. “I had a lot going on...moving home, getting married, and all that sort of thing, so...it was 
stressful, at that time.” (P8) 
72. “For me, they came at a time when my body was under a huge amount of strain from 
stress, and also I ran the marathon...my relationship broke down in the March, I ran the 
(marathon) in the April, and I was scheduled for the surgery in June...physically, there was a lot 
of stuff going on…”(P4) 
73. “I was over-loaded...I was working ten hours a day…I was exhausted, exhausted.  So, it 
happened that my grandmother died...” (P6) 
 
74. “I can remember my first day, my first seizure started…the problem I was facing at home 
had just got to a point where I just couldn’t deal with it any more…I got to my 
limit…something had to give, and for me, it obviously manifested in a seizure.” (P15) 
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DS as emotional ‘relief’ or 
‘shut-down’ 







DS originally triggered by a build-






Relief after DS 
 
 
75. “So it would seem like to have a seizure would take me out of my surrounding 
problems…Switched off, emotionally switched off, I don’t feel anything…I don’t feel unhappy 
or I don’t feel happy, I just feel as though somebody has literally switched me off and I’m not 
worried about anything.” (P15) 
76. “…I’m definitely aware that it’s at times when I do shut-off emotionally, that they come 
on...” (P4)  
 
77. “I think the seizures were the build-up of it.  I sort of feel it was just like a build-up, a 
mountain of things, and I got to the top and I got fed up of it...” (P9) 
78. “…if you don’t get things off your chest, and you’re holding certain things back, that 
keeps running round in your mind, then that is like stressing you out, then it’s building up and 
making you more and more agitated, and I think that’s possibly one of the causes that 
triggered it off.”  (P8) 
 
79. “I used to feel exhausted (after a seizure), but it was almost like all that fear had gone, 
almost like a relief feeling, funnily enough, that it had gone.” (P9) 
80. “I get a feeling as if something’s subsided in me, I feel very calm again....” (P15) 
Inconsistent relationship 
between emotional 
triggers and DS 
occurrence 
 81. “At times when I’m stressed and fairly anxious I can have lots of seizures, but then at the 
same time I can have none at all...” (P12) 
82. “I can’t see any pattern to it…so you could be happy, you could be sad, anything, it will 
just happen.” (P8) 
83. “...before, I’d always feel like fear. I was just like really scared...now, I just feel like every 







Tiredness / exhaustion 
 
Weeping 
84. “So…they bring on a completely different emotion of ‘Oh god, it’s happened again’ and ‘I 
haven’t done this and I haven’t done that’…there can be a feeling of that, after one, which is 
‘Oh god, here we go, another day lost, another day wasted.”  (P2) 
 
85. “I feel very very tired, and sort of like, more worn out, then I was before…” (P11) 
 
86. “When I come out of it, all I want to do is cry, and that’s it...I’m always crying after them, 
I’m just not myself, if you know what I mean?” (P14)   





9.3.6. Relating to others 
Relationships with others were discussed frequently by patients.  This cluster of 
themes included interpersonal sensitivity, caring for and supporting other people, and 
being a burden to others.  These themes are illustrated in Table 44.  
 
Interpersonal sensitivity 
Most patients reported being sensitive to other people’s mental states.  Some viewed 
this as a positive trait (statements 87 – 89), in that it allowed empathy for others and 
the ability to ‘read people’ well.  However, some suggested that this interpersonal 
sensitivity could at times be a negative tendency because it could lead to 
misinterpreting social signals (e.g. statements 90 and 91), or that it might sometimes 
be better not to be so aware of others’ mental states/emotions (statement 92).  Some 
patients linked their interpersonal sensitivity to developmental experiences (e.g. 
statement 90).   
 
Caring for and supporting others 
A prominent theme emerged relating to patients tending to be caring and supportive 
of other people, in a variety of ways.  Several patients reported being the person that 
‘people come to with their problems’, despite rarely sharing their own concerns and 
issues with others in return (statements 93 – 96).   
 
Being a burden to others 
Linked to the above theme, several patients described their emotions or seizures as 
a possible burden on others, and invested considerable effort in avoiding disclosing 
their difficulties to others (e.g. statements 97 - 99).  This was also connected to a 




Table 44. Themes about relating to others 
Theme Sub-themes Typical statements 






Interpersonal sensitivity as 
negative 
87. “I think I’m really good with other people...I do notice how people are feeling... I can stand 
back and think well what’s made them feel that way?” (P15) 
88. “I can read people, even when you meet them, within, I don’t know, a minute…and most 
of the time, I’m right.” (P10) 
89. “I’m very sensitive to other people’s feelings, and I have a lot of empathy.” (P6) 
 
90. “I remember when I was younger…I was very susceptible to other people’s emotions…I 
think having a fairly volatile home-life makes you that way.  You’re consciously looking out for 
stuff.” (P4)   
91. “I take some people the wrong way, when they say something to me, I might take it the 
wrong way, even though they don’t actually mean it that way….” (P8) 
92. “I’m going back to what I said about being sensitive to people, I just wish I didn’t do that, I 
just wish I didn’t understand it so well.  Because sometimes, you just don’t want to know...” (P2) 
Caring for and 
supporting others 
 93. “...people always come to me.  They talk to me about things, because I pick up straight 
away if something’s wrong...I always put other people first, before myself.”  (P8) 
94. “I’ve never had no-one look after me, I’ve always looked after other people….but it’s not 
like that now.”  (P3) 
95. “I’ve got time for, you know, even a complete stranger, to try to comfort them, whereas I 
ain’t been comforted.” (P11) 
96. “I think I have this thing where...in work...most people will come to me...I’m like an agony 
aunt.  Which is ironic…” (P7) 
Fear of burdening others  97. “I don’t want to burden anybody else with it…I don’t want to burden anybody else with 
what I’ve been feeling.” (P3) 
98. “I tend to refuse people’s help, I tend to not want to take anything.” (P2) 
99. “…I’m really rubbish and I’ve always been quite rubbish about people supporting me, in 
whatever capacity.  Be it emotionally or....I’m quite bad at that, and so to be reliant on 
anyone, I find very difficult.” (P4)   
P = participant number
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9.3.7. Resilience, protective factors and coping strategies 
Patients described factors that they perceived as being positive in their functioning or 
that facilitated coping with their difficulties.  Some described having resilient 
personality traits and several patients recognised factors in their lives that were 
protective in some way.  All patients described the use of coping strategies, adopted 
during times of emotional distress.  Table 45 provides representative quotations. 
 
Resilience 
Several patients described themselves as being emotionally ‘strong’, a ‘fighter’, tough 
and able to cope with adversity (statements 100 and 101).  Some patients described 
this as a trait that had been learned early in life.  Moreover, some perceived 
themselves as positive/optimistic, with a ‘glass half full’ outlook on life (statements 
102 – 105).  Several patients referred to a high need for control and independence 
(statements 106 – 108), and found that the occurrence of DS had significantly reduced 
their experience of confidence and autonomy in this regard (statements 106 - 108).   
 
Protective factors  
A range of protective factors were mentioned, often viewed as positive aspects of 
patients’ lives.  Spouses, family members and friends were discussed in positive terms 
by most patients, as sources of support and encouragement (statements 109 and 110).  
Additionally, some patients described academic and occupational success, also 
seeming to form a part of their sense of identity and self-confidence (statements 111 
and 112).  For some patients, work provided a relief from difficult life circumstances 
or emotions (statement 113).   
 
Coping strategies 
The use of coping strategies was evident in most of the sample.  These strategies 
most commonly involved attentional and behavioural distraction techniques, in 
addition to relaxation strategies such as meditation, martial arts, and enjoyment of 
music or nature (statements 114 – 118).  A common, but less adaptive strategy was 
self-isolation and behavioural avoidance of social situations during times of acute 
emotional distress (statements 119 – 121), labelled ‘shutting down’ by several 
patients.   
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Table 45. Themes relating to resilience, protective factors and coping 
Theme Sub-theme Typical statements 





















100. “I had to toughen up, to be strong…so I was a fighter, I fight for things that I want...” 
(P6) 
101. “I’ve always been able to cope with everything… because if you don’t help yourself, 
nobody will help you…” (P3) 
 
102. “...if there is a negative, I try to turn it into a positive.”  (P5) 
103. “…before I had all these things happen to me, I know that I was generally happy, a 
happy and outgoing person.” (P9) 
104. “I think I’m quite a positive person.  I always look, I look positively on anything, I try to 
be optimistic, no matter what comes my way…” (P15) 
105. “I’ve always been more of a glass half full than glass half empty person....” (P9) 
 
106. “He married a confident, incredibly confident, incredibly bossy, forceful, dominant 
woman.  And I am a very very long way away from the person that he married now. I’m not 
that person now.”  (P1) 
107. “…I was, I did everything. I was in charge and that was it, full stop.  But now, I’ve lost 
it, I just haven’t got the confidence I had...With the seizures, since I’ve been having these 
turns...I was always independent, always.  But I’ve lost it…I can’t cope with this, because it’s 
not me, I’m not in control, and I don’t like that.” (P3)  
108. “I don’t like losing control…in things which are related to me, it’s definitely out of the 
question.”  (P10) 








109. “I know, even on my worst days, that fundamentally I am actually really lucky, and I’m 
actually very happy…I know that I’m lucky with my lot, and everything I’ve got in my world, 
my family, my friends, and everything...”  (P1) 
110. “I’ve got people around me, so that helps you deal with things better and it makes you 
feel a little bit better, just knowing that people, you’ve got friends that’ll be there…” (P8) 
 
111. “I did excellently at school, I made sure I did excellently at college, I did excellently in 








112. “…sometimes I just think ok yeah, stop complaining...you can have a job, some people 
don’t have jobs, they don’t have qualifications, or they are very sick and things like that.” 
(P7) 
 
113. “...it’s the one place that I always feel that I can be myself, but even if I don’t feel well, 
if I go into (work), then I immediately feel well, because it’s like a feel-good factor.” (P15) 












Behavioural / social avoidance 
(‘shutting down’) 
114. “There are times when I try and distract myself, if I’ve realised that I’m feeling, you 
know, I’m having a bad day.”  (P1) 
115. “I’ve had to sort of force myself to get out of the depressions and try to find things to 
do to take my mind off it....anything to take my mind off it.” (P12) 
116. “I might go over the beach for a while…that’s nice, it helps, it don’t get me completely 
calm, but it’s a nice relaxing atmosphere and that’s what I try and do, I try and put myself in 
a situation where I go and do something relaxing, and try and calm down.”  (P13) 
117. “If I’m feeling down in the dumps, which I have been this week, I think right I’ll just put 
my music on…it makes me feel better…cos I think of the good times that we had.” (P3) 
118. “...when I was young I did a lot of martial arts, so I learned how to do meditation and 
breathing exercises and things, and I use them now.” (P12) 
 
119. “If I’m going through a stressful time, then I shut down...so I, stop talking to friends…I 
just focus on what I need to try and do, and what have you.  I stop answering text messages, 
and turn off my phone...” (P4) 
120. “So I kind of withdraw, I don’t phone call, I don’t pick up my phone, I don’t go out, I just 
stay in my room...it can go on for days…I tend to...shut down.” (P7) 
121. “...sometimes I have a tendency to shut down.  You know, erm, switch off….you know, 
me mobile phone, and not answer the door….I mean, shut off from society, you know, where 
I won’t come out, you know I’ll I stay in…this is how I find my way of dealing with it.” (P11) 







9.4.1. Summary and interpretation 
The presently described study was conducted in order to gain further insight into the 
emotional experiences of patients with DS, and how these patients perceive their 
emotions to relate to the onset and recurrence of their seizures.  The aim was to 
enrich and extend the quantitative findings described in previous chapters, to 
generate possible hypotheses for future research, and to provide an indication of 
areas of possible importance for clinical intervention.  In order to achieve this, semi-
structured interviews were carried out with a small subsample of patients who had 
completed the quantitative aspects of the research.  The interviews focused on 
patients’ general emotional functioning, how the seizures might relate to emotional 
states and/or difficult life events, and understanding emotions in others.  The findings 
are discussed sequentially below. 
 
General emotional functioning 
It is known that patients with DS tend to present with considerable emotional distress 
and difficulties in regulating emotional reactions, for example, depression, anxiety and 
borderline personality traits (e.g. affect dysregulation) are common in this population 
(see Chapter 2, sections 2.3.2. and 2.3.3).  This study provides further support for 
the existence of altered emotional functioning in this patient group.  It seems that 
patients with DS are most aware of frequent and intense states of negative affect, in 
addition to oscillating mood states (emotional lability) that may occur for specific 
reasons (i.e. in response to stressors), or that may be perceived as relatively 
unprovoked and rather random.  In addition, several patients subjectively described 
(often intrusive) rumination on their affective reactions and the situations that 
provoke them.  This is in line with a finding by Tojek et al. (2000) in which patients 
with DS were found to ruminate about previous life stressors to a greater extent 
than controls with ES.      
 
Moreover, the intermittent episodes of excessive emotional expression described by 
patients seemed to occur when their perceived ability to cope with their emotions 





Difficulties in calming down once such episodes had been triggered were also 
described.  It is interesting to consider whether DS may serve a similar function or 
to these episodic losses in emotional control, as another response to stress or 
negative emotions reaching a threshold (this idea was presented in Chapter 3, section 
3.6).  Nevertheless, the findings described above indicate that patients with DS 
experience considerable emotional distress, dysregulation, and at points, 
externalisation of this affect when it reaches unmanageable levels.  These findings are 
in accordance with some of the quantitative results, in which depression, anxiety, 
affect dysregulation, and tension reduction activities, for example, were found to be 
elevated in the patients compared to the controls (Chapter 5, section 5.3.3).  
Moreover, the present qualitative findings indicate that patients also seem to show 
considerable insight into these emotional phenomena and so are not in outright 
‘denial’ or ignorance of their psychological difficulties.  Several patients directly 
attributed their emotional difficulties to the occurrence of DS, or felt that DS at least 
exacerbated their emotional problems. 
 
It is particularly interesting that the above emotional problems were described 
alongside a general tendency to exert excessive control over the experience and/or 
expression of negative emotion.  Phenomena described within this theme can 
accurately be summed up by the two phrases ‘shutting down’ negative emotions and 
‘putting on a brave face’.  Basically, patients described a tendency towards inhibited 
experience of negative emotion, which could be conceptualised as a dissociative 
mechanism (i.e. emotional constriction, depersonalisation), in those patients who 
experienced this as relatively automatic and involuntary.  For these patients, this type 
of detachment response seemed to have developed into a habitual tendency, possibly 
as a consequence of early life stressors such as familial dysfunction and/or parental 
modelling.   
 
Some patients also avoided expressing genuine emotions to others, and/or referred 
to displaying an overtly positive façade even when this was incongruent with their 
actual emotional state.  For some, this was a voluntary coping strategy, and seemed 
to be linked to beliefs regarding the necessity for complete independence, autonomy 





pertaining to elevated scores on dissociative symptoms, such as emotional 
constriction and depersonalisation described in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.3). Moreover, 
this may also be related to the findings of Urbanek et al. (2014), that patients with DS 
report exerting greater control over states of anxiety and sadness, and more negative 
beliefs about emotions (e.g. shameful, irrational, useless), relative to healthy controls.     
 
The strong links between emotions and bodily experiences described by some 
patients also suggested that negative affect was associated with in an exaggerated 
focus on somatic symptoms and experiences.  This is in line with the research findings 
that have shown high levels of somatoform symptoms in patients with DS (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.3.2), and the findings on somatoform dissociation presented in 
Chapter 5 (section 5.3.3).  Together, these findings suggest that in patients with DS, 
difficult emotions and heightened stress may manifest as a variety of somatic 
symptoms (e.g. pain, gastrointestinal upset, sleep disturbance), and such symptoms 
may allow the individual to reduce the subjective experience of those unpleasant 
emotional states.  The specific mechanisms by which emotion may give rise to 
somatoform symptoms is a fascinating and important area for further neurobiological 
studies.   
 
Stressful and traumatic life events 
The themes pertaining to stressful and traumatic life events, once again, generally 
reflected and extended the findings of previous studies (Chapter 2, section 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2), and the results on adverse life events presented in Chapter 5 of the present 
thesis (section 5.3.3).  The qualitative findings described here indicate that patients 
with DS experience a wide range of adverse life events and perceive their lives as 
currently and/or historically very difficult.  The fact that abuse (physical, emotional, 
sexual) was disclosed by several patients further suggests the aetiological importance 
of these types of experience in DS, and shows that patients are generally aware of 
these experiences and the impact they have had.  Several patients also described 
locking these experiences away, burying them or suppressing them, which indicates 
that the trauma and psychological consequences may not have been fully processed 





complex and unresolved response to early traumatic experiences that may contribute 
significantly to the development of DS.     
 
Relationship disturbances were also clearly present for many patients, particularly 
involving problems with significant others that appeared longstanding and difficult to 
resolve.  Again, this is in accordance with previous quantitative studies, in which 
family/relationship dysfunction has been reported several times in this group (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.3).  Several patients described dysfunctional family dynamics in 
childhood, with considerable insight into the possible psychological consequences of 
these relationships.  Moreover, relationship crises and/or breakdown occurred 
immediately prior to DS onset in some cases.   It is interesting to note that these 
reports conflicted with the fact that childhood family dysfunction was not observed 
when measured quantitatively (Chapter 5, section 5.3.3).  It might be the case that 
the dysfunction described in the qualitative study was of a different nature to those 
aspects assessed using the Family Environment Scale, or that only a subgroup of 
patients experienced childhood family dysfunction. 
 
Whilst there were other generally traumatic or adverse life events described in the 
current study (i.e. bereavement, occupational stress), which were often multiple, the 
consistent references to somatic complaints and medical illnesses highlights the 
important and distressing role that bodily-related experiences play for this patient 
group.  The symptoms and occurrence of DS were described as a significant stressor 
that impacted on emotional functioning in the short- and long-term.  Therefore, it is 
clear that DS has a negative impact on patients’ stress levels and functioning.  
Moreover, the presence of other (possibly medically unexplained) symptoms is also 
important, as these were often long-term and seemed to cause considerable distress 
or reduced functioning.  The most commonly reported complaints were pain and 
sleep disturbances.  These symptoms could increase a tendency towards an 
attentional focus on somatic processes, in addition to causing increases in general 
distress (e.g. health-related anxiety).   
 
Furthermore, sleep disruption is known to increase the likelihood of other physical 





increased subjective/physiological signs of stress.  Therefore, it seems that sleep 
deprivation might exacerbate or contribute to the problems experienced by some 
patients with DS and should potentially be explored in further studies.  However, as 
recently noted by Pavlova, Allen and Dworetzky (2014), sleep disturbances have not 
yet been studied extensively in this group.  
 
It was interesting to note that, for some patients, these somatic complaints were 
attributed to negative emotions (i.e. anxiety, stress), and so it seems that these 
variables could be bidirectionally related.  In other words, as with DS themselves, the 
experience of pain and sleep disturbances are likely to increase emotional distress, 
allocation of attention to bodily processes and physiological stress responses, but 
these responses are also likely to exacerbate the somatic symptoms, thereby creating 
a perpetuating cycle.     
 
Emotion and DS 
The study has also provided further evidence indicating that traumatic and/or stressful 
life events serve as precipitating factors for the initial onset of DS.  The finding that 
almost all patients in this study could identify at least one stressful circumstance or 
life event at the time of DS onset indicates a fairly consistent pattern.  Moreover, the 
wide range of events described indicates that precipitating stressors may take a 
variety of forms, including physical trauma (e.g. severe medical illness, invasive medical 
procedures), bereavements, occupational stress, relationship crises, and bullying.  
Again, these findings generally concur with findings from previous studies (e.g. Binzer 
et al., 2004; Bowman & Markand, 1996; 1999; Tojek et al., 2000).   
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that whilst most patients could identify stressors 
around the time of seizure onset, many did not portray a clear understanding of the 
ways in which such stressors might contribute to the occurrence of DS.  Therefore, 
patients seemed to have limited insight into the processes by which their seizures had 
been triggered by the life events described.  On the other hand, it was clear that some 
patients had a better understanding of how their emotional states might relate to the 
ongoing occurrence of DS.  The theme of DS being a form of emotional release or 





are also reminiscent of those reported by Carton et al. (2003) and Wyatt et al. (2014), 
for example.   Patients’ perceptions of DS as a release or shutting down of emotion 
are in line with the commonality of ictal dissociative experiences (mental state 
symptoms of depersonalisation/derealisation) reported in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.3).  
Together, this lends preliminary support to the proposal that DS are dissociative 
phenomena (see Chapter 3, section 3.6).  However, there are limitations to this 
interpretation (see below section 9.4.3), and so this must be seen as a tentative 
conclusion at present.   
 
The inconsistency with which DS were associated with particular emotional states 
indicates that, if triggered by emotion, the relationship is not specific to any one 
emotional state (e.g. anger, fear), but rather that DS may be triggered by a variety of 
intense emotions.  In addition, as many patients described DS occurring during times 
of relative happiness or relaxation (similarly to patients interviewed by Wyatt et al., 
2014), it might be that the emotional ‘shut-down’ or ‘release’ does not necessarily 
occur in response to one emotional episode, but indeed might well occur after a 
gradual build-up and when the individual is in a ‘safer’ situation for the attack to occur.  
Either way, the lack of consistency most likely underlies the perceived unpredictability 
of the seizures and may make attempts at control or prevention more difficult.  The 
perceived unpredictability of seizures expressed by the patients in this study concurs 
with previous literature that suggests that many patients feel that their attacks occur 
‘out-of-the-blue’ (Reuber et al., 2011).   
 
Emotions and experiences that were reported to occur after the seizures were 
somewhat more consistent and predominantly included exhaustion, frustration, 
weeping, and a sense of relief.  It was apparent, therefore, that there were 
considerable emotional consequences of seizure occurrence in the short-term.  This 
echoed the fact that patients also felt that there had been significant longer-term 
negative emotional consequences of the disorder.  Again, there are clinical 
implications related to these findings, in that approaches incorporating seizure-related 
beliefs and representations (e.g. cognitive behavioural therapy) may be useful in 
assisting patients to develop more adaptive emotional responses to the occurrence 





address the causal processes, such approaches could prevent worsening of emotional 
functioning and seizure occurrence. 
 
Relating to others 
The finding that patients generally described sensitivity to others’ emotional states 
was particularly interesting, in the light of previous research and the experimental 
findings presented in this thesis.  Patients’ statements suggested that they were very 
much aware of and responsive to others emotions, which was seen as a positive 
tendency but also as negative by some.  This accords well with the findings of Bakvis, 
Roelofs, et al. (2009) and those presented in Chapter 6 of the current thesis, that 
patients with DS show exaggerated vigilance for outward signs of others’ emotional 
states (i.e. from facial expressions).  Furthermore, the qualitative findings described 
here suggest that at least some patients are aware of this tendency and so it may not 
be operating entirely under the level of conscious awareness.  Indeed, some patients 
were able to reflect on the origin of this vigilance, in difficult childhood family 
relationships.   
 
Moreover, patients’ subjective insights indicated that whilst this vigilance can at times 
be beneficial in their social relationships, for some it can also be detrimental, 
particularly when the social emotional cues are misread and the evaluation is 
inaccurate.  Again, in the light of the quantitative findings presented in Chapter 7, this 
is particularly interesting.  Those results suggested that patients with DS were 
generally less accurate than controls in reading facial expressions.  Combined then, it 
seems that in this patient group, there is vigilant monitoring of others’ emotions and 
some degree of ‘jumping to conclusions’ in interpreting others’ expressions.   
 
The theme regarding caring for and supporting other people may also be linked to 
the above pattern.  Patients tended to describe themselves as the person that people 
turned to with their problems, as supportive and empathic individuals.  It is possible 
that the vigilance to others’ emotions may be facilitative of DS patients noticing signs 
of distress or negative affect in others’ and thus, intervening and providing support 
when necessary.  This is also likely to be associated with the tendency to appear 





emotions.  As such, it seems that the general tendency is that patients with DS appear 
to inhibit the experience/expression of their own emotions (particularly negative), 
whilst being attuned towards and responsive to those of other people.   
 
Coping, resilience and protective factors 
The fact that patients often referred to their resilient personality traits (e.g. being a 
fighter, optimistic, positive) suggested that they perceived themselves as proficient in 
coping with adversity and felt psychologically ‘strong’.  Again, this seemed to be 
closely associated to the high levels of control and independence preferred by these 
patients, and the ability to exert high levels of regulation over their emotions.  In 
some cases, the resilience was seen as a natural response to the high levels of 
adversity that patients had experienced during their lives.  However, for some 
patients, it was felt that the occurrence of DS had negatively affected these resilient 
characteristics and had left them less confident, in control and independent.  This was 
clearly a source of considerable distress in some instances.   
 
It is possible that an exaggerated emphasis on being resilient in the face of adversity 
and maintaining a relatively positive perspective may be crucially linked with the 
tendency to not tolerate the experience or expression of negative affect.  Therefore, 
these beliefs and expectations imposed on the self could be an important mediator 
of the relationship between traumatic/stressful life events and the development of 
somatoform/dissociative symptoms, including DS.  Put simply, patients’ psychological 
resistance to processing and expressing trauma- or stress-related negative affect (i.e. 
the belief that acknowledging negative affect or accepting support is a weakness) could 
directly increase the tendency towards dissociation (psychological/somatoform) and 
thus, the development of DS or other MUS. 
 
The coping strategies described in this study were also of interest.  Several patients 
described using distraction techniques to cope with difficult emotions or situations, 
some of which appeared to be rather useful and adaptive strategies to allow them to 
feel calmer or less anxious, such as meditation, listening to music, the internet, or 
enjoying nature.  However, the common reports of using behavioural and social 





less adaptive, and that could be detrimental to their general functioning.  The 
excessive use of behavioural avoidance, for some, included prolonged periods of self-
imposed isolation, which would necessarily lead to reduced socialisation, physical 
exercise, among other consequences.  Once again, though, these reports are in 
accordance with previous literature which has indicated a tendency towards avoidant 
coping in this group (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.1).  These findings suggest that this is 
an important area for clinical intervention.     
 
Finally, the various protective factors described, such as supportive relationships, 
occupational and educational achievements, were also suggestive of areas for 
potential intervention in this group.  It seems that, whilst patients with DS are very 
much aware of the stressors and traumatic events in their lives, some can also 
recognise areas in which they feel fortunate.  As such, it may be that the presence of 
such protective factors limits the impact of DS, and may allow relatively better 
functioning than in those patients without them.  Indeed, as seen in Chapter 1, findings 
have previously shown that outcomes tend to be better for patients with DS who are 
in employment (e.g. Duncan et al., 2011), those with more years of education (e.g. 
Reuber, Pukrop, Bauer, et al., 2003), and those who are accompanied by a supportive 
other to their first clinic appointment (Arain et al., 2007). It is possible that for 
patients out of employment, or with less education and positive social contacts, social 
interventions aimed at the development of occupational, educational and 
interpersonal skills might provide considerable benefits.   
 
9.4.3. Strengths and limitations 
This study had several strengths.  Whilst quantitative studies have previously explored 
emotional functioning using self-report and experimental techniques, this is the first 
study to explore patients’ phenomenological perspectives on these topics.  The study 
provided insights into a number of important aspects of emotional functioning in 
patients with DS, from their own perspectives.  Therefore, the study showed the 
extent to which patients were aware of their emotional strengths and difficulties, and 
provided rich information regarding how patients experience emotions and DS to be 






The findings of the study have a number of clinical implications, which if applied in 
practice, could allow interventions to target specific emotion-related processes in this 
group (e.g. emotion regulation, stress management, beliefs regarding emotional 
strength/resilience), in addition to seizure-related cognitions.  Furthermore, the study 
has provided insights that could be used to generate testable hypotheses that could 
be examined in further quantitative study.  The study also provided the patients 
included with an additional opportunity to be involved formally in a research 
programme seeking to address aetiological factors in the disorder, with more 
flexibility than quantitative techniques alone would allow.  To date, most qualitative 
studies have focused on reactions to the diagnosis and treatment-related issues.   
 
In terms of limitations, there are several that apply to this study as with qualitative 
studies in general.  Obviously, the lack of inclusion of a control group in such a study 
precludes drawing absolute conclusions regarding the specificity of the findings to 
patients with DS.  It is possible that some of the phenomena described may be present 
in other clinical disorders or in healthy individuals.  Whilst this can be seen as a 
limitation of qualitative research, the goal of this study was not to draw firm causal 
conclusions regarding emotional functioning in DS, but rather to explore patients’ 
understandings of such processes from their individual experiences, and to identify 
areas of possible importance for clinical interventions.    
 
Moreover, another possible limitation is that this study aimed to examine patients’ 
subjective and conscious experiences of the links between emotions and DS.  
According to most theoretical models of the disorder, the mechanism underlying this 
relationship is likely to occur below the level of conscious awareness.  Indeed, the 
involuntary nature of the seizures is often underscored by patients generally 
perceiving their seizures to be beyond conscious control, and because they find it 
difficult to describe a specific relationship between emotional states and the 
occurrence of DS.  Therefore, it could be argued that an attempt to examine patients’ 
conscious access to these processes is unlikely to be informative.  However, the study 
has shown that this sample of patients with DS were able to introspect and reflect on 
their general emotional functioning and processing styles, which in itself provides 





interest that several patients were able to formulate a possible mechanism by which 
their emotions might be linked to their DS, in the form of an emotional release or 
shut-down.  Therefore, it seems that at least some patients with DS are able to 
demonstrate insight into a possible emotional mechanism underlying their seizures.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that a consistent relationship between specific emotions and 
the onset of seizures is either not present, or is not discernible by patients 
themselves. 
 
It should be noted, however, that an important possible influence on patients’ 
responses in this study was any formulation provided by relevant clinicians.  For 
example, all patients included in the sample had received a diagnosis of DS, and as 
such are likely to have received verbal and/or written explanations as to how the 
seizures might be related to psychological factors.  In addition, some patients may 
have been directed towards internet-based resources for individuals with functional 
neurological symptoms.  Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the views 
expressed by patients in this study had not been in some way influenced by clinician’s 
or other experts’ theoretical viewpoints.  Nevertheless, one of the exclusion criteria 
for recruitment for this study (as with the quantitative studies) was having undergone 
psychological interventions for DS, so it can be assumed that none of the patients 
included had experienced extensive therapeutic input that might have focused on 
seizure- or emotion-related beliefs or processes.      
 
It is also important to note that within IPA, the investigator actively interprets the 
data provided by participants and as such, this interpretation may be in some ways 
biased by the sociocultural and professional background of that investigator.  Indeed, 
whilst efforts were made to ‘bracket’ such influences when interpreting patients’ 
responses, bias cannot be excluded.  It is not possible to conclude that the research 
student was theoretically neutral at the time of the interviews or the analysis, having 
prior theoretical knowledge pertaining to DS and related processes (i.e. dissociation, 
trauma-related psychopathology). Therefore, it is possible that the interpretations 
provided in this chapter may have been influenced by this prior knowledge.  





and avoid making significant theoretical assumptions that were not consistently 
supported by patients’ statements.   
 
9.4.4. Conclusions 
The current study has shown that patients with DS have considerable insight into 
their emotional functioning and how their life events and emotional responses might 
relate to the initial onset of DS, and ongoing seizure recurrence.  Almost all patients 
could identify life events that may have contributed towards the initial onset of DS, 
or that were ongoing.  The findings indicated the experience of considerable 
emotional distress and dysregulation that was often long-standing, but also 
exacerbated by the development of DS.  Despite these difficulties, patients were 
generally aware of others’ emotions and needs, and invested effort in caring for and 
supporting others.  However, there was a clear tendency for the patients to highly 
value emotional resilience, control and independence, and to exert excessive levels 
of control over their experience and expression of negative emotions.  These 
tendencies represent a psychological coping mechanism whereby short-term 
functioning and the appearance of ‘coping’ are maintained.  This excessive emotional 
control, however, is not maintained consistently, and may contribute to episodes of 
excessive emotional dysregulation.  Indeed, DS may represent a consequence of this 
unprocessed and ‘bottled up’ negative affect, allowing the individual to release or 
‘shut-off’ from the resultant emotional experience.  Future research might seek to 





Chapter 10. General discussion 
 
10.1. Summary and interpretation of key findings 
The main findings are briefly summarised and interpreted individually in the 
subsections below.  For parsimony, many of the exploratory findings are not discussed 
again in this section.  Each section discusses how the key findings might relate to the 
models first proposed in Chapter 3 (section 3.6).  Table 46 displays a summary of the 
aetiological variables supported by the findings presented in the thesis, and how they 
might contribute to the development, onset and/or maintenance of DS.  The variables 
in bold are those that received the strongest support (i.e. experimental evidence, 
regression analyses) in the current research.   
 
10.1.1. Psychosocial factors 
Social/environmental factors 
The data generally supported previous findings and the hypotheses set out in Chapter 
5.  Patients with DS reported significantly more adverse life events and greater impact 
of these events, relative to the control group.  More specifically, rates of sexual and 
physical abuse were elevated relative to controls, although no differences were noted 
for emotional abuse or neglect.  Regression analyses suggested that the experience 
of sexual abuse was best predictive of a diagnosis of DS.  The qualitative study also 
indicated the importance of remote traumatic experiences, particularly childhood 
abuse. However, a range of traumatic and/or stressful life events were disclosed by 
patients in the interviews, which were often multiple or prolonged.  Other life events 
described included medical/somatic symptoms, diagnoses or crises, relationship 
conflict/disturbance, among other stressors (e.g. occupational stress).   
 
These findings provide additional support for the importance of a range of previous 
adverse (traumatic/stressful) life experiences in predisposing to DS, although sexual 
abuse seemed to be a particularly important risk factor.  This finding is consistent 
with the high rates of sexual abuse found in this patient group in previous literature 
(Sharpe & Faye, 2006).   
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Table 46.  Aetiological factors in dissociative seizures supported by the present research 
Predisposing Precipitating Triggering Maintaining 
 
Traumatic experiences (particularly 
physical/sexual abuse) and heightened 
perceived impact of events 
 
Borderline personality characteristics 
 
Psychopathology (post-traumatic 







Elevated autonomic responsivity to 
affective stimuli 
 
Hypervigilance to emotional facial 
expressions 
 
Reduced recognition and autonomic 








Traumatic events or 
trauma-associated events 
 




responsivity to affective 
stimuli  
 
Hypervigilance to emotional 
facial expressions  
 
Reduced recognition and 
autonomic responsivity to 





















responsivity to affective 
stimuli 
 
Hypervigilance to emotional 
facial expressions 
 
Reduced recognition and 
autonomic responsivity to 
emotional facial expressions 
*these factors are likely to be bidirectionally related to DS occurrence 






Traumatic experiences in childhood and adolescence might influence mental 
health/psychopathology, personality development, emotional processing, and 
tendencies towards dissociation, and thus might interact with other predisposing 
factors in increasing the risk for DS.  In addition, traumatic experiences might interact 
with pre-existing psychological vulnerabilities (e.g. cognitive deficits), in predisposing 
to the disorder.  Traumatic and/or stressful experiences also seem to precipitate the 
onset of the disorder.  The qualitative finding that almost all patients described one 
or more stressful/traumatic events around the time of seizure onset supports this 
hypothesis.   
 
The quantitative findings regarding childhood family functioning, however, were 
discordant with previous research and the hypotheses of the study.  The current 
sample of patients with DS rated their childhood family context similarly to controls.  
No differences were apparent for any of the domains examined, including childhood 
family control, expressiveness, conflict, cohesion, or independence.  Therefore, it 
seems that childhood family dysfunction is not a universal or key causal factor in DS, 
although it might moderate the effects of other childhood traumas.  Nevertheless, 
several patients disclosed difficult relationships or dynamics with one or more family 
members during childhood, although this was often in the context of other, more 
secure and adaptive attachment relationships.  In the qualitative study, several patients 
referred to protective factors in their lives, such as work-related and/or educational 
success/achievements and supportive relationships with family members, romantic 
partners, or friends.  These protective factors may moderate the effects of the risk 




In line with the hypotheses and previous literature (See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2), 
patients with DS reported elevations in depression and anxiety relative to controls, 
suggesting heightened levels of emotional distress.  Subjectively, patients described 
several emotional difficulties including episodes of intense negative affect (often 





with some degree of traumatisation (i.e. rating one or more life event as having had 
at least moderate impact), reported significantly elevated post-traumatic symptoms 
relative to traumatised controls, across all symptom types (i.e. arousal, avoidance, re-
experiencing, total).  Moreover, 66.7% of the patient sample met criteria for a 
diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) according to DSM-IV (data were 
collected prior to DSM-5 publication).  In the qualitative study, several patients 
discussed the impact that previous trauma (particularly in childhood) had had on their 
emotional functioning.  These findings highlight the possibility that DS are associated 
with a complex and pathological psychological response to traumatic life events.  
 
For some, these difficulties (e.g. depression, anxiety, trauma-related distress) 
predated the onset of DS and so might have acted as a predisposing or precipitating 
factor.  In contrast, for others, depressive symptoms seemed to have developed after 
the seizure disorder, suggesting that DS might have triggered or caused the negative 
affective state.  In such cases, once triggered, depressive symptoms might perpetuate 
DS, by increasing emotional distress and general dysfunction.   
 
Psychological and somatoform dissociation 
The current research provided further evidence for elevated psychological and 
somatoform dissociative tendencies in patients with DS, and supported the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 5 (section 5.1.2).  The use of a dimensional measure 
of psychological dissociation (Multiscale Dissociation Inventory) allowed the 
examination of a range of dissociative experiences, with the patient group receiving 
higher scores on all subscales (relative to controls), including Depersonalisation, 
Derealisation, Emotional Constriction, Memory Disturbance, Identity Dissociation 
and Disengagement.  Moreover, somatoform dissociation was also significantly 
elevated in the patient group compared to controls, as measured with the 
Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire.   
 
A tendency towards reduced/inhibited experience and expression of (negative) 
emotions was also apparent in the qualitative findings, labelled ‘shutting off’.  Patients 
also expressed strong links between emotional states and physical problems (e.g. pain, 





findings seem to relate to dissociative mechanisms whereby unwanted emotional 
experiences are dissociated from conscious awareness in order to reduce their 
impact.  These mechanisms seem to represent the way in which, at least some 
patients with DS, cope with their emotions in general.  However, these dissociative 
processes might also represent the underlying mechanism by which DS are triggered 
(see Chapter 3, Figure 1).      
 
Borderline personality features 
The results on the Inventory of Altered Self Capacities suggested that patients with 
DS display elevated behavioural and psychological tendencies that would be 
associated with BPD.  These included elevations (relative to controls) in concerns 
about abandonment in important relationships, affect dysregulation, tension reduction 
activities, and identity disturbances.  Interestingly, the regression analyses in the 
current study indicated that, of the variables entered, scores on the subscale 
measuring affect dysregulation were best predictive of a diagnosis of DS.  The 
qualitative findings also indicated that emotional dysregulation (alternating moods, 
emotional outbursts, difficulties reducing emotional arousal) was particularly 
problematic and/or distressing for most patients. 
 
These findings support those of previous studies (e.g. Reuber, Pukrop, et al., 2004).  
Therefore, it seems that affect dysregulation (and/or other borderline traits) might 
be an important predispositional factor for DS.  These characteristics could be central 
to the emotional distress experienced by patients with DS, and might, therefore, 
increase the risk of developing dysfunctional ways of coping with such distress (e.g. 
externalising or avoiding intense negative affect, somatisation/dissociation).  
However, it is also suggested here that such personality traits might perpetuate the 
disorder, by contributing to emotional disturbances, dysfunctional coping and 
relationship problems on an ongoing basis, and therefore maintaining distress. 
 
10.1.2. Emotions and dissociative seizures 
In the qualitative interviews, most patients could not identify any one emotional 
trigger for ongoing DS, suggesting that emotional triggers might involve generalised 





explicitly described their seizures as a way of releasing or ‘shutting off’ from intense 
emotional states.  It was clear, however, that patients often experienced a range of 
negative emotional states following the occurrence of DS, suggesting that the seizures 
have a negative short-term impact on emotional functioning. 
 
The quantitative findings pertaining to ictal symptoms partially supported those of 
previous studies (e.g. Goldstein & Mellers, 2006).  The most common ictal symptoms 
were those of autonomic arousal (AA; i.e. racing heart, sweating), mental state 
(predominantly reflecting depersonalisation/derealisation), and cognitive symptoms 
(cognitive manifestations of anxiety/fear).  Goldstein and Mellers (2006) reported that 
ictal AA symptoms were significantly more common in patients with DS relative to 
those with ES, which is consistent with the commonality of these symptoms in the 
sample included in the present research (most recent seizure = 88.9%; most severe 
seizure = 91.7%).  This supports the hypothesis that DS are associated with elevated 
sympathetic ANS activation, as proposed by Goldstein and Mellers (2006) and in the 
model presented in Chapter 3 (Figure 1).  However, the findings also extended those 
of the previous study, by showing that cognitive and mental state symptoms were 
also reported by a considerable proportion of patients (80-100%).   
 
These findings suggest that during (or around the time of) DS, patients may 
experience considerable subjective anxiety (cognitive symptoms), in addition to 
feelings of detachment from the environment or themselves (mental state symptoms).  
Moreover, the significant correlations between dissociation scores 
(depersonalisation/derealisation) and ictal mental state symptoms further suggested a 
clear link between dissociative states and seizure symptoms.  It is possible that the 
cognitive and autonomic symptoms of anxiety trigger a dissociative response, 
manifesting in the seizure symptoms and psychological dissociation.  This hypothesis 
is discussed further below, with reference to the proposed model of DS.  
 
10.1.3. Emotional processing  
Preconscious facial expression processing 
The main findings from the emotional Stroop experiment (Chapter 6) were that, after 





elevated attentional bias towards preconsciously processed emotional faces 
(angry/happy), relative to healthy control participants.  Taken together with the 
findings of Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009), this study provides additional support for the 
hypothesis that patients with DS show altered processing of others’ emotional facial 
displays, when these displays are not readily available to conscious awareness.  Whilst 
Bakvis et al. reported a specific effect with reference to angry faces, the current 
findings suggested that the effect was more generalised, including both happy and 
angry faces.   
 
The findings are tentatively interpreted as a preconscious hypervigilance to alterations 
in the emotional states of other people.  Interestingly, several patients described being 
highly aware of and attuned to others’ emotional states (or changes in them), 
suggesting some degree of insight into this tendency.  Moreover, a proportion of the 
sample reported some awareness of the facial stimuli in the emotional Stroop test; 
therefore, the preconscious nature of this bias is questionable, in the present study.  
In addition, it was not possible to exclude the possibility that medication use (i.e. 
AEDs) may have influenced the findings presented in Chapter 6.   
 
Nonetheless, if such a hypervigilance is replicated in other studies, it would suggest 
that this bias is an important feature of the emotional processing style of patients with 
DS.  As such, it might contribute to elevated levels of emotional distress and arousal 
in patients with DS, due to (preconscious) processing of potentially irrelevant 
emotional signals in others.  Moreover, this hypervigilance might cause interference 
with other important psychological processes, as suggested by the findings of Gul and 
Ahmad (2014), for example.  This interference could disrupt functioning in other 
domains, including cognitive processing and social behaviour.  As such, this bias might 
act as a predisposing or perpetuating factor in DS.  Furthermore, these preconscious 
processes might contribute to triggering individual DS, by contributing to elevated 
emotional distress and/or arousal, possibly without patients’ awareness of the reasons 








Conscious facial expression processing 
The key finding described in Chapter 7 was that when patients explicitly attended to 
facial expression stimuli, they displayed reduced recognition accuracy.  This effect was 
independent of depression, anxiety, education, general face processing abilities and 
medication use (i.e. AED or antidepressant use).  However, there were no group 
effects for intensity ratings, suggesting that patients could accurately determine the 
level of emotional intensity in emotional facial expressions.  The deficit was, therefore, 
specific to determining the emotional meaning of the expressions.  Moreover, 
reduced autonomic responses (SCRs) to these stimuli were also observed in a 
subgroup of participants, relative to controls.  These findings are in contrast to some 
patients’ subjective reports of being sensitive to and adept at understanding the 
emotional states of others, in the qualitative study.  However, it is interesting that 
some patients acknowledged that at times, they misinterpreted others’ emotional 
states.  
 
The deficit in determining the emotional meaning of facial expressions might be a 
predisposing factor in the development of DS.  One possible explanation could be 
that developmental trauma (e.g. abuse, relationship disturbances) might disrupt 
emotional learning processes, whereby particular facial expressions would usually 
become associated with specific behaviours in others and/or particular emotions in 
the developing individual.  Disruptions to this process might lead particular 
expressions to be associated with the ‘wrong’ emotional states in the self or others.  
This tentative hypothesis was suggested by the exploratory finding that recognition 
accuracy for neutral faces was negatively correlated with trauma scores.  Despite 
such a hypothetical disruption, it is possible that the level of expressed/provoked 
emotional intensity could be learned appropriately, just in connection with the wrong 
emotional state (this would explain the lack of group differences in intensity ratings).   
 
On the other hand, the reduced recognition and autonomic responding to facial 
expressions might represent a form of inhibitory, avoidant or dissociative response 
to them, which would serve to limit their potential psychological impact.  Again, such 
a tendency might have developed in response to being exposed to unusually frequent 





the facial expressions might reflect some form of habituation process; whereby 
patients’ have become desensitised to the emotional significance of others’ facial 
expressions.  Regardless of the specific cause of the deficit, reduced recognition and 
somatic responses to emotional facial expressions are likely to be associated with 
considerable distress and disturbed social functioning.  As such, these tendencies 
could also perpetuate DS on an ongoing basis, and/or trigger individual attacks (see 
below for further discussion).    
 
Emotional responding to consciously perceived affective images 
Contrary to the hypotheses of the study presented in Chapter 8, no between-groups 
differences were observed in subjective emotional reactions to general affective 
images.  Whilst the findings regarding valence were consistent with those of Roberts 
et al. (2012), the negative findings for arousal ratings were not.  Roberts et al. 
reported elevated arousal ratings for positive and neutral images, relative to controls.  
It is likely that methodological factors might have accounted for such differences.  The 
findings of the current study suggested that patients with DS experienced similar 
valence (positivity-negativity) and emotional arousal (low-high) as healthy individuals, 
in their subjective responses to the images.   
 
However, in a subgroup of participants (autonomic ‘responders’), the DS group 
showed elevated SCRs relative to controls, and this did not seem to be specific to 
one particular category of stimuli.  This latter finding was independent of the influence 
of depression, anxiety, and medication use (AEDs, antidepressants).  This finding 
suggests that on a physiological level, some patients with DS ‘over-react’ to affective 
images, although these physiological responses do not influence subjective emotional 
experience.  This finding suggests a dissociation between physiological and subjective 
elements of emotion, in this subgroup of patients. 
 
This tendency towards elevated somatic manifestations of emotion might predispose 
to developing DS in some patients.  In addition, this pattern of responding might 
perpetuate the disorder, by contributing to ongoing elevations in general affective 
arousal.  By doing so, such responses might maintain an arousal level that is closer to 





Importantly, elevated autonomic reactions to specific affective stimuli (in the presence 
or absence of subjective responses) might then trigger individual seizures, by causing 
arousal levels to reach such a threshold.  As proposed by Baslet (2011), this threshold 
is likely to vary between patients.  Moreover, the degree of autonomic responsivity 
(and subjective awareness) is also likely to vary between cases.  It is likely that this 
explanation might only apply to a subgroup of patients with DS.  Nonetheless, this 
finding has considerable significance for understanding the mechanisms by which DS 
might occur.    
 
Summary and conclusions - emotion, DS and an affective-dissociation model 
Together, the findings presented in the thesis support several of the propositions 
made in Chapter 3 (section 3.6).  In brief, the supported propositions are that DS are 
dissociative phenomena (i.e. involving a loss of voluntary control and awareness of 
psychological and/or somatic processes), and that emotional processing abnormalities 
may serve as predisposing, perpetuating and/or triggering factors in this disorder.  
Furthermore, the suggestion that elevated arousal levels may trigger individual DS 
occurrence is also tentatively supported.  
 
Regarding the dissociative nature of DS, the thesis has presented evidence that 
patients with DS experience a range of dissociative symptoms, including psychological 
and somatoform manifestations.  These experiences appear to be elevated in general 
daily life, but importantly, patients report dissociative phenomena occurring 
immediately before and during their seizures.  Indeed, some patients articulated a 
clear understanding that their seizures serve the purpose of allowing them to detach 
(i.e. dissociate) from strong and intense emotional states.  Therefore, in terms of the 
model presented in Chapter 3 (Figure 1), the box in which ‘dissociation’ is postulated 
has received support from the research presented.   
 
In light of the findings, the model has been modified (see Figure 15) by the addition 
of the word ‘acute’ to the ‘dissociation’ box.  This highlights the fact that the 
dissociative experiences occurring during DS represent a paroxysmal, time-limited 
state of acute dissociation.  Furthermore, an additional box has been added to the 





dissociative experiences occurring in daily life (i.e. not peri-ictally) may also be present 
in patients with DS (i.e. depersonalisation, derealisation, emotional constriction), and 
might increase the likelihood of acute dissociation (i.e. a DS), by perhaps ‘rehearsing’ 
dissociative responses to aversive psychological/somatic states.  It is also possible that 
these general tendencies towards dissociation are influenced by aberrant emotional 
processing.  
  
Turning to emotional processing biases, the findings have provided further evidence 
for the existence of a preconscious attentional hypervigilance towards social 
emotional signals (facial expressions) in patients with DS.  In relation to the proposed 
affective-dissociation model, the finding informs the top level, in that it represents an 
aberrant emotional processing bias that might contribute to an acute increase in 
affective arousal in some circumstances (e.g. when signs of threat are perceived).   
 
Moreover, this hypervigilance might also contribute to generally elevated affective 
arousal on an ongoing basis, which in turn would increase the likelihood that an acute 
rise in arousal would meet the ‘threshold’ at which DS might be triggered.  In 
accordance with this, an additional box has been added to the model, labelled 
‘generally elevated affective arousal’.  The box previously labelled as ‘elevated affective 
arousal’ has, therefore, been renamed ‘acute elevation of affective arousal’ to specify 
that this triggering arousal is a discrete, time-limited and acute increase.      
 
When processed at a conscious level, patients with DS showed inhibited autonomic 
responses and impaired recognition of the emotional meaning of facial expressions.  
Combined with the hypervigilance described previously, these tendencies could lead 
to a situation in which the individual is overly alert to the emotional states of others, 
yet fails to accurately identify these when explicitly trying to do so.  Regarding the 
triggering mechanism originally outlined in Figure 1, it is possible that subjective 
misinterpretation of others’ facial expressions could contribute to generally elevated 
affective distress and arousal, by causing ongoing difficulties in social interactions 










Aberrant emotional processing 
Hypervigilance to emotional facial expressions  
and/or 
Misinterpretation of / reduced autonomic responding to emotional facial expressions 
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Exaggerated autonomic reactivity to general affective stimuli 
Acute elevation of 
affective arousal 
(conscious / preconscious) 
Acute dissociation 
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In some circumstances (e.g. interpersonal conflict), the consequences of ‘misreading’ 
others’ facial expressions could create an intense/acute increase in emotional distress 
and/or arousal.  Therefore, the deficit in facial expression recognition might 
contribute directly or indirectly to triggering individual DS.  As such, this finding also 
informs the top level of the model displayed in Figure 15.   
 
However, it is slightly more difficult to interpret how the observed reduced 
autonomic responding to facial expressions would relate to the proposed triggering 
mechanism outlined in the model.  One possible interpretation of the findings is that 
attenuated SCRs in response to facial expressions in the short-term (e.g. seconds) 
could contribute to the observed deficit in conscious recognition, which in turn might 
give rise to elevations in emotional distress and arousal in the longer-term (e.g. 
minutes/hours).  These processes require further examination; however, reduced 
autonomic responding to facial expressions seems to be characteristic of at least a 
subgroup of patients with DS, and so it has been added to the top level of the model 
in Figure 15. 
 
Finally, the pattern of findings in the affective picture task suggested that some patients 
with DS generally respond to affectively significant stimuli with exaggerated 
physiological arousal, but that this arousal does not necessarily manifest in alterations 
in subjective experience.  This could be described as a dissociative emotional 
processing style and might result in an accumulation of (somatic) emotional arousal 
that is not fully perceived by the patient.  This response bias has, therefore, also been 
added to the top box in the model.  As such, it could contribute to generally elevated 
affective arousal, thereby increasing the risk of reaching the hypothetical threshold at 
which DS might occur.  However, when patients are faced with a specific stressor or 
adverse situation (e.g. interpersonal conflict, trauma reminders), the tendency to 
autonomically ‘over-react’ might serve as the ‘acute elevation in affective arousal’ 
which reaches the threshold and thus triggers the dissociative episode (the initiation 
of a DS).  
 
It should be noted that the current research did not inform the level of the model in 





that some patients saw their seizures as a culmination of built up emotion, the 
quantitative studies were not designed to test the hypothesis that a threshold is 
required for the initiation of a DS.  Future studies might seek to examine this 
hypothesis more explicitly.  Nevertheless, the concept of a threshold has been 
retained in this model, in order to explain the paroxysmal nature of DS. 
 
 
10.2. General strengths and limitations 
This section summarises the general strengths and weaknesses of the research 
described in the thesis; however, the merits and limitations of the individual studies 
are not repeated here.   
 
10.2.1. Strengths 
A key strength of the research presented is that it is the first attempt to examine 
several different aspects of emotional processing in the same sample of patients with 
DS.  Whilst there have been previous studies of emotional processing in the literature 
(see Chapter 3, section 3.5), this is the first study to assess responsivity to social and 
more general affective stimuli in the same group of patients.  Indeed, the study 
reported in Chapter 7 is the first of its kind in this clinical group.  Moreover, the 
combined use of quantitative and qualitative techniques allowed an assessment of the 
extent of patients’ subjective insights into these processes.     
 
The measurement of relevant psychosocial variables (Chapter 5) also allowed for 
exploratory analyses of potential relationships between emotional processing biases 
and these variables.  In addition, it was possible to control for potential confounding 
variables (e.g. depression, anxiety) when examining group differences on the 
experimental tasks, which allowed a more rigorous analysis of emotional processing 
biases specific to patients with DS.  Furthermore, the inclusion of relevant 
standardised cognitive tests in the battery was an additional advantage, in that it was 
possible to determine whether the two groups showed equivalent performance on 
tests of cognitive abilities that may have affected performance on the experimental 
tests.  Where the groups did not perform at a similar level, it was possible to 






The inclusion of a DS sample (n=40) larger than that used in several previous studies 
is also an advantage.  Previous studies have tended to include samples of between 10 
and 20 patients (e.g. Bakvis, Roelofs, et al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2012), although some 
investigators have recruited larger samples (e.g. Gul & Ahmad, 2014; DS n = 72).  The 
inclusion of 40 patients allowed adequate statistical power to detect between-groups 
differences with covariates included in the analysis, and for the exploratory 
correlational and regression analyses.  Moreover, the patient and control samples 
were generally well-matched on important characteristics that might have otherwise 
affected the findings obtained, including gender, ethnicity, and age.  The exclusion of 
potentially confounding medical and psychiatric diagnoses from both samples also 
allowed a more precise examination of any differences specific to DS only. 
 
A strength of the statistical methods used was that stringent alpha levels and/or post-
hoc corrections were applied in determining the significance values, when multiple 
tests were conducted.  This consideration ensured that the probability of Type 1 
errors was minimised, and that the findings reported were more likely to reflect 
genuine effects rather than spurious findings relating to elevated familywise error.   
 
10.2.2. Limitations 
A key limitation of the research was the use of a cross-sectional between-groups 
design, which can create difficulty in interpreting the direction of causality for 
significant effects.  For example, whilst Chapter 7 showed between-groups differences 
in facial expression recognition between groups, it was not possible to conclusively 
infer whether the deficit in recognition in the DS group contributed to the disorder, 
or whether the disorder caused the differences.  Other types of research design can 
improve the confidence with which conclusions can be drawn (i.e. prospective 
longitudinal designs).   
 
Another potential limitation is the lack of a clinical comparison group.  Whilst it was 
considered important to include a healthy control group in order to assess relative 
differences to normative performance on the measures included, an additional clinical 





groups are discussed below in section 10.4.  The main problem with comparing 
performance of patients with DS to healthy controls is the fact that DS is confounded 
with medication use, the experience of chronic seizures, and/or loss of psychosocial 
functioning due to the seizures (i.e. social, occupational and educational constraints).  
Whilst the inclusion of a control group of patients with ES would rectify these issues, 
this would not be an appropriate control group due to the potential for seizure-
related neurological issues (e.g. medial temporal sclerosis) to influence affective 
processes in that group (e.g. Meletti et al, 2009).     
 
Related to the above is the fact that it was not possible to unequivocally exclude the 
possible influence of medication on the performance of the patients on the emotional 
Stroop test.  As discussed in Chapter 6, it is known that AED use can be associated 
with cognitive side-effects (e.g. Aldenkamp et al., 2003) and mood alterations (e.g. 
Nadkarni & Devinsky, 2005), which could potentially have influenced the findings  
presented.  However, several measures were taken to assess this possible source of 
influence.  Various cognitive abilities (e.g. memory, general intellectual functioning, 
general face processing) and emotional distress (e.g. anxiety, depression) were 
measured and controlled for statistically (where differences were identified).  
Moreover, examination of absolute reactions times in Chapter 6 indicated that 
processing speed was not significantly slower in the DS group.  In addition, it has been 
reported that the number of AEDs taken by patients with ES had no influence on 
facial expression processing in that group (Meletti et al., 2009).  In fact, these authors 
found that the only AED to have a possible effect on facial expression processing was 
phenobarbital (which none of the patients in the present sample were taking at the 
time of testing).   
 
However, it is known that the use of antidepressants (SSRIs in particularly), might 
affect emotional/facial expression processing and its neural correlates (Arce et al., 
2008; Browning et al., 2007; Harmer et al., 2003; 2006; Merens, van der Does, & 
Spinhoven, 2007).  The literature on the effects of serotonin manipulations is 
complex; however, effects are often apparent in both healthy and clinical populations, 
such as enhanced recognition of facial expressions.  Whilst the influence of 





was apparent on the emotional Stroop test in the present research.  Future studies 
should include larger sample sizes of patients, with sufficient numbers of medicated 
and unmedicated individuals, thereby allowing a comparison of the possible influences 
of medication on these processes.   
 
An additional possible weakness in the research presented here was that the diagnosis 
of DS was not based on video-EEG for all patients in the sample.  The gold-standard 
in diagnosis of DS is now considered to be video-EEG, which provides a fairly 
conclusive test of the nature of the habitual seizures experienced by patients.  In this 
study, 67.5% of patients had undergone video-EEG as part of the investigations into 
their seizures, with 90% having undergone routine EEG and 80% reporting at least 
one MRI scan.  Altogether, these rates suggest that misdiagnosis would not have been 
a substantive issue in this sample.  However, whilst unlikely, there is a small possibility 
that at least some of the patients included here may have suffered from comorbid 
current or previous epilepsy.  An implication is that possible comorbid ES may have 
affected the measures of emotional processing (e.g. Meletti et al., 2003).  However, 
this limitation would also apply if 100% of the patient sample had undergone video-
EEG, as an absence of epileptiform activity in the monitoring unit does not provide 
absolute certainty that the individual does not also experience some ES.   Therefore, 
this limitation is one that must be considered when examining any study of this nature 
in this patient group.   
 
Furthermore, all patients were recruited from specialist neuropsychiatry clinics.  Not 
only would these patients be more likely to be complex cases and/or presenting with 
psychiatric comorbidities, all patients would have accepted a referral to mental health 
services.  This represents a potential source of bias in the sample.  Moreover, 
regarding seizure semiology, patients were not categorised into subgroups on the 
basis of seizure ‘types’ (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.2).  It may have been beneficial to 
examine subgroups of patients on this basis, in order to examine whether any of the 
psychosocial or emotional processing variables were associated with particular 






An additional limitation of this study was that the groups were not sufficiently 
matched for years of education (YoE).  Whilst attempts were made to match this 
variable during recruitment, the final sample differed significantly.  Whilst YoE was 
controlled for statistically within the data analyses, this is not a desirable difference 
between experimental groups.  For example, within some of the regression analyses, 
the effect of YoE remained significant when other factors were held constant, 
suggesting that this factor was an important predictor of group status.  Despite this 
difference, the groups did not differ on general intellectual functioning (IQ) scores; 
therefore, the difference in education does not seem to have been associated with 
considerable differences in cognitive functioning. 
 
Statistically, some authors have argued that it is not appropriate to control for 
differences in variables that vary systematically between two populations (e.g. 
depression or anxiety in this instance), using statistical corrections.  For example, 
Miller and Chapman (2001), argued that ANCOVA is widely misused to this effect, 
particularly in psychopathology research.  However, whilst this argument may hold 
for some variables, it is not the case that differences in anxiety and depression 
necessarily reflect a substantive difference between patients with DS and healthy 
controls.  There are many healthy individuals who experience mild to moderate 
symptoms of anxiety and depression, and likewise there are many patients with DS 
who do not.  Moreover, as discussed above, it is just as likely that depression and 
anxiety are a consequence of the seizures as that they contribute to the causation of 
DS.  The aim of the research here was to determine the potential emotional 
processing biases specifically associated with DS, and so the decision to control for 
symptoms of common psychopathology was made.  Future studies might seek to 
manage this issue in alternative ways, such as including control groups of individuals 
with subclinical or clinical levels of depression or anxiety but without DS (or any 
other dissociative or conversion disorder).     
 
10.3. Possible implications of the current research 
The current findings have considerable implications for the understanding and 
treatment of DS.  In terms of theoretical implications, a better understanding of 





are most at risk of developing the disorder, the mechanism by which individual seizures 
are triggered, and possible emotional processing biases which might contribute to 
perpetuating the seizures.  As discussed previously, negative and/or trauma-related 
emotions have been seen as a core cause of DS and conversion/dissociative disorders 
for some time.  However, the empirical literature has generally not sufficiently 
examined emotional processes in DS as yet.  Whilst work has started to be published 
in this area, there are still many questions to be answered.  The research presented 
here was an attempt to answer some of these questions, and to indicate important 
avenues for further experimental research. 
 
On a practical level, the most important implications are those pertaining to clinical 
issues such as diagnosis and treatment of patients with DS.  Given that DS seem to 
be associated with alterations in emotional processing, avenues for relevant 
interventions might involve the development of stronger emotion recognition skills, 
or might be aimed at reducing attentional distraction by emotional stimuli.  These 
could be carried out using computerised training packages, for example.  Cognitive 
interventions such as cognitive bias modification (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009), 
utilise experimental methodologies to attempt to modify dysfunctional biases in other 
clinical disorders (e.g. depression, anxiety; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011).  Perhaps similar 
techniques could be applied to the specific biases present in patients with DS (which 
would require further elucidation in research studies first).  
 
Moreover, a suitable clinical approach might focus on integrating awareness of 
subjective and somatic emotional experiences.  Importantly, techniques could perhaps 
aim to develop patients’ awareness and tolerance of somatic emotional arousal.  
Interventions aimed at managing, reducing or releasing affective/somatic arousal may 
be particularly relevant (e.g. relaxation, meditation, physical exercise).  Whilst some of 
these approaches might currently be incorporated into other treatment models (i.e. 
CBT), some patients might benefit from more focused work in these areas.  Vancini et 
al. (2014) have recently advocated the recommendation of physical exercise 
programmes for individuals with DS.   
 





generally, aiming to improve patients’ willingness and ability to tolerate and work 
through negative affective states, rather than avoiding or dissociating during them.  
Indeed, Howlett and Reuber (2009) incorporated aspects of emotional processing in 
their integrated treatment approach for patients with DS.  Mindfulness-based 
therapies may well be useful for patients with DS (Baslet, 2011; 2012; Baslet et al., 
2014; Baslet and Hill, 2011).  Mindfulness-based therapies could facilitate the allocation 
of attentional resources to possible triggers and internal states, allowing patients to 
gain more insight into the series of events that serve to initiate their seizures (Baslet, 
2011).   
 
Psychoeducation aimed at informing patients about the types of symptoms that might 
be dissociative might be beneficial, so that patients can identify such symptoms and 
then possibly redirect attention to their emotional precipitants, in order to develop 
more adaptive coping responses.  Indeed, psychoeducational websites and pamphlets 
are becoming more common in ‘first-step’ treatment of DS (e.g. Mayor et al., 2013; 
N.C. Thompson et al., 2013).   
 
Moreover, given the findings presented in this thesis, another possibly useful approach 
might be the use of mentalisation-based therapies, as have been applied with patients 
with BPD (e.g. Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; 2006).  Mentalisation-based therapies aim to 
improve patients’ ability to consider the mental states of the self and others, and how 
these might relate to behaviour.  As such, these techniques might be particularly 
beneficial for interventions with patients diagnosed with DS who report similar 
difficulties as patients with BPD (e.g. affect dysregulation, interpersonal conflict, 
tension reduction activities).  Moreover, the evidence for impaired facial expression 
recognition in the current sample (Chapter 7) also indicates the possible value of this 
type of approach.     
 
Relating to the findings on traumatic experiences, it is possible that interventions 
might seek to explicitly address trauma-related distress.  Treatments for PTSD have 
increasingly focused on facilitating emotional processing of the traumatic memories, 
with evidence to suggest that techniques such as prolonged exposure and EMDR are 





2012).  Perhaps, in patients who disclose significant traumatic histories or who meet 
criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD, referral to PTSD specialist clinicians might be 
appropriate.  It is possible that patients diagnosed with DS should routinely be 
screened for trauma history and post-traumatic symptomology. 
 
10.4. Directions for future research 
The current section includes suggestions for future research pertaining to the studies 
of emotional processing only.  As mentioned previously, further research may seek 
to compare emotional processing in DS patients with additional clinical groups.  For 
example, it might be valuable to include a group of participants reporting symptoms 
of anxiety or depression only (without any dissociative, conversion or somatoform 
disorder/symptoms), in order to provide a more rigorous control for these 
symptoms than can be achieved using statistical methods (as in the current study).  
On the other hand, a control group of patients with PTSD symptoms without DS 
could be included in future studies, in order to differentiate them from traumatised 
patients with DS (as carried out by Roberts et al., 2012, for example), and thus 
examine specifically what is unique about traumatised individuals who develop DS 
compared to individuals who develop more common post-traumatic symptoms (e.g. 
re-experiencing).  Furthermore, in terms of establishing similarities or differences 
between DS and other dissociative/conversion disorders, an additional control group 
from one of these categories (e.g. conversion paralysis, conversion movement 
disorder, depersonalisation/derealisation disorder) might also be of interest. 
 
The possibility of using additional experimental paradigms to examine emotional 
processing should also be considered.  The paradigms utilised in the studies reported 
here are fairly well established techniques that have been used widely in other clinical 
groups.  However, there are a variety of other possible techniques that could be used 
to extend the current findings, as several questions remain unanswered.  Regarding 
preconscious processes, it is important that additional studies aim to provide further 
examination of the extent to which hypervigilance to emotional facial expressions 
occurs on a preconscious or conscious level.  Other paradigms could be utilised that 
allow the manipulation of such stimuli and the measurement of subsequent 





other priming paradigms.  The degree of awareness of the stimuli could be 
systematically varied by altering presentation time, and it might be interesting to 
conduct between-groups analyses between patients who have different degrees of 
awareness.  This would allow an examination of the possible influence of conscious 
awareness on emotional responding, for example.   
 
Regarding explicit facial expression processing, it might be of value to explore the use 
of ‘morphing’ paradigms (e.g. Calder et al., 1996), in which participants are required 
to detect a specific emotion in facial expressions that systemically vary from neutral 
to the target emotional expression in small successive steps.  This type of paradigm 
is more comparable to detecting dynamic changes in facial expressions in real-life than 
viewing static prototypical images of faces, and it is possible that this might be of 
relevance in this population (i.e. given the proposed hypervigilance to such signals).    
 
A clear direction for future research is to further examine emotional processing of 
stimuli that extends beyond facial expressions.  Given the fact that exaggerated 
autonomic responding to general affective stimuli was observed in Chapter 8, it would 
be of interest to examine whether this patient group show preconscious attentional 
biases towards such stimuli, or particular categories of them (e.g. negative stimuli).  
This would indicate whether the preconscious bias observed in Chapter 6 extended 
to other, more varied stimuli.  Another possibility would be to study emotional 
processing of trauma-related stimuli in patients with DS.  Whilst there are ethical 
concerns that would need to be addressed in carrying out such a study, the possible 
theoretical and practical value may justify the use of such methods.   
 
It might also be relevant to explore whether there are attentional biases towards 
stimuli (words, pictures) that relate to physical trauma (e.g. injury, surgery, illness) or 
psychological trauma (interpersonal conflict, violence, abuse).  If attentional biases to 
such stimuli were revealed, there would be direct and important theoretical and 
therapeutic implications.  Studies in patients with PTSD and borderline personality 
disorder have utilised personalised trauma scripts, yielding important insights (e.g. 





investigators to more precisely examine the specific types of traumatic experience of 
relevance to patients with DS.    
 
Moreover, as seen in other psychological disorders, emotional processing biases often 
tend to relate to stimuli that are somehow directly relevant to the symptoms of the 
disorder itself (e.g. threat and anxiety, negative stimuli and depression, physical 
symptom stimuli in somatoform disorder, see Chapter 6, section 6.1).  Therefore, an 
important next step in this area would be to include stimuli that have direct relevance 
to the symptoms of DS, in order to examine the extent to which patients exhibit 
particular cognitive biases that might underlie or contribute to the occurrence of 
their seizures.  These could involve words linked to seizure symptoms (e.g. drop, 
faint, swoon, shake, blank, panic, attack, paralysed, fear).  Given the wide variety of 
different presentations, such stimuli could be personalised for each patient included.  
Another possibility is the use of images relating to the seizures, which could either 
be generic or again, could be personalised for each patient.  The ‘Implicit Association 
Test’ measures implicit attitudes and could be used to further examine patients’ 
implicit cognitive schemas about their symptoms, for example.  Recently, Dimaro et 
al. (2014) used a similar measure to examine anxiety-related beliefs in DS patients 
(see Chapter 3, section 3.5.2).  Again, such studies might directly inform cognitive 
interventions in the disorder. 
 
It seems that a crucial area of additional research is to further explore emotional 
processes leading up to, and around the time of individual seizures.  This would allow 
further examination of some of the hypotheses generated by the qualitative studies 
and those proposed to trigger DS in the model presented in the current chapter 
(Figure 15).  Such studies might aim to monitor sympathetic arousal or activation of 
the HPA-axis on an ongoing basis for a given period of time, perhaps taking 
measurements at regular intervals.  These physiological measures might be combined 
with the use of experience sampling (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) to examine 
subtle fluctuations in mood and emotion leading up to and following individual 
seizures.  A pragmatic and potentially feasible way of conducting such a study might 
be during inpatient stays in an epilepsy monitoring unit.  Such a study carried out in 





nutrition, activity, substance use) than if it were carried out on an outpatient basis.  
This type of study would also represent a prospective design, in which the research 
staff and patients would be blind to diagnosis, although the possibility of a DS diagnosis 
might be known.     
 
Finally, in terms of research design, a longitudinal study of emotional processing in 
this group is likely to be particularly informative, perhaps with measurements taken 
at initial onset of the disorder and then at intervals over its course (possibly before 
and after treatments).  This would provide further evidence as to the direction of 
causality between emotional processing biases and DS.   
 
10.5. Conclusions 
To conclude, DS are complex and severely disruptive phenomena.  The remote 
causes of the disorder are likely to be the combined presence of a variety of risk 
factors, most likely rooted in developmental trauma and/or severe/multiple stresses.  
These life experiences seem to cause or amplify specific alterations in psychological 
functioning (e.g. dissociative tendencies, affect dysregulation, avoidant coping, 
depression/anxiety), and may combine with other vulnerabilities (e.g. neurological 
differences, cognitive deficits) to increase the risk of the initial onset of DS.  Shaping 
variables, such as exposure to symptom models (i.e. family member DS or ES) may 
serve to direct these vulnerabilities towards DS rather than a different type of MUS.  
In adulthood, adverse life events (e.g. medical trauma, general traumatic events, 
multiple stressors, relationship crises) and ongoing psychological vulnerability (e.g. 
elevated stress/arousal levels, dissociative tendencies, PTSD, depression/anxiety) may 
elevate emotional dysfunction to such a level that the individual’s cognitive, affective 
and behavioural means of coping are no longer sufficient, and thus, affective arousal 
may reach an intolerable threshold.  At this point, the initial presentation of DS is 
proposed to be precipitated and the first seizure occur.   
 
Within this thesis, it has been argued that DS are acute and severe dissociative states, 
characterised by losses in voluntary control and awareness of cognitive, affective, 
sensorimotor and behavioural processes.  This acute dissociative state has been 





patients with DS.  Furthermore, it has been suggested that this extreme manifestation 
of dissociation (DS), may be related to and possibly exacerbated by a more general 
‘trait’ style of dissociative responding.  DS as a dissociative state, are hypothesised to 
be triggered by an acute elevation in already raised levels of affective arousal.  The 
generally elevated levels of affective arousal seem to be perpetuated by a variety of 
psychosocial factors that may differ between patients.   
 
Importantly, the results presented in the thesis have provided additional evidence for 
aberrant processing of affective stimuli in patients with DS.  These differences include 
a preconscious hypervigilance for emotional facial expressions, alongside reduced 
explicit recognition and autonomic responding to such stimuli when they are available 
to conscious awareness.  Moreover, the findings have suggested a tendency towards 
exaggerated autonomic responsivity to more general affective visual images, in the 
absence of any alteration in subjective responding to these stimuli, in patients with 
DS.   
 
Together, the findings indicate that these important differences in emotional 
processing could play a critical role in the psychological mechanism that underlies DS 
occurrence.  Specifically, these aberrant emotional processes might contribute to 
acute elevations in affective distress and arousal which would serve to trigger a severe 
and disruptive dissociative reaction.  Therefore, these aberrant affective processes 
could be seen as the proximal cause of the occurrence of individual DS episodes, in 
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Appendix 3. Information sheet for patients (quantitative) 
 
 
Information Sheet for Participants with Dissociative Seizures 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study at the Institute of Psychiatry (IoP), King’s 
College London.  This study is part of a student research project (PhD) being undertaken 
in the Department of Psychology, IoP.  Before you decide whether to participate, you need 
to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you 
wish.  Feel free to ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. 
 
Study title:  Emotional processing in patients diagnosed with Dissociative Seizures. 
(LREC: 08/H0807/82) 
 
Purpose of the research:   The aim of this study is to look at how people diagnosed with 
Dissociative Seizures perceive and respond to emotionally meaningful information, in 
comparison to people without this diagnosis.  Important differences in how emotional 
information is experienced and responded to may contribute to some of the symptoms that 
occur in Dissociative Seizures, and therefore this investigation may provide a more 
detailed understanding of the condition.  People diagnosed with Dissociative Seizures vary 
widely in many ways.  Therefore this research will also assess whether different ways of 
perceiving emotional information are linked to other characteristics, such as personality 
traits, particular life events, and seizure-symptoms.   We will examine how these 
characteristics differ from participants who do not have this diagnosis.   
  
 
Why have I been invited?  You have been invited to participate on the basis of your 
recent visit to the Neuropsychiatry Unit at the Maudsley Hospital or the Psychological 
Medicine Department at King’s College Hospital.  A total of 40 people diagnosed with 
Dissociative Seizures and 40 people without this diagnosis will be included in the study.  
 
Do I have to take part?  No.  It is entirely your decision whether you take part in the study 





and asked to sign a form agreeing to take part.  However, you would be able to withdraw 
from the study at any time, or refrain from particular aspects of the research without giving 
a reason.  If you decide not to participate or you withdraw from the study at a later stage, 
this will in no way affect the medical treatment that you receive now or in the future.   
 
What will happen to me if I decide to take part?  First, the researcher (Susannah Pick) 
would need to assess your eligibility for the study on the basis of information about you 
that was collected when you were seen at the clinic.  Following this, the researcher would 
let you know if you are eligible for the study.  If you are not eligible you won’t need to do 
anything else.  If you are eligible, you would be invited to the Institute of Psychiatry 
(adjacent to the Maudsley Hospital, Denmark Hill) on a day that is convenient for you.  On 
arrival, any questions will be answered and the procedure for the study will be explained 
in full.  You will be provided with an a sheet which includes details of each test and 
questionnaire you will be asked to complete.  You will also be able to ask any questions 
about the tests at this stage.   
 
When you are ready to begin, you would initially carry out three computerised tasks that 
involve looking at a variety of pictures and making simple judgements about them, such 
as whether they are pleasant or unpleasant.  During two of these tasks, small sensors will 
be attached to three fingers on one of your hands (these sensors do not lead to any 
discomfort).  You are not required to have previous experience with computers for these 
tasks.  Four brief tasks will then be administered by the researcher, and finally you would 
be asked to complete a number of questionnaires.  The researcher will be present 
throughout the session, to answer any questions or assist you as necessary.  The study 
will involve only one visit to the IoP although it will take approximately 5 hours to complete.  
However, several breaks will be provided (including a lunch break).   
 
Expenses & payment:  You will receive a payment of £30 as reimbursement for your time 
and up to £20 for your travel expenses incurred in getting to the IOP. 
 
Possible risks & disadvantages of taking part: No direct health risks are expected to 
result from this study.  However, it is important for you to be aware that some of the pictures 
to be presented to you include unpleasant content, and therefore may be distressing.  
However they are generally no more distressing than images commonly seen on the 
television news or in newspapers.     
 
In addition, some of the questionnaires given to you include questions about potentially 
sensitive issues that some participants may find difficult, such as whether or not you have 
experienced any traumatic events in your lifetime, and the nature of these events.  It is 





and you will be given the option to opt-out of completing these on the day.  If you feel 
concerned about these aspects of the study please feel free to discuss this further with the 
researcher.  If you feel that any aspect of the research has caused you to be distressed 
on the day, you would be welcome to talk to the researcher about this, who will be available 
to provide any information, support and reassurance you may need.  We can also provide 
you with a range of options to support you in managing any distress, and would discuss 
these with you if necessary to determine the most appropriate for you at the time. 
 
Due to the length of the testing session and the number of different activities involved, it is 
also possible that you may feel tired by the end of the day.  For this reason, several breaks 
will be included and the tasks that require most concentration and attention will be 
completed earlier in the day.  Additional breaks can also be taken on request.  
 
Potential benefits of taking part:  There will be no immediate benefit to you for taking 
part in this study.  However the aim of the research is to increase the current understanding 
of this condition, which would indirectly benefit both yourself and other people who are 
diagnosed with DS. 
 
What happens if something goes wrong?  While we do not anticipate any adverse 
effects from taking part in this study, if you are harmed by taking part in this research 
project, there are no special compensation arrangements.  If you are harmed due to 
someone’s negligence you may have grounds for a legal action, but you may have to pay 
for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect 
of how you have been treated or approached during the course of the study, the normal 
National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be available to you.  Furthermore, 
if you have any problems or queries during the course of the study, you would be welcome 
to address these with the researcher.   
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? All information provided will be treated as 
confidential and will be managed exclusively by the researchers involved.  You will not be 
identified on our computers or in publications by name.  Participants will be given a unique 
reference number for storage and analysis of their data.  Therefore this is anonymous after 
the point of collection.  Any information about you will have your name and address 
removed so that you cannot be recognised from it.  This data will be stored on password-
protected computers at the IoP for 10 years after which it will be destroyed.  However there 
are some limitations to the confidentiality of the data collected during the study.  If there is 
any indication of risk to your own/another’s safety, the information will be passed on to 






What will happen to the results of the study:  The results of the study will be 
summarised in articles that will be submitted for publication in scientific journals and 
presented at conferences.  You will not be identified in any published report or article 
unless your consent is sought to do so.  Copies of any published articles and a brief 
summary of the results will be sent to participants on request.  However each individual 
person’s results will not be provided.  The results of this study will also form the basis of a 
doctoral thesis (PhD) that will be written by the primary researcher (Susannah Pick).        
 
Discontinuation of the study by the investigators:  At any time during the study, the 
investigators have the right to discontinue your participation in the study for any reason.  If 
later on in the study it is concluded that you are no longer able to consent to participating, 
we would like to be able to continue to use any data that we have already collected, 
although this would not include any of personal details that could identify you in any way. 
 
Who is organising the research?  The study is being funded by the Department of 
Psychology, IoP.  It is being organised by Miss Susannah Pick (Postgraduate Research 
Student), under the supervision of Professor Laura Goldstein (Professor of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, IOP) and Dr John Mellers (Consultant Neuropsychiatrist, SLaM NHS 
Foundation Trust).   
 
Who has reviewed the study?  This study has been granted ethical approval by the Joint 
South London and Maudsley & Institute of Psychiatry NHS Research Ethics Committee 
(Ref: 08/H0807/82).  The study has also been reviewed by the Dept of Psychology PhD 
Research Committee. 
 
Further information & contact details:  If you wish to discuss any aspect of the study 
please feel free to contact the researcher, referring to the below contact details. 
 
Susannah Pick 
Department of Psychology, PO Box 78 
Institute of Psychiatry 
King’s College London 
De Crespigny Park 
London 
SE5 8AF 
Tel: 020 7848 0766 
Email: susannah.pick@kcl.ac.uk 
 
If you require more information about the study, you can also contact Professor Laura 





(l.goldstein@kcl.ac.uk) or Dr John Mellers (Consultant Neuropsychiatrist) Tel 020 3228 
2330. 
 
If you wish to seek independent advice on whether to participate or not you can contact 
the Patient Advice & Liaison Service on 0800 731 2864 or PALS@slam.nhs.uk. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet.  You can keep this copy.  If you have 
understood the contents of this sheet and wish to take part, please inform the researcher 
that you are willing to sign the consent form.  If you have any further questions, please feel 







Appendix 4. Information sheet for control participants (quantitative) 
 
Information Sheet for People without Dissociative Seizures 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study at the Institute of Psychiatry (IoP), King’s 
College London.  This study is part of a student research project (PhD) being undertaken 
in the Department of Psychology, IOP.  Before you decide whether to participate, you need 
to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you 
wish.  Feel free to ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. 
 
Study title:  Emotional processing in patients diagnosed with Dissociative Seizures.  
(LREC: 08/H0807/82) 
 
Purpose of the research:   Dissociative Seizures are episodes of altered awareness and 
behaviour that resemble epilepsy, but are not found to have a physical cause.  It is thought 
instead that Dissociative Seizures are caused by psychological factors. The aim of this 
study is to look at how people diagnosed with Dissociative Seizures perceive and respond 
to emotionally meaningful information, in comparison to people without this diagnosis.  
Important differences in how emotional information is experienced and responded to may 
contribute to some of the symptoms that occur in Dissociative Seizures, and therefore this 
investigation may provide a more detailed understanding of the condition.  People 
diagnosed with Dissociative Seizures vary widely in many ways.  Therefore this research 
will also assess whether different ways of perceiving emotional information are linked to 
other characteristics, such as personality traits, particular life events, and seizure-
symptoms.  We will examine how these characteristics differ from participants who do not 
have this diagnosis.   
 
Why have I been invited?  You have been invited to participate on the basis of your 
response to our recent advertisement/having registered your details on the MindSearch 
database.  A total of 40 people diagnosed with Dissociative Seizures and 40 people without 
this diagnosis will be included in the study.  We would still like to ask you some further 







Do I have to take part?  No.  It is entirely your decision whether you take part in the study 
or not.  If you decide to take part, you will be given a copy of this information sheet to keep 
and asked to sign a form agreeing to take part.  However, you would be able to withdraw 
from the study at any time or refrain from particular aspects of the research if you so wish, 
without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I decide to take part?  You would be invited to the Institute of 
Psychiatry (adjacent to the Maudsley Hospital, Denmark Hill) to take part in the study on 
a day that is convenient for you.  On arrival, any questions will be answered and the 
procedure for the study will be explained in full by the researcher.  You will be provided 
with a sheet which includes details of each test and questionnaire you will be asked to 
complete.  You will also be able to ask any questions about the tests at this stage.   
 
When you are ready to begin, you will carry out three computerised tasks that involve 
looking at a variety of pictures and making simple judgements about them, such as 
whether they are pleasant or unpleasant.  During two of these tasks, small sensors will be 
attached to three fingers on one of your hands (these sensors do not lead to any 
discomfort).  You are not required to have previous experience with computers for these 
tasks.  Four brief tasks will also be administered by the researcher, and you will also be 
asked to complete a number of questionnaires.  The researcher will be present throughout 
the session, to answer any questions or assist you as necessary.  The study will involve 
only one visit to the IoP although it will take approximately 5 hours to complete.  However, 
several breaks will be provided (including a lunch break).   
 
Expenses & payment:  You will receive a payment of £30 as reimbursement for your time 
and up to £20 for your travel expenses incurred in getting to and from the IoP. We will 
ask you to provide receipts or car mileage details so we can reimburse up to £20 for 
the travel expenses.  
 
 
Possible risks & disadvantages of taking part: No direct health risks are expected to 
result from this study.  However, it is important for you to be aware that some of the pictures 
to be presented to you include unpleasant content, and therefore may be distressing.  
However they are generally no more distressing than images commonly seen on the 
television news or in newspapers.   
 
In addition, some of the questionnaires given to you include questions about potentially 
sensitive issues that some participants may find difficult, such as whether or not you have 





important for you to be aware that you are not obliged to complete these questionnaires, 
and you will be given the option to opt-out of completing these on the day.     If you feel 
concerned about these aspects of the study please feel free to discuss this further with the 
researcher.  If you feel that any aspect of the research has caused you to be distressed 
on the day, you would be welcome to talk to the researcher about this, who will be available 
to provide any information, support and reassurance you may need.  We can also provide 
you with a range of options to support you in managing any distress, and would discuss 
these with you if necessary to determine the most appropriate for you at the time. 
 
 
Due to the length of the testing session and the number of different activities involved, it is 
also possible that you may feel tired by the end of the day.  For this reason, several breaks 
will be included and the tasks that require most concentration and attention will be 
completed earlier in the day.  Additional breaks can also be taken on request.  
 
Possible benefits of taking part:  There will be no immediate benefit to you for taking 
part in this study.  However the aim of the research is to increase the current understanding 
of Dissociative Seizures and could help people diagnosed with that condition.    
 
What happens if something goes wrong?  While we do not anticipate any adverse 
effects from taking part in this study, if you are harmed by taking part in this research 
project, there are no special compensation arrangements.  If you are harmed due to 
someone’s negligence you may have grounds for a legal action, but you may have to pay 
for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect 
of how you have been treated or approached during the course of the study, the normal 
National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be available to you.  Furthermore, 
if you have any problems or queries during the course of the study, you would be welcome 
to address these with the researcher.   
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? All information provided will be treated as 
confidential and will be managed exclusively by the researchers involved.  You will not be 
identified on our computers or in publications by name.  Participants will be given a unique 
reference number for storage and analysis of their data.  Therefore this is anonymous after 
the point of collection.  Any information about you will have your name and address 
removed so that you cannot be recognised from it.  These data will be stored on password-
protected computers at the IoP for 10 years after which it will be destroyed.  However there 
are some limitations to the confidentiality of the data collected during the study.  If there is 
any indication of risk to your own/another’s safety, the information will be passed on to 






What will happen to the results of the study?  The results of the study will be 
summarised in articles that will be submitted for publication in scientific journals and 
presented at conferences.  You will not be identified in any published report or article 
unless your consent is sought to do so.  Copies of any published articles and a brief 
summary of the results will be sent to participants on request.  However each individual 
person’s results will not be provided.  The findings of this study will also form the basis of 
a doctoral thesis (PhD) that will be written by the primary researcher (Susannah Pick).                  
 
Discontinuation of the study by the investigators:  At any time during the study, the 
investigators have the right to discontinue your participation in the study for any reason.  If 
later on in the study it is concluded that you are no longer able to consent to participating, 
we would like to be able to continue to use any data that we have already collected, 
although this would not include any of personal details that could identify you in any way. 
 
Who is organising the research?  The study is being funded by the Department of 
Psychology, IoP.  It is being organised by Miss Susannah Pick (Postgraduate Research 
Student), under the supervision of Professor Laura Goldstein (Professor of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, IoP) and Dr John Mellers (Consultant Neuropsychiatrist, SLaM NHS 
Foundation Trust).   
 
Who has reviewed the study?  This study has been granted ethical approval by the Joint 
South London and Maudsley & Institute of Psychiatry NHS Research Ethics Committee 
(Ref: 08/H0807/82).  The study has also been reviewed by the Dept of Psychology PhD 
Research Committee. 
 
Further information & contact details:  If you wish to discuss any aspect of the study 
please feel free to contact the researcher, referring to the below contact details. 
 
Susannah Pick 
Department of Psychology, PO Box 78 
Institute of Psychiatry 
King’s College London 
De Crespigny Park 
London 
SE5 8AF 
Tel: 020 7848 0766 
Email: susannah.pick@iop.kcl.ac.uk 
 
If you require more information about the study, you can also contact Professor Laura 





(l.goldstein@iop.kcl.ac.uk) or Dr John Mellers (Consultant Neuropsychiatrist) Tel 020 3228 
2330.   
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet.  You can keep this copy.  If you have 
understood the contents of this sheet and wish to take part, please inform the researcher 
that you are willing to sign the consent form.  If you have any further questions, please feel 






Appendix 5. Consent form for patients (quantitative) 
 
Consent Form for People with Dissociative Seizures 
 
Emotional Processing in Patients Diagnosed with Dissociative Seizures 
(LREC: 08/H0807/82) 
 
Researcher: Miss Susannah Pick 
 
Please tick each box if you agree to the statement 
 
 I have read the information sheet for the above stated study, have had time to 
consider the information and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 Further, I understand that I may seek information about each test either before or after 
it is given. 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw from the 
testing at any time without giving a reason, and without my current / future medical care 
being affected. 
 I understand that my personal information will be kept confidential.  
 
 I consent to members of the research team for this study, who are from the Institute 
of Psychiatry and the Maudsley Hospital, having access to my medical records, 
when this is relevant to my taking part in the research.   
 I consent that in the event of a future loss in capacity, any data already collected 
may continue to be used, confidentially, in connection with this study 
 
 I would  like to receive a summary  of the results of the study 
 















_____________________________   ________________ 
Signature of participant      Date 
 
_______________________________ 





 I have explained the study to (name of  participant)  and have answered questions 







Signature of investigator      Date 
 
_______________________________ 













Appendix 6. Consent form for control participants (quantitative) 
  
 
 Consent Form for People without Dissociative Seizures 
 
Emotional Processing in Patients Diagnosed with Dissociative Seizures 
(LREC: 08/H0807/82) 
 
Researcher: Miss Susannah Pick 
 
Please tick each box if you agree to the statement 
 
 I have read the information sheet for the above stated study, have had time to 
consider the information and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 Further, I understand that I may seek information about each test either before or after 
it is given. 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw from the 
testing at any time without giving a reason. 
 I understand that my personal information will be kept confidential.  
 
 I consent that in the event of a future loss in capacity, any data already collected 
may continue to be used, confidentially, in connection with this study 
 
 I would  like to receive a summary  of the results of the study 
 





_____________________________   ________________ 
Signature of participant      Date 
 
_______________________________ 









 I have explained the study to (name of  participant)  and have answered questions 





_______________________________  ________________ 
Signature of investigator      Date 
 
_______________________________ 











Information Sheet for Participants with Dissociative 
Seizures: Follow-Up Interviews 
 
You are invited to take part in a research interview at the Institute of Psychiatry (IoP), 
King’s College London.  This study is part of a student research project (PhD) being 
undertaken in the Department of Psychology, IoP.  Before you decide whether to 
participate, you need to understand why the research is being done and what it would 
involve for you. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others 
about the study if you wish.  Feel free to ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information. 
 
Study title:  Emotional processing in patients diagnosed with Dissociative Seizures: 
Follow-Up Interviews (LREC: 08/H0807/82) 
 
Purpose of the research:   The main aim of this study is to look at how people diagnosed 
with Dissociative Seizures perceive and respond to emotionally meaningful information, in 
comparison to people without this diagnosis.  Important differences in how emotional 
information is experienced and responded to may contribute to some of the symptoms that 
occur in Dissociative Seizures, and therefore this investigation may provide a more 
detailed understanding of the condition.   
 
We are now carrying out a follow-up study, to try to find out how patients diagnosed with 
Dissociative Seizures think that emotions and stress affect them, their lives, and their 
symptoms.  This involves carrying out in-depth interviews with patients who have already 
taken part in the main study, focusing on these topics.  We hope that this follow-up study 
will provide further insights into some possible causes of the disorder, and give us 
information about patients’ own thoughts and feelings about this.   
 
Why have I been invited?  You have been invited to participate as you have now 
completed the main part of this study.  We are now interested in finding out about your 






Do I have to take part?  No.  It is entirely your decision whether you take part in the study 
or not.  If you are interested in taking part, you will be given a copy of this information sheet 
and asked to sign a form agreeing to take part.  However, you would be able to withdraw 
from the study at any time, or refrain from particular aspects of the research without giving 
a reason.  If you decide not to participate or you withdraw from the study at a later stage, 
this will in no way affect the medical treatment that you receive now or in the future.   
 
What will happen to me if I decide to take part?   
. If you agree to take part in this follow-up study we would agree that you would have one 
further meeting with the researcher (SP), during which you would be asked questions 
about your views and understanding of how emotions and stress affect you and your 
seizures.  The researcher will guide the interview with some specific questions, but you 
will also be free to discuss issues that you feel are important to the subject.  This interview 
would take around 30-60 minutes, and would be recorded using a digital voice recorder 
for later analysis.   
 
Expenses & payment:  You will receive a payment of £15 as reimbursement for your time 
and up to £20 for your travel expenses incurred in getting to the IOP. We will ask you to 
provide receipts or car mileage details so we can reimburse up to £20 for the travel 
expenses.  
 
Possible risks & disadvantages of taking part: No direct health risks are expected to 
result from this study.  However, some of the questions asked during the interview may 
pertain to potentially sensitive issues that you may find difficult or uncomfortable, such as 
how emotionally upsetting events/situations tend to affect you.   
 
It is important for you to be aware that you are not obliged to answer all of the questions, 
and you will be given the option to not answer or move to the next question if you wish, or 
to withdraw from the interview at any time.  If you feel concerned about these aspects of 
the study please feel free to discuss this further with the researcher.   
 
If you feel that any aspect of the research has caused you to be distressed on the day, 
you would be welcome to talk to the researcher about this, who will be available to provide 
any information, support and reassurance you may need.  We can also provide you with a 
range of options to support you in managing any distress, and would discuss these with 
you if necessary to determine the most appropriate for you at the time. 
 
Potential benefits of taking part:  There will be no immediate benefit to you for taking 





your own views about how emotion/stress contributes to your symptoms.  We hope this 
will enhance understanding of this disorder among professionals and the general public 
alike, which would indirectly benefit you and other people diagnosed with Dissociative 
Seizures.  
 
What happens if something goes wrong?  While we do not anticipate any adverse 
effects from taking part in this study, if you are harmed by taking part in this research 
project, there are no special compensation arrangements.  If you are harmed due to 
someone’s negligence you may have grounds for a legal action, but you may have to pay 
for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect 
of how you have been treated or approached during the course of the study, the normal 
National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be available to you.  Furthermore, 
if you have any problems or queries during the course of the study, you would be welcome 
to address these with the researcher.   
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? All information provided will be treated as 
confidential and will be managed exclusively by the researchers involved.  You will not be 
identified on our computers or in publications by name.  Participants will be given a unique 
reference number for storage and analysis of their data.  Therefore this is anonymous after 
the point of collection.  Any information about you will have your name and address 
removed so that you cannot be recognised from it.  This data will be stored on password-
protected computers at the IoP for 10 years after which it will be destroyed.  The recordings 
that we make of the interviews will be kept securely until they have been typed out 
(transcribed) and then they will be safely disposed of to preserve your anonymity. 
 
However there are some limitations to the confidentiality of the data collected during the 
study.  If there is any indication of risk to your own/another’s safety, the information will be 
passed on to other relevant professionals.  In this event, you would be informed in 
advance. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study:  The results of the study will be 
summarised in articles that will be submitted for publication in scientific journals and 
presented at conferences.  You will not be identified in any published report or article 
unless your consent is sought to do so.  Copies of any published articles and a brief 
summary of the results will be sent to participants on request.  However each individual 
person’s results will not be provided.  The results of this study will also form the basis of a 
doctoral thesis (PhD) that will be written by the primary researcher (Susannah Pick).        
 
Discontinuation of the study by the investigators:  At any time during the study, the 





later on in the study it is concluded that you are no longer able to consent to participating, 
we would like to be able to continue to use any data that we have already collected, 
although this would not include any of personal details that could identify you in any way. 
 
Who is organising the research?  The study is being funded by the Department of 
Psychology, IoP.  It is being organised by Ms Susannah Pick (Postgraduate Research 
Student), under the supervision of Professor Laura Goldstein (Professor of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, IOP) and Dr John Mellers (Consultant Neuropsychiatrist, SLaM NHS 
Foundation Trust).   
 
Who has reviewed the study?  This study has been granted ethical approval by the Joint 
South London and Maudsley & Institute of Psychiatry NHS Research Ethics Committee 
(Ref: 08/H0807/82).  The study has also been reviewed by the Dept of Psychology PhD 
Research Committee. 
 
Further information & contact details:  If you wish to discuss any aspect of the study 
please feel free to contact the researcher, referring to the below contact details. 
 
Susannah Pick 
Department of Psychology, PO Box 78 
Institute of Psychiatry 
King’s College London 
De Crespigny Park 
London 
SE5 8AF 
Tel: 020 7848 0766 
Email: susannah.pick@iop.kcl.ac.uk 
 
If you require more information about the study, you can also contact Professor Laura 
Goldstein (Professor of Clinical Neuropsychology) Tel 020 7848 0218 
(l.goldstein@iop.kcl.ac.uk) or Dr John Mellers (Consultant Neuropsychiatrist) Tel 020 3228 
2330. 
 
If you wish to seek independent advice on whether to participate or not you can contact 
the Patient Advice & Liaison Service on 0800 731 2864 or PALS@slam.nhs.uk. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet.  You can keep this copy.  If you have 
understood the contents of this sheet and wish to take part, please inform the researcher 
that you are willing to sign the consent form.  If you have any further questions, please feel 







Appendix 8. Consent form (qualitative) 
 
 
Consent Form for People with Dissociative Seizures 




Researcher: Ms Susannah Pick 
 
Please tick each box if you agree to the statement 
 I have read the information sheet for the above stated study, have had time to 
consider the information and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 Further, I understand that I may seek additional information about the follow-up study 
at any time. 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw from the 
testing at any time without giving a reason, and without my current / future medical care 
being affected. 
 I understand that my personal information will be kept confidential.  
 
 I consent to members of the research team for this study, who are from the Institute 
of Psychiatry and the Maudsley Hospital, having access to my medical records, 
when this is relevant to my taking part in the research.   
 I consent that in the event of a future loss in capacity, any data already collected 
may continue to be used, confidentially, in connection with this study 
 I consent to being interviewed where the interview will be recorded using electronic 
auditory recording equipment 
 I consent to the interview being transcribed (typed out) in full, but that my identity 
may not be revealed in this transcript 
 I consent to aspects of what I might say in the interview being quoted directly in 






 I would  like to receive a summary  of the results of the study 
 






_____________________________   ________________ 
Signature of participant      Date 
 
_______________________________ 
Name of participant (in capitals) 
 
 
 I have explained the study to (name of  participant)  and have answered questions 






Signature of investigator      Date 
 
_______________________________ 






























Volunteers required for a Psychology 
research study 
 
Investigating subjective and physiological responses 
to emotionally arousing pictures 
 
We are seeking to recruit healthy volunteers to form a control group for a research 
study investigating the role of emotional processing biases in a specific clinical 
disorder.  The study involves three computerised tasks.  These involve making 
simple judgements about emotionally arousing pictures of people and things.  Two 
of the tasks will also include recording of your responses to the items with small 
sensors on three of your fingers.   
 
You will also be asked to complete several other tasks and questionnaires.  The 
study will take approximately 3-4 hours to complete (including breaks), and you 
will be reimbursed £30 for your time and inconvenience. 
 
You must be between 18 and 65 years old, have no history of / current psychiatric 
condition, neurological illness or substance dependence and be fluent in English.  
Participation in the research would be voluntary and you would be free to withdraw 
at any time. 
 
 
If you are interested in taking part in the study or would like further information, 












ATTACK SYMPTOMS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please indicate whether you have experienced each of the following 
symptoms during your most recent attack and / or during your most 
severe attack by circling Y or N 
 
 Most recent attack Most severe attack 
Shortness of breath 
or smothering 
sensation (CA) 
Y N Y N 
Dizziness, unsteady 
feelings or faintness 
(MS) 
Y N Y N 
Racing or pounding 
heart (AA) 
Y N Y N 
Trembling or 
shaking (AA) 
Y N Y N 
Sweating (AA) 
 
Y N Y N 
Choking (CA) 
 
Y N Y N 
Nausea or abdominal 
distress/ 
butterflies or  knot in 
stomach (CA) 
Y N Y N 
Numbness or 
tingling in arms, legs 
or face (GEN) 
Y N Y N 
Dry mouth or throat 
(AA) 
Y N Y N 
Hot flushes or chills 
(GEN) 
Y N Y N 
Chest pains or 
discomfort (CA) 
Y N Y N 
Feeling that things 
are not real (MS) 
Y N Y N 
Desire to escape 
from the scene of the 
attack (COG) 
Y N Y N 
Thoughts or images 
that you cannot get 
rid of (COG) 
 








Y N Y N 
Feeling that things 
around you are 
strange, unreal, 
foggy or detached 
(MS)  
Y N Y N 
Feeling outside or 
detached from part 
or all of your body 
(MS) 




Y N Y N 
Thinking you are 
going to die (COG) 
Y N Y N 
Thinking “I’m losing 
control” (COG) 
Y N Y N 
Thinking “I’m going 
crazy” (COG) 
Y N Y N 
Thinking “I’m going 
blind” (COG) 
Y N Y N 
Thinking “I’m going 
to be paralysed” 
(COG) 
Y N Y N 
Thinking “I’m going 
to scream” (COG) 
Y N Y N 
Thinking “My attack 
will never end” 
(COG) 
Y N Y N 
Thinking “I’m going 
to black out” (COG) 
Y N Y N 
CA = chest/abdomen symptoms; AA = autonomic arousal symptoms; COG = cognitive symptoms;  







Appendix 12. Stimuli used in the emotional Stroop test 
 
 
Example facial stimuli 
 
                Happiness                          Anger                                Neutral 
   
 
Full list of facial stimuli (from Ekman & Friesen, 1976) 
 
Experimental stimuli: 001, 003, 006, 014, 018, 021, 029, 030, 033, 034, 038, 041, 















You are now going to be shown a pattern many times. 
 
The pattern is an oval shape, made of several lines of colour. 
 
The pattern will be shown in either red, yellow, or green, 
 
(Please press space to continue) 
 
Please say aloud the colour of the pattern, each time you see it. 
 
Please say the colour as quickly and clearly as you can. 
 
Remember: it is only the COLOUR of the pattern that you must look at, nothing more. 
 
Press the space bar for some examples. When you have looked at each example, 
press space to continue. 
 
Please look at the screen at all times during this task. 
 
Also, try not to cough or make any other noises during this task, except saying the 
colour names. 
 
Remember to stay as still as possible throughout the task. 
 
(Please press space to continue) 
 
Please say the colour of each pattern loudly and clearly. 
 
You will now have the opportunity to practise. 
 
Press space when you are ready to begin the practice items. 
 
You have now completed the practice items. 
 
Remember: it is very important that you do not make any other noises during this 
task, except for naming the colours. 
 
When you say the colour names, please speak as loudly and clearly as you can, and 
answer as quickly but as accurately as possible. 
 
When you are ready to begin the task, please press space. 
 

































Full list of facial stimuli (from Ekman & Friesen, 1976) 
 
Practice items: 022, 027, 028 
 
Experimental items:  014, 016, 018, 020, 021, 034, 037, 038, 040, 041, 057, 059, 
061, 064, 065, 085, 088, 089, 091, 092, 093, 095, 096, 098, 099, 101, 104, 105, 





































You will now see many different faces, showing various expressions. 
For each face, you will be asked to decide which emotion is expressed, and how 
intense you think it is. 
Please answer as quickly but as accurately as you can. 
(Please press space to continue) 
 
Some of the faces will show clear emotions, but others may seem neutral. 
Please report your immediate personal reaction to the facial expression, and no 
more. 
There are no right or wrong answers. 
(Please press space to continue) 
 
Before each face, you will see a white cross on the screen for some time. 
Next, the face will be shown for a few seconds. 
Then you will be asked to make two judgements about the facial expression you 
just saw. 
(Please press space to continue) 
 
First, you will be asked which of these emotions was in the face: 
Happiness, anger, fear, disgust, neutral. 
Please give your answer by pressing the number key that is shown next to the 
emotion you saw (these will be different for each face). 
If you think the face showed no emotion you would choose ‘neutral’. 
However, if you think there is an emotion in the face but you’re not sure what it 
is, take a guess, but do not choose neutral. 
(Press space to continue) 
 
Then you will be asked how strong you think the emotion was. 
Please choose a number from 0-7 to show this. 
On this scale, 0 = no emotion, and 7 = the strongest the emotion could possibly 
be. 
You can choose any number form 0-7. 
(Please press space to continue) 
 
Please look at the screen at all times during this task. 
It is also very important that you sit as still as possible throughout this task. 
(Please press space to continue) 
 
Here are some examples of the types of faces you will be viewing. 
Please practise rating these examples as requested on the screen. 
(Press space to begin the practice items) 
 
You have now completed the practice items. 
Remember to look at the screen at all times during this task. 
Please also stay as still as you can. 
Feel free to ask any questions now. 
(Please press space when you are ready to begin) 
 






Appendix 16. Rating screens (facial expression processing task) 
 
Emotion-labelling 





















Appendix 17. IAPS stimuli used in the affective picture viewing task 
 
Example stimuli 





















Practice stimuli: 1721, 2715, 7052 
Experimental stimuli: 1300, 1441, 1610, 2397, 2399, 2490, 2540, 2590, 2811, 
2840, 2880, 3030, 4608, 4660, 5001, 5551, 5621, 5623, 5760, 5833, 6830, 7006, 






Appendix 18. Digitised self-assessment manikin (SAM) screen-shots 
(affective picture viewing task) 
 




















Appendix 19. Standardised instructions (affective picture viewing task)
You will now see many different pictures on the screen, one by one. 
You will be asked to decide how each picture made you feel. 
Please press space to continue. 
Before each picture you will see a cross in the centre of the screen for some time. 
Next, the picture will appear for a few seconds.   
You will then be asked for two ratings about how the picture made you feel.  
Please press space to continue. 
 
One rating is about whether the picture made you experience pleasant or unpleasant 
feelings. 
If you felt completely happy (pleasant, satisfied, contented, hopeful), press 9. 
If you felt completely unhappy (annoyed, unsatisfied, bored), press 1. 
You can also describe feelings in between, by pressing any number from 1 to 9.   
If you felt completely neutral, select 5. 
Please press space to see an example of the scale. 
 
The other rating is about whether you felt calm or excited when looking at the 
picture. 
The scale goes from feeling completely excited (stimulated, jittery, wide awake, 
aroused) to feeling completely relaxed (sluggish, sleepy or calm).   
If you felt completely aroused or excited press 9.   
If you felt totally relaxed and calm press 1.   
Again, you can describe feelings in-between by pressing any number from 1 to 9.   
If you did not feel at all excited or at all calm you would select 5. 
Please press space to see an example of this scale. 
 
Some of the pictures may make you feel strong emotions; others may seem neutral.   
Please rate your immediate personal experience, and no more. 
You will not always be asked to make your ratings in the same order. 
Please press space to continue. 
 
Please look at the screen at all times during this task. 
Here are some examples of the types of pictures you will be viewing and rating.   
Please practise rating these examples as requested on the screen. 
Please press space to begin the practice items. 
 
You have now completed the practice items. 
Please remember to look at the screen at all times during this task. 
Please make your ratings as quickly and accurately as possible. 
It is also very important that you stay as still as you possibly can during the task. 
Feel free to ask any questions now. 
Please press space to begin. 
 










 Can you describe to me, in general terms, what sort of a person you are emotionally? 
Prompts: 
- Do your emotions/feelings change much over time? 
- Do you ever try to change your feelings? 
- Would you say that you generally experience more positive or negative emotions, or roughly the 
same amount of each? 
- Do your emotions ever affect aspects of your life? (e.g. your relationships, work/college) 
- Do you find it easy to name or label what you are currently feeling? 
-  
 How do you tend to respond when you are faced with an emotionally upsetting event or situation? 
Prompts: 
- For example, if somebody does something to upset or anger you?  
- Do you always know straight away when something has upset you? 
- Do you experience any physical changes when you are upset emotionally?  
- Do you tend to express your feelings?   
- Do you find it easy to calm down, once you are upset? 
-  
 How easy do you find it to understand other people’s emotional responses to things (feelings)? 
Prompts:  
- Can you usually tell if somebody is upset, happy, sad, angry, etc? 
- If someone is upset or angry, can you generally understand why they may feel that way? 
- Do you ever feel confused by other people’s reactions to things? 
-  
 Do you feel that your emotions/feelings were involved when your seizures/attacks started? 
Prompts: 
-   If yes, can you give me any ideas about what sort of events or experiences were most important 
in this? 
-     If no, what are your views on the reasons for why you started to have your seizures? 
 
 In your view, are emotions/stress involved in the fact that you are having your seizures? 
Prompts: 
- If so, can you describe how you think this may be happening? 
- Do you feel that you have any control over this? 
- If emotions and stress are not reasons why you have seizures, why do you think that you are having 
seizures? 
 
 During, just before, or straight after your seizures, can you tell me if you regularly experience any 
specific emotions (have any particular feelings)? 
Prompts: 
- E.g. joy, anger, or fear 
- Do you experience a sudden shift in the strength of your feelings/emotions? 
 
 Do you think that Dissociative Seizures are related to emotions/stress in general? 
Prompts: 
- E.g. in other people 
 
 Is there anything else that you would like to tell me about your emotions and feelings?  Particularly 
in relation to your diagnosis and experience of DS. 
 
 
 
